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Organization and Representation of Informal Workers in São Tomé and Príncipe: State Agency and Sectoral Informal Alternatives

CRISTINA UDELSMANN RODRIGUES and MAGDALENA BIALOBORSKA

Abstract: In São Tomé and Príncipe, both the size of the informal economy and the scope of the mechanisms of organization and representation are little known. A research conducted recently showed that the almost always limited and irregular incomes generated in this sector are also associated with precarity and a lack of social protection mechanisms. While initiatives led by the state and supported by international funders positioned unions as privileged organizations for representing and supporting the workers in this sector, the limited results generated opportunities for the creation of sectoral bottom-up initiatives. The discussion is then focused on the areas addressed by the initiatives of specific sectors and types of activity – taxi and motorbike drivers and money exchangers – comparing the outcomes with those of the unions in terms of increased social protection and representation.

Introduction

The size of the informal economy of São Tomé and Príncipe, an insular microstate of the Gulf of Guinea with less than 200,000 mostly urban inhabitants, has never been accurately measured. However, most of the estimates and perceptions about the informal economy, as compared to the formal economy, point to its preponderance, in proportional terms, in the set of income-generating activities of the population. According to the National Institute of Statistics (INE), data collected in 2013 on the active population indicates that 62 percent were working age (resident population of fifteen or more years). The unemployment rate is estimated at 13.6 percent, reaching 19.7 percent of women and 9.3 percent of men. The occupancy rate, which includes both formal jobs and income generating activities and employment in the informal economy, is estimated at 54 percent of the population aged fifteen and over, and is much higher among men (67.7 percent) than among women (40.8 percent).

Formal jobs, calculated on the basis of data supplied by private companies and public administration regarding entries in the social security system, in 2010 numbered less than ten thousand (9,602).
Despite the importance of the informal economy, there are no studies or surveys which may serve as a source of the concrete number of workers belonging to the informal sector, both with respect to those living solely on income earned in the informal economy and those who complement and/or supplement their income through informal business and other activities. The common perception, namely obtained through qualitative field research, is that the chances of finding a job in the formal sector are very limited. On the other hand, those who have a (formal) job often receive such low wages that they need to supplement them with other (informal) income. One can therefore infer that the vast majority of the working population is dedicated to informal economic activities, creating their own forms of survival, their “employment posts,” through their own business or through entry into existing hiring businesses.

The size and scope of organization and representation in the informal economy, as well as the protection provided to workers outside the formal system, is correspondingly little known beyond the aforementioned social security figures. Beyond the almost always precarious and irregular incomes, a number of other problems have been associated with the informal economy, related mainly to the lack of rights, poor working conditions, and lack of inclusion in a social protection system. In São Tomé and Príncipe, as well as in similar contexts of developing countries, this lack of social protection and of income stability has led in some cases to initiatives aimed at changing the living conditions of workers in the informal sector through defense organizations. These materialized mainly in the form of informal workers’ organizations, both established by the initiative of the workers themselves or as a result of incentives on the part of other bodies such as trade unions (in turn, supported by the state), NGOs or even state institutions and/or partnerships with civil society. In São Tomé, both the bottom-up initiatives started by informal agents, or the top-down forms of organizing the workers, including most importantly the activities of the two central trade unions, resulted in the establishment of structured associations with the potential to support their respective members.

This article aims to analyze two types of processes dedicated to the organization and representation of the informal workers in São Tomé and Príncipe—trade unions and sectoral initiatives—and provide some concrete examples of associations of the informal workers. In this analysis, the motivations for the establishment of such organizations are articulated together with the description of the actions and activities carried out by them, in order to compare their respective support for workers. Aspects of the differences between these two main types of organizations are further explored through the identification, on one hand, of the main obstacles that undermine the effectiveness and efficiency of informal workers’ organizations and, on the other, of the capacities developed and support provided by these organizations that contribute to the improvement of the situation of the members and agents represented.

The results presented here are based on documental and empirical research conducted in 2013. Fieldwork in São Tomé included interviews with informal economy workers and relevant informants in the institutions related to this sector, for example, unions, non-governmental organizations, and government departments and services. The collection of information on the organizations of the informal economy focused on both the common workers and the presidents of associations of money exchangers, taxi drivers, and motorbike-taxi drivers. Over forty such interviews were conducted in the city of São Tomé, where the informal sector as well as the organizational initiatives and representatives are more vibrant. The informal workers were chosen randomly, resorting to a “snowball”
selection methodology, with the aim of collecting personal stories and experiences. The organizations identified and contacted provided broader points of view of the country and the informal economy sector and were therefore selected based on their relevance regarding workers’ issues. Data collection was complemented by querying other data locally, especially in the National Institute of Statistics (INE) that congregates most of the official data about the national economy. Our conclusions aim to provide a meaningful panorama of organization and representation in the informal economy in the country, as well as of elements for comparison with other African contexts. Despite the reduced size of the country, its population, and the absolute size of the informal economy workforce, by highlighting the dynamics of sectoral associational constructions and their social relevance, the research highlights the importance of such mechanisms to help workers in Africa in the face of precarity and a lack of social security.

Organization in the Informal Economy in Africa: Mixed Dynamics and Drivers

The Disorganization of the Informal Economy in Africa

The processes of organization among informal workers in Africa, as well as in other geographical latitudes where the informal sector has significant weight, arise as a consequence of the evolution and growing complexity of the informal economy. Initially regarded as a transitory phenomenon in developing countries, a result of processes of economic liberalization and structural adjustment associated with rapid urbanization, the informal economy has become, however, a constant. Involving more and more social actors, providing livelihoods to a significant part of the population and constituting a very significant part of the GDP of developing countries, it began to be debated both among local policy stakeholders and globally among academics.4 While countries like São Tomé and Príncipe are not usually part of the informal economy debate due to the small size of its population and economy and the importance of the sector regionally, research has shown the recurrences within the context of the global south and how they produce locally adapted responses.

At the international level, the role of the International Labor Organization (ILO), concerned with the multiple implications of the informal economy in the area of labor and social protection needs to be noted, particularly in what regards research. Since the concept of the informal economy was articulated in the early 1970s, it has come to dominate discussions not only on the economy, but also those related to socio-economic development.5 Several studies, analysis, and monitoring began to be produced regularly, providing insight about the informal economy and of the many actors involved, from informal actors to governments.6

Frequently, the informal is associated with little order, lack of control, extreme poverty, and low education levels among workers. However, there were significant changes in recent decades in Africa, either due to the extent this sector acquired in the overall economy and by the growing complexity of the activities involved. Currently, the informal economy absorbs different types of workers and agents, ranging from the self-employed to wage workers, individually or integrated in collective enterprises. Despite its importance in terms of the growing number of people that it absorbs, and to whom it ensures livelihoods, there are many adverse aspects for workers involved in informal activities. The most important of these is the lack of protection and access to the kind of benefits that most of the workers in the formal economy have. Moreover, the higher exposure to irregular income makes this
sector more prone to instability, which in turn calls for collective organizational solutions, sought after in the informal sector itself or elsewhere.

**Organizing Dynamics and Actors**

In the face of the scenario of precariousness associated with informality, extended to a very large number of people, one of the actions the ILO has identified since the dawn of the century is a strong incentive for the creation of organizations of informal workers, both with the help of the unions in the formal sector as well as by representatives of various informal sector occupations. This has happened in different ways. The ILO International Symposium on Trade Unions and the Informal Sector, held in Geneva in 1999, noted the importance of the creation of associations of workers, according to the needs of people involved in working in the informal economy, and it made several recommendations both for governments and for international organizations. At the International Labor Conference in 2002, dedicated to decent work and the informal economy, the ILO defined the facilitation of the processes of representation as one of the tasks for government and emphasized that legislation is the most important factor for providing social protection to all workers.

The need for organization and the creation of systems of representation was also felt, in some cases, by the workers themselves, especially in the areas where the confrontations with the local authorities are more frequent, for example in commerce, or in those where better organization allows for a better performance of the activities, as in the transportation sector. The actions developed collectively are perceived, in some cases, as having more probability of success, increasing not only the visibility and awareness of problems but also the power of persuasion of informal workers involved in them.

In general, two main types of organizational processes can be distinguished in the informal sector. On the one hand formal workers’ associations or trade unions are developing actions aiming at broadening their reach to informal sector representatives. On the other hand processes of organization are emerging from within the informal sector, with organizations of informal workers created by the workers themselves in response to their needs. A third type of organizational process, with tendencies to grow and which involve increasing numbers of social actors, is the development of international networks in the informal economy. The latter will not be addressed here as it would require further investigation, but it is worth highlighting the potential relevance of these networks in the insular Gulf context. The increased traffic and flows of people foster the development of international movements and networks in which São Tomé participates, with a potential for expanded economic opportunities.

Resulting from local dynamics, individuals and groups join collective organizations, on the regional and even international level. As members of networks, not only can their operations be more effective, but also their visibility and solidarity increases. A better awareness on the part of informal workers that some order and structure could produce positive effects not only in terms of their own activities but also in relation to social protection has led to the initiation of processes of self-organization in different contexts and cases. The main objectives that underlie the formation of organizations in Africa therefore relate schematically to, first, the need to enhance the capacity of members to act against adverse situations at different levels and, secondly, the need to be able to claim improvements of their situation and conditions, whether related to specific activities they perform or regarding the informal economy in general.
The types of informal worker associations vary according to the different African contexts. There are small organizations operating in a single location or part of a city and organizations at the national, regional, or even across international level networks, such as in case of the cross-border trade. Normally, each association brings together people linked by the same profession. In addition to the workers themselves, these associations may, in some cases, be linked to other sectors of public life such as governmental and non-governmental institutions.

Studies about the Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP), which have included the Santomean informal economy, have shown that the process of organization and representation is relatively recent and is composed of two main types of actions: the expansion of formal labor unions to include informal workers and the formation of organizations of proprietors or self-organization of the workers involved in this sector. The steady increase in the number of informal workers’ organizations, both those created by the workers themselves and those that are created as a result of encouragement from government institutions or unions, demonstrates their importance at various levels for agents, for governments, for the unions, and, in parallel, for the political parties, as informal workers constitute a significant political force.

Perceptions about the Benefits and Purpose of Organizing

From the point of view of the workers in the informal sector, there are several advantages associated with the creation of associations. Firstly, the “three Vs” (voice, visibility, and validity) articulated by WIEGO (Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing), specifically directed to the necessity of organizing women in the informal economy but also valid for other groups. Informal workers, when organized, have more influence in the political, economic and social decisions made by national governments and even international organizations. In negotiations on issues such as increasing salaries, reduction of taxes and fees, access to finance and credit, and access to social protection among other concerns, organizations achieve better results than individual people. In the African context there are many examples of such negotiations, and there are several identified methods that generate benefits for workers. In the specific case of social protection, for example, there are examples of negotiations over the inclusion of informal workers in the national systems of social protection and also the cases of creation of specific internal systems, adequate to the needs of each group. Examples range from achievements in developing countries regarding the social protection schemes for specific groups, like home-based workers or street vendors, to national social protection strategies integrating the workers employed in the informal economy.

From the point of view of governments, informal workers when organized are more easily controlled and some actions to gradually formalize the economy may even be imposed. Moreover, if there are representatives for the various negotiations between the state and the organizations and, at the same time, organized structures able to provide information for decision making, governments can better adjust their policies to the real situations. These advantages are more and more recognized in many cases, which favors the emergence and consolidation of this type of collective action. Finally, social structures such as workers’ unions that in recent years experienced a strong tendency to lose members in most African countries—which is undoubtedly also linked to the lack of formal employment—consider informal workers as a possibility for maintaining a workforce
capable of negotiating with governments and, therefore, able to enhance the effectiveness of their actions and claims. Activities of trade unions with workers in the informal sector constitute a major phenomenon in recent decades in Africa.\textsuperscript{16}

The perceptions related to organization in the São Tomé and Príncipe informal economy do not differ much from those described above. Despite its extension, organizations in this small insular state are seen as potential instruments for increased social and economic protection, while government normally prefers to negotiate with such organized structures. The processes of constitution and consolidation of these organizations are, however, dependent on a multiplicity of conditions.

\textbf{São Tomé And Príncipe: Large Informal Economy and Limited Organization}

\textit{Changing Economy and Increased Precariousness in the Transition from the Roças to a Market Economy}

The Santomean plantation economy of sugar (from the late fifteenth century to the end of the next century) and then of cocoa and coffee (from the nineteenth century) was heavily based on the use of the islands as a hub for the Atlantic slave trade. Large-scale coffee and cocoa plantations, called \textit{roças}, are closely linked to the formation of the country’s economy and society.\textsuperscript{17} Slave labor—a afterwards “contract” work in the twentieth century, likewise limited in terms of individual freedoms—dominated the labor scene for several decades.\textsuperscript{18} Economic and social dependence within the colonial plantation system impeded the formation of social networks and solidarities.

In the periods of economic stagnation, related to the decline of the sugar industry from the first half of the seventeenth century, the importance of \textit{forros}, the creole population that by that time constituted the majority of São Tomé’s urban society, had increased and gained some economic autonomy. In periods of recovery of the importance of the \textit{roças}, in the nineteenth century, the circumstances of the \textit{forros} again began to be circumscribed as they had not accepted working in the fields, and, devoid of land, they had very limited options.\textsuperscript{19} Those who have not managed to work in the administration were restricted to searching for basic survival, often made difficult by the Portuguese colonists.\textsuperscript{20} Although the \textit{forros} were not able to generate significant economic alternatives to the colonial dominance of the \textit{roças}, they can be considered to have originated alternative urban solutions to survival, mostly related to trade and services.

Independence, proclaimed on July 12, 1975, brought a politically recognized equality between different social groups whose social statuses were very dissimilar at that time. The cities, however, witnessed important growth due to rural exoduses of former contract workers, creating new urban social and economic configurations. The \textit{roças} were nationalized, and their designation was changed to \textit{empresas} (companies). They started to be run by directors appointed by the minister of agriculture, but these directors in most cases, did not have adequate preparation for performing managerial tasks, thus contributing to increased rural migration towards the cities.\textsuperscript{21} The precarious conditions in which the workers had to perform their duties led to a massive abandonment of the plantations and the beginning of the exodus to the capital city, with the hope of finding better opportunities. \textit{Empresas/roças} became inoperative and de-capitalized and subsequent attempts to diversify the economy by creating several public companies did not succeed. The excessive ambition of the investment plans and the mismanagement of companies led to “considerable financial loses, further worsening public finances.”\textsuperscript{22} The situation worsened in the mid-eighties when
the government, responding to the economic downturn, launched the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP). The results did not respond to the expectations and the majority of both agricultural and non-agricultural state enterprises were liquidated or privatized. As an advisor to the president noted, “these farms, since the last colonial years, had gone bankrupt.”

In recent decades, the country started relying heavily on international aid while at the same time an “alternative” to agriculture, the tourism sector, slowly started to develop. Expectations related to oil exploration since the 2000s have fueled hopes for increased autonomy from international financial aid. However, as with the emerging tourism sector, the oil related activities have not absorbed a significant portion of the working population. The country’s extreme external dependence, both in terms of imported products and financial aid that allows its operation, does not seem to be decreasing. This fact is regarded as one of the causes of political instability as political parties systematically voice mutual accusations regarding the state of the country and the economy.

The gradual reduction of State employment as a consequence of privatization or closing down of state enterprises from the 1980s has not been accompanied by sufficient development of the private sector that could absorb the available labor force. The Reform of State Enterprises in the 1990s (Law/14/92), economic liberalization, international crises, and political democratization of the country were some of the conditions that led to the emergence and gradual expansion of small-scale economic activities in various sectors. Created by the people involved without support from the state or the formal private sector, such activities, usually unregistered, are primarily intended to ensure the livelihoods of the families of the agents. Its main features are its small scale, the lack of organization, and the lack of legalization.

The “more dynamic” informal economy is, as expected, concentrated in towns and cities. The urban population of the country grew by more than 10 percent over the last ten years and is currently estimated at 67 percent of the total of population. Consequently, many jobs, especially in the private sector, are not formal, meaning that the employees work without a contract, do not pay social security contributions, do not have access to social protection or the right to paid holidays, among other working conditions. The report Household Budget Survey of the National Institute of Statistics indicates that the tax on corporate income affects only twenty companies including commercial banks, the main provider of telecommunications, hotels and import/export firms. The other agents (small retail business and activities related to transportation and financial services), representing almost 65 percent of GDP, come from the informal sector or benefit from tax exemptions.

Given this scenario, post-independence economic transformations constituted the main cause for the increased number of people who began to look for ways to survive via informal activities, leading to the gradual and steady growth of this sector. The levê-levê pace (the local notion of tranquility related to the natural abundance of the island and its quietness) and the lack of economic opportunities cause much of the working population, especially the youth, to remain in a situation of basic subsistence, limited to ensuring daily meals, without any prospects or plans for the future, as our interviewees often stated.

The poverty of the islands is also one of the causes usually pointed to as a factor behind the growth of the informal economy as a response to precariousness. More than 66 percent of the population is considered poor by international development standards and live on less than $1.70 per day. The poverty rate is higher among women, 41 percent of whom are heads of households. In the District of Caué, the poorest of the country, the poverty rate
exceed 84 percent. According to the Institute of National Statistics, also living conditions—access to water, electricity, etc.—are generally poor.

Because of the frequent combination between formal and informal activities, and the essence of the informal economy that is the fact of not being registered, it is not possible to provide definite estimates for the population engaged in informal activities, as mentioned earlier. However, given the extension of the informal economy and the discouraging social and economic indicators, the precariousness of this sector is easily inferred.

**Informal Networks, Social and Economic Solidarity and Protection**

Broadly and over several years and different historical periods, protection of workers has been precarious in the islands. Over a prolonged period, when colonial domination over the local manual labor was the basis of social relations, the proto-class of Creoles (*forros*) started to progressively engage in activities related to administration. During the period of economic stagnation in the 18th century caused by the decline of international competitiveness of sugar, they increased their social and economic importance. In the so-called “second colonization” of the 19th century the Portuguese returned to the island to start the coffee and cocoa plantations.\(^{32}\) The position of the Creoles again deteriorated as they largely lost position and status, and in many cases their land was expropriated in an attempt to force them to work in the fields.\(^{33}\) However, these families have not lost all their prestige over the years. They created a solidarity network where a limited number of families participate and despite the historical transformations have maintained some social ties that favor its members politically and economically.\(^{34}\)

With independence, social and economic equality came to be the proclaimed basis of the new society under construction.\(^{35}\) The pre-existing social differences and new differentiations that have been molded, however, created new social settings and new networks and solidarities, especially at the political level.\(^{36}\) The transition to democracy that began in 1989 brought no improvement to the country’s economic situation and political instability; clientelism and the related importance of family connections did not contribute to the realization of development plans that could provide long-term improvement for the inhabitants of the islands. The explanation, often given to the acronym STP (of São Tomé and Príncipe), as stating *Somos Todos Primos* (We Are All Cousins), and the title of Gerhard Seibert’s 2002 book *Comrades, Clients and Cousins* provide some clues for better understanding the nature of social relations in the present situation, both at the general as well as at the highest political levels, the latter usually considered formal.

Notably, family relations in the country, as a result of the historical processes that the displaced *roça* workers underwent, have acquired a very specific form within the African context. In general, family networks are considerably “recent”—including the mentioned Creole base—built since the arrival of the first members to the islands, who would normally have come alone as workers, over the period since the 17th century. Concomitantly, as referred to on several occasions in conversations and interviews, not all families can count on an extended family network ready to provide support to the members.\(^ {37}\) In some social spheres, family connections may provide for easy entrance into various institutions, involving both access to jobs or political positions, and help in resolving a range of issues.\(^ {38}\) But, such connections do not always function as a web of familiar solidarity in daily life, as found in other African contexts. This kind of regular everyday solidarity is often viewed as a crucial feature of African society, particularly in cases where people are not covered by national systems of social protection, which is the common situation in Africa.\(^ {39}\) In São Tomé,
the historic process of the construction of the society was based much more on systems that were geared towards a nuclear family organization within the framework of systems of work and residence on roças, than in the typically African model of an extended family. Already a decade ago, “the idea that there is a degradation of values in general and particularly in relation to broader family networks” was frequently articulated in São Tomé.40

While family networks are generally weak, social protection (Law 1/90 of 8 May), which covers formal economy workers in situations that inhibit the generation of income through their work (e.g., illness, disability, unemployment, child birth, etc.) was estimated to cover only about eleven thousand beneficiaries in 2004.41 In 2010, however, it was found that it only reaches 9,602 workers, 19 percent of the active population.42 Additionally, although legislation has been developed extending the scope of protection to the self-employed and those not covered by other schemes of compulsory social protection (Law 7/2004), the so-called Social Protection of Citizenship, provided by the state to the more vulnerable covered only 4,479 people in 2010.43

Therefore, if we take into account these figures, the social protection neither comes through the state to a significant proportion of the population nor is it anchored, alternatively, in informal family networks. These numbers are apparently the fundamental reasons that led to the creation of organizations among the members of certain professional groups. Through mutual aid systems, they aim at improving the situation of those who are in real need and/or who are in vulnerable situations. The results of a comparative study on social protection, informal economy, and exclusion in Portuguese speaking African countries, conducted between 2005 and 2006, mentions some processes, advanced or in the early stages, of organization in the São Tomé informal economy. In the area of trade, there was the intervention of various “associations and organizations representing the sellers, which can be an important tool for mediation and facilitation of a progressive institutionalization of norms, codes of conduct and labour procedures to alleviate the negative effects associated with the practice of commercial activities in informal circumstances and provide the basis for the extension of social protection schemes.”44 The existence of organizations, including the Union of Taxi Drivers, was also noted.45 This organization represented the majority of passenger transporters in São Tomé at that time. And the first steps towards organizing the agents of the foreign exchange parallel market were also being taken at that time, although apparently, these had not yet achieved positive results.46

Taking into account these evolutions and the results of the research and of fieldwork, it can be concluded that both the family and the state networks, and even the networks of support and solidarity associated with the informal economy themselves, failed to cover the spectrum of protection required in such contexts of vulnerability. The developments registered in terms of collective organization in the informal economy, already showing some positive results, need, however, to be mentioned.

Organizations of the Informal Economy São Tomé

Collective Organization in São Tomé City

Trade comes first among the São Tomé informal economy occupations in terms of involving the most people. With a short walk through the central area of the capital or other district centers, it is possible to estimate the extent of this activity. Vendors of all types of articles occupy the various markets, squares, and stalls on the edge of the streets. Besides all kinds of food or processed products, there are clothes, shoes, housewares, cosmetics,
cigarettes. Next to the vendors that have a permanent spot, there are street vendors, and what also draws attention is the number of people selling food and drinks to the sellers and buyers themselves, circling with huge thermo-bottles or plastic boxes on top of their heads, bringing these products to the market points. Furthermore, in the city center, it is possible to see the many informal alternatives to transportation, mainly concentrating around the Mercado Velho (Old Market). The transportation sector also involves a substantial number of agents, some partially formalized, using nine seat Hiaces or motorbike-taxis, supplementing the lack of public transportation companies, both state and private. This “alternative” system serves the capital but also connects the capital with the larger villages throughout the island.

While these can be considered the most active sectors of the Santomean informal urban economy, they are also sectors where collective organization, both led by the state and by the joint action of the agents, is more active, regardless of the reduced number of people this involves or the apparent fragile sustainability of the activities developed. The feeble dynamism of civil society in São Tomé is, in fact, the result of the historical specificities of the archipelago, mainly of the strong dependence of roça workers on their bosses and also of the restrictions imposed on the creation of associations after independence and within a proto-socialist regime. After independence and the nationalization of the plantations, the society had created the expectation that the state should solve all problems and guarantee better living conditions for all inhabitants. However, the first informal associations, initially created by farmers, began to emerge in the late 1980s with the goal of transforming the precarious situation they faced as a result of inappropriate policies adopted by the state. These associations, however, had a very limited life span as the plantation economy did not advance. Afterwards, the political opening in the early 1990s generated more opportunities for the creation of new political parties rather than associations. Simultaneously, non-governmental organizations began to appear, particularly through the external support of foreign NGOs. The first umbrella platform of national and international NGOs, the Federation of Non-Governmental Organizations in São Tomé and Príncipe (FONG-STP), was created in 2001. Its aim was to represent various such organizations and promote greater cooperation and coordination among them. The progressive orientation of the activities of local organizations to the programs of donor funding, which did not always correspond to associative objectives, was one of the most notable results over the years of experience with the projects and support programs in São Tomé, as indeed is the case in many other developing countries. “The dynamics of NGOs here are very debatable. They act more in terms of financial resources, while there is funding, but when there is not, they feel retracted.” The results, in general, are therefore considered weak and limited, without sustainability.

Labor Unions: Top-Down Establishment Promoted by the State

The initial stages of the formation of labor unions was in the late 1970s when under the aegis of a single party regime the first workers’ organizations, inspired on a socialist model, were created and have since then continuously been funded by the state. The first federation of unions, the Organização Nacional dos Trabalhadores de São Tomé e Príncipe – Central Sindical (National Union Organization of Workers of São Tomé and Principe, ONTSTP-CS) was created in the late 1980s. With the democratic and economic liberalization of the next decade, the labor movement gained another dimension with the establishment in 1993 the second federation of unions, the União Geral dos Trabalhadores de São Tomé e Príncipe (General Union of Workers of São Tomé and Principe, UGT-STP). “These unions have given the first steps in
this whole democracy of legalization . . . until the first days of 2000. Afterwards there was a kind of boom and today we are no longer represented by this type of organizations.”

Regardless of the political and economic transformations, state support of the Santomean unions and federations has not ceased regardless of the sectoral claims for better conditions of work or salaries that regularly mobilize workers and their organizations. They have not, however, been able to provide the support workers expect and need.

The processes of organization of informal workers in São Tomé and Príncipe started in the late 1990s, mostly steered by the already existing post-independence unions that, following directives received from the World Confederation of Labor (WCL), began to “help workers who were losing their jobs” as a result of privatization and liquidation of state enterprises. In 1998, the UGT-STP federation created the first organization in the informal sector, the association of palaîes (fish-sellers), predominantly consisting of women. Other efforts to organize informal workers occurred in the first decade of this century. Currently, and since the late 1990s, UGT-STP also includes workers of the informal sector, and it has on its list the Informal Traders Union, the Motorbike-Taxi Drivers Union, and the Union of Taxi Drivers. These extensions were largely fomented by the state and by renewed government policies, some of them through international funding. “We included informal workers in the late 1990s. In 1997-1998, we started with palaîes and then, a little later, came the taxi-drivers. And we have with us the motorbike-taxi drivers for five-six years.”

The older trade union federation, the ONTSTP-CS, brings together about ten unions. “On the level of health care system, public companies, the port, the airport; it seems that by the end of the year, the public workers will join our union.” Regarding the informal sector, ONTSTP-CS integrates the union of self-employed workers of the port and the dockworkers’ union (União dos Estivadores), an organization that despite the name is still based within the informal economy. The inclusion of informal worker associations in this federation is newer than in the case of UGT-STP and was initiated at the request of informal sector representatives in the late 1990s. “In the case of our central, they were the ones that asked us. The associations of informal workers can be a part of our central,” noted the ONTSTP-CS General Secretary. “We made this decision because we found that the informal sector is in a growing period and there is no alternative for these professionals.”

To increase the number of unionized workers, the unions prepare various studies and analyses, followed by proposals. In 2002/2003, UGT-STP conducted a survey on the main problems facing unions and their members, both globally and at the level of local unions. Based on this information, it established principal objectives to be achieved and actions to be taken. Among the fourteen goals defined as priorities, the organization of the informal sector and the promotion of social coverage are considered central. The federations pay special attention to raising the awareness about the benefits provided by the organization of informal workers, to training, to the dissemination of information regarding workers’ rights, and to the possibilities for inclusion in the national system of social protection. Both organizations are aware of the size of the informal sector and the amount of people it involves, as well as of the fact that in general the workers are in precarious employment situations. The top-down orientation is therefore towards the gradual formalization of workers to increasingly achieve better working and living conditions.

One of the most relevant examples of concrete action by unions in organizing informal activities is that of the clothing market sellers. The UGT-STP has an unquestionable part in the formation of this association, being conscious of the expected growth. The process is in its early phase but some of the objectives have already been established. The main problem
of vendors is the growing competition from the *fardos* ("bales") sellers who import bales of used clothing, usually from coastal West African countries; the decrease of demand in a context of the worsening economic situation of families; and the constant increase, both quantitatively and, in terms of quality, of used clothing available in the city. In addition to the merchants selling *fardos* in the vicinity of the market, there are many in other places in the islands who sell new and used clothes they bring from abroad or that are sent to them by relatives or friends. The decrease in the volume of business results in difficulty or even the impossibility of paying the fee that the city council requires monthly from all sellers of the market, which exceeds 200,000 Dobras (USD 12). The future association will be supported by the union and aims to face these problems with initial activities that include meetings and discussions to “verify the difficulties of each one and check how things are.”

Despite the slow pace of both the achievement by trade unions in establishing bridges between informal sector workers and the government and the actual provision of the means for increased protection, the preference of the government is still centered on these organizations. This is in great part due to the equal or worse capacity of sector-based associations and organizations to assure protection and representation as well.

**Bottom-Up Organizations of the Informal Economy: Money Exchangers, Taxi Drivers, and Motorbike-Taxi Drivers**

Following the creation of unions and the top-down inception of initiatives aimed at the informal economy, some processes in the “upward” direction have been developed, arising among the informal workers themselves, the majority of which are not supported by national or international funding. Overall, both the bottom-up and top-down initiatives have the same general objective of improving social protection of workers and representation. Specifically, sectoral initiatives supported by the workers and developed by them aim at amplifying the voices of a particular group engaged in a particular activity; solve specific problems of each professional group; create mutual aid systems of social protection; and provide access to credit to improve the activities in each sector. The results achieved are, however, different, underlining again the problems of organization and representation in the informal economy despite the various incentives and inspiration.

The resolution of various issues with the state institutions were facilitated when these types of groups began to form, as stated by both the informal workers interviewed and the government key-informants. Nevertheless, the role of trade unions and federations in these apparently more “autonomous” processes should be highlighted, as many of the associations created by the informal workers were influenced by the initial activities of trade unions and/or, at a certain stage, joined one of the federations or asked for their support. Among the associations analyzed here, only the money exchangers do not have and never had any link with the unions. The others maintain direct relations but the influence of unions is relative, given the bottom-up genesis of informal associations and the limited capacity of unions to support the associations in their activities.

**Money Exchangers**

The association of money exchangers was established in 2008 in the capital with the main objective of organizing all those who work in this area, both small and large-scale agents. The adherence was almost complete, estimated at 120 registrations, and today the organization has more members than the existing moneychangers working in the city of São Tomé. As underlined by its president, “those who are not registered are not allowed to
exchange money." This then almost forces everyone employed in the foreign exchange market to join the organization. This control, relatively easy to achieve, was not well accepted among the moneychangers from other nationalities who began to appear in São Tomé’s exchange market about two years ago. From that time, and also because of the worsening international economic situation, local moneychangers witnessed a significant decrease in the volume of their business. The introduction of a fixed exchange rate against the Euro in January 2010 was another cause of the limitation of moneychangers’ activity. They have tried many new ways to earn money, especially those related to making loans, but this requires greater trust of their customers. “These days, we are tightened by other groups of Lebanese and Nigerians, we hardly earn any money,” noted the president of the Association of Money Exchangers. “We have to invest in another activity, which is the case of mortgages. We receive post-dated checks, give the money to the person in advance and charge some percentage.” This competition, which the moneychangers consider unfair, is indicated as the biggest problem nowadays.

Currently, moneychangers have no support from the state or non-governmental organizations. Members pay, though irregularly, monthly fees to the association. Several attempts to gain such support have been unsuccessful: “We had a meeting with the government, with the Governor of the Central Bank; we have already managed a deal to get some space for our organization, to be able to have our headquarters, but so far nothing has been completed, we are waiting.” Given scarce resources, the activities of the association are limited. The aim of the majority of actions is to increase the association’s visibility through the organization of various activities such as cleaning the streets or the beaches, and also by providing aid to disaster victims. Support to the members in terms of social protection, solving specific problems of the group, or providing access to credit is not undertaken by the association as a whole but by smaller groups within it. Minor actions related to mutual aid are organized by these smaller groups that operate in specific informally pre-determined spots and have their own representative, who is in direct contact with the association and takes only the more serious concerns to the association whenever necessary. Such groups also provide mutual aid to members and within this limited circle, especially in cases of illness, death, accidents, or other situations where someone needs financial support and cannot get otherwise. In practice, the role of the smaller, informal groups is more important than the role of the association because the actions taken have real and regular impact on the functioning of the representatives of this profession. The recognized greater effectiveness of these arrangements allows keeping order and regulating operations, still within an informal articulated system.

**Taxi Drivers**

Generally there has been increasing informality in this sector since independence and informal transportation of this type is probably one of the most visible informal activities in São Tomé. On the one hand, there are an increasing number of taxi drivers and, on the other, a gradual increase in the number of motorbike taxis that began about six to seven years ago. Both types operate mostly within the informal economy, as they do not pay any type of taxes. The association of taxi-drivers, registered as Sindicato dos Taxistas e Proprietários de Viaturas Ligeiras e Pesados de Aluguer (SINTAPROVA, Union of Taxi Drivers, Rental Cars and Light Trucks Owners), was established in 2004 with the support of the federation UGT-STP. It is currently the institution “accountable to the government for taxi drivers.”

Two types
of associates are registered in this association—those who pursue their activities in legalized form, i.e. paying taxes, and those who work informally, not fulfilling their tax obligations. Despite both types paying a tax for using their vehicles, the majority of them do not pay any contribution to social welfare or activity taxes. The second interesting feature of this association is that both the drivers and the owners of taxis are grouped together. The latter, in most cases, also work as drivers. Drivers working for the owners usually do not have a written contract and the relation is based on an oral commitment that often does not benefit the worker. Typically, drivers receive a monthly salary ranging between 800,000 and one million dobras (a little less than 50 dollars), not having the right to holidays or paid social security contributions. Likewise, the employer is not responsible for support in case of illness or accidents.

The association was created to represent the transportation sector, to solve the common problems of workers in the sector, and to organize the areas where the taxis are concentrated. “A thousand or more taxi drivers [in the country] is a [big] class and we have these continued difficulties; so we wanted to have a representative who can respond for the group.” Initially the association had 150 members and this number has grown successively over the years as taxis increasingly provide the main form of transportation in the country.

Most of the organization’s objectives, as stated in its statutes, were not yet achieved. These included support of and intervening in defense of its members; organizing the technical, financial, and human resources to support the associated taxi drivers; promoting political, cultural, political, and unionist training of the members. The activities of the association are confined practically to the maintenance of order at taxi ranks. According to the president of the association, the support of the federation barely exists and they are still not able to collaborate with other institutions: “It is a struggle that we have constantly.” Members do not pay the established quotas regularly (or never) and so lack of financial resources is the main obstacle that hinders the performance of other activities, more related to communication, social protection or access to credits in order to improve the working and living conditions of the associates.

**Motoqueiros (Motorbike-Taxi Drivers)**

As already mentioned, motorbike-taxi drivers usually do not pay taxes as well. Similar to SINTAPROVA, the union of motorbike-taxi drivers is undergoing a relatively passive period of its existence due to the difficulty of collecting contributions from its members. It is the most recent union in the informal economy, which is related to the fact that this activity started only a few years ago. The first motorbike-taxi drivers, called *motoqueiros*, began to circulate in the city in 2006-2007, “spontaneously, especially because of the lack of employment.” The trend toward using motorbike taxis came from the West African countries such as Nigeria, Togo, Gabon, and Angola, where this practice already existed. Very quickly, this new form of transportation gained popularity, causing a rapid increase in the number of motor-bikers, as passengers recognized several advantages: the lowest fare, the speed and convenience of door-to-door service unlike the fixed routes of collective taxis, and the possibility and ease of finding a motorcyclist almost anywhere in town and surroundings.

Motorbike transport, initially restricted to the capital city, quickly spread to other locations, especially larger ones, and there are currently several stands of motorbike-taxis elsewhere in the island. The increased availability of these services evolved proportionally to the interest of young people for this new profession. Although there are no exact figures
because these professionals are not all registered, over the last six years the group that originally did not reach a dozen taxi drivers has now near estimated eight hundred agents on São Tomé alone, which is proportionally a significant part of the urban working population. There are a reported significant number of cases of workers who frequently use this occupation as an extra means for augmenting their official earnings, which makes it even more difficult to assess the actual figures.

The difficulties that representatives of this class felt from the beginning, particularly the animosity from the authorities and other taxi drivers, increased as the number of motor bikers began exceeding customer demand. The association of motorbike-taxi drivers, created in November 2009, was registered with the Department of Labor, Employment and Professional Training of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs in September 2011 as the Union of Motorbike-Taxi Drivers (SINMOTOSTP). It was created as a result of the acknowledgment of various problems between the bikers and the police, the state, and even with some citizens. The motorbike-taxi drivers felt marginalized, devalued, and disrespected. In order not to embark on further confrontations with the authorities and other discontented groups, which were already latent, they began to organize themselves, while also striving to improve their working conditions. They contacted one of the federations, UGT-STP, and also asked some political parties for financial support. Currently, the association includes approximately 140 members in São Tomé only, which represents about 18 percent of the total of professionals.

Various actions have been developed over the years, such as the distribution of reflective vests (that most of drivers never use), attempts to raise awareness about the importance of having a driving license, and advocacy for negotiating a reduction of the price of licenses, but the results have not been as hoped for. Not all associates are covered by the activities and the capacity to influence national policy is limited. There has also been an attempt to incorporate the bikers in the national social security system, which, however, was never implemented. Here too in this sector, the objectives of raising the voices of informal economy workers and strengthening representation have been tenuous and irregular. The organization of collective mutual aid systems of social protection has also fallen short regarding the existing number of agents and other anticipated advantages of the associative efforts, like facilitating access to credit, have not been consistently developed.

Conclusion

The insufficiency of employment, which is main cause for the constant growth of the informal sector in São Tomé and Príncipe, is accompanied by other factors that stimulate and perpetuate informal economic activities and their precarity. One of these is the difficulty workers face in legalizing their activities and creating opportunities that allow them to access the benefits that most of the formal workers have, e.g., inclusion in the national system of social protection or access to credit. In the context of significant socioeconomic changes and particularly the context of weak family networks and support, certain functions covered by associations, such as representation and capacity for negotiation, are considered increasingly important, both by the state and non-state counterparts and by the agents themselves.

In general, it can be said that the associations of informal workers in São Tomé and Príncipe, both those supported by the state (i.e., national trade unions) and those arising from sectoral initiatives, are insufficiently dynamic to attain the objectives they have in common and the objectives particular to their individual associations. In specific areas, such
as major concerns like facing and regulating sectoral competition, problems are apparently resolved with the creation and consolidation of such associations, which are based on existing social networks. For instance, the association of clothing vendors has been partially able to regulate the somewhat competitive and continuously growing market. Money exchangers through their association found ways of minimizing the effects of foreign competition. Among the taxi drivers, it was possible to organize internal competition by regulating the functioning of taxi stands and at the same time exerting pressure for the regulation of the main competitors who started appear, the motorcycle taxis. The latter in turn, have been able to create an association to regulate their participation and representation in the transportation sector.

In general, however, there is a gradual decrease in the activities of associations over the years, including the state-supported unions. The weak results of the actions often slow down the initial enthusiasm that accompanied the establishment of such organizations. The constant problems with the lack of funds to implement programs and the weak capacity to influence policy at a higher level are also hampering factors that require a degree of persistence hardly found among the informal agents. Despite the positive signs of change in the area of self-organization, with the growing tendency of sectoral bottom-up created organizations replacing the top-down traditional mechanisms, the crucial areas that such organizations propose to address are not yet effectively covered. Representation and amplification of the voices of informal workers, the creation of social protection mechanisms or the support of activities through facilitating access to credit are not yet established and will apparently require further efforts on the part of relevant stakeholders, which include the informal economy agents themselves.

Notes

1 According to the last Census (INE 2013), the country has a total population of 179,200 living in a total surface area that slightly exceeds one thousand square kilometers. The majority of population, nearly 96 percent, lives on the bigger island, São Tomé. The urban population is much larger than the rural, an estimated 119,781 persons. The urban district where the capital city called São Tomé is located has nearly 70,000 inhabitants.
2 INE, 2013.
6 ILO 2012.
8 ILO 1999a.
9 ILO 2005.
13 Feliciano et.al. 2008; Lopes 2011.
14 See the organization’s website: http://wiego.org/.
15 See ILO at http://www.social-protection.org/ or the above mentioned WIEGO website for examples worldwide.
17 See Nascimento, 2002; Seibert, 2002; or Hodges and Newitt, 1988.
18 Nascimento 2002.
20 Ibid., pp. 76-77.
21 Ibid., p. 168.
22 Ibid., pp. 173-74.
23 Ibid.
24 Interview, Advisor to the President for Economic Development and Financial Affairs, São Tomé, 14 August 2013.
27 Abreu 2013.
29 INE 2013.
30 INE 2010b, p.2.
31 INE 2010b.
33 Ibid., pp. 76-77.
34 Ibid., pp. 63, 75.
35 Ibid., p. 140.
36 Ibid., pp. 139-40.
39 Feliciano et. al. 2008.
42 Valverde 2010, p.34.
43 Valverde 2010, p.11.
44 Feliciano et al. 2008, pp. 107-08.
46 Ibid., pp. 120-21.
48 Ibid., p.12.
50 Hearn 2007; Brass 2012.
51 Interview, Executive Secretary of the FONG-STP, São Tomé, 9 August 2013.
52 Interview, General Secretary of the UGT- STP, São Tomé, 28 August 2013.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Interview, General Secretary of ONTSTP-CS, São Tomé, 28 August 2013.
57 Ibid.
58 UGT-STP 2003.
59 Interview, General Secretary ONTSTP-CS, São Tomé, 28 August 2013.
60 Interview, clothing market trader responsible for the process of organization of the vendors, São Tomé, 29 August 2013.
61 Some have temporarily left the country or for an undetermined period and others engaged in other forms of subsistence, without however leaving the association.
62 Interview, President of the Association of Money Changers, São Tomé, 27 August 2013.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Interview, President of the Union of Motorbike-Taxi Drivers of São Tomé and Príncipe, São Tomé, 15 August 2013.
67 Interview, President of SINTAPROVA, São Tomé, 22 August 2013.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Interview, President, Sindicato de Motoqueiros de São Tomé e Príncipe (SIMOTOSTP, Union of Mororbike-taxi Drivers in São Tome and Principe), São Tomé, 15 August 2013.
71 Ibid. See also Oteng-Ababio and Agyemang 2015.
72 Interview, President of SINMOTOSTP, São Tomé, 15 August 2013.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.

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Public Spending on Agriculture and Poverty in Eastern Cape Province, South Africa

SIMBARASHE NDHLEVE, AJURUCHUKWU OBI, and M.D.V. NAKIN

Abstract: Efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goal 1 (MDG1), which was to reduce by half the proportion of the population living below the poverty line by 2015, and the demands of democratization in South Africa have directed attention at the agricultural sector’s potential for reducing poverty. Expectedly, agriculture has attracted considerable interest and public investment. This article explores the linkages between public spending in agriculture, agricultural growth, and poverty in the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa. The identification of the critical linkages will contribute to improving decision making on the use of public funds in agriculture. Methodologically, the study simulates the required agricultural investment and required agricultural growth rate that is sufficient to meet MDG1 by 2025 by employing partial equilibrium modeling based on the System Dynamics Analyses approach. This entailed the application of growth decomposition technique and growth elasticity of poverty concepts with a specific emphasis on policy interventions for promoting agricultural growth. The drivers and cause-effect relationships between agriculture and poverty reduction were investigated. The employed models allowed for an exploration of plausible future growth in public spending in agriculture, agricultural growth elasticity of poverty, and the possibility of reducing poverty levels in the province while evaluating strategies for meeting the MDG1 by 2025. Estimates for the required agricultural growth rate and the increase in public spending on agriculture required in order to reach MDG1 by 2025 were calculated for each district municipality in the Eastern Cape Province. All the district municipalities were then evaluated in terms of their need to increase public investment in agriculture and the ability to achieve MDG1 by 2025 and beyond. Estimates for both the required public spending and the required agricultural growth were then calculated following both the business-as-usual scenario and the best-case scenario.

Simbarashe Ndhlleve, Ph.D, is a researcher at Walter Sisulu University’s Risk and Vulnerability Science Centre. His research interests include agricultural economics, econometric modeling, rural livelihoods analyses, climate change, food security, and poverty and inequality analyses. He has published several book chapters and journal articles on these research themes.

Ajuruchukwu Obi is Professor of Agricultural Economics, University of Fort Hare and has supervised many postgraduate students and post-doctoral fellows. He has numerous publications in agricultural economics. He is a member of the Rutgers University Consortium on smallholder transformation under USAID’s Feed-the-Future program and consults for the FARA on CAADP and Science Agenda for Africa’s Agricultural Development.

M.D.V. Nakin, Ph.D., is Acting Director, Risk and Vulnerability Science Centre, Walter Sisulu University. The centre conducts research on climate change focusing mainly on agriculture, food, and water security. With a background in marine ecology, he has supervised many students and has authored/co-authored many scientific papers.

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Introduction

Agriculture has since occupied the center stage in meeting the Millennium Development Goal 1 (MDG1) in many developing countries, which sought to reduce poverty worldwide by half by 2015.1 Studies from six such countries strongly concur that rural economic growth and widespread poverty reduction require increased production in agriculture.2 Multiple authors provide evidence that buttress this important linkage among agriculture, income growth, and poverty.3 The agricultural sector has both a direct and an indirect impact on economic development.4 In China, it was agricultural growth that enabled a significant reduction in poverty during the period 1978 to 1997.5 The importance of the agricultural sector goes well beyond its direct impact on rural incomes as it has both upstream or backward linkages on the supply side and downstream or forward linkages on the manufacturing side.6 The agricultural sector has a high degree of interrelatedness with the other sectors that emerges as a consequence of both the demand and supply effects of inputs and outputs.

South Africa has a dual agricultural economy, with both a well-developed commercial farming system and a more subsistence-based communal farming system.7 South Africa’s GDP data from agriculture averaged R57972.17 million from 1993 until 2016, reaching an all-time high of R77828.85 million in the fourth quarter of 2014 and a record low of R33530.55 million in the first quarter of 1993.8 The agricultural sector represented less than 10 percent of the economy in 1960, and currently this figure is below 2.5 percent. However, the fact that the sector represents less than 2.5 percent of the economy does not provide the true picture of the sector’s impact on the greater economy as this excludes the multiplier effects like buying inputs from the manufacturing sector, provision of raw materials for manufacturing and purchases a host of services.9 The multiplier effect implies that each additional unit demanded from the agricultural sector has a strong effect on other sectors. Agriculture is an important source of inputs for other production activities and other industries/sectors, and the output of other industries is used in the form of inputs, which confirms the fact that agriculture’s linkages with the rest of the economy are not only important but are usually underestimated. Calculations from national statistics show that primary agriculture has a backward linkage of 2.14 and a calculated forward linkage of the sector of 1.81. Despite the declining share in GDP, the South African agricultural sector continues to play an important role in the economy as it operates as a net exporter of agricultural commodities. South Africa maintained its status as a net exporter of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries products during 2013.10 Agriculture has a direct bearing on income growth, poverty reduction, and overall economic growth. Continued investment in the sector will have a significant impact on a large number of households and the greater economy due to its employment and food security effects.11 Growth in agriculture does not only benefit the rural communities; increased output in the rural areas has a direct bearing on the urban sector through its food price decreasing effect and creation of employment.

Economic growth in the former homelands of South Africa, where more than 70 percent of the population is regarded as poor and land is abundant, will definitely require significant improvements in agricultural production. Thus, there is need for studies analyzing the linkages between agriculture and agricultural growth and consequent reductions in poverty. With the objective of proposing a methodology for estimating the required investment to achieve any specified development target, this study presents an analysis of the linkages between public investment flows, agricultural growth, rural income

http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v17/v17i2a2.pdf
levels, and the level of poverty in Eastern Cape Province of South Africa. It examined the nature and dimensions of poverty in the province and how the two relate to public spending and the state of agriculture since the emergence of democratic South Africa in 1994. More specifically, this study aims:

a) To analyze and establish the influence of public investment in agricultural production in Eastern Cape;

b) To analyze the empirical relationship between agricultural growth and poverty in Eastern Cape Province;

c) To estimate the agricultural investment growth rate required to reach MDG 1 of reducing by half the level of 1990 poverty in Eastern Cape.

Measurement of the poverty level requires a standard definition to be applied over time to properly determine trends. The dependent variable in this study is the incidence of poverty. There are four approaches used in measuring poverty: the monetary approach, the capability approach, the social exclusion approach, and the participatory approach. The monetary approach is used to define poverty in this study. A poverty line is defined in terms of the monetary income sufficient for a person to attain a minimal standard of living. The World Bank estimate for the poverty line is $2 per person per day. In South Africa, the poverty line for households was set at R800 per month per household in the 1996 prices. The same argument is retained in this study.

This paper is based on the premise that agricultural spending across Eastern Cape’s district municipalities has the largest impact on agricultural production and poverty reduction. An assessment of expenditure need and fiscal capacity makes it possible to bring about equitable distribution of resources and have the highest impact on poverty. Since governments frequently face budget constraints, enquiries of this nature help them to quantify the required spending. The findings of the analysis will rationalize the employed methodology by providing lessons regarding the level and composition of public spending that can be useful for poverty reduction and economic development.

It is every government’s desire to have spending that produces the highest impact on GDP growth and poverty reduction. Populists advocate for increase in public spending, but simply increasing the level of spending is unsustainable as this will likely result in misallocation of government funds and inefficient spending.

**Agriculture and Poverty Reduction**

The slow rate of progress towards the reduction of poverty to levels stated by the MDGs in Africa is quite worrying. Thus, governments are facing substantial pressures to reduce poverty. One school of thought agrees without reservations that agricultural expenditure is the key driver of agricultural growth and poverty. The other school of thought agrees, but with reservations. An argument was presented in literature that not all countries that allow their public spending to grow significantly score better quantitative results. Public goods and services by the government will only impact positively on poverty if these goods reach the targeted poor populations. Misallocation of these services often results in inefficiencies.

Table 1 below shows a meta-analysis that summarizes the relationship between public agricultural expenditure and its influence on agricultural GDP for various regions and country studies.
Table 1: Elasticity of Agricultural GDP and GDP Growth with Respect to Agricultural Expenditure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study Countries</th>
<th>Value for Elasticity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forty three (43) developing countries: Elasticity of agricultural GDP growth with respect to (w.r.t) government agricultural spending</td>
<td>0.05^{18}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forty three (43) Developing countries: Elasticity of agricultural Output w.r.t government agricultural spending</td>
<td>0.04^{19}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa’s elasticity of real GDP w.r.t real public expenditure</td>
<td>0.016^{20}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98 Developing countries: Elasticity of agricultural GDP w.r.t ODA</td>
<td>0.03^{21}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 shows how agricultural GDP and national GDP response to changes in agricultural public expenditure components. The first two figures, 0.052 and 0.04 shows the elasticity of agricultural GDP with respect to government agricultural spending. A value of 0.05 implies that for each one rand spend on agricultural expenditure, 5 cents was returned. Changes in public agricultural expenditure positively impact agricultural GDP. The above figures for elasticity strengthen the development economists’ theoretical understanding of the causal mechanisms underlying public agricultural expenditure and agricultural growth.\(^{22}\)

Poverty decreases recorded in the modern history of England, India and China started with increased productivity amongst smallholder farmers.\(^{23}\) A meta–analysis with illustrations of the relationship between agricultural growth and the incidence of poverty is presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Elasticity of Poverty with Respect to Agricultural GDP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value for Elasticity(^{24})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 above shows agricultural growth’s conduciveness to poverty reduction for five African countries. Negative elasticity larger than 1 are considered conducive to economic growth, a 1 percent increase in agricultural GDP leads to more than a 1 percent decrease in poverty, all other things being constant.\(^{25}\) Thus a 1 percent increase in agricultural GDP in Ghana leads to 1.78 percent decrease in poverty, all other things being constant. Table 1 and Table 2 confirm a unidirectional relationship, where causality ran from government expenditures to agricultural GDP growth and agricultural GDP to poverty reduction. Increased agricultural production reduces poverty. It is increased agricultural production
that has allowed the poor countries to prosper. Almost none of the poor countries have achieved economic growth without first increasing agricultural production.\(^{26}\)

**Description of Eastern Cape Province**

For the sake of this study it is important to present a review of the Eastern Cape Province, which is highly rural and essentially agrarian in nature. The province is richly endowed with farmland. Communal land tenure is mainly practiced in all the former homelands (Ciskei and Transkei). Households share some common village resources and using communal land, a similar situation to all the other rural areas in South Africa inhabited by black South Africans. Land is under the control of local and district authorities (headmen and tribal authorities) or residents allocated by means of “Permission to Occupy” (PTOs) certificates, which are approved by the headmen and the magistrates. As land and other resources in the rural areas are scarce, the size and the distribution of land and other productive assets among households are not the same. The climate varies according to the distance from the ocean. Coastal areas enjoy mild temperate conditions ranging between 14 and 23°C, while the inland areas experience slightly more extreme conditions with temperatures of 5 to 35°C. Inland mountain areas experience winter snows and summer rainfalls. The Eastern Cape is the only one of South Africa’s nine provinces to have all seven of its biomes, or ecological zones and twenty-nine Acocks veld types within its boundaries.\(^{27}\) This gives it a tremendous diversity of climates, allowing for a vast range of activities. The Eastern Cape has always been a livestock farming area. It is the country’s premier livestock region and presents excellent opportunities for meat, leather, and wool processing. Table 3 shows the extent of poverty by district municipality for the Eastern Cape Province.

**Table 3: Share of Population Below the Poverty Line Across Eastern Cape District Municipalities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Cape</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>66.5</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson Mandela Bay</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cacadu DM</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>30.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amatole DM</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>75.2</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris Hani DM</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukhahlamba</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.R.Tambo DM</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred Nzo DM</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eastern Cape’s Socio-Economic Consultative Council (ECSECC) 2016.

Poverty is indeed widespread in the Eastern Cape Province as a whole. The district municipalities with the largest share of population living below poverty line in the province are Alfred Nzo and OR Tambo with 57.5 percent and 54.9 percent, respectively. It is worst in the former homelands where more than 50 percent of the population is classified as poor. When comparing poverty levels between 1996 and 2014, the recorded slight decreases in
poverty imply that the province’s ability to meet the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving poverty was in serious doubt.

In South Africa, a majority of the poor live in rural areas and derive income from both agricultural and non-agricultural activities, and strong linkages are always reported between agricultural growth and poverty reduction. Thus, in South Africa, agricultural growth can have the same poverty reducing effect as that recorded in the Asian countries. Moreover, the magnitude of poverty in the former homelands, the number of people involved in agriculture and the millions of lives in rural areas confirms that transformation of rural South Africa requires nothing short of a radical change in the agricultural sector. In Africa, every 1 percent increase in per capita agricultural output led to a 1.61 percent increase in the incomes of the poorest 20 percent of the population. The same results are achieved by asserting that the same increase can reduce the number of people living below the poverty line by 0.83 percent.

Research Approach

There are various macroeconomic models and methodologies that have applications in the sphere of public investment, growth, and poverty reduction. For example, using time series data, the World Bank simulated the macroeconomic impact of public investment on GDP. More gains can be achieved by using similar macro-economic models to analyze and address misallocation of resources across and within subsectors. The research approach involved developing detailed econometric model for the agricultural sector for the Eastern Cape, including the collection and processing of historical economic data, and construction of substantial, partial equilibrium agricultural sector model. This modeling approach enables examination of complex, dynamic economic interrelationships at the industrial sector level, which enable simulations of the required resources to meet MDG1 by each district municipality in the Eastern Cape. Several studies find an important association among public agricultural expenditure, agricultural growth and poverty reduction. Despite these revelations, this notion does not translate into budget allocations. In the light of this background, this paper presents a tentative methodology and the evidence that the agricultural sector contributes to and is a major determinant of economic growth and could reduce poverty.

Model Description

The adopted methodological approach supports the linkages among government spending on agriculture, agricultural and non-agricultural income growth, and poverty reduction. It summarizes the main components and develops the set of models that draws simple relationships among the variables. Following these channels, this study is therefore designed around the conceptual principles relating to the two sources of income—agricultural income and non-agricultural income. Part of the framework was adapted from a policy brief. The marginal impact of agricultural and non-agricultural income on poverty can be presented by calculations of the equation that captures the elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to both agricultural and non-agricultural growth (see Appendix B: Equations (1) and (2)).

In order to capture the essence of the Eastern Cape’s agricultural and non-agricultural sector on poverty reduction, a conceptual model linking poverty levels, agricultural income, non-agricultural incomes, and public expenditure was developed to capture their interdependencies. The mechanism at work is as follows: an increase in public agricultural investment causes an increase in agricultural output/GDP, which spills over to non-
agricultural output/GDP through a multiplier effect. These changes in agricultural and non-agricultural GDP increase incomes and reduce the poverty rate. A conceptual framework presented in Figure 1 captures the key elements of the framework.

**Figure 1: Conceptual Model for Linkages between Agricultural, Non-agricultural GDP, and Poverty**

![Conceptual Model Diagram]

**Note:** See Appendix A for variable explanation

Figure 1 presents the set of variables important when undertaking an analysis of the impact of agriculture and non-agricultural GDP on poverty reduction. This study is designed around the conceptual principles relating to the two sources of rural income growth or poverty reduction, namely agricultural income and non-agricultural income. Both agricultural and non-agricultural GDP reduces poverty. The arrows in the diagram above define the direction of the causal effect of a variable on another one. All the negative sign on the arrow implies a tendency in the linked variable move in the opposite direction with variable causing the effect and arrows without a sign implies a tendency in the linked variable to move in the same direction of the variable causing the effect. Part of the framework was adapted from similar research and some modifications were done so that the framework fits the current analysis. In addition to the direct impact on poverty, both agricultural and non-agricultural growth directly creates farm or non-farm rural employment opportunities, thereby directly augmenting rural wages and incomes and thus indirectly reducing rural poverty. The diagram tracks the whole chain of causality between Agricultural GDP ($G_{ag}$), Non-agricultural GDP ($G_{ng}$), the indirect effects, and poverty rate. Key parameter values emerge as important: poverty elasticity of agricultural growth, poverty elasticity of non-agricultural growth, the elasticity of agricultural growth to public agricultural expenditure increase, and the multiplier connecting non-agricultural growth to agricultural growth. This framework prompts the analysis as it lays the basis for Equations 1 and 2 (Appendix B developed to estimate the relationships among the variables in this study). Any positive effect on the immediate macroeconomic determinants, namely $G_{ag}$,
Gng, and the indirect effects are likely to cause a decrease in poverty. Agriculture has economy-wide growth linkages. The importance of agriculture for overall growth on poverty is not only due to its large share of the rural economy but also because of its linkages to other sectors. For example, increasing maize production stimulates growth in the food-processing sector while also reducing food prices and increasing real incomes, which are then spent on non-agricultural commodities.

**Costing Millennium Development Goal 1**

Statistical simulations were employed to assess progress made towards achieving the MDG1 target using the time series indicators. Simulations were used on indicators to track changes in the performance of agriculture with respect to agricultural productivity and its role as a poverty and inequality reducing agent in the Eastern Cape Province. Exponential smoothing following the Hodrick-Prescott Filter was used to project whether the 2015 and 2025 estimate for the incidence of poverty as projected from past trends was enough to achieve the first MDG1 of cutting the poverty rate of 1995 by half by 2015. The Hodrick-Prescott Filter was used as an empirical technique to obtain smooth estimate of trend component of a series when you have only a few observations on which to base your forecast. This method is widely used among macroeconomists to obtain a smooth estimate of the long-term trend component of a series. Using the available data, an attempt is made to extrapolate figures for the coming years. These figures are then used to assess whether the set targets for MDG1 are achievable or not. Figures for the base year (1995) and current status are compared to the estimates for 2015 and 2025 assuming a Business as Usual Scenario.

Each MDG requires an assessment of the range of interventions available and appropriate to meet the target and should provide a transparent framework for budgeting to meet the MDGs. It is therefore important to establish what increase in agricultural public investment would be needed to reduce the poverty rate sufficiently to meet MDG1. The adopted methodology and the series of derived equations in Appendix A seek to estimate what increase in agricultural public investment would be needed to reduce the poverty rate sufficiently to meet MDG1. Thus, the above string of causation is converted to rates of change, so the ultimate question becomes what changes in the agricultural expenditure growth rate will induce changes in the growth rate of output to meet MDG1. Three rates of change equations emerge from the string of causation namely: agricultural growth to GDP growth; GDP growth rates to change in poverty rates; and public agricultural expenditure to agricultural growth rate. They are quantified by Equations (3), (4) and (5) presented in Appendix B.

The simulations are done in reverse order for each district in the Eastern Cape Province. The rates of growth of agricultural output needed to reduce poverty rates to MDG1 levels by 2025 are calculated. Then, the rates of increase in agricultural public investment needed to achieve the required rates of growth in agricultural output are calculated. These simulated values are compared with business-as-usual rates that examine the consequences of continuing current trends in the economy.

**Results and Discussion**

The results presented in this paper summarize the trends in the incidence of poverty across all the seven district municipalities of the Eastern Cape Province and draw further attention to the distribution of the benefits of agricultural growth by tracing the response of agricultural GDP to public spending on agriculture, and how growth in agriculture
translates into poverty reduction over the years. Part of the results assesses the progress made by all the seven district municipalities towards the MDG1 and further estimates the required growth in public spending necessary to reach MDG1.

**Progress towards MDG1**

The results from Exponential Smoothing are shown in Appendix C. Appendix C, which present results of the Eastern Cape Province’s progress towards MDG1, checking on whether this goal is achievable or not. Based on their past performance, results in Appendix C show the outcome of the results of the Exponential Smoothing for each district municipality.

Comparing figures for the base year (1995) and poverty level estimates for 2015 and 2025 assuming a Business as Usual Scenario, all the district municipalities of the Eastern Cape Province are either off-track and slow or off-track and retrogressing as far as progress towards the MDG1 is concerned. Except for Nelson Mandela Metropolitan, all the district municipalities have been making progress, albeit slowly. The results of the estimates show that all seven districts would not reach the MDG1 target before 2015 and may not even by 2025. The situation is even worse in the case of Nelson Mandela Metropolitan. In that district, poverty is even increasing, implying retrogression and moving further away from the set target. The observed slow progress suggests that the global goal of halving poverty by 2015 was unattainable in the province.

**Required Agricultural Growth Rate to Meet MDG1**

The question addressed by this section is what is the estimated agricultural growth rate required to meet MDG1 in the Eastern Cape Province? Growth-poverty elasticity values are used to determine the extent to which poverty declines as agricultural production grows. Data for missing variables was supplemented for by estimates from previous studies and explanations are provided for the choice of selected estimates. Table 3 provides the list of variables used and the estimated statistics for each variable.
Table 3: Variables Used in Costing Millennium Development Goal 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District municipality</th>
<th>Required change in poverty for each year (%)</th>
<th>$\varepsilon_{ag}$ = elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to (w.r.t.) agricultural GDP growth</th>
<th>$s_{ag}$ = share of agriculture in GDP</th>
<th>$s_{ng}$ = share of non-agriculture in GDP</th>
<th>$\varepsilon_{ng}$ = elasticity of poverty reduction w.r.t. non-agricultural GDP growth</th>
<th>$s_{ng}$ = share of non-agriculture in GDP</th>
<th>$g_{ng}$ = non-agricultural GDP growth rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amatole</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred Nzo</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cacadu</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris Hani</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson Mandela</td>
<td>14.60</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O R Tambo</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKhahlamba</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from ECSECC (2016) database and following the methodology.
Estimates of growth elasticity of poverty for all the seven district municipalities of the Eastern Cape Province are given in Table 3. It provides estimates of the elasticity between both agricultural GDP per capita and non-agricultural GDP per capita and the incidence of poverty in Eastern Cape for the period between 1995 and 2010. Using the Amatole district municipality as an example, the results suggest that for every one percent growth in agricultural production, as indicated by agricultural GDP change, the incidence of poverty falls by 0.28 percent. The estimated results on agricultural production show that the elasticity of the incidence of poverty with respect to agricultural GDP ranges from 0.12 to 0.41 and that for non-agricultural production ranges from 0.012 to 0.38. Non-agricultural production scored the lower of the two ranges given with an elasticity of 0.012. This figure is lower than 0.12 for agricultural production. The estimated coefficients of non-agricultural GDP per capita are significantly lower than that for agricultural GDP per capita for most district municipalities. It is, however, important to note that this does not necessarily imply that growth in agricultural GDP per capita was more important than growth in non-agricultural GDP per capita since the answer to that question also depends on actual rates of growth in the two variables over the study period.

Table 6.9 shows the breakdown thus obtained, revealing that for six out of seven district municipalities growth in agricultural GDP per capita was more important in reducing poverty, with only one district municipality shown to have reduced poverty mainly because of growth in non-agricultural GDP per capita. Notice that in some district municipalities such as Amatole, Cacadu, and UKhahlamba growth in non-agricultural GDP contributed very little to poverty reduction. The contribution for agricultural GDP growth was marginally high for all the district municipalities except for Amatole and Nelson Mandela Metropolitan.

Besides promoting agriculture, the overall reduction of poverty and the feasibility of the MDG1 and all the other goals in the Eastern Cape can be improved by undertaking a growth path that promotes both the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Therefore, in district municipalities where poverty reduction and the achievement of MDG1 prove unattainable through increased promotion of agriculture, non-agricultural activities could be promoted as they are assumed to contribute significantly to household incomes.35

Similar variables were used to estimate the amount of resources required to meet MDG1.36 By adopting the same procedures, the methods employed here estimate the Required Annual Agriculture Growth Rates to Achieve MDG1 and the Required Agricultural Expenditure Growth Rates to Achieve MDG1 across all district municipalities of the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa. Estimates for the above variables were calculated from the Eastern Cape Province’s data, Figures for both agricultural and non-agricultural elasticity of poverty were calculated using Equation (4) in Appendix A.

The value of the multiplier is very important as the results of studies of costing poverty reduction are sensitive to the choice of the multiplier and therefore proposed the use of values derived from systematic research. But municipal data on public expenditure on agriculture is scarce. In order to accommodate this, a careful review of the literature was undertaken to determine the most appropriate values for elasticity of agricultural growth with respect to public agricultural expenditure to be adapted for this study. In this study, the calculated values, the multiplier and expenditure elasticity, were considered flawed due to lack of appropriate data. The use of values from previous studies will make the results
comparable to previous outcomes. Further, the use of values from previous studies is relatively common in the literature on costing poverty reduction. Table 4 shows the values for agricultural elasticity of public agricultural expenditure and the multiplier effect as founded in the literature, the respective authors, and the reason for adoption of those variables. The multiplier effect is assumed to be 1.5, which suggests that for each rand of gain in agricultural GDP, non-agricultural GDP rises by a factor of 1.5 in the same region. The multiplier effect has its greatest impact when idle resources exist. The figure for the multiplier is high, and this is based on the reasoned expectation that the Eastern Cape’s agricultural economy is operating below national GDP as there are idle resources like land, labor and agricultural equipment. Therefore, for each spending round, idle resources are always available to be brought into production. The value for the multiplier was, however, supplemented with sensitivity analyses.

Table 4: Adapted Values for the Multiplier and Expenditure Elasticity of Growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Elasticity Value</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiplier effect</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Recent and comparable to other values from Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure Elasticity of Growth</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>Founded using data from Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Following Equation 1 and the subsequent equation for poverty reduction due to non-agricultural growth, it is possible to calculate the value of the required agricultural growth rate. To estimate the agricultural growth rate required to meet the MDG1 in the Eastern Cape Province, we assume that growth rates will follow the business-as-usual trend. This scenario assumes that the economy follows similar growth as that observed during the period 1995 to 2010. The estimated figures for both the required annual agricultural growth rates to achieve MDG1 and the required agricultural expenditure growth rates needed to attain this growth rate are then calculated.

Table 5 shows the percent increase in public investment requirements based on growth-poverty elasticity methodology. All the district municipalities of the Eastern Cape Province will need to boost their annual agricultural growth to figures shown in Table 5, respectively, in order to achieve MDG1. The calculated values are higher than the observed municipal averages shown in column 2 of the same table. There is a huge gap between the required agricultural growth rate and the observed averages for the period 1995 to 2010. To reach this target, government agricultural spending will have to increase by the indicated percentage points for each respective multiplier value from (See Table 5) from an average of three percent per annum observed from 2000 to 2010. However, there is a large variation in required investment increases across the province’s district municipalities.
Table 5: Annual Agricultural Growth Rate and Expenditure Required to Reach MDG1 by 2025

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District municipality</th>
<th>Assumed Annual Non-Agricultural Growth Rates, 2004 – 2025 (percent)</th>
<th>Annual Agricultural growth rate since 1995 (percent)</th>
<th>Required Annual Agriculture Growth Rates to Achieve MDG1(%)</th>
<th>Required Agricultural Expenditure Growth Rates to Achieve MDG1(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Low Multiplier (0.5)</td>
<td>Medium Multiplier value (1.0)</td>
<td>High Multiplier (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amatole</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>14.27</td>
<td>13.11</td>
<td>12.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred Nzo</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>3.46</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cacadu</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chris Hani</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson Mandela Metropolitan</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>6.94</td>
<td>59.53</td>
<td>33.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O R Tambo</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>14.20</td>
<td>11.58</td>
<td>9.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKhahla mba</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the ECSECC 2016 database and following the methodology.
Presenting the exact current level of public spending and the required increases is more informative but because of data scarcity, results on the required increase in public finance for agriculture per municipality were presented in percentages only. Estimates indicate that in order to achieve MDG1, all the municipalities need to increase public spending on agriculture. Cacadu and Ukhahlamba have the least expected increase of 3 percent per annum. Nelson Mandela Metropolitan, OR Tambo, and Amatole have the highest required percentage increase in agricultural expenditure, in that order. Attainment of the required poverty levels in Nelson Mandela Metropolitan, OR Tambo, and Amatole can, however, be achieved by pursuing a pattern of spending that disproportionally favor spending in non-agricultural sector over agricultural sector. Almost all district municipalities need to increase their financial outlays in order to reach the MDG1 target. The inability of the Eastern Cape Province to reduce poverty substantially can largely be blamed on prescriptive spending that does not pay attention to the quality, analyses of trends, and impact of public spending on poverty.

Important findings emerge from the estimates found using the growth elasticity of poverty (GEP) estimates for Eastern Cape Province’s district municipalities. Increased growth rate in agricultural production is paramount to reducing poverty in the province, and increased investment in agriculture is key to the achievement of this required growth. Computation of GEP has demonstrated that all the district municipalities of Eastern Cape need to boost their annual agricultural growth to 3.2 percent on average in order to achieve MDG1. To reach this target, government agricultural spending has to increase to an average of 10 percent per annum. However, there is a large variation in required investment increments across the Eastern Cape Province’s district municipalities. These gaps between the 2010 level and the target poverty level can still be reduced by increasing public spending in line with the required increases and in all the cases this implies stepping up investment by a few percentage points (Table 5). Increases in agricultural spending should be guided by the calculated gaps in order to achieve MDG1.

Both the foregoing findings and reviewed literature advocate for increased public investment in agriculture and increased agricultural productivity for poverty to be reduced significantly. With regard to poverty reduction through increased public expenditure in agriculture, previous studies strongly recommended pro-poor growth path. The feasibility of attaining the MDG1 and all the other goals can be improved by a growth path that takes into account the nature of Eastern Cape’s economy: abundant land, labor, and an agriculture based economy. Agriculture is a relatively labor intensive, low wage, and low skilled activity compared with manufacturing or services. It follows that increasing public investment in agriculture might increase output and hence employment of low-skilled, low-wage workers. And the beneficiaries are likely to be the populations below the poverty datum line—hence the result that poverty is more effectively relieved by expanding agricultural output relative to spending the funds in another sector of the economy which might have fewer (or no) workers living in poverty. Therefore, an effort should be made to promote policy intervention and increased public spending that contribute to pro-poor growth. Agricultural activities could be promoted in areas where poverty reduction and the achievement of MDG1 prove to be unattainable through increased public expenditure in agriculture. Similarly, non-agricultural activities could be promoted in Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality since growth in the non-agricultural sector has a higher poverty reducing impact than growth in the agricultural sector in this municipality. Practising
agricultural and non-agricultural activities as sources of income have been considered essential in reducing poverty in the Eastern Cape Province.

The above findings propose that government needs to commit to a new, more radical course of action that clearly puts the agricultural sector at the forefront rather than maintaining the status quo in all the studied municipalities except for Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality. Agricultural transformation requires fiscal policy adjustment on various aspects of public agricultural investment, including size of public spending, type of public spending, efficiency of public spending, and even investments in non-agricultural sector.

Our results illustrate the considerable utility of the partial equilibrium framework as a tool for estimating the required resources to meet specified poverty levels but with limitations. The model assumes some parameters from literature and adopts partial equilibrium analyses and ignores the general equilibrium effects that might however have a much clearer outcome. While agricultural development is prioritized in the province, analyses of other sectors allows us to explicitly recognize the beneficial impact of a dynamic poverty reduction system in the province without ignoring other important sectors. However, a quantitative assessment of this aspect is beyond the scope of this paper.

**Conclusion**

The broad objective of the study was to evaluate the methodology that links public spending in agriculture and agricultural growth and agricultural growth and poverty reduction. Statistical methodologies can be used as powerful tools for decision making if coupled with the availability of appropriate data. Accurate and realistic policy frameworks for agriculture provide coherent plans government departments can use to evaluate progress towards MDG1. Estimates from the adapted model are close to reality and they rely on the reasonable expectation that intervention to meet MDG1 by provincial and national governments in poor economies is possible, as demonstrated by the string of causation in the Eastern Cape. This might be achieved through prioritization of spending. Investments in agricultural research and extension, rural infrastructure, and rural education have the greatest impact on agricultural growth and poverty reduction. The progress is slow in the Eastern Cape Province, with the targets seemingly unachievable during the set timeframe. Although showing some significant strides towards the set target, the province is seemingly faltering in reducing poverty. Furthermore, the Eastern Cape Province would require increased investment in agriculture accompanied by robust and pro-poor growth well above historical rates.

While in theory a strong case for using complex methodologies for estimating the required public expenditure can be made, in practice the proposed methodology highlights significant difficulties in terms of availability of data and failure to exhaustively capture other growth spillover effects. This, however, does not imply that the proposed methodology should be completely abandoned. While trying to simplify the methodology, future research should involve developing a computable general equilibrium model that can consider the spillover effects of other sectors. Similarly, adopted parameters should be replaced by realistic and primary data acquired in the study area and will be supported by sensitivity analyses based on actual macro-economic indicators as employed by the statutory authorities such as Statistics South Africa and the Reserve Bank of South Africa.
Appendix A: Variable Description and Sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Data Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP constant 2005 prices</td>
<td>GDP is calculated using the output approach, the total value of goods and services, measured in constant prices, produced in a region with labour employed in that region.</td>
<td>National GDP data are compiled by the ECSECC and National and Various Provincial Departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Agricultural GDP Constant 2005 prices</td>
<td>Total value of agricultural goods and services, measured in constant prices, produced in a region with labour employed in that region.</td>
<td>Statistical Abstracts, ECSECC database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non Agricultural GDP constant 2005 prices</td>
<td>The total market value of all non-agricultural goods and services, measured in constant prices, produced within the political boundaries of an economy during the year.</td>
<td>ECSECC database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidence of poverty</td>
<td>The proportion of the population that lies beneath the official poverty line.</td>
<td>ECSECC database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public agricultural Expenditure</td>
<td>Spending by the government to pursue agricultural and rural development activities with the expectation of greater future benefits or rewards.</td>
<td>National treasury, National and Provincial Departments of agriculture and miscellaneous government publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth rate</td>
<td>The percentage change in GDP from one year to the next. How much GDP grows over time.</td>
<td>STATS SA, Reserve Bank Data, World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of agriculture in GDP</td>
<td>Share of agricultural GDP in total GDP</td>
<td>Authors’ calculations based on data from ECSECC and various other sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of non-agricultural GDP in total GDP</td>
<td>Share of non-agricultural GDP in total GDP</td>
<td>Authors’ calculations based on data from ECSECC and various other sources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B: Multi-step GDP Costing Equations

The marginal impact of agricultural and non-agricultural incomes on poverty is assessed using the following equation:

\[
\frac{dP}{P} = (\varepsilon_{ag} \frac{dY_{ag}}{Y_{ag}} s_{ag} + \varepsilon_{ng} \frac{dY_{ng}}{Y_{ng}} s_{ng}) + \left\{ \frac{dP}{P} \frac{Y_{ag}}{Y_{ng}} \frac{dY_{ag}}{dY_{ng}} \frac{Y_{ag}}{Y_{ng}} s_{ag} \right\} \quad - - - - - - - - - - - - - (1)
\]

Equation 1 captures the elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to both agricultural and non-agricultural growth. Where for each of the district municipality and the Eastern Cape Province,

\begin{align*}
    P & = \text{the incidence of poverty} \\
    Y_{ag} & = \text{agricultural GDP} \\
    Y_{ng} & = \text{non-agricultural GDP} \\
    s_{ag} & = \text{share of agriculture in GDP} \\
    s_{ng} & = \text{share of non-agriculture in GDP}. \\
\end{align*}

\begin{align*}
    P & = \text{change in poverty for each year} \\
    \varepsilon_{ag} & = \text{elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to (w.r.t.) agricultural GDP growth} \\
    \varepsilon_{ng} & = \text{elasticity of poverty reduction w.r.t. non-agricultural GDP growth} \\
    g_{ag} & = \text{agricultural GDP growth rate} \\
    g_{ng} & = \text{non-agricultural GDP growth rate} \\
    \phi_{ng,ag} & = \text{multiplier effect or linkage between agricultural GDP growth and non-agricultural GDP growth}. \\
\end{align*}

Thus, Equation (1) can be rewritten as:

\[
P = \{\varepsilon_{ag} g_{ag} \} S_{ag} + \{\varepsilon_{ng} g_{ng} \} S_{ng} + \left\{ \varepsilon_{ag} \phi_{ng,ag} \right\} s_{ag} \quad - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (2)
\]

Strong growth linkages and multiplier effects of agricultural growth to the non-agricultural sectors have been identified by many researchers. These linkages and their effects on poverty levels are captured in Equation (2) above. The first and second coefficients capture the effect on poverty generated by both agricultural and non-agricultural growth respectively. The third coefficient captures the elasticity of poverty generated by multiplier effect due to growth in the agricultural sector. Partitioning the expected reduction in poverty among each of the terms in Equation (2) and solving for the required agricultural growth rate yields the following equation:

\[
g_{ag} = \left\{ P - \frac{\cdot \cdot \cdot}{P_{ng}} \right\} \{\varepsilon_{ag} S_{ag} + \left\{ \varepsilon_{ag} \phi_{ng,ag} \right\} s_{ag} \} \quad - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (3)
\]

Where:

\begin{align*}
    P_{ng} & = \text{the rate of poverty reduction emanating from a given non-agricultural growth rate,} \\
    \text{which is calculated from the second term in Equation (3), i.e.} \\
    P_{ag} & = \varepsilon_{ag} g_{ng} S_{ng} \quad - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - (4)
\end{align*}
Equation (3) represents the agricultural growth rate that is required to reduce poverty annually from its direct effect. The level of public expenditure needed for agriculture to grow is calculated in Equation (5) and once the required agricultural growth rates are known, the corresponding annual changes in expenditure needed to achieve these growth rates can be calculated as:

\[ \frac{\dot{E}_{ag}}{\delta_{ag}} = \frac{g_{ag}}{\delta_{ag}} \]  

Where:

\[ \dot{E}_{ag} = \text{the annual growth rate in agricultural expenditures, or} \]

\[ \delta_{ag} = \text{elasticity of agricultural growth w.r.t. agricultural expenditure growth which is} \]

\[ \frac{dY_{ag}}{dE_{ag}} \cdot E_{ag} \]

The annual agricultural expenditure required between 2011 and 2025 can be easily calculated from the baseline data on actual agricultural expenditure in 2010 from Equation (5).
Appendix C: Simulated Trend for the Incidence of Poverty until 2025

![Graphs showing simulated trends for poverty incidence in different districts until 2025.](image-url)
Appendix D: Variables Used in Costing MDG1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( P )</th>
<th>( P_{ng} )</th>
<th>( P - P_{ng} )</th>
<th>( \varepsilon_{ag} * S_{ag} )</th>
<th>( (\varepsilon_{ag} * \phi_{ng,ag}) * S_{ag} )</th>
<th>( {\varepsilon_{ag} * S_{ag} + (\varepsilon_{ag} * \phi_{ng,ag}) * S_{ag}} )</th>
<th>( g_{ag} )</th>
<th>( \varepsilon_{ag} )</th>
<th>( \varepsilon_{ng} )</th>
<th>Adopted multiplier</th>
<th>( S_{ag} )</th>
<th>( g_{ng} )</th>
<th>( S_{ng} )</th>
<th>( E_{ag} )</th>
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<td>1.23</td>
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<td>3.19</td>
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<td>93.00</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>5.63</td>
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<td>1.85</td>
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<td>15.00</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>97.00</td>
<td>6.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from ECSECC (2016) database and following the methodology presented.
Notes

1 For details on the Millennium Development Goal 1, see http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml
4 Van Zyl 2009.
5 Fan et al. 2002.
7 Government Communications 2013.
8 Stats SA 2016.
9 Greyling 2012.
10 South Africa Government Communications 2012.
11 Greyling 2015.
13 Fan et al. 2002.
15 Tanzi 2008.
19 Ibid.
20 Ashipala and Haimbodi 2003.
24 Diao et al. 2007.
25 FFC 2011.
28 Machete 2004 and Ndhleve and Obi 2011.
30 Thirtle et al. 2001.
32 Fan et al. 2008
35 Non-agricultural activities have been considered essential in some parts of the province; see Ndhleve and Obi 2010.
36 Fan and Rosegrant 2008 and Fan et al. 2003 successfully estimated the amount of resources required to meet MDG1 in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and the Pacific.
37 Fan et al. 2008.
38 Fan, Zhang, and Rao 2004 argue that investments in agricultural research and extension, rural infrastructure and rural education have the greatest impact on agricultural growth and poverty reduction. 


References


The “Terrible Loneliness”: Loneliness and Worry in Settler Women’s Memoirs from East and South-Central Africa, 1890-1939.

JULIA WELLS

Abstract: Descriptions of loneliness and worry fill settler women’s memoirs from British Africa. Despite this prevalence, scholars rarely discuss such emotions at length. This paper explores the themes of loneliness and worry in the memoirs of female settlers from British East and South-Central Africa, 1890-1939. The majority are drawn from Kenya and Rhodesia, and include authors such as Karen Blixen, Elspeth Huxley, Hylda Richards, Jessie Currie, Ruth Fisher, and Mathilde Goy. Unpacking through a close textual analysis what women meant by loneliness and worry, and how they explained those feelings, this paper positions loneliness and worry as crucial aspects of settler women’s colonial memoirs and a defining feature of their experiences of British Africa.

Jessie Monteath Currie’s arrival in Africa was not auspicious. Leaving England in 1892, she travelled to Africa to join her husband on a mission in the British Central African Protectorate (present-day Malawi).¹ They had been married just a fortnight when he had left for Africa, one year earlier.² She travelled up the Zambezi River to meet him, the heat rapidly exhausting and depressing her. “I am daily feeling weaker from the extreme heat,” she wrote, “I feel so exhausted that I can hardly crawl from the boat.”³ As they sailed up the river, her expectations dwindled. She had “a foolish feeling that this journey will never end,” and commented that “I have long since resigned myself to fate” and “how bitter and horrible I have grown.”⁴ When she finally met her husband, their reunion was passionless and impersonal.⁵

Currie and her husband journeyed to their home on Mount Mulanje, which she translated as “the hill of good-bye.”⁶ Her life on the mission—a lowered standard of living, geographical and social isolation, and severe malaria—undermined her mental health. She “awoke each morning with a sense of great depression” and “had a strange desire for something unusual to happen, anything in fact to break the monotony and terrible loneliness.”⁷ With her husband and the mission doctor as the only Europeans in the area, she longed to see another white woman.⁸ Time did not sweeten Mount Mulanje. Although she had moments of enjoyment, she explained that “I was dull and languid; the present seemed to hold me in a stifling grasp…I confess it now, that sometimes in those later days I lay down in the little summer-house in the garden, wishing I would die there and then.”⁹ Not long afterwards, Currie and her husband returned to England.¹⁰

Julia Wells earned an MA from the Victoria University of Wellington in 2016. Her MA examined the home medical treatments carried out by white settlers in British Africa in European and African communities. Her research interests include tropical medical history and colonial African history.

http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v17/v17i2a3.pdf

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This paper explores settler women’s literary representations of loneliness, worry, boredom and sadness in white women’s memoirs from East and South-Central Africa, primarily Kenya and Rhodesia, between 1890 and 1939. Through a close reading of women’s memoirs, such as Currie’s, it unpacks how women described and explained these feelings in print. In some ways, settler women in British Africa shared much with women in other colonies throughout the British Empire (and in the United States), such as loneliness following migration and worry while establishing farms. Other factors, however, distinguish the African experience from that of women in other colonies. The presence of the particularly deadly *falciparum* malaria and blackwater fever, the African wildlife, public worries about tropical neurasthenia and mental deterioration in the tropics, and the very strong geographic isolation of rural settlers all contributed to the specificity of the colonial experience in Africa.

**Settler Women and Colonial Memoirs**

Currie and her husband were at the beginning of a wave of immigration from Britain and Europe into newly occupied African territories. Britons travelled to freshly annexed territories in East and South-Central Africa as colonial officials, missionaries, traders, and farmers and miners. The white populations of Kenya and Rhodesia rose rapidly in the early twentieth century; indeed, Kenya’s white population tripled between 1905 and the outbreak of World War One.\(^\text{11}\) By 1914, over five thousand white people had moved into Kenya.\(^\text{12}\) The population continued to grow rapidly in the interwar period.\(^\text{13}\)

The two main colonies for permanent white settlement in the region were Kenya and Rhodesia, although those populations were still very small compared to the local African population. Other areas in the region had far smaller numbers of white residents (Nyasaland, for example). Despite numerous cultural similarities, Kenya and Rhodesia nevertheless had substantial social differences. In neither colony was there room for white working class migrants—these economic spaces were filled using local labor. However, in Rhodesia there were jobs for white artisans, clerks, and small business owners, while in Kenya these roles were generally the purview of Indian migrants.\(^\text{14}\) While both colonies drew their white populations from the middle and upper classes, in Kenya the preferred migrant was firmly from the upper echelons of British society. Seen as the officer’s colony, it had the reputation of being settled by the younger sons of British aristocrats.\(^\text{15}\)

The women discussed here almost universally came to Africa as wives. Their husbands’ careers were diverse: missionaries, farmers, miners, and officials from the colonial service. Missionary wife Jessie Currie is accompanied in these pages by several other missionary women. Mathilde Goy and her husband travelled to a mission station on the Zambezi River in 1889. Her residence ended in tragedy after her seven month old son and then her husband died of fever, forcing her to leave.\(^\text{16}\) Annie Hore journeyed with her husband, a London Missionary Society missionary, in the early 1880s to their mission station on Lake Tanganyika. Interestingly, Hore’s *To Lake Tanganyika in a Bath-Chair* does not focus on her life at the mission. Instead, it centers round her journey from Zanzibar to the interior. The book concludes with her living at the mission, spiritually satisfied by her Christian mission and her health and that of her son recovered.\(^\text{17}\) One of the few women to appear in these pages who travelled to Africa unmarried is Ruth Fisher (though she married another missionary a few years after arriving in Uganda). Fisher went as a Church Missionary Society missionary to Uganda in 1900, and in 1905 published a popular book called *On the
Borders of Pigmy-Land, which went through five editions in the early twentieth century. She provides an insight into the opportunities that missionary work gave single, middle class women to move beyond the more rigid expectations they faced in Britain.

Many of the women whose accounts appear here were married to farmers. Indeed, the phrase “married to” is misleading, as most of these women took an active role in farm management. With a high proportion of socially elite, well-connected, and well-educated women, Kenyan farms produced several of colonial Africa’s best-known writers. The most famous of them was Karen Blixen. She migrated to Kenya with her husband to establish a coffee farm, which was located in the Ngong Hills near Nairobi. After separating with and later divorcing her husband, Blixen managed the farm herself. Blixen returned to Denmark after her farm failed and her lover, Denys Finch Hatton, died in a plane crash in the early 1930s. Elspeth Huxley was another of the most iconic colonial Kenyan writers. Huxley was a child when she arrived in Kenya; her parents were settlers who established a coffee farm. Her 1959 autobiography The Flame Trees of Thika described her childhood living on the farm.

While members of the settler elite penned many of the Kenyan colonial farming memoirs, this was not exclusively the case. Alyse Simpson’s strongly autobiographical work The Land That Never Was draws upon her experiences living on a new, under-capitalized farm in inter-war Kenya. Plagued by their lack of money and experience, the Simpsons’ farm eventually failed and they returned to Kenya. As Dane Kennedy writes, “her tale is one of disillusionment, providing a revealing and valuable corrective to the roseate popular image of the white settler’s experience in Kenya.” Similar in tone are some of the writings from Rhodesian settler farms. Hylda Richards, like Simpson, was a middle class woman who, along with her husband, struggled to make their farm pay. The Richards’ farm (located near Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia) eventually became sufficiently successful, but only after a decade of struggle. Richards was a fairly popular writer in the area, publishing humorous verse under a pseudonym through the 1930s and 1940s, then her memoir Next Year Will Be Better in 1952.

Another group of women who authored memoirs about the region were the wives of colonial service officials. As they were not generally permanent settlers, few are considered here. However, Emily Bradley’s autobiographical advice book is of some use. Emily and Kenneth Bradley travelled to Northern Rhodesia in the 1920s and remained there until the 1940s, a residence longer than that of many supposedly permanent farmers. Kenneth Bradley wrote several well-known books about his work as a District Officer, and Emily Bradley penned two household guides for tropical Africa. Her 1950 advice book, Dearest Priscilla: Letters to the Wife of a Colonial Civil Servant, not only includes plentiful personal reminiscences, but also extensive discussions and advice about women’s emotions, capturing both the expectations and the reality of life for civil service wives.

Published memoirs privilege the voices of particular types of settlers: well educated, well connected, and economically secure. Socially elite settlers of the Kenyan highlands produced more memoirs, for example, than the wives of mine officials and small farmers in Rhodesia. Some of that source bias is here addressed through the use of Madeline Heald’s compendium Down Memory Lane with Some Early Rhodesian Women (1979). This collection of biographies were contributed by families, and includes a far greater cross-section of women than is seen through printed memoirs.
The women discussed in this paper are varied, ranging across time periods, locations, and personal situation. Their differences, however, should not overshadow the fact that they shared much in the way of culture and experiences. As Kennedy argues, while there were substantial differences between Kenya and Rhodesia, there was nevertheless a common culture between the two. Women who grew up in England carried a shared understanding of “Africa” and “Africans,” which shaped their experiences of the continent. Famous memoirs by explorers (for example, Henry Stanley’s 1890 In Darkest Africa), boys’ adventure stories (such as those of George Henty), missionary publications, and newspaper reports all ensured that white settlers entered Africa already conditioned to popular prejudices: African peoples as uncivilized, child-like, and at times dangerous; African landscapes as challenging, exhilarating, and deadly.

Another point to touch on is the use of the term “settler.” Not all of the women discussed here would have termed themselves as “settlers” in the permanent sense. Missionaries and colonial officials generally intended to reside in the colony for a fixed period of time and then to return home (usually to Britain). Miners and farmers usually intended to remain for a long time, but not necessarily permanently. Alyse Simpson wrote in The Land That Never Was: “in common with most settlers, we dreamed of ultimate success and then ‘home’; before we were too old.” Many settlers who intended a long residence returned quickly to Britain. Here the term is used as shorthand for Europeans who migrated for a significant period of time to East and South-Central Africa.

Since the 1980s, life writing by women has received greater attention by scholars. Noting that “autobiography has been employed by many women writers to write themselves into history,” women’s autobiographies have been used by scholars to explore questions of identity, self-knowledge, and agency. Many female settlers in Britain’s African colonies authored memoirs about their stay on the continent. A few, most notably Karen Blixen’s 1937 Out of Africa, achieved considerable fame and have been reprinted many times. Although Blixen’s continuing popularity (encouraged substantially by the 1985 Sydney Pollack prize-winning film of the book featuring Robert Redford and Meryl Streep) is not representative of most colonial women’s memoirs, some now obscure memoirs did command a sizable audience and went through several reprints. Women’s memoirs from colonial Africa are not simple views onto their authors’ lives; they are, necessarily, a literary genre, with particular conventions and shaped to appeal to an audience at home in Britain (an audience that had expectations of how a British woman would behave in a tropical environment). At the same time, women’s memoirs provide historians with a unique insight into the voices, albeit mediated, of individual settlers.

While most women’s experiences in colonial East and South-Central Africa were not so dramatically negative, Currie’s story highlights common features in settler women’s narratives from colonial Africa. The isolation, loneliness, boredom, worry and alienation that she records appear in numerous women’s memoirs (and indeed, in memoirs of women in new environments around the world). Despite such prevalence, settler women’s loneliness and worry is under-developed in the literature on the region. It is well established that “costs of whiteness” existed. Nevertheless, while the scholarship of white colonial Africa frequently acknowledges women’s loneliness and worry, little space is devoted to its analysis. Gillian Whitlock explores ideas of isolation, silence and confinement, but focuses primarily on their appearance in Simpson’s The Land That Never Was, and the comparison between this text and Blixen’s Out of Africa. Anthony Kirk-Greene discusses both white women’s and men’s emotional challenges in Africa, but confines his subject material to the
colonial service. Other authors who consider female loneliness and worry more briefly include Heather Dalton, Dane Kennedy, Helen Callaway, Deborah Kirkwood, Beverley Gartrell, and Catherine Barnes Stevenson.

Narratives of struggle fill various purposes in women’s memoirs. From the eighteenth century, women were viewed as inherently weak and so naturally at risk while travelling. Upper class and middle class women of “refined sensibilities” were believed to suffer most while abroad, as they “would perceive even minor discomforts immediately.” Such fears of women’s travel were enflamed when the destination was Africa. Africa was widely viewed as a place for men, with the “rough” conditions, lack of “civilized” comforts, deadly diseases, dangerous animals, and a tropical climate all rendering the continent unfit for the delicate British woman. Female bodies in the tropics, according to medical wisdom of the period, were at a greater risk than men of developing tropical neurasthenia, a catch-all diagnosis for physical or mental suffering without an obvious cause. Once British immigration increased, the reputation of Kenya softened somewhat. Lord Delamere’s characterization of Kenya as a “white man’s country” and its development into the notion of the “white highlands” did suggest that it was possible for particular areas of Africa to be marked out as suitable for white settlement. Even within these areas, however, fears about the body persisted: worries about high altitudes, the tropical sun, and the long-term viability of white populations persisted in Kenya’s highlands. A 1938 public debate in Mombasa on the question of whether Kenya was a white man’s country resulted in a vote for “no.” In Rhodesia, a widespread belief existed that the climatic conditions of October and November induced mental instability in Europeans that could lead to suicide. In part, women’s descriptions of loneliness and worry in colonial Africa meet a narrative need for the protagonist to be out of place in Africa, fitting the trope of the respectable British woman out of place and uncomfortable/at risk while travelling. Some degree of physical and mental suffering affirmed the protagonist’s whiteness, marking her as British despite her physical location in the tropics.

Descriptions of unhappiness and sickness in Africa also played into women’s narratives of sacrifice. In missionary memoirs in particular, white female missionaries’ suffering acts as a religious sacrifice, a penance as part of their Christian mission. For some, vivid descriptions of sickness and suffering appear almost as offerings, with hardship giving a claim to African territory. Illness and death act as a penance for occupation, and pain invokes a certain belonging. Whitlock explains that scenes of burial as metaphors for claiming the land are common in settler texts. Denys Finch-Hatton’s famous burial scene in Out of Africa, for example, renders him inseparable from the continent, and the lions that sit upon his grave signal Africa’s acceptance. For others, suffering is part of an over-arching narrative of growth and development, with the author struggling at first, overcoming obstacles, and finally coming to love Africa, and live there successfully. For a few, tales of struggle justify the ultimate failure of return to England, leaving unsuccessful farms or missions.

The last point to mention is how women’s memoirs fitted into the larger colonial project. Women’s writings were undeniably part of “writing the empire,” packaging foreign places and peoples into dramatic, exotic conventions to be enjoyed by readers at home in Britain. African people are typically vanished from accounts: landscapes are empty and unpeopled, local people appearing only as brief curiosities, servants, or the subject (particularly by missionaries) of censorious comments. Colonial tropes reoccur through the
pages: white women are “alone,” despite being surrounded by servants; they journey through unchartered, wild territory; they tame wild landscape with farmland. Few show any interest in local people or customs. Furthermore, women’s descriptions of “charitable” acts (teaching schools, carrying out medical treatments for local people) fed a narrative of benevolent colonialism. Many of the daily tasks that women describe, whether managing a colonial farm, hosting civil service “sundown” drinks, or bandaging a wound for a farm laborer, speak to the role that white women had in upholding and maintaining colonialism.

Yet at the same time as being constructed, sometimes formulaic, narratives and intimately tied to the wider colonial endeavor, women’s writings are also deeply personal. They are accounts of globally mobile individuals, writing about their experiences—and often struggles—in a radically new environment. They are intimate insights into the inner lives of white women in British Africa.

Isolation and Loneliness

Migration was a psychological strain for many women and the shock of arrival appears throughout colonial memoirs. The first sighting of an African port could bring excitement and enthusiasm, but it could also be a reminder of that left behind. As Charlotte Mansfield sailed into Cape Town, another passenger advised her to “eat an apple when approaching Cape Town... the dull grey city under the shadow of the overhanging mountain will give you melancholia, but you can’t eat and cry at the same time.”44 As Hylda Richards leaned over the ship’s railing arriving at Cape Town, she experienced “a dreadful wave of homesickness.”45 Wives travelling alone to Africa not infrequently had the shock of arrival intensified, when husbands (particularly missionary or farmer husbands) were delayed and could not meet them.46 Depending on the port women where the arrived, upon leaving the ship they could encounter very unfamiliar environments. A few were shocked by poverty.

When missionary Ruth Fisher took the Ugandan railway to her missionary post in 1900, while travelling between Mombasa and Voi she found that “the land was in the grip of famine” and “some of its last victims dragged their exhausted limbs to the banks of the railroad as the train passed through.”47

Those whose standard of living lowered with migration struggled to adjust. Although Kirsti Sigel notes that “there are numerous discussions of the lack of embodiment in women’s autobiographies,” in African colonial memoirs physical experience and the lived-in body play a central role.48 Women frequently wrote of the physical discomfort of their new environment. One child born in Rhodesia wrote: “my mother, who was a gentle, cultured, slender woman, had thought Johannesburg primitive, but when she arrived in Francistown and was met by George with a sprung Scotch cart...four trotting oxen and forty miles to go to the mine on a country track—imagine her feelings!”49 Struggling to transplant British living habits onto a Rhodesian farm, Richards asked herself “what had made me think I was a success? Not one of my triumphs had been lasting. On every side were instances of my neglect.”50 She faced endless difficulties in keeping yeast alive and successfully baking bread; a fallen angel cake so infuriated her that she hurled it into the veldt.51

The African landscape distressed many women and their writings often present African nature as hard, savage, ruthless, and uncaring. “A picnic in the jungle! What could be more exquisite?” asked Currie ironically.52 She described a romantic, Eden-like jungle scene, then slowly subverted it: a serpent appeared in the water, thousands of beetles covered the rock, and white ants gnawed a dying tree.53 The beautiful, velvet-podded creeper she admired
was covered in poisonous thorns. Reactions such as Currie’s cross class boundaries and areas. Currie experienced extreme social isolation and depressed spirits during her time in Nyasaland—it is not surprising that she would transfer such feelings onto the landscape. Yet while it is perhaps more common among women further removed from the settler elite, fashionable Kenyan settlers who regularly went on safari also made such comments. Even in Huxley’s Flame Trees, a book that explicitly makes claim to a white African identity and belonging, feelings of alienation remain, at least amongst the first generation of settlers. Tilly Grant discovered ants had eaten alive her newly hatched chicks, causing her to exclaim “I wish I’d never come to this rotten country…everything is raw and crude and savage and I hate it!” Her neighbor Lettice Palmer echoed the sentiment, observing that “this country frightens me…It’s a sort of quiet, smiling, destructive ferocity” and that “it is a cruel country that will take the heart out of your breast and grind it into powder, powdered stone. And no one will mind, that is the worst of it.” With African nature representing the continent, authors believed they had uncovered a fundamental harshness at Africa’s core.

Such perceived harshness formed a crucial element in women’s narratives of belonging. In the period, medical and popular debates raged over whether Europeans could thrive in tropical Africa; even in the supposedly safer highland areas of Kenya and Rhodesia, fears persisted over the long-term viability of a white settler population. In relation to landscape, some authors posed subtly different questions: could white women really belong in Africa, and could Africa belong to them? Some, for example Beryl Markham, Blixen, and Huxley, felt an innate connection: it is notable that all of these women lived in Kenya in fashionable circles, and that Huxley and Markham both arrived in Kenya as small children. In a letter home, Blixen wrote “I have a feeling that this country belongs to us” and “the fact that most white people hate it…brings it in a way still closer to the hearts of those who feel they can understand its voice and that it has spoken to them.”

On the other hand, many would have agreed with Palmer that “as for myself, I don’t belong here.” Particularly for struggling farmers, the themes of Africa’s indifference to white settlers and the difficulty of permanently marking the land run through memoirs. As the protagonist in Alyse Simpson’s The Land That Never Was prepared to leave Kenya, she mused: “buried our acres would be in no time, and covered with weeds—like some forgotten grave…in less than six months from now there would be no trace of our six year sojourn…it would now revert, almost at once, to the savage state we had found it in.” The abandoned settler farm reverting to bush is one of the final images of Doris Lessing’s iconic Southern Rhodesia novel, The Grass is Singing.

Even more than their emotional isolation from the landscape, women of all classes and in all locations felt isolated from friends and family. Migration invariably entailed leaving friends and family, a painful separation broken only by letters or visits. Letters were slow, but nevertheless precious and written frequently. “Only those who have really experienced it can enter into the awful homesickness that sometimes a girl feels on her first long separation from England,” Fisher wrote, and explained that anyone in such a situation “may behave like a big baby” when reading letters from home. Trips home or visits from relatives were a pleasure, but only possible regularly for the wealthy—for missionaries and struggling farmers without wealthy relatives at home, visits to England were a luxury that was often out of reach. In Rhodesia, unlike in Kenya, the lower levels of wealth among settlers generally precluded unnecessary travel.
The lack of white female friendship opportunities amplified women’s loneliness. Although all women in rural locations experienced some degree of isolation from others, this was lessened in areas of denser settlement. Very remote areas (such as those in which missionaries settled) and areas with few white women (such as in mining communities) amplified rural isolation from other settlers. In Rhodesia, a woman begged Richards’ husband “to bring his wife and children out, because all her other female neighbours had died of fever.”

Although the vast majority of women would have lived with white men, for many they could not substitute for female friendship. “However kind and tender a man may be he lacks the subtle sympathy and understanding which a good woman has,” Currie wrote; “he lacks the patience to listen to the feminine trifles that interest most of our sex.” With so little choice in company, women could be bitterly disappointed if female neighbors or visitors failed their expectations. Currie experienced great disappointment when a woman finally visited and yet “she did not understand me.”

Husbands’ frequent physical and mental absences also isolated women. Men, whether missionaries, on farms, or working at mines, were usually away during the day, leaving many empty hours. Some memoirs also suggest emotional distance between wives and husbands. Currie invariably refers to her husband as “the Msungu” (master or white man), and when the mission doctor left on tour, to give the couple some honeymoon privacy, she commented “how we wearied for his coming back.” In The Land that Never Was, the protagonist Joan met her cousin Jim preparing to be best man at a wedding. Jim explained that the groom’s “fiancée was on your boat…he hasn’t seen her for five solid years…hardly remembers her…I reckon there is many a fellow who’s married a stranger at this Cathedral, worse luck.” Men often appear on the fringes of women’s memoirs, characteristically silent, particularly in the memoirs of women who had generally negative experiences of Africa. In Currie, Richards and Simpson’s memoirs, the husbands all barely participate, standing silently on the sidelines enhancing the sense of isolation.

In some texts alienation from peers complements that from husbands. Some found their intense isolation rendered socializing difficult. Here again, class differentiations are seen: wealthier and more socially connected women, even in rural areas, were more integrated into settler society and less likely to suffer from crippling isolation. At a wedding, Currie found that she “dreaded society, and felt that it would be an effort even to speak.” Once there, “the drawing room seemed perfectly dazzling. I sat down shy in the corner and envied the other ladies…with their flow of talk. I was not in it. Mount Mlanje had struck me dumb.”

Another woman “became a very shy person and never really enjoyed the conventional social activities” after nine years of social isolation at the “Maid of the Mist” mine in Barbeton, Eastern Transvaal. Poverty also played its role. The Land that Never Was features a recurring image of being on the outer, with Joan excluding herself—usually for economy—from fashionable Kenyan settler society. In both Simpson and Currie’s texts, their alienation persists after returning to Britain. Both husbands refused to speak of Africa, and Joan found that no one in England understood their struggles.

Indeed, for Simpson and Currie, the sense of loneliness in the texts becomes claustrophobic. Joan became anxious about letters, “for letters were of the outside world of which I seemed almost to have grown afraid,” and noted that “solitude of long duration made you silent.” On the first page of The Hill of Good-bye, Currie questions whether she can make the reader “see the sights that haunt me, and hear the sounds that thrill me even now.” She concludes, “I would that I could.” Joan and Currie felt imprisoned—
economically constrained, isolated, surrounded by silence, and trapped within themselves. Such imprisonment inverts the freedom celebrated in classic colonial texts, such as Markham’s *West with the Night* or Blixen’s *Out of Africa*. Whitlock compares *Out of Africa* with *The Land that Never Was* to illustrate that the enduring image of East Africa as a land of freedom is highly socio-economically specific, describing Simpson’s work as a “class-based critique of the Kenyan dream.”

There is certainly a strong element of socio-economic determinism in whether women experienced greater or less freedom in British Africa. Markham’s position among Kenya’s maverick settler elite undoubtedly facilitated her successful career as a pilot. Wealthier women had a greater ability to travel (within the colony and back to Europe) for companionship, had more time to write letters, and had a greater range of pursuits (such as safaris) available to them. For women of a lower socio-economic status, this was not the case. Travel was prohibitively expensive, isolation more difficult to overcome, and fewer servants meant more time spent on domestic work. When Cousin Jim visits Joan, for example, and comments how wonderfully free they were in the countryside—no need to dress, shave, go to church regularly—Joan disagrees, saying “it doesn’t seem free to me, Jim…On the contrary, we are tied hand and foot here.”

A little later, Simpson writes: “when I studied those who called Kenya beautiful, the opinion seemed mostly to come from the wealthy, the sport-loving and those who had no other choice.” The only moment when Joan feels free is when she leaves Simba Valley to return home to England, feeling as if an “appalling dead weight” had gone, finally allowing her “to take breath.”

At the same time, the role of class in determining women’s freedom should not be overstated. Some women from outside the social elite also enjoyed employment and activities that would have been impossible for a respectable woman in Britain. *Down Memory Lane* mentions several women who participated in the mining industry in Rhodesia. One woman overcame her fear of prospecting shafts and soon divided the management of the family’s mining ventures between herself and her husband. Some claims were registered in her name, and she “took over the running of the mine completely and my husband rarely visited it.” After her husband’s death she continued to work Soloman Shaft and Kent Mine, still being lowered into prospecting shafts in a bucket at age seventy. Alexandrina Kitto, despite her initial shock at rural Rhodesian life, made her own furniture, taught a servant to make bricks, and ran Jessie Mine when her husband was ill.

**Boredom and Ennui**

Although some women’s loneliness led to feelings of stifling imprisonment, many merely experienced boredom. Wealthier women with extensive staffs found they had long hours to fill, and often with little to fill them. A sense of ennui fills the letters and memoirs of some of the wives of wealthier farmers or civil servants. In *Dearest Priscilla*, Emily Bradley noted the lack of ready entertainment in rural areas and advised settler women to stay occupied. “Idleness leads to boredom, and boredom to discontent, and sometimes to actual illness,” she explained. Bradley recorded one friend as having “spoke feelingly of the time one spends alone. How quickly the books are read, the tasks done, and the hours stretch on and on, so easily filled with boredom, with a caged squirrel’s thoughts, and with discontent.”

To some degree, boredom was a privilege, built upon the labor of African servants and other workers. Poorer settler women had little free time to fill. Yet even women who were fully occupied could find themselves bored by domestic work, especially by the struggle to
recreate British living habits in the wildly different environment of colonial farms. Richards, for example, missed her “busy creative sort of life” and found her first year “dragged on,” despite being busy on her and her husband’s farm.90

**Worry**

Worry was another all-pervasive experience among colonial women. Many women found economic survival to be an endless source of anxiety—particularly for farmers’ wives, but also for those of low-paid civil servants. Settlers often came to farms with little knowledge of farming in general, and very rarely with a specific knowledge of farming in that region. As Lewis Gann and Peter Duignan observe, “again and again a farmer in Rhodesia or Kenya might lose all his capital.”91 For the wealthy such losses might be bearable, but for small farmers with little capital, they were devastating. During the inter-war era, the most optimistic promotional literature for Kenya recommended £2,000 capital to start a farm, with £4,000 to £5,000 being the more common figure.92 For previously unfarmed land, the requirements were much larger.93 Many settlers emigrated with far less money, leading to debt and ultimate failure.94 Even those with enough capital faced further problems, including the Great Depression and disastrous fluctuations in international markets during the early 1920s and 1930s.95

Debt and other economic problems worried some women greatly. Blixen’s failing coffee farm was an “intolerable pressure,” giving her the feeling of living “day to day with this sword hanging over my head.”96 She realized that “what was making life so hard for me was the fact that I am so poor” and wrote that “I feel my poverty like a foreign body inside me, like the broken-off point of a spear.”97 Economic trouble in *The Land that Never Was* is foreshadowed when Joan and John reach Nymba and witness a “pathetic little sale” in which “even the dresses of a White woman were being sold against the debts left behind by a couple who had come to make their fortune.”98 After Ada Slatter’s husband committed suicide, she was left in Salisbury, Rhodesia, struggling to find work and with very little money to support her children.99 She viewed the failure and mortgage of their farm as a contributing factor in her husband’s suicide.100 Although most women did not face such extreme situations, constant financial worry was a daily reality for many. The specter of becoming “poor whites” (of the kind described in Daphne Anderson’s *The Toe-Rags*), with all of the financial struggle, loss of status, and “race and class ambiguity” that this entailed, would have heightened the financial worries of women already at the lower end of the white communities’ social hierarchies.101

Some women also feared African animals. Wealthy women who went on regular safaris were less likely to fear larger animals such as lions, but for women who had less contact with them, they could be a source of fear. The wife of a Rhodesian miner recalled hearing lions roaring, and commented that “naturally we were very frightened by this and we slept very little on those nights.”102 Less exotic animals also bothered her: “to add to our terrors, the hut was infested with huge rats and I don’t know of which we were the more terrified—the rats or the lions.”103 Even well-seasoned colonials found *siafu* (driver ants capable of consuming animals or humans) chilling. Markham experienced terrible nightmares about *siafu*, which “relegate all other bad dreams to the category of unlikely but tranquil hallucinations” and described with horror the thought of crashing her plane and being left “hors de combat and the Siafu hungry that night.”104
Women in Africa often feared the local people on first arrival, but such fears frequently disappeared quickly. In some places, fears of African people were more ingrained for the white population than others. As Sarah De Mul notes, news “about the African resistance to colonial rule in 1893 and 1896,” helped established Rhodesia’s reputation as a dangerous place, a preconception that new settlers would have taken with them from Britain and doubtless inflamed fears. Kennedy argues that anxieties about African men and “black peril” were very real among settler women, although they had almost no basis in fact. He attributes the persistence of such fears to the symbolic importance of “black peril” for the settler community, “reaffirming a sense of solidarity” and regulating the relationships between Africans and Europeans. In actual fact, sexual relationships between white women and African men were essentially unknown, although many male Africans were arrested on dubious intent or attempt charges during “black peril” panics. Place was a substantial determining factor in the degree of women’s fears about “black peril,” and in Southern Rhodesia it “was at times a fully hysterical obsession amongst the white population,” of the type captured by Lessing in The Grass is Singing.

The other colonies considered here did not experience a public panic of the same extent and many women’s fears diminished over time after they arrived. As Simpson wrote, “were these [villagers]…the men of whom I had been so afraid sometime ago?” Annie Hore discovered that she “felt uneasy for the first few days I was alone, but the steady and respectful conduct of our Zanzibar men soon gave me confidence.” A few discovered that white men posed a greater risk: Joan’s African cook protected her from a drunken settler wielding a gun. Mansfield advised potential settlers to Rhodesia that “a low white is certainly more to be feared than an ignorant black.” That is not to imply, however, that women generally developed friendships or cordial relationships with their servants. The close relationship that Blixen described with her servant Farah Aden is far from typical; as Kennedy notes, settlers often degraded and physically punished their servants and even warmer relationships were usually deeply paternalistic.

Worry over health was far more continuous. Geographic isolation implied medical isolation, and both potential and actual illnesses worried many women. Although Bradley recommended that women take all precautions, then try not to worry about germs, as “hypochondria is an insidious temptation in countries with bad medical histories,” such advice was probably easier written than followed. While crowded British cities also presented much to fear in terms of disease, the deadly and exotic reputation of tropical illnesses encouraged concern. Once ill, medical isolation inflamed worry. One of Fisher’s missionary companions was “taken with bad fever,” and after three days of 104° temperatures they summoned a doctor. The distance meant that he did not arrive for six days, giving the party a “very anxious time of waiting.” Physical isolation intersected with socio-economic status: it was easier for wealthier women to arrange medical care/transport over long distance than it was for isolated poorer women. For those who undertook treatment themselves, the results could be devastating. Mrs. Cook lived with her husband in a cave in the Nata Reserve, and when his leg became seriously infected she attempted to amputate it herself, after which he died.

The presence of children dramatically increased medical anxiety. Pregnancy in isolated areas was dangerous and feared, and children increased financial pressure. One of the D’Urban children recalled rain pouring through the roof as their brother was born in rural Rhodesia—an umbrella had to be held over their mother. Wealthier women could travel to

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http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v17/v17i2a3.pdf
a main center or to England for childbirth, somewhat lessening the anxiety associated. It was common for children to be sent home to Britain, although this was again class specific.

For women who kept their children in Africa, sick children appear in memoirs as a particular point of pain and anxiety. Women “worried incessantly” about their children. Richards “took little pleasure in the children” as she “was worried to death whenever they were out of sight.” Despite constant vigilance, she was pessimistic about her ability to protect them: “I was always on the alert for an emergency which I felt I should be incompetent to meet and which would, therefore, prove fatal.” Such anxiety was likely inflamed by the concerns over racial degeneration in the tropics; while a diligent mother could protect her children from snakes and scorpions, they were powerless against the African climate.

Sadness

Sadness is also common in women’s memoirs. Women often discuss the sadness of migration. The process of sending children back to England, as mentioned above, was a miserable separation for all concerned. In Flame Trees, Palmer explained that “we have a son, you know…and of course he has to stay at home, and while I suppose that this is necessary… I find it hard to bear.” When she discovered that he nearly died from appendicitis, she exclaimed “what good am I to him as a mother?” and longed to bring him to Africa as even “a year would mean everything to me.” Migration sadness also encompassed environments, with some women missing familiar English landscapes or locations. During her first attack of malaria, Currie repeatedly fantasized about her country home and garden spring.

The greatest sadness in women’s memoirs comes from deaths: those of friends, servants, pets or—at the most acute—husbands or children. Such instances range across memoirs of all types, from each colony, profession and degree of financial security. Even in memoirs written years later, women’s grief is often still vivid and raw. Goy represents her husband’s death as beyond the ability of the reader to understand and her to explain. After he died of fever, she “felt as if I were lost in a terrible desert.” With little available assistance, she measured the coffin and grave and helped construct them. “I leave you to picture what it was to me,” she wrote, “no one can imagine the suffering I endured, the longing I had to tell my trouble to those I loved.”

Conclusion

In conclusion, loneliness and worry appear throughout white settler women’s memoirs from colonial British East and South-Central Africa. A distinctly gendered experience, women’s loneliness was established through the rupture of migration and the shock of arrival, and fed by the lack of connection to African landscapes and social isolation from friends, family, and even husbands. Geographic location and socio-economic status played a major role in women’s isolation, with wealthier settlers in areas of denser population able to mitigate somewhat the loneliness of migration and remote settlement. Women who had little ability to travel for companionship or enjoy new social pursuits (such as safaris) found the transition to be far more isolating. The sadness of migration, isolation, and often death is present in many memoirs.

Worry—another ever-present part of most women’s emotional landscape—was driven by precarious economic situations and fears of local people, African animals, and the new
disease environment. Once again, women’s location within Britain’s African colonies, their socio-economic situation, and their individual temperaments shaped the nature of the worry that they experienced. Wealthy women with many servants, especially those who did not take an active role in their husbands’ professions or the family’s farm, often experienced ennui, finding themselves listless and with little to occupy themselves. Women with less financial security and fewer servants did not lack occupation, but they could find the domestic drudgery boring, particularly combined with their geographic isolation from the companionship of other white women.

The popular Out of Africa image of colonial Africa has little room for women who did not find freedom, enjoyment or spiritual connection in Africa. While such images allow for romantic grief, they have minimal space for mundane frustration, worry, and loneliness. This article began with Currie’s story, who represents the other pole of women’s experience, those for whom Africa brought not freedom or connection, but “terrible loneliness,” sickness, depression, worry, and silence. Most women, of course, would have fallen somewhere in the middle. Overall, an appreciation of settler women’s loneliness and worry is crucial to a balanced understanding of their experiences in British Africa.

Notes
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5 Ibid., p. 13.
6 Ibid., p. 2.
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8 Ibid., p. 150.
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15 Ibid., pp. 6, 47.
16 Goy 1902.
17 Hore 1886.
18 Fisher 1904; Speake 2003, p. 798.
19 Blixen 1986.
20 Huxley 1959.
22 Kennedy 1985, p. v.
24 Bradley 1950.
26 Kennedy 1987, pp. 1, 8.
27 During the latter decades of the 19th century, Henty wrote numerous juvenile adventure novels promoting the empire, though only a few dealt specifically with Africa. These
included By Sheer Pluck: A Tale of the Ashanti War (1883) and The Young Colonists: A Tale of the Zulu and Boer Wars (1885).

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55 Huxley 1959, p. 38.
56 Ibid., pp. 67, 272.
58 Huxley 1959, p. 272.
59 As Whitlock notes, “the relationship between the experiences of the young couple in The Land That Never Was, Joan and John, and those of the Simpsons...is unclear.” However, the memoir is generally regarded as substantially autobiographical. Simpson 1985, p. 258; Whitlock 2000, p. 119; Kennedy 1985, p. x.
60 Lessing 2013, pp. 195-96, 205.
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73 See, for example, Simpson 1985, p. 52.
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82 Ibid., p. 262.
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93 Ibid.
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Using Repeat Photography to Observe Vegetation Change Over Time in Gorongosa National Park

HANNAH V. HERRERO, JANE SOUTHWORTH, ERIN BUNTING, and BRIAN CHILD

Abstract: Protected areas are important conservation tools, as they can be managed to preserve baseline ecosystem health, including that of vegetation dynamics. Understanding long-term ecosystem dynamics within a protected area enables one to understand how this static park landscape responds to outside pressure and changing drivers. In this study, a repeat photography analysis was used to analyze changes in the vegetation pattern and abundance at Gorongosa National Park in Mozambique across seventy-two years of the parks history. Archival photographs dating as far back as 1940 were selected for sites that could be relocated in a subsequent field visit in 2012. Qualitative and quantitative analysis on vegetation abundance by structural group was undertaken using Edwards’ Tabular Key. Results when comparing the photographic pairs show that, in general, tree cover has increased on average from 25 percent to 40 percent over the last seventy-two years. This 15 percent increase may be in response to environmental drivers such as human management, herbivory, fire, and precipitation. Contrary to many recent studies on shrub encroachment in southern Africa, this study finds an increase in tree cover. Such analysis and results are valuable in that they demonstrate long-term ecological change within a managed protected area.

Introduction

Dryland ecosystems, defined as water limited systems, cover more land globally than any other ecosystem type and range from desert to savanna landscapes in their structure. Globally, dryland ecosystems are projected to experience broad scale change in composition and

Hannah V. Herrero is a University of Florida Geography Ph.D. candidate studying long-term vegetation health and land cover change of savanna landscapes in and around protected areas in southern Africa. She wishes to pursue a career combining research and application to ecosystem management.

Jane Southworth is Professor and Chair, Department of Geography, University of Florida with research interests based on the study of human-environment interactions within the field of Land Change Science. Her particular focus is on remote sensing of vegetation dynamics and savanna systems.

Erin Bunting received her Ph.D. from the University of Florida and is currently a geographer with the United States Geological Survey. In late 2017, she will become Director of Remote Sensing & GIS Research and Outreach Services at Michigan State University. Her research focuses on remote sensing of landscape change across global drylands.

Brian Child is Associate Professor, Department of Geography and Center for African Studies, University of Florida with a research focus on community-based conservation, parks management, and environmental / resource economics conducted throughout much of East and Southern Africa.

http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v17/v17i2a4.pdf

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productivity related to global environmental change, specifically climate change. Dryland expansion has been noted globally and caused by a net reduction in soil available moisture due to changes in precipitation regimes. This global expansion of drylands has resulted in savanna like composition in new and ever expanding areas. Savannas, such as those that dominate Gorongosa National Park (GNP) sustain up to one-third of the world’s human population and 13.6 percent of global Net Primary Productivity. Savannas are a globally distributed ecosystem that can be defined as grassland with scattered trees or shrubs. Across southern Africa upwards of 54 percent of the landscape is deemed savanna and these areas are highly heterogeneous in composition. The primary drivers of savanna pattern and process that produce differential responses of vegetation cover are fire, grazing, climate variability and agriculture.

Monitoring land-cover changes in savanna ecosystems can be difficult because of their highly heterogeneous composition. However, monitoring these system changes is important to ecosystem function and diversity. Therefore, it is critical to monitor land-cover changes across these sensitive savanna regions as events such as shrub encroachment and landscape degradation have been noted in the literature. Up to 31 percent of southern Africa’s savannas may be considered degraded. Landscape degradation in this context is defined as a decrease in vegetation cover (or even a complete loss), a shift in species towards annual plants, shrub encroachment (vegetation densification), long-term overgrazing, weakening perennial grasses, and/or a decrease in biodiversity. Shrub encroachment is an ecological process observed across Southern Africa, including South Africa and Botswana. However, a literature review shows that across Mozambique, particularly in and around GNP, studies on and quantification of shrub encroachment have not taken place. The present study aims to remedy this. Shrub encroachment is of particular concern to ecologists because of the transformation of habitats, that is to say, the loss of one habitat and the gain of a fundamentally different, and often less desirable, type. Potential impacts of shrub encroachment are biogeochemical and biophysical changes. Factors that catalyze shrub encroachment are the exclusive use of moisture by the encroaching shrub species, high amounts of soil nutrients, low fire frequency, and high cattle selectivity.

Remote measurements of past landscapes can be used to study change over time. One way this can be done is via the use of traditional photography, specifically a process called repeat photography. Repeat photography is the practice of taking a photograph from the same physical perspective at different points in time. This is a technique that was first developed in Europe in the 1880s to evaluate landscape change with glaciers. It has since expanded across all ecosystems types globally. Repeat photography is a valuable tool because it gives us a much longer time-series of data than satellite remote sensing alone, which only goes back to the mid-1970s, and in terms of more useful spatial and temporal analysis, the mid-1980s. We also have a much higher spatial resolution with ground-point photography.

Gorongosa National Park (GNP), where this research was undertaken, is a mid-latitude highly heterogeneous savanna landscape, which has undergone significant human influence across the last 70 years. The goal of this study is to assess vegetation change, in particular related to tree and shrub covers using repeat photography with two related research questions. This research therefore asks: (1) has there been a change in tree cover? (2) has there been a
change in shrub cover to indicate any potential shrub encroachment as has happened across many other savanna park landscapes?

**Study Area**

Gorongosa National Park, whose area is around 4000 km$^2$, is located at approximately 18.2°S and 34.0°E (Figure 1). The average temperature in the park fluctuates between 15°C and 30°C with mean annual precipitation (MAP) from 1981 to 2016 of ~1000 mm (Figure 2), but it has slightly decreased over time. The minimum total annual precipitation was ~650 mm in 1992 and the maximum total annual precipitation was ~1625 mm in 2001. In GNP, the wet season lasts from November to March, which is driven by the migration of the Intertropical Convergence Zone. The park is located south of the Zambezi River, north of the Pungwe River, west of the Indian Ocean, and east of Mount Gorongosa. The elevation of the park ranges from around fifteen meters in the lowlands to 1800 meters on the mountaintop. The Gorongosa ecosystem is very complex and contains multiple types of habitats including savanna, miombo, and montane forest, but the main focus of this project is on the savannas.

**Figure 1. Study Area Map of GNP and its Location within Africa**

Sample sites 1-6 are marked for the repeat photography locations.
In 1920, during the time of the Portuguese colonization of Mozambique, Gorongosa was set up as a Game Reserve. Gorongosa was established as a national park by the Portuguese government in 1960. However, shortly thereafter, in 1964, the war for independence from Portugal began and lasted until 1974, when Mozambique was declared independent. Based on aerial surveys at the end of the 1960’s and early 1970’s an estimated 2,200 elephant, 14,000 buffalo, 5,500 wildebeest, 3,000 zebra, 3,500 waterbuck, 2,000 impala, 3,500 hippo, and herds of eland, sable, and hartebeest were all found within GNP. These surveys provide the “baseline” for current conservation in the park. In 1977, a civil war broke out and lasted for fifteen years. At various points during the war, the headquarters for each side was within GNP and many battles took place inside the park and at nearby Mount Gorongosa. These wars resulted in GNP losing from 90 percent to 99 percent of its large animal populations. In addition to this, during the period from 1993 to 1996 a variety of illegal hunting ventures existed within GNP and killed even more of the already devastated wildlife populations. This extreme loss of wildlife diverges from natural systems processes, and these population numbers in Gorongosa are opposite of what was observed in most of southern Africa’s protected areas during this period (1970-2005).

Figure 2. Total Annual Precipitation Amounts Interpolated Over the Park 1981-2016

Source: Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station data (CHIRPS)

In 2004, the Gorongosa Restoration Project began as a partnership between the Carr Foundation and the Mozambican government. Gorongosa has adopted a management and development model that balances conservation with the needs of the people surrounding the park by increasing tourism, science, and community investment in the park. As part of the conservation effort, park managers have been conducting baseline ecosystem monitoring.
which is why managers are interested in determining how vegetation is changing within the park. In 2010, three years into the Gorongosa Restoration Project, an aerial survey was conducted and found that wildlife within the park had increased by about 40 percent since the beginning of the restoration project.21

Methods

This study analyzed ground based photographs from at least two dates, one from the 1900s and the second from 2012, to describe the vegetation change in GNP, which has a large digital archive with several hundred landscape photos and many hours of video. After sorting through the photographs and videos, nineteen photographs or still captures of the video from six sites around GNP were selected as these were deemed useable, meaning the location was identifiable and the photos could be repeated today.

During the 1930s several structures were built inside the park, some of which at least still partially stand today. The majority of the photographic evidence presented here focuses on the area around these structures because these were the most accurately identifiable. One of the best examples of this is the “Lion House” on the edge of the floodplain. Many of the photographs are focused around the Lion House because this was one of the main areas tourists would visit within the park. When these structures were built, the area directly under them was cleared, and therefore the vegetation was altered. The structures and roads then fell into disarray with the political turmoil and fighting.

There are seventy-two years of data presented in this study, though not at a consistent time interval. The earliest photograph analyzed was from 1940, and the dates then range through the early 1970s (see tables for the exact year of each photograph). Each of the sites of the earlier images was located in July 2012 (during the dry season) and a “repeat” photograph was taken. To insure as much compatibility as possible these “repeat” photographs were taken from a similar vantage point and distance as the original photograph, and a similar focal length and angle was also used. In the historical archive, the exact camera and lens were not recorded. Therefore, a basic 18-55 mm lens was used, unless otherwise specified. In certain cases that were further away a longer lens of 70-300 mm was used. Seasonality was accounted for because the park is closed during the rainy season, so all comparison photographs were from the dry season in the past. Using shadows, the time of day was matched between the historical photographs and the shots taken in 2012. At each of the sites a GPS location was also recorded. Vegetation plot analysis and qualitative field notes, including dominant vegetation types, and overall landscape type were also recorded (Table 1) for the current analysis.

The changes in the photographs were quantified by using Edwards tabular key to structural groups and formation classes to determine what habitat cover was present at each of the dates (Table 1).22 This key includes Dominant Height Class, Total Plant Cover >0.1 percent, and Total Plant Cover <0.1 percent (bare ground) to distinguish between Woodland (tree dominated), Bushland (tree and shrub dominated), Shrubland (shrub dominated), Grassland (grass dominated), and Herbland (herb dominated) in southern Africa. The same research method was implemented by the first author throughout the analysis to ensure consistency, and the process was as follows: historical and July 2012 photographs were placed side-by-side and broken into
Table 1. Edwards Tabular Key for Vegetation Structure used for the Vegetation Samples Taken at Each Repeat Photography Site.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dominant Height class</th>
<th>Total plant cover &gt; 0.1%</th>
<th>Total plant cover &lt; 0.1%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Forest &amp; woodland</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Total tree cover</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tree &gt; 29 m</td>
<td>100-75%</td>
<td>75-10%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9-2%</td>
<td>2-5%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1-0%</td>
<td>0-1%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>B. Thicket &amp; bushland</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total tree cover</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shrub 1.5-2 m</td>
<td>100-10%</td>
<td>10-5%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5-2%</td>
<td>2-5%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-0%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Shrubland</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Total shrub cover</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shrub 0.5-1 m</td>
<td>100-75%</td>
<td>75-10%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9-2%</td>
<td>2-5%</td>
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<td>1-0%</td>
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<td>D. Grassland</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Total grass cover</td>
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<td>Grass 2 m</td>
<td>100-75%</td>
<td>75-10%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9-2%</td>
<td>2-5%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>E. Desert shrubland</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shrubs dominant</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shrub 2.5 m</td>
<td>17. High thicket</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shrub 1.5 m</td>
<td>18. Low thicket</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shrub 1 m</td>
<td>19. High bushland</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shrub 0.5-1 m</td>
<td>20. Low bushland</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shrub 0.5 m</td>
<td>21. High closed shrubland</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shrub 1 m</td>
<td>22. Tall closed shrubland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shrub 0.5-1 m</td>
<td>23. Short closed shrubland</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shrub 0.5 m</td>
<td>24. Low closed shrubland</td>
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<td></td>
<td>F. Desert woodland</td>
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<td>Trees dominant</td>
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<td>Desert woodland</td>
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<td>High desert</td>
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<td>Tall desert</td>
<td>58. Tall desert woodland</td>
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<td>Short desert</td>
<td>59. Short desert woodland</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Low desert</td>
<td>60. Low desert woodland</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grasses dominant</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Grasses 2.5 m</td>
<td>33. High closed grassland</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Grasses 1.5 m</td>
<td>34. Tall closed grassland</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Grasses 0.5-1 m</td>
<td>35. Short closed grassland</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Grasses &lt;0.5 m</td>
<td>36. Low closed grassland</td>
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<td>Herbs dominant</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Herbs 2.5 m</td>
<td>45. High closed herbland</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Herbs 1.5 m</td>
<td>46. Tall closed herbland</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Herbs 0.5-1 m</td>
<td>47. Short closed herbland</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Herbs &lt;0.5 m</td>
<td>48. Low closed herbland</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

four quadrants with a grid overlay. Then percentages of each type of vegetation were estimated in each quadrant by visual quantification, summed, and recorded. The percentage change over time was then calculated using the formula:

\[
Percent \ Change = \left( \frac{2012 \ Percent \ Cover - Historic \ Percent \ Cover}{Historic \ Percent \ Cover} \right) \times 100
\]

**Results**

The data from the estimates of vegetation cover show that overall tree cover has increased from 1940 to 2012 (Figure 3). The historic photographs have an average of 25 percent tree cover, whereas the new photographs show an average of 40 percent tree cover. This is an average increase of 15 percent through time. The exception to this is in the second of the three photographs 15 Chitengo (Site 4, the base camp of the park) and the photographs taken at the location named the Hippo House (Site 6) where there was a loss of vegetation cover.

**Table 2. Repeat Photographic Sites**

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<thead>
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<th>Site Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Photographs:</th>
<th>Tree Cover Percent Change</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Lion House</td>
<td>Historic 1940</td>
<td>20-&gt;80=+300%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>20-&gt;30=+50%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>5-&gt;20=+300%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>5-&gt;10=+100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2-&gt;20=+900%</td>
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**Google Earth Imagery**
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Year Taken</td>
<td>Photographic Analysis</td>
<td>Google Earth Image</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Chitengo</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>5-&gt;5=0%</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>30-&gt;20=33%</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>40-&gt;50=+25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bunga Inselburg</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>75-&gt;90=+20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Hippo House</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>80-&gt;2=-97.5%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>80-&gt;60=25%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Sites, with name, year taken, photographs analyzed, percent tree cover recorded in historic photography and 2012 photograph and percent change, and a 2012 Google Earth Image of each site, with the star representing where the site is. (For details of where the site is spatially within the park, see Figure 1.)

The photographs at Site 1 were taken on the edge of floodplain, where the “Lion House” still stands and four cabins used to stand (Table 2). At site 1 in a 1960 photograph, the majority of the shot is low closed grassland and behind that is short closed woodland. This area may have been cleared previously to allow construction of these structures. From this perspective in 2012, tree growth is prominent. This area is now classified as closed short woodland. The dominating genus is *Vachellia* (previously *Acacia*), and the dominant species is *Vachellia xanthophloea* (fever tree). These trees have grown in closer to the site of the original structures, though only the foundations remain today. The grass composition has remained similar.

The photograph taken at Site 2 was just outside the National Park gate (Table 2). In a 1957 photograph, there was a much lower density of trees in the background with a significantly taller bare tree rising up above the canopy in the background. From this perspective in 2012, there are several larger branches in the foreground, and there are more trees and scrub on either side of the road just inside the gate. While both of these photographs would have vegetation classified as tall closed woodland, the tree cover has greatly increased in density in the recent image.
Figure 3. Percent of Tree Cover in GNP, at the six selected sites

Note: Percent of tree cover determined from 19 photographic sample pairs, beginning in 1940 to 2012 (For order of site dates, see table 2 above).

The photograph taken at Site 3 was at the old Pungwe River crossing just outside the park gates (Table 2). In a 1957 photograph, the site contained some bare ground with tall closed shrubland with short closed woodland behind that. This area was previously cleared in order to make a roadway to the original entrance into the park before the current paved road was created. From this perspective in 2012, grass growth is prominent, and this area is now classified as tall closed grassland with tall open woodland behind it. The grass composition was fairly homogenous in 2012. The area around the old river crossing is now used for agricultural production.

The photograph from Site 4 is of Chitengo, which is the center of human activity in the park (Table 2). In a 1967 photograph, there are several large trees in both the left and right of the frame. A photograph taken from the same perspective in 2012 shows that the tree closest to the concrete on the left hand side is missing. However, when we look at the next image comparison, we can see that there are overall more trees in 2012, and the trees that are there are larger and denser.

The photograph from Site 5 is an area that contains the Vunduzi River in the foreground with the Bunga Inselbergs and Mount Gorongosa in the background (Table 2). At site 5, in a 1965 photograph, there was open short grassland a few hundred meters on either side of the Vunduzi River. This grassland was bordered by short closed woodland. When this shot was retaken in 2012, riparian vegetation has filled in the area around the Vunduzi River. Further out from the river vegetation density and coverage increased into a short bushland, which is a result of shrub encroachment. Some of the taller trees have been replaced with shorter bushes.
The photograph taken at Site 6 was at the Hippo House, alongside Lake Urema (Table 2). In a 1970 photograph, the site contained many tall trees, and was classified as tall open woodland. At the time this area was used as a lunch spot for tourists in the park. In 2012, all of the trees have disappeared. Even the scrub palms have largely been eliminated. Left now is ground with very short grass cover, and a few taller patches of grass.

Discussion and Conclusion

Until recently, we were limited to ground-point and aerial photographs for spatial-temporal studies of landscape change across GNP. However, this research is unique in that it provides a much longer timeframe and finer spatial resolution than most imagery-based studies can. It does however find similar trends to recent studies, such as Daskin et al. (2015) who also found increased tree cover throughout the park landscape. Unlike other parks in the region, we see an increase in tree cover and not shrub encroachment. As mentioned earlier, shrub encroachment has a variety of negative impacts on ecosystems, so this increase in tree cover may indicate that GNP vegetation is healthier relative to other parks in the region, as a result of the unique situation of removal or herbivory in their park during the wars. As such, this provided an unbelievable natural experimental situation for herbivory removal impacts and also highlights the importance of such tools as repeat photography which provides a much longer time frame for study. This also provides an excellent basis for park management, as clearly for tourism parks need to maintain wildlife numbers but also ensure maintenance of the larger ecosystem health. This longer-term study provides an exciting and underutilized approach on which management and future plans can be based. Repeat photography approaches should be used across a suite of park landscapes where historical photographic datasets exist in order to add a different “on the ground” perspective, get longer-term data (pre-dating satellites), and finer temporal resolution going forward, as well as much finer spatial resolution. Utilizing this technique can also target specific areas of interest. Given the new digital age and the progress of tourism in this park, many photographs are now being taken and stored for potential future use.

As already noted, this study shows, via a comparison of historic photographs to ones taken in 2012, that tree cover has increased on average from 25 percent to 40 percent (15 percent overall) over the last seventy-two years across Gorongosa National Park. However, this study did not capture specific evidence of shrub encroachment; rather, the growth of the tree cover was quite clear overall. Even though there are similar savanna landscapes throughout the lower part of the park, we cannot make blanket statements about the entire park. The individual areas studied do offer great insight into general conservation patterns and can assist managers in making decisions. Aside from providing ecological baselines, managers are also interested, from a historical perspective, in seeing how the park has changed over the last seventy-two years. There are some areas in the park that demonstrated extensive growth of vegetation, like the Lion House with trees, the Pungwe River crossing with trees, and the Bunga Inselburgs with riparian trees and also shrubs. Hippo House looked very different in that there was almost a complete loss of tree cover.

Multiple factors may contribute to changing vegetation structure. One factor is management. For example, in the repeat photography of the Lion House, it may be the case that
Vachellia were present until humans built infrastructure. The National Park gate and Chitengo are also managed areas that have been maintained in a similar way throughout history, especially given that the Restoration Project has reinstated tourism in the park. At the Bue Maria River crossing, what was once a maintained road has been abandoned, but part of the area is now devoted to agriculture as well. Other factors may be more natural. In the repeat photograph of Mount Gorongosa with the Vunduzi River and Bunga Inselbergs, we saw a great deal of change over time (Table 2). The source of this river is radial flow from Mount Gorongosa. As evidenced in the photograph, the river has meandered further to the south (to the left in the photo in Table 2) since 1965. This may suggest a change in the flood regime of this river from the mountain, which in turn affects the distribution of rich soil and riparian and floodplain associated vegetation around the river. The repeat photograph of the Hippo House showed that there has been tree cover loss. Given the history of this area, it is unclear whether this area was cleared during the war by military forces to better use this house on stilts as a watchtower, or if excessive flooding from the Lake is responsible for this loss of trees. Regardless of the reason, the area has not returned to tree cover and so is more likely a natural change and highlights one of the few areas of tree decline, which is mostly likely due to water.

The landscape of GNP is sculpted by numerous drivers of spatial heterogeneity including: herbivory, climate variability, and fire. Large animals, such as elephants, are at least partially responsible for the management of Vachellia seedlings through browsing and trampling. In a study in Tanzania, it was found that decreasing the number of herbivores (due to poaching) led to an increase in shrub and tree vegetation. During the War for Independence and civil wars, 90-99 percent of all the large mammals in Gorongosa were extirpated. Managers have been implementing a plan to increase the number of megafauna (mostly herbivores, such as elephants, hippos, buffalo, and eland) to maintain vegetation and overall health of the ecosystem. As of 2015, the number of herbivores from the beginning of the project in 2007 has increased by 40 percent. Therefore, it will be critical to continue to monitor this landscape as wildlife numbers are increased in an attempt to return the park to its earlier floral and faunal state, which is one of the primary goals of the GNP management team.

Another one of the main drivers in these savanna systems is climate, including precipitation and temperature. Changes in precipitation can contribute to changes in land cover type. In this park, there is a mean annual precipitation of ~1,000 mm from 1981 to 2016 (Figure 2), (with a minimum total annual precipitation of ~650 mm in 1992 and ~1625 mm in 2001). Given the slight decrease in total annual precipitation through time, this park may be susceptible to some land cover change. However, research has shown that the main climate driver in landscapes below 700mm mean annual precipitation (MAP) is precipitation. In these lower precipitation zones, there is a strong linear relationship between metrics of biomass (for example, spectral-based indices such as NDVI) and precipitation. In the transition zone of 700-950mm MAP both precipitation and temperature co-dominate the vegetation cover. Though above 950mm MAP, temperature and fire dominates the landscape pattern. Precipitation in Gorongosa National Park fluctuates near these MAP boundaries, so each of this climate factors (precipitation, temperature, and fire) may play a role in land cover change. Under climate change, these factors should be monitored further.
Fire frequency has shown conflicting impacts of sprouting of vegetation. In general, where fires are more frequent, grass is promoted, and where fires are less frequent, trees are promoted.\textsuperscript{36} The dominant tree genus that has increased in the documented sites is \textit{Vachellia} (see Site 1 photos in Table 2). In other studies, \textit{Vachellia} was also found to be one of the primary increasing tree genera and pioneers in Africa.\textsuperscript{37} After reconstructing the fire history of GNP over the last half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, Daskin et al. 2015 found that fire frequency has not significantly decreased over time.\textsuperscript{38} No single driver is responsible for the vegetation mosaic across GNP, but with significant herbivory change, some climate changes, and slightly differing fire regimes, we are potentially seeing a broad scale alteration of the resultant vegetated landscape.

Future research would continue with the utilization of satellite imagery, beginning in the 1980s, in order to extend the spatial extent. Time series metrics and further discrete data classification of imagery would be ideal to evaluate moderate-term (over the last 30 years) vegetation change and the changing pattern of cover across the entire landscape.

**Acknowledgements**

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**Notes**

1 Chapin 2002; Monserud et al. 1993.
2 Feng and Fu 2013; Ciais 2009.
3 Chapin, 2002
4 Andela et al., 2013; Campo-Bescos et al. 2013; Archer et al. 1995; Van Auken 2000;
6 Campbell and Child 1971; Ringrose et al. 2008.
7 Vogel and Strohbach 2009.
8 Ibid.
11 Moleele 2002.
13 Byers 1987; Crimmins and Crimmins 2008.
14 Hottman and O’Connor 1999.
15 Ringrose et al. 2008.
16 Tinley 1977.
17 Parque Nacional Da Gorongosa Website 2015; Stalmans 2012.
18 Stalmans 2012.
19 Craigie et al. 2010.
20 Roe 2004.
21 Parque Nacional Da Gorongosa Website 2015.
22 Edwards 1983.
23 Daskin et al. 2015.
24 Tinley 1977.
26 Stalmans 2012.
27 Moleele et al., 2002.
29 Prins and van der Jeugd 1993.
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31 Parque Nacional Da Gorongosa Website 2015.
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35 Bond et al. 2003.
35 Hottman and O’Connor 1999.
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BOOK REVIEWS


Baadj’s laudable study is a tale of centrifugal forces. Restoring the Arab world or the entire Muslim world to the age of glory under the Abbasids (750 – 1258 CE), during which the caliph in Baghdad at one point held sway from Central Asia to present-day Algeria has been the ambition of various Arab and Muslim leaders from the turn of the first millennium down to modern times. In the dynasty of the Almohads (1121-1269 CE), based in present-day Morocco, however, a Khomeini-like state emerged which claimed an authority superseding and opposing that of the distant Abbasids. Between the Maghreb al-Aqsa-based Almohads and the Abbasid caliphs with their Egyptian-based champion Saladin (d. 1193 CE) was Ifriqiya (present-day Tunisia) and Tripolitania (roughly present-day Libya), the former loosely held by the Almohads, and the latter mostly administered by no one. Baadj knows that mention of Saladin will arouse interest not only in the scholarly community but even in the general public: this is one of the few medieval Muslim leaders (be it noted he was a Kurd, not an Arab) known outside of the Middle East. The 12th century head of state and general, who recovered Jerusalem from the Crusaders (1187 CE), stabilized Egypt, and consistently maintained allegiance to the senescent Abbasid Caliphate, while not successful in all domains and on every battlefield, has been praised and lionized by authors in both the east and west. These included (to name only a few) his contemporary, biographer Beha Ed-Din, the more critical A. Ehrenkreutz (Saladin, 1972), Tariq Ali in his 1998 novel, The Book of Saladin, and even Ridley Scott (director) in his 2005 film "Kingdom of Heaven." Baadj asks: when Saladin sent the officers Qaraqush and al-Qaraitkin (1168 or 1170 CE) into present-day Libya and Tunisia, was his aim merely to control the flow of gold from West African mines? Was it to carry the black banner of the Abbasids to the shores of the Atlantic and into Spain? Or were these expeditions merely a case of “spillover,” in which a prosperous and powerful Ayyubid administration in Egypt simply wished to try its luck in the west? Baadj concludes that access to the flow of gold was surely significant, but spillover and simple opportunism were also factors.

Regarding the Almohads, Caliph al-Mansur’s guiding policy was probably that stated on his deathbed (1199 CE): “We have no greater charge than the defense of al-Andalus.” In other words, Muslim east and Muslim west had to defend themselves separately, each region for itself. Therefore Saladin should not have been greatly surprised when the Almohad ruler rebuffed his requests in 1189 and 1190 CE for loan of the Almohad fleet to be used against the Crusaders. The fact however that Saladin was willing to cut loose and disavow the actions of the remaining troops of Qaraqush in Ifriqiya confirms Baadj’s argument that Saladin was
capable of bending to considerations of realpolitik, and that conquering the Maghreb was not his priority.

To complicate matters further Ali Bin Ghaniya and Yahya Bin Ghaniya were a pair of brothers based in Majorca who opposed the Almohads, swore allegiance to the Abbasid caliph, and tried to carve out their own domain in the Maghreb in the roughly fifty years between 1167 and 1233 CE, at various times fighting the Almohads, Qaraqush and his allies, and frequently both. If Majorca seems like an unlikely base for the launch of an empire, doubters might be cautioned by the example of the first Moghul emperor Babur (whom however Baadj does not mention), who appeared out of the Central Asia with few forces but over time built up an army capable of conquering northern India. Babur however had technological and tactical advantages, whereas the brothers had only charisma and the ability to spring back again from nearly any defeat. After the demise of Ali, Yahya lost Majorca to the Almohads in 1203 CE and never regained it, but amazingly, even without his island base he succeeded in waging a thirty-year guerrilla war with the Almohads until his death in 1233 CE. Yahya however was no founder of empires; after a defeat in 1205 CE when his pack train was captured his possessions were found to amount to thousands of pack-loads of loot; this was a marauder who called no place home.

Students of North African history will benefit from Baadj’s use of heretofore ignored sources, in particular the *Midmar* of Ibn Taqi al-Din (d. 1220 CE). The domain of the Abbasids had fractured long before Saladin and the Almohads; it was not to be restored.

Kenneth W. Meyer, Western Washington University


Scholarship on archival research has gone through extensive revision for several decades to show how the archives continue to evolve; particularly, how they thrive in some areas, but encounter various challenges as well. In *African Voices on Slavery and the Slave Trade*, the contributors seek to show the significance of slave voices in discourses about slavery. The book explains the ways in which African voices have been silenced in oral testimonies, possession rituals, Arabic language sources, missionary and colonial records, and existing academic literature in general. The authors do not deny the significance of the archives, and the contributions by Europeans, particularly missionaries and colonial officials. However, they tackle and raise important historiographical, methodological, and epistemological questions about the reliability of sources preserved for centuries on the experiences of African slaves, who either remained on the continent or were forcefully transported across the Atlantic waters and elsewhere for economic exploitation. Part of the objective of *African Voices on Slavery and the Slave Trade* is to challenge scholars and researchers to look beyond their past conclusions, based on archival sources, and “revisit their sources to retrieve African voices...with a renewed focus on methodology” (p. 4). The authors are convinced that such reflective methodological
assessment could draw African voices from the peripheral to the forefront of academic discourse.

Africanist and diaspora scholars interested in the history of slavery are often made to believe that any scholarship not grounded in European archival sources is incomplete. A major strength of *African Voices on Slavery and the Slave Trade* is its ability to create an opposite paradigm that emphasizes the significance of slaves’ testimonies and oral sources. Testimonies and oral sources, two pivotal areas of research, have been sidelined for various reasons, including misleading notion that they are unreliable. Archives sources are not flawless either. They have their shortcomings too, and “it is equally important to understand the way that documents have been influenced by particular values, mind-sets and objectives of the individual authors” (p. 114). Further, as the book emphasizes, “to understand the archive one needs to understand the institutions it served” (p. 116). The contradiction is that most of the people who preserved and perpetuated slavery including missionaries, Jesuit priests and colonial officials who created laws to protect their interest in slavery were among those who recorded and created most of the archives, with little or no regards for the voices of those they enslaved (pp. 70-73).

One recurring question in *African Voices on Slavery and the Slave Trade* is, how can researchers filter and rely on European sources and Arabic scripts or documentations alone when they reflect only tiny portion of slaves’ voice and experiences as recorded in the archives? Those interested in this central question are not alone. The authors provide balanced analysis to show that although some missionaries, colonial officials, and those who documented slavery in Arabic scripts were biased and prejudiced in their articulation of slave experiences, they left relevant body of work for understanding part of the testimonies by slaves and their owners. Nonetheless, researchers have to exercise caution when using biographies of missionaries and colonial officials because of “possibility of exaggerations and outright fabrications…to portray the success of their evangelical efforts” (p. 59). Another strength of the book is that it highlights linguistic inadequacies and their major impact on archival sources. The authors caution researchers to be aware of Europeans’ lack of knowledge or their little understanding of local languages and cultures, and the ways in which such inadequacies and flaws tainted their interpretations (p. 64). How to unearth and highlight the role of memory is another focus of the book. Like testimonies and oral sources, memory embedded in cultural practices and rituals are also sidelined in most literature. To reverse this trend, the contributors remind us of iconography or the study of visual representations, including ritual and spirit possessio, that are often ignored or not treated as reliable sources, although they suffer the same weaknesses as written European text in several archival holdings. The book states that “ritual spaces offer a terrain in which good and bad, past and present, suffering and salvation coexist…and are worth being considered, not to create an opposition between discursive and performative memory…but to pay due attention to the neglected and obscure forms of memory” (p. 172).

In general, *African Voices on Slavery and the Slave Trade* makes significant contribution to historiography in the field. The book adds to ongoing dialogue about epistemology, methodology, theory and the complexity of using archival sources. It is an important work that challenges researchers to reflect deeply on the validity and reliability of sources, particularly the dangers of over-reliance on archives that were created by those in authority or those who held a

Catherine Besteman, an anthropologist at Colby College, writes an engaging and timely account of the challenges that Somali Bantu refugees face in their incorporation into American society. Besteman’s longstanding connection to the Somali Bantu community began when she conducted fieldwork in Banta, Somalia, for her PhD dissertation in 1987-1988. Almost twenty years later, and after being unable to reconnect with her old friends for years because of Somalia’s civil war, she reunited with some of them who had relocated to Lewiston, only an hour away from her own home. This encounter led her to immerse herself in helping them in their new lives in the US and to write this rich ethnography, in which she examines the important question of: “How do people who have survived the ravages of war and displacement rebuild their lives in a new country when their world has totally changed?” (p. 4).

*Making Refuge* starts with an evocative description of farming life in Banta before the war and an explanation of how race and ancestry became crucial identity markers when the civil war came to the Jubba Valley. In the 19th century, thousands of slaves from Africa’s east coast were brought to Somalia to work on plantations owned by Somalis. This created a categorization differentiating both groups in social and physical terms: the *jareer* (“hard hair”) are those of slave ancestry, while the *jileec* (“soft hair”) are the ethnic Somalis. This ethnic differentiation also proved to be key in the Somali Bantu resettlement in the US: during the civil war, and after losing their lands and many loved ones, thousands of Somali Bantus fled to Kenya and lived in the Dadaab refugee camp, where they again endured violence and racism from other Somalis. Here they began constructing their Somali Bantu identity in contrast to that of ethnic Somalis and then helped for their refugee resettlement when they were identified as extremely vulnerable inside the camp. Understanding this context helps the reader better grasp the challenges faced by Somali Bantus who start a new life in the US and the importance of their own identity once they settle in Lewiston.

The book is then divided in three parts in which Besteman focuses, first, on issues of humanitarianism and how these discourses constrain and burden those who receive aid and who wish to retain agency over their own lives. Secondly, she discusses the process of resettlement. Lewiston is, in fact, a secondary destination for Somalis and Somali Bantus who were initially resettled in other parts of the country and chose to relocate to Lewiston to establish a larger community of co-nationals. When large numbers of them relocated to
Lewiston, they found that the city was not fully prepared for their arrival, and clashes emerged. But escaping the temptation of blaming incorporation issues on discrimination and racism, Besteman describes four different “versions” of this process. The first concerns Lewiston’s city officials who highlight the financial burden of accommodating unexpected refugees; the second exposes the xenophobic reactions of members of the community who vocally express their rejection of an unwelcome intrusion into their city; the third highlights the crucial role of the social workers, teachers, and community activists who extend care and support to the newcomers. Finally, she focuses on how the members of the Somali Bantu community interpret their own integration process and how they work hard to make Lewiston their home.

Making Lewiston home is the last part of the book and, here, Besteman addresses the issue of immigrant integration by engaging with debates of assimilation. She highlights that integration is not a one-sided issue: refugees in Lewiston change some practices to adapt to their new lives, but Lewiston also changes to include them. While some citizens are more resistant to this change, others understand the need to transform institutions, schools and workplaces to accommodate the newcomers and work hard to make this happen. Thus, Besteman shows how newcomers and locals negotiate their lives together, illustrating that integration works both ways.

Making Refuge is particularly relevant in a time when refugee resettlement is widely discussed, as it points to the flaws and contradictions of a system that expects refugees to be docile and thankful recipients of charity to gain resettlement but at the same time requires for them to become self-sufficient shortly after arriving in the country. Besteman offers many useful lessons to policy makers and those who provide services to refugees as well as students of immigrant incorporation.

Cristina Ramos, University of Florida


Originally published in India in 2012 as *Brown over Black*, Antoinette Burton’s monograph was re-issued last year by Duke University Press under the title *Africa in the Indian Imagination*. This is a well-deserved recognition for a thought provoking, unsettling contribution to the field of Indian Ocean studies—and beyond— that presents the reader with an experimental historiographical method and an unconventional account of Afro-Asian interaction in the post-Bandung era.

Burton’s project of reframing the narratives of Afro-Asian solidarity begins as early as the epigraph: “Exploitation and domination of one nation over another can have no place in a world striving to put an end to all wars.” These words, written by M.K. Gandhi in April 1945 with reference to decolonization and India’s bid for independence, are implicitly re-contextualized by Burton and used as an incisive commentary to what she identifies as the racial logics and sexual politics that informed India’s relationship with Africa in the first decades after independence. According to Burton, India’s effort to create a national identity entailed a vision of Africa and of blackness that was intrinsically defined by the assumption of
their inferior status, in civilizational and racial terms. To substantiate her argument, she
discusses in the introductory chapter (the most far-reaching in terms of theoretical vision and
historical narrative) the “politics of citation” by which Africa and Africans were routinely called
upon, re-signified and “consumed” across a number of texts, so as to become an imaginative
pillar of Indian identity. The book elaborates on this citationary politics as a disavowing
mechanism and a top-down approach to Africa that reveals “the culturally particularistic and
highly gendered” (p. 18) imaginaries of postcolonial India and that calls into question the
fraternal narratives of Bandung. Although Burton is careful to observe that this does not deny
the close entanglement between India and Africa and their archive of cross-racial interaction,
she invites her readers to consider Afro-Asian solidarity, and the modern and contemporary
history of south-south connections, from the vantage point of frictions and fault lines. The rest
of the book, which is conceived as a citationary apparatus, engages a variety of fictional and
non-fictional narratives that are used as specific accounts of the ways in which Africa was
imagined by Indians or by Africans of Indian descent.

The first chapter brings to the reader a commentary on the first novel written by a South
African Indian and on the interpretive possibilities that arise from a method that is attuned to
the citationary politics that plays out within—and beyond—the text. Written in 1960, Ansuyah
R. Singh’s *Behold the Earth Mourns* is the story of a transnational Indian marriage set in Durban
against the backdrop of the passive resistance campaign of 1946-1948, which was organized in
response to the Smuts government’s introduction of the so-called Ghetto Act. In order to
capture the full historicity of Singh’s book, Burton suggests that this be read not only as a
diaspora novel that portrays the struggles of the Indian community in South Africa at the
intersection of class, gender, and race, but as a work of fiction where African characters, and the
possibilities of interracial encounters and collisions, are central to the plot. A novel that openly
dramatizes the frustrations and inadequacies of India’s relationship with Africa is Chanakya
Sen’s *The Morning After* (1973). Published in Bengali only five years after the Bandung
Conference of 1955, Sen’s is a surprisingly early fictional rendering of
the anxieties that generate when the fraternal rhetoric of Bandung translates into interracial interactions and intimacies
within the boundaries of India and the household. As Burton maintains in chapter three, the
novel offers “an intimate counter-history of Afro-Asian solidarity” (p. 115), exposing the
hierarchical logic that inspired India’s development programs for Africa as well as the racial
and sexual protocols of postcolonial India.

In chapters two and four Burton turns her critical gaze from literature to nonfiction and
interrogates two texts that attest to the contrasting ways in which the hyphen that at once
sanctions and hampers the idea of Afro-Asian solidarity has been interpreted and experienced.
The second chapter focuses on *The Importance of Being Black* (1965), Goa-born journalist Frank
Moraeas’ account of his travels through Africa. By reading (perhaps too readily) the travelogue
as a “critical ethnography of emergent African nation-states” (p. 57), Burton argues that this text
and its author participate in the discursive violence of colonial tropes about Africa and Africans,
reframed in the idiom of Indian modernity and reproduced in the context of south-south
confraternity. A reversed narrative of Afro-Asian solidarities—and conflicts—emerges from
Phyllis Naidoo’s writings, primarily *Footprints on Grey Street* (2002), taken up by Burton in the
last chapter. Naidoo’s record of South African freedom fighters of Indian descent, working side
by side with other anti-apartheid activists, is presented as both an effort to desegregate the history of South Africa and a way to refigure Grey Street, the heart of Durban’s Indian community, as a center of interracial politics.

Antoinette Burton’s *Africa in the Indian Imagination* is a highly stimulating study of the (dis)continuities of colonial discourses of race and gender into the framework of transnational solidarity inspired by the Bandung spirit. The project would have benefited from a more rigorous discussion of the theoretical relevance and methodological implications of the “politics of citation,” also considering that the progression of chapters and texts somewhat nibbles away at thematic consistency, particularly towards the end of the volume. Even so, Burton’s book offers a major contribution to our understanding of how India imagined Africa (and, consequently, itself as an independent nation state) and raises the important challenge of rethinking and complicating the postcolonial histories of Afro-Asian connections.

Luca Raimondi, King’s College London


In a 1964 interview with the Argentine revolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara (1969), Josie Fanon— the widow of Frantz Fanon— asked Guevara why he began his tour of Africa in Algeria. Guevara replied that in order “to go to Africa we have to come to Algeria first.” From here, Guevara turned his attention to the possibilities and potential pitfalls of revolution in Africa. Implied in Guevara’s initial response to Fanon, though, was an understanding of both Algeria and, by extension, Africa funneled through the lens of the revolution and war of decolonization that marked the North African state’s previous decade. As Jeffrey James Byrne’s *Mecca of Revolution* wonderfully details, in the early 1960s, this was a connection that Guevara was not alone in making. Rather, over the course of the 1950s and 1960s, Algeria came to hold a unique place in the burgeoning anticolonial and Cold War imaginary, emerging for many in Africa, Asia, and beyond as one of the epicenters for a burgeoning Third World order.

The world Byrne thus attempts to reconstruct in *Mecca of Revolution* is one of wide-ranging conflict, confusion, hope, and ambition. Over the last decade, an increasing array of books have sought to transport readers into this world and the political and cultural imaginaries pursued by so many activists, politicians, and freedom fighters in the mid-twentieth century. In many ways, Byrne’s book stands atop this growing literature. Not only does he provide a seemingly exhaustive narrative enriched by a wide-ranging archival record featuring material from Algeria, France, Serbia, the United States, and Great Britain, but he also reads these sources with a discerning eye intent on taking seriously the complicated worldviews driving this vibrant and chaotic moment in world history.

To this end, Byrne divides his text into five substantive chapters, each of which examines a particular facet of Algeria’s decolonization experience, along with the varying ways in which this experience was read in sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and the Middle East, among other locales. In doing so, Byrne dutifully unpacks the Algerian revolutionaries’ and later government’s often divergent relationships to the diverse groups of political actors that
comprised these varying political and geographic regions. In Africa, this entailed an analysis of the Algerian government’s relationship to the governments of such states as Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana, Sékou Touré’s Guinea, and Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt. Other portions of the book detail the Algerian interactions with Cuba, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union. In nearly all of these instances, Byrne consistently reiterates to his readers the innovation and methodological bricolage implicit in the Algerians’ attempts to project their revolution outward and in attempting to manage its and the burgeoning Third World’s contradictions from the inside.

As a result, in *Mecca of Revolution*, Byrne not only forces his readers to recognize the complexity of the given historical moment in Algeria, but, more importantly, challenges them to embrace this complexity in their own studies of the decolonization era in Africa and beyond. In doing so, Byrne argues that, at varying moments, decolonizing and newly independent states like Algeria simultaneously embraced and struggled with the politics of Third World internationalism, Cold War polarity, and, in certain instances, even the remaining vestiges of colonial rule. For some looking in, the inconsistencies and contradictions embedded within Algerian policy led to disappointment, while others developed the blinded eyes necessary to overlook them. However, what Byrne ultimately does show through his analysis of this political moment is that the inconsistencies and contradictions of the decolonization era were necessarily par for the course in not only the transition from colonial to self-rule, but, just as importantly, the international definition of an envisioned anti-imperial Third World order for the coming decades.

In African Studies, Byrne’s *Mecca of Revolution* thus joins a growing collection of books detailing both the continent’s decolonization and the diversity of ways in which Africans related to and negotiated the various possibilities of decolonization. Among these recent works include Frederick Cooper’s analysis of citizenship in French West Africa, Elizabeth Schmidt’s work on Guinean nationalism, and Meredith Terretta’s on Cameroonian internationalism, to name a few. What sets Byrne apart from these rich studies is the way in which he integrated so many often-divergent historical literatures—Algerian, Africanist, Middle Eastern, Cold War, and French—in unpacking his argument. For this reason alone, *Mecca of Revolution* should make a lasting impact in fields including the study of mid-century decolonization movements, Third World internationalism, and the global Cold War, among others.

Notes


Jeffrey S. Ahlman, Smith College


On the first day of the Battle of the Somme, the British Army suffered some 60,000 casualties in a horrific slaughter, one that came to define, in part, the brutal absurdity of the First World War.
Although the Great War was fought in Africa, the Middle East, and Russia, it has been defined and remembered largely by the hecatombs on the Western Front, where France and Britain, joined later by the United States, battled Germany in a war of attrition: this was understood as a White Man’s War. And yet, on 18 August 1916, Private Walter Colebourne, a British-born black man from Liverpool lost his life at the Somme.

Ray Costello addressed this death and the military experiences of other British-born and domiciled black soldiers and other African descended peoples in his *Black Tommies: British Soldiers of African Descent in the First World War*, a work that complicates our understanding of the war. Although the military contributions of Caribbean and African peoples to the British war effort has long been researched, the contributions of blacks in Britain has not—and it is no easy task. The British did not identify one’s race on census records, nor, typically, on military records. Costello thus had scant information, often discovered haphazardly, to reclaim the lives of black servicemen. What Costello discovered is not without merit and gives one pause not just about British racism, which is well known, but more about the British military’s commitment to a racial hierarchy, at the potential expense of successfully prosecuting the war.

British-born and domiciled blacks were a rather small, dispersed demographic in 1914. These black individuals who volunteered for service early in the war, like most fit Britons, readily found themselves assigned to the regular army, then sent to France to fight Germans; black men were thus given weapons, training, and encouragement to kill white men. Some recruiting officers, however, thought better of this, with one stating, “‘we must discourage coloured volunteers’” (p. 16). But there was no rule prohibiting blacks from serving; rather, enlistment officers exercised their discretion and, reflecting the will of the War Office, simply found many blacks unfit for service, despite the demonstrable need for manpower.

Racism more directly affected the commissioning of black officers. The British *Manual of Military Law* of 1914 stated officers must be of “‘pure European descent’” (p. 92). George Bemand, an educated, mixed-race Londoner, born in Jamaica, claimed pure European descent and earned his commission as a Second Lieutenant in the Royal Field Artillery. Other blacks, however, stated they were not of pure European descent and they, too, were commissioned. Some medical officer candidates were commissioned, others rejected because of race. Costello concludes from this inconsistency that merit and wartime exigencies overcame racism—but not consistently, shadism and class were often mediating influences. Still, unlike in the United States military, British blacks did lead white soldiers.

Although Costello’s stated purpose was to research British-born and domiciled blacks in the war, much of his work narrated the service of African descended peoples from the colonies. In British colonial Africa, African volunteers and conscripts fought German colonial African soldiers. In the Caribbean colonies, black men demanded the right to serve both to show loyalty and for expected political rewards. The War Office opposed their service, fearing it could lead to independence struggles. Pressured, the War Office relented, ultimately allowing Caribbean units to form and serve in Europe—but only as labor units. These colonial units profoundly impacted British-born and domiciled blacks; recruiting officers assigned some of these black citizens to colonial units, suggesting a deep-seated racist belief of who truly constituted the nation.
This work demonstrates that, in this centennial moment, new, fresh understandings of the Great War and its combatants can be found, especially by looking at the war through the lens of race. Unfortunately, Costello promised much more than he delivered. The data on British-born and domiciled blacks is so scant that the anecdotes provided only whet our appetite for more information and much more analysis, not to mention engagement with historiographic arguments about race and diaspora. Second, we almost never learn of the black soldiers’ experiences, just that they served. Third, Costello framed his contribution with an excessive reliance on secondary sources, such as on the race riots of 1919 or the history of British West Indian Regiment; he only synthesizes, not analyzes this historiography. Finally, this work suggests that the time is ripe, now, for an international, comparative study of the role, contributions, and experiences of all African descended peoples in the Great War.

Brett A. Berliner, Morgan State University


In sub-Saharan Africa in particular and the world in general, literary works that by their main theme crosscuts Christianity, Islam, and liberal democracy are one and the same as treading on inflammable political terrains. From the East Coast of sub-Saharan Africa through its central tropical basins to the West Coast, the historical development of emergent African nations has been laced with sumptuous and reoccurring attempts to adapt to the Western model of liberal democracy. In most of these cases the spirituality of the people often defined through the interfacing agencies of Christianity and Islam emerge as determining factors. Analytically presenting these situations in such a way as to present a vivid picture of the trending political events in sub-Saharan Africa is just what Robert Dowd did in *Christianity, Islam and Liberal Democracy: Lessons from sub-Saharan Africa.*

This work of comparative geo-political analysis of “Religion in Politics” is fully enriched with a capacious bibliography, elucidating reference notes, and index and an extravagant display of informative reference figures and tables. The seven chapters thematically offer as much in-depth details as possible, yet maintaining a resilient art of inter-chapter connectivity. In the introduction, which is chapter one, the author builds up his thematic framework with a strong index of existing theoretical models. His major proposition is that “Christianity and Islam are not unchanging, essences. They always have a locality in time and space and their locality affects the way in which the religions are interpreted and appropriated” (p. 6). He then goes further to elaborate on this thesis by giving instances that cut across Africa, Asia and Europe, offering arguments that subsequently rest on his findings and thematic focus.

The second chapter, “Time, Place, and the Application of Religion to Politics,” displays the author’s in-depth knowledge of the theology of politics. Beginning with the premise that “there has been a great deal of variation in how leaders of the same religious faith tradition, whether Christians or Muslims have applied their faith tradition to politics across time and across space at the same point in time,” he proceed with a crucial question. “How do we explain these differences that exist even within the same religious tradition? We want to know why religious
leaders choose to apply their faith traditions in ways that promote or impede political participation, support for democracy and respect for freedom of religion, speech and association” (p. 22). The following sections of this chapter clearly present what could be defined as theoretical prologue to the above question thematically outlined with elucidating presentations.

Moving from the realm of theoretical backgrounds we are launched through the third chapter into the motion of practical politics with a short and incising title, “The Role of Religious Leaders.” This chapter introduces the game of “real religious politics” in sub-Saharan Africa. As the author aptly puts it: “In this chapter, I present evidence from sub-Saharan Africa that reveals a correlation between two factors—religious diversity and educational attainment—and the extent to which Christian and Muslim religious leaders promoted pro-freedom political activism during the 1980s and 1990s” (p. 50). Citing degrees of variations in religious and ethnic diversities as supporting variables, the author concluded that “Christian and Muslim religious leaders tend to be more supportive of democracy in more highly educated and religiously diverse settings than religiously homogenous settings” (p. 79).

Chapter four goes further to explain “the impact of religious communities” in defining appropriate pattern of liberal democracy. Chapter five looks at the comparative settings of Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda, the three sub-Saharan African nations that arguably present the practical models of interfacing religious factor in liberal democracy. Chapter six is no doubt a curious follow-up of the fifth chapter in which the author passes the bulk of his theoretical argument on the Nigerian scenario. He sums up his argument with the question: “Does Nigeria’s religious diversity explain why religious observance had a more positive effect on civic engagement and religious tolerance there than in Senegal and Uganda, or are there other factors that distinguish Nigeria from the often two countries that explain why religious observance had a more positive effect (on) Civic engagement and religious tolerance in Nigeria” (p. 123)?

The concluding part of the work, chapter seven, is not only a compelling summary of this pain-staking copious treatise but raises a number of questions that make the work a compelling impetus for further research on the subject matter. With a striking intellectual humility uncommon with most intellectual traditions, the author wraps up what appears to be the inconclusiveness of his conclusion in these words:

While we know that Christianity and Muslims apply religious ideas to politics in various ways in Nigeria, in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and in other religions of the world, we have more work to do before we can say that we understand and can explain this variation very well. As I try to make clear in this final chapter, more research is needed. However, my hope is that this book represents a step forward along the path that leads toward greater understanding and evidence informed policy prescriptions (p. 171).

The book thus in presenting copious wealth of knowledge in the interfacing roles of Christianity and Islam in promoting the culture of liberal democracy in sub-Saharan Africa in the same vein presents itself as a veritable springboard for further research.

Nwankwo T. Nwaezeigwe, University of Nigeria

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[http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v17/v17i2a5.pdf](http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v17/v17i2a5.pdf)

Gifford examines African Christianity and its significance in the development and modernity in Africa. The book has nine chapters excluding the preliminary notes. The author is one of the several European scholars who have researched Africa Christianity in the last three decades. However, the author perceives that his scholarship might not be entirely a true representation of African Christianity, a byproduct of misconception or broad generalizations, and as such he welcomes criticism. Gifford’s admission inevitably sets the tone for a careful appraisal of his scholarship.

The author observed the significance for Africa of Christian denominations, the colonial emergence in Africa, and the predatory disposition in the division of Africa by the colonial powers. Gifford describes the growth of Christianity in sub-Saharan Africa as “perhaps the most salient social force in sub-Saharan Africa” (p. 12). However, Gifford sets forth his views on observable theological and religious idiosyncrasies between African Christianity and the historic denominations. The author copiously describes the enchanted Christianity he associates with African Christianity and the disenchanted nature of historic denominations on human development. In sustaining his arguments on enchanted Christianity he opines: “enchanted imagination, along with the prosperity Gospel, and emphasis on the pastor’s ‘anointing,’ are the principal characteristics of much African Pentecostalism” (front flap).

Interestingly, the author was very selective in his data analyses characterized by broad generalizations about a multifaceted African Christianity phenomenon. Nevertheless, Gifford observes that there is the urgent need for the appraisal of Christianity and other religions in the sustainable development of Africa. While acknowledging the contributions of religious organizations to development, the author inadvertently seems trapped in essentialism as he failed to appreciate the heterogeneous and the uniqueness of African Christianities. Gifford’s disposition implies the denial of the lived realities within the African context to address their existential realities as African Christianities, particularly some Pentecostal ethos which resonates in the Traditional African worldview such as malevolent forces, curses, demons, witchcraft, and exorcism. Gifford’s disposition might be a byproduct of the armchair research disposition of some scholars who make use of data collated from pronouncements, books, creeds, and pamphlets but are devoid of the understanding of religious praxis as well as the lack of engagement with religious practitioners.

Gifford interprets a denial of the spiritual realm to be necessary for progress and development in Africa, although seemingly claiming to have a firm understanding of the religious worldviews and the peculiarities of African Christianities. The clarion call from Gifford that African Christianity should abandon its “enchanted dimension” (p. 105), which is a major distinctiveness of the movement which is contextual and addresses the lived experiences of Africans. However, to condemn the Catholic Church, with its somewhat secularized development cynosure, of its indifference for and powerlessness to provide another remedy to the enchanted religious needs of African Catholics is surprising.

Gifford’s argument about the enchanted imaginations is not peculiar to African Christianities alone but also a feature of even the Charismatic Catholics although overly...
exaggerated. The repudiation of any compatibility between the enchanted worldview as well as rationality depicts the “locked in western syndrome” mindset of Gifford. The overly western mindset and supremacist notions are evident in the boisterous assertion, “claiming that no other organization can match this involvement in development” on the contributions of Catholic Church in Africa to development. The author’s claim might be correct during the colonial era in Africa. However, a cursory overview of African Pentecostalism to development was grossly understated and denied by Gifford. The contributions of the Pentecostal tradition pervade various sectors of the economy including education, financial sector, healthcare delivery, farming, hospitality, and so forth.

The clarion call by Gifford for disengagement from the enchanted to disenchanted imaginations by African Christianities to move to the level of modernity is wishful thinking devoid of contextual knowledge and lived realities of Africans. Therefore, Gifford’s prior acknowledgment of the possibility of over generalizations in this work was not a matter of perception, but a reality and the overtly simplified complex religious realities in Africa is to deny it heterogeneous and homogenous nature.

Babatunde Adedibu, Redeemed Christian Bible College, Nigeria


Development is undoubtedly a prevailing buzzword although it is accentuated by different discourses across time and space. Despite the discursive shifts that have occurred throughout the periods of modernization to a stage envisioned by some theorists as “post-development,” there are several dominant concepts that have framed our understanding of the socio-economic, cultural, and political conditions of the world. This book under review attempts to critically engage with some of these concepts, revealing their often universalizing and uncontested (sometimes contested) genealogies as well as their stereotypical representations of the state of poverty and development in Africa. The objective of the stimulating eight-chapter edited book is to engage with popularized ‘Western-oriented’ concepts around Africa’s “development.”

Using the analogy of photographic cameras to explain how their lenses are not designed to reproduce images of black and white subjects with equal sharpness, Kjell Havnevik presents this caution in the first chapter: “we should avoid universalizing our technical, scientific and cultural development as if they could be applied to other cultures without critical reflection” (p. 3). This is an appeal against the “naturalization” of Western values and perspectives. The book reveals four themes under which the West frames Africa’s development. The first theme is used to reinforce the asymmetrical power relations between the West and Africa. Cemented by racist perceptions and stereotypes, the representation of the “other” did facilitate the spread of colonialism with the goal of bringing civilization to people who were culturally, economically, and socially backward. Even though “this ‘afro-pessimism’ has partly turned to ‘afro-optimism’” in recent years, still “it is only occasionally that optimistic and positive stories about Africa and elsewhere hit the headlines” (p. 27).
The second theme is based on the concepts of poverty, empowerment, and livelihoods. Despite efforts to address poverty on the continent since the 1970s, 41 percent of the population according to 2015 estimates live below the World Bank’s poverty threshold of $1.25 per day. While this statistic might be useful, there are limits to mainly using an income-based monetary approach to understand poverty in Africa because poverty is “context bound and displays many particularities in its multidimensionality” (p. 36). To further showcase this multidimensionality, empowerment has become a popular term used to frame Africa’s development discourses, with the expectation that the marginalized and the disenfranchised in society could grasp some relative power and agency to act. Nonetheless, there remain real challenges with the term including practices of tokenism where stakeholders are brought to the table to only endorse programs and policies that have been agreed upon in private circles.

The book’s third theme is focused on the concepts of displacement and primitive accumulation. What both concepts have in common is a reflection on ongoing changes that hinder people’s livelihoods and access to land and other resources. Understanding the historical processes that underlie these intertwined concepts helps to appreciate why they are often sidelined in development discussions although they are both crucial elements of the West’s framing of development in Africa. The last theme relates to agricultural production, sustainability, rights, and power—encapsulated in such concepts as food security and food sovereignty. As a logical continuation of the previous theme, it highlights the limits in our current understanding of the causes of hunger over long periods of time, including the power relations that sustain it. The suggestion is for a definition that avoids the neoliberal win-win narrative and rather shifts the paradigm towards environmental sustainability, global social justice, human rights, and fair trading agreements.

While the book is a delightful addition to discourses on Africa’s development, there are at least two things that could have improved it. Firstly, there is reference to “West” and “Western” in various chapters but no explanation is provided as to what they mean in the context of the book. For example, is it the “West” in terms of North America and Europe or as a “white, Christian Man” (p. 2) or both? Properly contextualizing these terms would have been useful in the first chapter because based on what we know from development studies, such binaries as Self/Other, West/Rest, North/South, and Developed/Developing cannot be taken for granted, especially for a book that critically engages with challenging concepts. Secondly, there should have been a conclusion to examine implications of the “challenging concepts” for the theory and practice of development in Africa. Some chapters provided a few insights but a conclusion by the editors could have provided a broader reflective overview, as it would have properly concretized the editors’ hope that their endeavor leads to improved policy prescription and intervention for Africa’s development. Having said that, the book’s length and writing style auger well for a good read. Thus, I recommend it for students, scholars, and practitioners of development in Africa and possibly elsewhere.

Nathan Andrews, Queen’s University

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http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v17i2a5.pdf

The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WEAMU) is one of the four formal currency unions in the world, consisting of the countries Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Like other common markets, such as the European Union (EU), the WEAMU eliminates custom duties, establishes a common external tariff, creates common rules for competition, and guarantees the free movement of persons, establishments, provision of services, and capital flows. Building Integrated Economies in West Africa is a comprehensive analysis of the lessons learned from the WEAMU so far and the policy recommendations to achieve development and stability objectives.

Editor Alex Kireyev and his International Monetary Fund (IMF) colleagues’ efforts resulted in an excellent manuscript that provides a comprehensive and engaging analysis of the different institutional challenges, while keeping in sight the common goals of the WEAMU. The foreword, written by the IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde, outlines the importance of the book for policy-makers in West Africa, as well as policy-makers in countries contemplating to create or join a monetary union. In addition, Lagarde emphasizes that the book is a facet of the Fund’s commitment to helping WEAMU countries manage their economic challenges. The book is well organized and opens with a succinct introduction that highlights the findings and recommendations for each of the six parts: overview and policy setting, growth and inclusiveness, fiscal policy and coordination, regional monetary policy, financial development and sustainability, and competitiveness and integration. The parts are further divided in chapters, in which each of the experts at the IMF comment on specific fiscal mechanisms that govern the Union. The chapters are clear and include numerous tables and figures that visualize empirical data and organizational structures of the WEAMU.

The first part, overview and policy setting, provides an outline of the history and organization of the monetary union. The authors explain that the WEAMU countries have taken significant steps toward economic integration, but that progress has been slow because several countries remained noncompliant with the convergence criteria and nontariff restrictions within the common market persist. The second part, growth and inclusiveness, assesses why economic growth in the WEAMU countries has been lower than the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. The part indicates that “macroeconomic” shocks are key contributors to the lack of development in the region. These shocks are caused by political instability and the lack of diversity in output and export. The IMF experts suggest that inclusiveness and equality as well as the mobilization of financial resources will stimulate growth in the West African region. The third part, financial policy and coordination, states that the high fiscal deficits exert pressure on the Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCAEO), the common central bank of the WEAMU. Achieving fiscal discipline remains a challenge in a monetary union without a central fiscal authority. However, given that the macroeconomic shocks are uneven in the region, fiscal federalism is necessary to share the risks. The authors argue that better tax coordination and tax policy harmonization could help increase revenue collection and improve the fiscal space. The fourth part, regional monetary policy, argues that the BCAEO has significant weight in the
banking system. However, the current financial markets and low inflation rates prevent the central bank from having a stronger impact on liquidity conditions and inflation. Although investments are necessary, the BCAEO should be cautious because elevated levels of central bank liquidity provision to commercial banks in the region may cause instability, as widening fiscal and external imbalances can lead to weakness in the fiscal, monetary, and supervisory coordination between national and supranational institutions. The fifth part, financial development and stability, explains that financial institutions in the WEAMU counties too often do not comply with international standards for prudential norms. The IMF sees financial stability as a critical factor for financial growth and a necessity for attracting foreign investments and capital flows. Therefore, the framework for crisis prevention needs strengthening, as it is a crucial instrument of macroeconomic development. The sixth part, competitiveness and integration, argues that WEAMU countries have few exportable commodities and should invest in upgrading capacities in key sectors to become more competitive on the international market. Furthermore, the region should take advantage of the regional market. As a result of weak implementation of trade and financial integration, the common market has not significantly contributed to reduced poverty. However, the IMF remains hopeful that a focus on regional policies in sectors where comparative advantages are the strongest, combined with the distributive effects of integration, will enable the WEAMU to foster economic growth.

Building Integrated Economies in West Africa offers a systematized overview of challenges and accomplishments of low-income countries forming a monetary union. The authors’ ability to describe an extensive and complex topic in an articulate book is remarkable. The drawback, however, is that the authors could have made more of an effort to build on existing research and include theories to justify their policy recommendations. Furthermore, the authors neglect to critically evaluate the impact of external factors that hinder growth in the WEAMU countries, most importantly, the systemic political constrains arising from economic policies that favor the interests of western countries at the expense of developing nations. Despite the inadequate theoretical justifications and critical assessments of western influences, the book is a noteworthy reference work for policy-makers, scholars, and students seeking to establish, develop, or enhance their expertise the WEAMU or monetary unions in general.

Anne Mook, University of Florida


Healing Roots should be compulsory reading for students of pharmacology in Africa. That statement summarizes the wealth of information and in-depth analysis contained in a book that set out to, and succeeded in articulating the dissonance that exists in attempts to validate indigenous medicine using completely alien and super-imposed standards. Dr. Laplante’s research focuses on the plant, Artemisia Afra (A. Afra) or Umhlonyne in Xhosa and Zulu, which is “one of the oldest and best-known of all indigenous medicines in southern Africa,” and has
been used by locals to treat a wide range of ailments when taken as “enemas, poultices, infusions, body washes, lotions, smoked, snuffed or drunk as tea” (p. 3).

Laplante’s anthropological quest focused on the subjection of *A. Afra* to Randomized control trials (RCT), in order to determine its efficacy against tuberculosis. *A. Afra*’s RCT (pre-clinical trial stage) was conducted in Cape Town, South Africa between 2005 and 2010 by the research consortium, The International Center for Indigenous Phytotherapy Studies (TICIPS), and was funded by the National Institute of Health’s (NIH) National Center for Complementary and Alternative Medicine in Washington D.C.

The author’s level of understanding of African traditional medicine is uncommon for a non-indigenous researcher, and this goes beyond the fact that she spent time interviewing, observing, and engaging stakeholders involved in the indigenous knowing and use of *A. Afra* and those involved in the pre-clinical trials of the herb. From the pages of *Healing Roots*, it becomes clear that Dr. Laplante did not conduct the research as an outsider, an external observer. She sought to embed herself in the life of *A. Afra*, and that act forms the core of her thesis, which is that indigenous medicine’s efficaciousness is grounded in its holistic approach to life and living; indigenous medicine lives with, thrives in, and attends to the needs of human beings within the same physical and spiritual space.

While indigenous medicine encompasses all of life itself, RCT thrives on the exclusion of a molecule through a process that sanitizes the plant of life and the lived experiences of end-users. Dr. Laplante’s work is instructive as it does not outrightly repudiate the RCT process in its entirety per se, but probes the necessity and possibility of validity the efficacy of indigenous medicine through a process that drains it of its mediums of effectiveness. These mediums, which Laplante was able to establish through her interactions with the major traditional users of *A. Afra*, the *Isangoma* and *bossiedoktors*, include being called to become a healer, establishing proximity with the plant, and “establishing good relations with the plants.” Both *Isangoma* and *bossiedoktors* agree that the way *A. Afra* is manipulated from the cultivation to the experimentation stage during RCT separates the plant from the people it is meant to heal and renders it inefficacious to a large extent.

Laplante’s interaction with *Isangoma* and *bossiedoktor* around one single plant *A. Afra*, gives her a one sided view of African traditional medicine. In its entirety, African indigenous medicine is deep and diverse, contrary to Laplante’s submission that it is ‘less about objects’ such as plants, barks and minerals than about the ways to relate accordingly through these mediums (p. 245). In Africa, there exists herbal practitioners who administer herbs gained from generations past, and who do not necessarily embrace such other mediums as sounds, dances and performances to invoke ancestors. Successful traditional bonsetters, midwives, and other health practitioners in Africa often utilize only herbs and tried and tested techniques to assist patients in healing. In her experience, therefore, Dr. Laplante refers to only an aspect of African indigenous medicine.

The author’s view of the RCT process as disfigured or inadequate due to its insistence on singling out molecular configurations can be said to apply across several aspects of African indigenous medicine. Many other trajectories exists, which ensures the effectiveness of indigenous medicine, but which does not make it to RCT due to the way the latter is structured. However, one can say that the mode of preparation of indigenous herbal remedies, appears to
promote the effectiveness of certain molecules within the plant; for some remedies, plants are boiled, for others smoked, for others grinded, and so on.

In all however, African indigenous medicine does come with its own distinct reality and there is need for research methods to be enlarged, and to eschew certain restrictive demands in order to benefit suffering humanity in search of health and wholeness.

Chika Ezeanya-Esiobu, University of Rwanda


In The Land Reform Deception, Laurie recounts modern Zimbabwean land seizures through the lens of career politicians, war veterans, and opportunistic thieves. While the topic, nepotistic land distribution, and the subject, Zimbabwe, are far from new ground, Laurie’s text enriches the existing literature with gripping testimonies from politicians, farmers, Zimbabwe’s internal intelligence service, the military, and police officers. He confidently challenges the assumption that Mugabe’s government deliberately redistributed all of Zimbabwe’s seized land. In short, Laurie argues that President Mugabe’s redistributive land policy had the unintended consequence of abrogating property rights across much of Zimbabwe while the regime was forced to concede to land grabbing by Zimbabweans from all walks of life. According to Laurie, lax enforcement by the police and military as well as sweeping declarations by politicians resulted in land grabbing and evictions that the Mugabe administration was forced to recognize as fait accompli. Laurie embeds these evocative narratives in an analytical framework already adeptly punctuated with descriptive statistics evincing the work’s foundational argument. These complementary data draw in both scholars and laypeople.

Laurie is not afraid to confront the received wisdom regarding Zimbabwe’s land reform. For example, Laurie disagrees with Sam Moyo’s 2011 account that bandits complied with the 2002 Land Acquisition Act. Zimbabwean farmers’ testimonies in Laurie’s work serve as evidence to question Moyo’s assessment. Likewise, Laurie directly indicts ruling elites who profited from land seizures, a claim which suggests that previous research misidentified the thieves and victims. For example, Laurie opposes accounts such as Scoones et al. (2011) as well as Moyo among others who he argues fail to recognize economic political elites as the beneficiaries of seized land during this period (p. 195). Instead, he inculpates not only opportunistic bandits but also political and military elite who took advantage of the security vacuum created by a criminally negligent government.

A thorough descriptive narrative supports Laurie’s indelible, analytical contribution to the property rights research program. In this work, he constructs a typology of “best” land invaders; these invaders are the most suited to seize land and delegitimize the claims of existing inhabitants. To Laurie, the economic and political backgrounds of those invaders are directly related to how they seize the land, how confident the bandits can be in retaining it, and how long they plan to control it. Clearly, the nephew of the president may be more secure against opposition than a subsistence farmer who seizes another subsistence farmer’s plot. Laurie also considers land that has changed hands over the course of his study. While some veterans and
politically-connected invaders maintain a parcel of land, others lose the parcel that they seized to other, more ‘successful’ invaders (p. 256). Laurie’s sophisticated understanding of these invaders extends to the motives for land seizures. Laurie also usefully differentiates land seized and used agriculturally, land seized and used commercially, land seized as an investment asset, and land immediately sold (p. 185). These analytical typologies begin to demonstrate the overall depth and descriptive commitment of Laurie’s manuscript, which itself parallels the complexity of Zimbabwean land seizures.

The Land Reform Deception lays out several power asymmetries that privilege invaders over farmers during the land seizure period. While the opportunistic invaders seek financial profit the new claim, the inhabitants lose more than their financial wellbeing (p. 268). Victims also forfeit emotional and social value that they vest in their farm and farm life. Farmers who resisted invaders also faced temporally asymmetric battles: their time-sensitive, immobile assets (crops) faced harangue from invaders and saboteurs who often could retreat to their day jobs in Harare or other urban centers. Of course all of this farm theft, market uncertainty, and acquisition by mostly-inexperienced farmers reduced Zimbabwe’s agricultural productivity.

This definitive work causally ties reform efforts with specific political opportunists through interviews, numerical data, and legislative outcomes. Members of parliament and police individually benefited from this period of chaos, and Laurie explains why and how they participated in the seizures. Importantly, though, Laurie explicitly and clearly details chaos through approximately eleven years of lawlessness, legal ambiguity, and finally codified redistribution. At times, land distribution may be the outcome of purposeful design, but here it was also a response by Zimbabwe’s weak government to concede to massive seizures by political elites and opportunist bandits.

References


Ryan Gibb, Baker University


Few subject matters, perhaps, have received as much critical study as man’s inhumanity to man which manifests as colonialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, among others. One of the great minds who have studied colonialism is Frantz Fanon (1925-1961). Remarkable about Fanon is his less than two-score year stint with life which belies his robust intellectual, philosophical, and political stature. Fanon’s intellectual relevance continues to reverberate as inhumanity against man generally and against the black race, in particular, has continued apace. Christopher J. Lee’s Frantz Fanon: Toward a Revolutionary Humanism presents an encapsulated study of both Fanon and Fanonism, an academic concept that has regrettably been relegated to the
background of the historical significance of Fanon himself. The book is Lee’s attempt at properly situating Fanon within the historical realities that both produced him and his political, philosophical, and psychological arguments now referred to as Fanonism. Lee underscores Fanon’s “radical empathy” by which Fanon committed class suicide by jettisoning his middle class privileges for a life among the oppressed. These views are well espoused by Lee.

Henry Louis Gates Jr.’s informed standpoint noted “the relative disregard for Fanon’s personal history in contemporary scholarship, which occasioned the anachronistic use of Fanon’s work and caused his alienation from the specific colonial contexts and revolutionary spirit that influenced his thinking” (p. 22). Similarly, Lee denounces the ahistorical study of Fanon and emphasizes the inalienable need for a historical contextualization of Fanon’s work. Lee argues that the ahistorical study of Fanon’s work severs it from its nuanced and pragmatic depth. Lee’s intellectual biography does not, therefore, focus on any one concept or book by Fanon but studies the entire gamut of Fanon’s scholarly oeuvre. Lee refutes the opinion that Fanon is an entry point to understanding Martinique (his place of birth) and Algeria (his adopted country) and posits contrarily that Martinique and Algeria should be entry points to understanding Fanon.

Lee shows how the paradox of Fanon’s “French-ness” which granted Martiniquais equal political and social status, in principle, but denied them same in practice based on race, made Fanon conscious of the socio-political and economic implications of Martinique’s racial demography. In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon depicts psychological realism, which Lee explains as “a grounded dialectic between the social and the unconscious” (p. 75). Lee discusses the so-called North African Syndrome, a psychosomatic condition which Fanon encountered among Algerian immigrants in Lyon, France, who suffered from physical ailments that Fanon thought were attributable to social alienation. In Lee’s view, the psychological effects of racism on the psyche of black persons which makes them to relate differently with white persons than they would do with blacks informed Fanon’s foray into psychoanalysis.

Fanon’s A Dying Colonialism, Lee points out, presents a critical social realism that “posed the fact of colonialism (and anti-colonialism) against views that would have Algeria merely be a part of France” (p. 135). Fanon’s membership of the staff of the El Moudjahid, a publication of the National Liberation Front (FLN), was a boost to its French edition and readership. Lee sees The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon’s last book as “providing solutions to the problems of racism and dehumanization” thus underpinning the symmetry between it and Black Skin, White Masks.

Perhaps the paradox of Fanon’s “French-ness” that both granted and denied him equal citizenship produced in him another paradox of “being a physician and committed to armed struggle” (p. 158). To Fanon, violence has cathartic potentials but should not be gratuitously employed. It is “a situated act, specific to colonization and decolonization” (p. 156). Decolonization is anticolonial violence and therefore “antiviolence violence.” Lee notes that Fanon was never fully able to resolve this paradox thus presaging his own difficulty in striking a convincing balance between a humane physician and an advocate for violent decolonization though he set out to do so.

Lee examines Fanon’s “radical empathy”—a distinct ethic emblematic of Fanon’s politics and writing by which he sought a ‘Third’ world not categorized by physical development but
one that is “beyond the existing worlds of the colonizer and the colonized” (p. 178). This is Fanon’s “new humanism."

This intellectual biography affords Lee the opportunity to mentally revisit his formative years in Gaborone (Botswana), his home country, during the apartheid era in neighboring South Africa. It provides not an in-depth study or analyses of any of Fanon’s philosophical or political ideas but enough of all that Fanon stood for to whet any scholarly appetite.

Oluchi J. Igili, Adekunle Ajasin University


One rich element of modern colonial histories is that they acknowledge the nuance with how colonialism affected different nations. Giacomo Macola successfully crafted what he declared as “the first detailed history of firearms in central Africa between the early nineteenth and the early twentieth century” (p. 19), which is an example of applying nuance to a basic idea: what happened when guns were introduced to Central Africa on a cultural level? This comprehensive examination of guns’ social symbolism is conjoint with a broader history of firearms in the region, which encompasses the early introduction of guns to gun regulation in the 1920s across dozens of different nations.

Macola’s central argument is that there is no single correct answer as to how Central Africans saw guns outside of utilitarianism. His attempts to explain the varied responses to the integration of European weaponry among African nations are multifaceted, and he continuously emphasized that it is important to examine how different nations responded separately from how other nations did. One example of this is the different Luvale and Ngoni views of the relationship of guns to masculinity. There was strong evidence in the late nineteenth century of a link between “gun ownership and masculinity” (p. 65) among the Luvale hunters and raiders of northwestern Zambia and southeastern Angola. To own a gun was to master nature, and to be superior to other predators. The Ngoni, however, saw owning a gun as emasculating. Macola attributes the reluctance of Ngoni to accept firearms in part to social conventions that military bravery “was the key to unlocking the potential for self-advancement inherent in Ngoni institutions” (p. 136), which had to be done predominantly with spears and other melee weaponry. Macola broke down similar studies of all of the major nations within Central Africa, and he treated them as entities independent of broader social and cultural waves in Central Africa.

Macola’s scholarship is a technically superior piece. The text indicates a deep understanding of the historiography with no major omissions of the secondary literature, a nuanced perspective on literary ideas like constructivism and Actor Network Theory, and a diverse range of primary sources. Sources that he used included European travelogues, oral histories, linguistic records, early colonial documents, and surviving guns. Macola was correct in his assessment that the “nineteenth and early twentieth century was variegated. So, too, must the sources that permit us to study it” (p. 25). The different weaknesses of these sources like the
racialist perspectives in travelogues and insular oral histories are mediated with the advantages of the other primary sources.

The book’s strength is simultaneously its principle weakness: density. Macola’s depth of analysis of historical events and social climates is extremely valuable for specialists in African and material histories for its unique insights into the cultural signs associated with firearms in Central Africa. It would also be a useful supplementary material for insight into the cultures of different Central African nations for colonial, military, and technological historians. The book’s drawing on bulky theoretical pieces that explore “recent constructivist approaches to the history of technology and consumption” (p. 161) similarly limits the book’s accessibility to the general public. The book is weighed heavily in jargon, and difficult for non-specialists to follow Macola’s arguments. Macola even warned in the introduction, however, that “enthusiasts and encyclopedists should steer clear” (p. 17) of this book. This book has a narrow audience of historians and anthropologists but does an excellent job catering to this audience.

This book is a part of the broader wave of interdisciplinary histories concerning the African continent. Macola’s scholarship highlights the strong potential for historians and anthropologists with his solid, yet dense, book. This book is a refreshing reminder to treat societal trends as separate from broader historical waves. Colonialism was not a singular event that affected every nation the same way, so it would be futile to assume that different legacies of colonialism, be it Vietnamese bicycles or African firearms, have as rich and varied histories as the individuals that viewed, examined, and used these artifacts.

Quentin Holbert, Memorial University of Newfoundland


*Street Life Under a Roof* is an in-depth account of Point Place, a five-story apartment block and self-run shelter without running water, electricity, or sanitation in Durban, and where over one hundred young people live as a temporary escape from sleeping under the open sky. It is a rough urban environment with frequent deaths from gunshots, stabbings, beatings, tuberculosis, road accidents, and HIV/AIDS. The book is a well written and often gripping ethnographical study of the young, marginalized, and poor youth who live there, and who are separated from distant homes that are either unable or unwilling to provide for them. Throughout, the data that substantiates the analysis is rich and very detailed.

Margaretten explores the aspirations and fears of the resident youth from the context of complex social relationships they produce, contest, and reshape in order to increase life chances. A main theme is the construction of kinship relationships that provide opportunities for betterment and survival. These help resolve disputes, open up for relations of social and material reciprocity, and diminish uncertainty. The constructions of identities within Point Place are shown throughout to differ from those outside. For instance, categories of kin, and the naming and claiming of relations such as “brother,” “sister,” “baby,” and “mother” are not just for fun but designate personal ties. They substantiate different obligations of companionship between youth in ways that traverse the familiar categorizations in terms of age, gender, and
ethnicity. Thereby, the youth employ these terms to increase the possibility of trust, affection, love, and importantly, to secure shelter, safety and food. The multiple meanings and uses of the term ‘love’ are also shown to validate social practices around sharing; love is used to increase material gains and express mutual support; and it is used to signify the ambition of establishing a lasting connection (p. 67). Remarkably, the multiple invented relations of kin that provide for possibilities of future hopes are sometimes recognized by state institutions. This is exemplified as the constructed relations of kin gain the acceptance of city courts and “relatives” are allowed privileges that non-relatives normally would not be allowed, such as signing off for the release of friends and being allowed to follow juvenile cases.

The context specific, social construction of sexual norms at Point Place is another main theme. Here, the variability of sexual exchanges is shown to go beyond the simplistic characterizations of female sexual favors that are exchanged for money or gifts from males, and the related materiality and consumptive dimensions of sex. In fact, prostitution and commercial sex (activities commonly associated with homeless young women) are openly scorned by women at Point Place.

A third area of interest is the difficult and potentially life-threatening negotiations around condom use (p. 86). On the one hand, the main challenge for young women is their limited ability to demand usage, which is based on their reliance on boyfriends for material provisions. But on the other, young women balance out the risk with the assumption that non-usage will improve the chances of establishing a common future of shared sustenance and having children with unfaithful boyfriends. In an everyday capacity access to important resources such as shelter and food are thereby intertwined with the organization of domestic duties, and considerations concerning the danger of particular male-female relationships. As a consequence, women often accept male unfaithfulness provided it is external to Point Place and their safe, shared space with boyfriends inside is preserved. Nevertheless, this difficult balance is frequently offset by ideals of masculinity centered on conspicuous style, charm, and money, and which are embedded in cultural and historical imageries. In practice therefore, male fidelity is rare and partnerships are often short. And relationships often break down and get violent when HIV and AIDS strike because masculine norms and self-worth can no longer be upheld.

Overall, the book demonstrates that street youth are not in dire need of rehabilitation, in the sense of having to change their ostensibly idle and irresponsible lifestyles, as city authorities would have us believe. Rather, their complex social relationships are expressions of people striving towards the same hopes as the rest of society. These are important points that policy makers should heed. The book’s empirical findings and discussions around gender dynamics make a worthy contribution to anthropological analysis of youth and understandings of the logics of social organization that develop in tough urban environments.

Paul Stacey, University of Copenhagen

In the aftermath of the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in April 1974, which opened the way for the independence of Mozambique and Angola the following year, the apartheid government of Prime Minister John Vorster (1966-78) intensified an “outward policy” to win friends among the leadership of the independent African states. Initially this policy had some success, but the disastrous South African invasion of Angola in late 1975 effectively brought it to an end. The Vorster administration then worked with the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, to persuade the white minority government of Rhodesia to concede the principle of majority rule, while in early 1978 South Africa agreed, under pressure, to a plan for a transition to independence in Namibia worked out by a US-led Western Contact Group. It is on these four years in the apartheid regime’s long “search for survival,” 1974 to 1978, that Miller focuses his attention in this impressive monograph.

He only discusses, then, a brief period in the over forty-year life of the apartheid regime. His somewhat strange title refers to the efforts that that regime, representing the Afrikaner volk (people), made to “Africanise” itself, for though Afrikaner meant person of Africa, previous Afrikaner governments had been able to delude themselves that South Africa was somehow not part of a black-dominated continent. Miller, an Australian who received his doctorate from the University of Cambridge and has held posts at American universities, explores how the South African leadership under Vorster tried to legitimise apartheid by reaching out to independent African states and trying to persuade them to accept the bona fides of “separate development,” together with the idea that South Africa, even under white minority domination, was indeed an African country. After these attempts failed, Vorster had to deal with Kissinger and accept the idea of a decolonised Rhodesia and Namibia. Those who pushed for a military rather than a diplomatic approach again won Vorster’s support, however, and the raid by the South African Defence Force into Angola in May 1978 greatly increased South Africa’s loss of international credibility.

With rare exceptions—Dan O’Meara, an ex-South African based in Canada, being one—scholars based overseas have not done major work on the Afrikaner apartheid regimes after 1948. For long many such scholars had an ideological resistance to analysing those regimes dispassionately, while such work meant much reading of documentary evidence in Afrikaans. Jamie Miller has admirably spent a long time burrowing in the South African archives—some of which have been effectively closed to scholars since he used them—and he interviewed whomever he could, to understand why the regime acted as it did. He writes exceptionally well, and his book is well-structured and beautifully published by Oxford University Press. Though some of the ground he covers is not original, no one has researched this story in anything like the depth he has, and the result is a major contribution to knowledge of the ideology and discourse of the apartheid state in relation to the rest of Africa.

That is not to say, however, that this long book is without its limitations. Though Miller provides considerable background in his first chapters, his focus on the mid-1970s leads him, in my view, to over-emphasise its importance as a turning-point and to play down the continuities. In many ways Vorster continued Verwoerd’s attempt to use decolonization in
what was inevitably a vain attempt to legitimise apartheid. Even had the Angolan intervention not brought the “outward policy” to an end, the apartheid state’s harsh response to the Soweto uprising surely would have. The policies of the late Vorster years were in many ways continued by Vorster’s successor, P.W. Botha. Miller ends his account, in a third part of his book, to which he gives the hardly apposite title of “From Collapse to Reconstruction,” with the fall of Vorster. In my view, he exaggerates the international significance of the Cassinga raid of May 1978, while leaving, say, the arms embargo of the previous November, following the murder of Steve Biko, unexplored. Though P.W. Botha continued to use a big stick, he also continued Vorster’s diplomacy on the issue of SWA/Namibia. But though these and other parts of Miller’s argument may be challenged, his book will, without doubt, long remain a key work on apartheid foreign policy in the 1970s.

Chris Saunders, University of Cape Town


Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s book articulates Nelson Mandela’s lifework as a uniquely African humanist decolonization project. What he calls the Mandela Phenomenon is a post-racial pluralist humanism as part of a Global South initiated Third Humanist Revolution. Rather than restrict his analysis of Mandela’s life to a tabulation of instrumental wins and losses on a national or international political stage Ndlovu-Gatsheni instead approaches Mandela's life as building towards a larger goal of global emancipation and peace. His book is divided into three chapters bookended by an Introduction and Epilogue.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s Introduction grounds his argument that Mandela embodies a Third Humanist Revolution by drawing on political, sociological, philosophical and cultural scholarship to contextualize both Mandela’s life and humanism’s evolution. This segues into Chapter One, “Decolonial Theory of Life,” where Ndlovu-Gatsheni positions Humanism in response to the oppressing forces of Hellenocentrism, Westernization, and Eurocentrism (and its consequence Orientalism). Ndlovu-Gatsheni adeptly challenges those who would present Mandela’s story as a univocal and linear narrative when more realistically and humanly Mandela evolves intellectually to incorporate multiple schools of thought (i.e., African traditions, Christianity, Marxism, Ethnic Republicanism, Intercultural Liberalism) as they move him towards his goals of liberation and peace. Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues that these influences and his evolution helped to forge a “committed decolonial ethical leader and [one who] who successfully avoided degeneration into reverse racism, nativism and xenophobia until his death” (p. 68).

In Chapter Two, “Mandela: Different Lives in One,” Ndlovu-Gatsheni cites challenges of telling Mandela’s story such as not canonizing him as a saint living a flawless life or constructing a fairytale ending to his efforts at building a united nation. Mandela struggled with existential contradictions (e.g. privileging family life vs. political life, submission to the ANC vs. his individualism) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni cites such contradictions along with various life experiences as politicizing the young Mandela. As with other accounts of Mandela’s
politization imprisonment factors prominently in Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s analysis yet he argues, “Imprisonment features prominently in the pedigree of African nationalist struggles … [however] Mandela’s long imprisonment made him part of a project of those in control of the apartheid state” (p. 88). Ndlovu-Gatsheni complicates the possible readings of Mandela’s imprisonment and implicates various social others who would have a hand in constructing Mandela’s life story.

Chapter Three, “Mandela at CODESA, and New Conceptions of Justice,” considers how Mandela’s negotiations at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa happened against the backdrop of the USSR’s fall, growing liberal apathy, apartheidists’ sabotage attempts, and opposing forces seeking both economic preservation and nationalization. Ndlovu-Gatsheni argues that the Nuremburg model of victor’s justice was sidestepped in favor of an Afrocentric survivor’s justice (i.e., reconciliation over retribution) in hopes of a lasting peace. Mandela reached out to and broke bread with those who had ideologically isolated, persecuted, tried, and imprisoned him thus incurring sharp criticisms of those who viewed these overtures as a betrayal. Ndlovu-Gatsheni notes that South Africa has not seen the economic miracle that some have hoped for although leaders expect greater future prosperity. While great inequities still persist in South Africa they have arguably faced less interracial bloodshed and overall economic downturn as have countries instituting fast-track economic reforms such as Zimbabwe.

In his “Epilogue,” Ndlovu-Gatsheni acknowledges that some would place Nelson Mandela alongside Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King while others see him as coveting accolades. Other critics have characterized Mandela as a naïve idealist decrying injustices in Africa and globally, sometimes alone, in pursuit of his pluriversal world. Ndlovu-Gatsheni counters that Mandela’s is a “dignified legacy from which to continue the decolonial humanist struggle” (p. 141). Ndlovu-Gatsheni prefaces this conclusion by figuratively elevating the racism that Mandela fought to a form of witchcraft (i.e., racecraft) that is as frequently practiced as it is denied and that wrecks psychological devastation on its targets.

In sum, this book is effective in providing different ways of viewing Nelson Mandela and his work that humanize him without either tarnishing or overstating his legacy. Author Ndlovu-Gatsheni provides a convincing argument for placing Mandela at the helm of a Third Humanist Revolution though arguably this revolution has yet to reach fruition. This book is relevant to scholars in several disciplines. Specifically, this book will appeal to scholars in Humanism, African Studies, International Policy, Peace Studies, Cultural Studies (specifically those interested in political narrative and biography) and those studying (Post)colonial thought.

Gordon Alley-Young, Kingsborough Community College – City University of New York


In Humor, Silence and Civil Society in Nigeria, Ebenezer Obadare tinkers with the subject of civil society and challenges the existing notions of associational life as the entirety of civil society by canvassing for the inclusion and recognition of non-associational life in Nigeria’s civic space. Introducing the book, Obadare posits that seeing civil society only in terms of voluntary civic
associations sells the idea short, both historically and substantively (p. 1). Hence, starting from the standpoint that civil society is beyond the standpoint of aggregate of associations (p. 2) or that associations are by no means exhaustive of the totality of the forms, dimensions, and practices of civil society (p. 10) Obadare poses several questions. These include the possibility of thinking of civil society outside formal institutions; the implications of a non-associational imagining for the idea of civil society; and the implications of a non-associational understanding of civil society for the current thinking about civil society organizations themselves (p. 8).

Going forward, Obadare discusses the contentious debates on civil society and the emergence of civil society in Nigeria in Chapters 1 and 2. In examining the terrain of contention that permeates civil society literature, the author acknowledges that the idea of civil society has always been a site of constant hermeneutic battles and that civil society has always meant different things to different scholars and thinkers and that each thinker’s emphasis has tended to be shaped either by local exigencies or ideological worldview, or often by a combination of both (pp. 32, 42).

Chapter 2 traces the provenance of civil society discourse to the struggle in the late 1980s and 1990s to dislodge the military from power and establish a liberal democratic rule in Nigeria. Hence, civil society in Nigeria was borne out of a desperate necessity considering the temporal period during which it emerged and, as such, discourses on the subject has been democratization driven and it is still very much in the thrall of democratic consolidation (p. 57). In Chapters 3 and 4, the uses of humor and silence as instances of informal strategies of resistance outside rigid associational formats are explained and uncovered. Using these tropes, as alternative forms of resistance, Obadare explains—despite their assumed and proclaimed shortcomings—how they have been deployed to challenge and contest political hegemony in Nigeria. In this regard, he evinces the example of late Chief Bola Ige, Nigeria’s former minister of justice, famed political orator and a leading activist during the military years who adopted the phrase of “siddon look” and “tanda look” as his evocation of silence and willful refusal to be complicit in the tragedy of governance at the time in Nigeria.

The analysis of the uses of humor and silence is an attempt to divert intellectual energy towards “social life as a whole,” as opposed to only associations towards it. With specific references to the Nigerian condition, Obadare draws up various instances where humor has served and helped the suffered and their “sufferness” in their daily lamentations of everyday life in post-independence Nigeria. While humor and jokes might have spoken variously to the perceived venality of the Nigerian state and its agents (p. 70) its usage must also be held circumspect, as it has a potency to “make a painful impression on the person against whom it is directed” (p. 77). Nonetheless, the real utility of humor lies in its capacity to challenge and respectfully disrespect political authority.

Siddon Look and Tanda Look, two metaphors of willful but forced silence utilized by late Chief Bola Ige during the military regimes of Ibrahim Babaginda and Sani Abacha, advances the extra-organizational explanation of civil society according to Obadare. Notwithstanding the scholarly admonitions on the futility of silence, Obadare’s epitomizes the Chief Ige’s silence stating that by acquiescing to the regime of Babaginda and Abacha especially fondest wish to keep everybody silent, Bola Ige was at the same time resisting and undermining it, mobilizing
both exit and voice in a single agential masterstroke (p. 101). Hence, silence was a way of giving voice while at the same time evading the penalty that open speech attracted; a way for silence to point to something beyond itself.

Concluding the book, Obadare generously posits that current civil society research should not be concerned with what goes on within the realm of the state, but also what goes on outside the realm of the state because of its profound impact on state life (p. 116). And also because humor and silence, are important tropes in non-associational discourse, a focus on associations alone, according to Obadare, imposes arbitrary limits, rather than freeing civil society theory and practice from the shackles of associational conditioning and focus on the powers in everyday insurgencies, insurrections and gestures of tacit refusal and iconoclasm, gestures that sullenly and silently contest the forms of an existing hegemony (pp. 129, 9).

Ebenezer Obadare’s book comes highly recommended to students and scholars interested in the study of civil society and non-associational life in Nigeria.

Fisayo Ajala, Spaces for Change. Lagos, Nigeria


This book provides a good vantage point to understanding the internal workings of what is probably the most secretive, heavily militarized, and authoritarian state in the world. The book deals with how citizens form their images of the state, the nation, and the link between them, through their daily interactions with state actors. The author explains the nexus as well as the rifts between citizens and the state by focusing on schools as public institutions that create citizens and state projects such as mass conscription and militarization that are used to enact the state’s sovereignty over its citizens and create ‘strong’ images. However, state coercion and authoritarian rules represent part of the state’s struggle for legitimacy and expose the weak distinction between nation and state. This is an argument that is akin to Migdal’s state-in-society approach that takes states as arenas of power struggle mainly shaped by image and practices (Boundaries and Belonging, 2004).

By arguing that states struggle to gain legitimacy mainly through executing their own nation-building projects, the author takes the case of Eritrea and show how educational institutions are being used as a platform to promote revolutionary values of Eritrean nationalism as defined by the state, constituting self-sufficiency, progress and development-oriented, absolute willingness to sacrifice, and a warrior ethos. These values evolved through the thirty-year war for independence, which is commonly referred to as “The Struggle.” Thus, the book explains how education was used as a key instrument of the militarized nation-building agenda of People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) that embodies both the state and the nation of Eritrea since independence in 1991. The ruling party promoted militarism as part of Eritrean nationalism having roots primarily in the war for independence and later to justify the defence of its borders. This was strengthened through the use of iconic expressions such as “Eritrea is a nation of soldiers” which was further reinforced by popular symbols such as Shida (commonly worn plastic sandals) that embodies the exaltation of “The
struggle,” a blatant example of what the author referred as a quotidian nationalism. As the author explains, however, the insistent application of coercion and mass conscription by the government to make citizens participate in the nation-building project and its defence, has given new meaning to these common expressions and symbols for teachers, students, and others that began to imagine the whole country as a prison.

Organizing the book in five chapters, the author presents a revealing discussion on the other forms of PFDJ’s struggles including those to produce loyal national subjects, to reproduce and objectify itself, and to achieve institutional coherence. These struggles were also mirrored by a similar struggle by state employees, particularly teachers who struggled with their feelings about the state, the nation, and their responsibilities to it. As the author persuasively argues, this struggle placed teachers in an indeterminate situation of being wedged in between participating in the government’s program of mass militarization and fulfilling their commitment to educating the nation. This also indicates the inconsistencies of state power as oppressive to, and at the same time, enacted by teachers as they are directly involved in the making of soldiers.

A major strength of the book is the author’s judicious use of participant observation to make connections between schools as public institutions that are responsible for producing educated citizens and processes of militarization that similarly construct national subjects and define their relationship to the state. The author provides a rich description of her entry into the country from its margins, her interviews, and lived experiences as a teacher, a peace corps volunteer, and even her intimate relationship with an Eritrean teacher. Her detailed account of teachers’ daily experiences in and out of public schools enabled her to shed light on seemingly complex issues like the emergence of authoritarianism, nation and state, asserting the power of ethnographic research. In one of the very few factual errors in the book, Riggan refers to Tigrinya as both an ethnic and a language designation (cf. pp. 17, 37, 40, 75, 167, 168), although the term should only refer to the language. Also, a map would have been supportive of the description provided in the introduction section that deals with ethnic and linguistic groups’ distribution in the country (cf. pp. 17). Nonetheless, the book is very informative to the general reader and as a reference for students intending to apply similar research methodology.

Zerihun Berhane Weldegebriel, Addis Ababa University


Language can serve as a window into a culture and its people; that is the essence of Sanders’ Learning Zulu. The book evokes Toni Morrison’s main message in Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination (1992) of using Blackness to make Whiteness visible, and using Black people as a backdrop in White people’s lives. The author, a White South African, writes about his experiences of learning not only the language of the majority of Black South Africans isiZulu but also what he refers to as “their ways of being.” In this semi-autobiographical book the author discusses his experiences, with the Zulu people characterizing the background and contours of his life.

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http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v17/v17i2a5.pdf
The book is divided into five chapters. All chapters are essentially about Sanders learning the culture and language of the Zulu people. The author begins the book by asking for *uxolo* (forgiveness). He asserts that writing *Learning isiZulu* is part of his atonement. While he does not explicitly state what he should be forgiven for or why he needs to atone, one can speculate that he wants to be for the sins of the apartheid regime against Black people in South Africa. But why ask for forgiveness when the very act of learning isiZulu and the Zulu culture under apartheid was revolutionary for a White person. Not many White people in South Africa wanted to learn the languages of Black people. Oppression of Black South Africans stripped African languages of their social capital or value. Only English and Afrikaans had social capital, Africans had to learn those languages in order to adjust and adapt to economic and socio-political oppression. So, by learning isiZulu, a language that carried no social value in apartheid South Africa, the author was rather an insurgent of sorts. Normally, it is the oppressed that learn the language of oppressors, not the other way around unless it is for facilitation of oppression. But in this case, he chose to learn the language of the oppressed for the sake of learning the language.

Chapter One discusses the legacy of Colenso who wrote the first English-Zulu dictionary and advocated for proper usage of isiZulu and rejection of “fanagalo/fanakalo” that was largely used by White and Indian people to communicate with Zulu people. Chapter Two deals with Sanders’ entry into both the language and culture of the Zulus through English. This chapter evinces depth in its analysis of outstanding Zulu novels and their meaning in the Zulu cultural context. It is important to point out that as prominent as these Zulu novels are, they were considered “safe” and apolitical enough for the apartheid government, which banned all politically oriented and freedom advocating books, to endorse their publication and dissemination. By focusing on these politically “safe” novels, flagrantly all written by men, Sanders presents a depoliticized South Africa in a country that was highly politicized. Culture exists within a political landscape, yet the author is able to decontextualize and depoliticize culture in this chapter.

Chapter Three is entitled “Ipi Intombi” after a theatrical piece that received accolades in the Western world for its portrayal of African life. In this chapter, the author focuses on the notion of cultural appropriation that financially benefitted White designers and producers of the play “Ipi Intombi.” The author also discusses the success of Johnny Clegg, the musician who is famously known as the White Zulu. This chapter lays bare the value of whiteness through cultural appropriation. It illuminates that Zulu culture performed by White people is more revered and valued than when it is performed by its own people. In other words, cultural appropriation is more about racial power than it is about cultural power. Yet, the author glides over this critical point and disregards issues of racial power that are concomitant with cultural appropriation.

Chapter Four seems displaced and disjointed from the first three chapters. This chapter is focused on the South African President Zuma’s Zuluness. The chapter is titled “100% Zulu Boy,” a slogan used by supporters of Jacob Zuma. The author seems to fall into the pitfall of the inability to distinguish between the political leadership of Zuma and his ethnicity. His focus on Zuma’s statements about what it means to be a Zulu man is erroneous as Zuma is not the authority on Zuluness. He is the President of South Africa and the president of the National
African Congress, not the paragon of the Zulu culture. Zuma’s assertions on what it means to be a Zulu man are not the quintessence of Zuluness. At some point the author says the White judge who presided over President Zuma’s rape case is similar to Zuma in terms of speaking both English and isiZulu. In the context of apartheid South Africa, for White people learning isiZulu was indeed, as stated earlier, an act of insurgency of some sorts. The author praises the White judge for understanding isiZulu and choosing to reveal this at the end of the trial and yet chastises President Zuma for speaking isiZulu, not English, throughout the court proceedings. This part of the book reveals the apartheid-era language politics, in the sense that when a White person speaks an African language, it is perceived as admirable and unnecessary, but when a Black person speaks his or her African language it is perceived as defiance. Speaking English for Zulus, Africans in general, was never a choice but a known instrument of oppression. However, this point also seems to elude the author, who simply says that speaking English was a necessity for one to be employed; he should have added “under normal circumstances.” In this chapter, the author also asserts that there are egregious acts committed in the name of the Zulu culture, and he denounces the “bad” Zulu culture and only aligns himself with the positive Zulu culture. The irony in the author’s denouncement of the “bad” Zulu culture is that he never condemns the “bad” English or Afrikaner culture that made it an anomaly for him to learn isiZulu through colonialism and apartheid.

Chapter Five continues to address egregious acts committed by Zulu people in the name of isiZulu. It discusses xenophobic attacks that occurred in 2008 and how isiZulu as a language was used as a litmus test to identify and attack non-South Africans from other African countries. Again, the author disassociates himself from the language that can be used to enact violence because that is not the language he “loves.” He rightfully condemns using isiZulu as a shield to engage in behaviors that are deleterious to other Africans. Again, the irony of condemnation of violence used in the name of Zuluness is amplified by his silence on the violence enacted in the name of English and Afrikaner cultures and languages within South Africa.

Overall, the book is well written and well researched albeit at times the author seems self-congratulatory. The subtext of the book is that he has made sacrifices and taken risks for learning isiZulu. Were the risks related to being an insurgent of sorts? He proclaims that learning isiZulu and Zulu culture “involves reparation and its attendant complications” (p. 10). Elaboration on what he means by “reparations and its attendant complications” would have enhanced the substance and quality of the book. Nonetheless, the book is a good testimony of resistance and survival of the Zulu people, culture, and isiZulu the language. While the author acknowledges the context of apartheid as a backdrop of his work, he adeptly circumvents the traumatic psychological and physical violence that the people, the language, the culture endured under apartheid.

Sanders takes to task Nxumalo and Ntuli, both renowned isiZulu authors, for being isiZulu “purists.” Can he really blame them for holding on to a language that the apartheid government strategically and operationally tried to erase? Is it about language purism or language survival? With the end of apartheid, the democratic South Africa has eleven official languages but English and Afrikaans remain de facto official languages. Perhaps what the author perceives as isiZulu
purism is a way of restoring and salvaging what the inferno of apartheid was supposed to have annihilated and what the present democratic South Africa devalues.

The book can be a valuable source for learning about cultural appropriation, language as a socio-cultural construct and the role of language in politics and power. Moreover, the book will be beneficial to those who wrestle with the question posed by Morrison: “what prompts and makes possible this process of entering what one is estranged from…” (p. 4)? The question seems to be what Sanders is also attempting to tackle.

Shirley Mthethwa-Sommers, Nazareth College.


Nelson Mandela’s life was not only defined by his fight against systemic oppression, but his life was also devoted to advancing the dignity of his people and the promotion of racial harmony in post-apartheid South Africa. This made Mandela one of the extraordinary human beings of our modern era. While his extraordinary life continues to attract scholarly/popular works, the attention on his years as a political prisoner appears to be disappearing from the scholarly landscape. This is why Sharon Sliwinski’s *Mandela’s Dark Years: A Political Theory of Dreaming* is relevant and timely in our attempt to better understand Mandela’s life in totality.

Sliwinski’s book is generally well-written with huge doses of political theory intermixed with in-depth conceptualization of dreaming or dream-life. Although short, the book has largely succeeded in examining the subject matter in six sections or chapters. Chapter one sets the tone for the book as the author recounts her reading of Mandela’s autobiography, *Long Walk to Freedom*, and the struggles he faced as a political prisoner on the Robben Island. What triggered the idea for the book, as the author narrates, was the section called “The Dark Years” in Mandela’s autobiography. Like other prisoners, especially the prisoners of conscience, emotional/psychological hardships can be as tormenting as physical pain/suffering. The urge to survive and gain freedom could be described as the ultimate goal/dream of a prisoner. As the author notes, Mandela recounted the recurrent dreams or nightmares he had in his autobiography. Like other prisoners, especially the prisoners of conscience, emotional/psychological hardships can be as tormenting as physical pain/suffering. The urge to survive and gain freedom could be described as the ultimate goal/dream of a prisoner. As the author notes, Mandela recounted the recurrent dreams or nightmares he had in his autobiography. But the key question of interest is: Why should Mandela’s dream matter beyond the ordinary conception of dreams? Finding an answer to this question appears to be the fundamental objective of Sliwinski’s book. In the words of Sliwinski, “Mandela’s nightmare seemed just as dramatic and important as his famous speech from the Rivonia Trial in which he named the apartheid’s injustice and defined the ideal” (a democratic and free society) for which he was prepared to die (p. 4). What then is a dream? And how significant are dreams?

The author examines these questions in chapter two and subsequent chapters. Drawing on many scholarly works on dreams, the author did a great job by integrating the ideas of what I will describe as dream scholars for the analysis. For example, the author echoes Sigmund Feud’s conceptualization of dreams as not only a distinct species of thinking, but dreams dramatize an idea and construct a situation out of thought that have been transmitted into images (p. 5). From the ordinary viewpoint, a dream is considered as an “experience that takes place on an unconscious plane, usually under the cover of sleep” (p. 27). Advancing these ideas
with reference to Mandela’s dream-life, the author reminds readers that a dream-life is not a documentary display of events, but a “symbolic account of the dreamer’s lived experience” (p. 7). The author provides three interpretations of this idea with reference to Mandela. First, the author argues that Mandela’s dream-thinking created a sense of alienation as a result of his prolonged imprisonment. Second, although Mandela was not physically free, he still had the freedom to experience what Sliwinski describes as a wander in an empty and uninhabited world of dreams. Third, Mandela’s dream-life, as the author observes, “testified to the experience of being ostracized from the larger political community of humanity” (p. 7). The chapter’s discussion of enlarged thought or mentality in reference to Mandela in the post-apartheid era is novel. It is clear that these discussions fall within the broader debates on the relevance of dream-life/psychoanalysis and the question of rationality. Sliwinski has actually addressed this very issue with reference to Mandela’s dreams. According to her, Mandela’s dream-life represents a good case of a political thinker who has shown that the “most potent and transformative forms of political thought” do not necessarily depend on rationality. But in dark or extremely difficult times, another form of thinking (dream-thinking) is needed to survive (p. 13).

The author builds on these theoretical ideas of dream-life and Mandela’s nightmares in chapters three, four, and five. Discussion of issues such as dream-work as civil defense, the distinction between dream-work and dream-thoughts as well as other aspects of dream-life and its relation to Mandela were examined (pp. 17-25). Like other chapters, the fourth chapter takes readers into deeper echelons of complex conceptual discourse on dream-life and Mandela. The author’s critical analysis of dreaming as a dialogue with oneself and the retelling of a dream as a form of communication with another person is quite revealing. Chapter five extends the book’s central arguments on dreams with reference to Mandela’s nightmares. As the author notes, Mandela’s dream-life was one of the channels he used to exercise his sense of freedom (p. 37). Chapter six concludes the theoretically “heavy dose” analyses with the author making a case for the importance of dream-life as an alternative thought-landscape or safe orbit worth exploring, especially in dark times (pp. 43-44).

As the preceding review has shown, Sliwinski’s book is an excellent/enjoyable piece. However, the book has a major shortcoming worth noting. It is apparent that the framework through which Mandela was analyzed in the book was largely through the European or Western-focused lens. Mandela was indeed a global political/cultural icon, but he was also a proud African who grew up with African ideas, values, and viewpoints on freedom and dreams that could also be interpreted from an African-centered perspective. Unfortunately, the author did not discuss any of these, let alone draw on any African scholar or writer on dreams in her analysis of Mandela’s dream-life. Notwithstanding, the book is still a valuable addition to the literature on dream-life and Mandela’s life.

Felix Kumah-Abiwu, Kent State University

Nigeria’s film industry Nollywood is a dynamic industry compared to none other across the continent. Its development can be dated back to 1981 when the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) banned the Nigerian government from distributing Hollywood films for what it called a misappropriation of copyrighted media. This led not only to the creation of an enormous cinematographic gap, but the creation of “distaste for traditional, licit modes of consumption” (p. 9). Thus, coupled with successive military governments that had a preference for documentaries and the rise in urban crime rate, Nollywood as a system was born.

Noah Tiska, an Assistant Professor of Media Studies at Queens College, City University of New York, in six chapters reviews the main theme of Nollywoods stars’ success story over time. There are sub themes like promotion by local video distributors, migration of stars and media and the use of adults as child performers, to name a few. He sets out to redress two conventional ways in which Nollywood’s creative performers are misread. First, Nollywood and its stars operate/act in a copied form/manner that is imitating the trends from the West without an understanding of the “consequential cross-cultural, transnational politics of the process” (p. 9). Secondly, from the cultural critics in Africa, the view that Nollywood’s stars are extremely local configurations who are restricted to Southern Nigeria, having nothing to say to the world beyond Nigeria’s borders and worst of all unenlightened black Africans indebted to tradition and tribalism. So Tiska asks one very pertinent question which runs as a thin line through the book: “What would a theory of cinema stardom look like if it began from Nollywood and not Hollywood?” (p. 9). To address these questions, the writer, in captivating detail, traces how Nollywood and its stars have survived several odds, using the most meager resources, obsolete technology (in the eyes of the West) like the VHS and VCD, audio–visual distractions/distortions, and low quality outputs amongst others to break boundaries and become an accepted cinematic medium globally. Three paradigms seen in Nollywood presentations are its privacy (small groups of spectators usually in a domestic setting), its screen size presentations (this over time has developed from television to the laptop and even smart phones) and its autonomy (an individual’s power over the media to start, stop, or pause at will). To address these issues, the writer traces the fact that Nollywood’s star system is the first to develop with African film performers on the African continent. He cites a Ghanian, Van Vicker, who frequently portrays natives of Nigeria (e.g., Igbo and Hausa) in his Nollywood films. Also, Funke Akindele’s impressive range as an actress, especially in her imitation of Lady Gaga in the “Lady Gaga” film, as used to indicate the great confluence of Nollywood performers and their roles. He uses biographical facts like those of Omotola Jalade-Ekeinde, Funke Akindele, Uche Jombo and other stars to give insight into the stars’ personae and how Nollywood thrives in West Africa and the diaspora. He shows how actors act fluidly as fictional characters, reflecting themselves or in a documentary.

*Nollywood Stars* begins with a brief introduction then an address of the academic star studies with Nollywood phenomenon. Subsequently, the writer addresses the matter of materiality or format and how it affects Nollywood stardom, then the corporate identity of Nigeria’s telecommunication power, Globalcom, and its promotion of stars as moving–image.
advertisements. The last three chapters address the piracy of the media in the age of globalization, the past, present and future contours of child stardom in Nollywood and concludes with a look at “youth stardom against the backdrop of West Africa’s child welfare movements” (p. 27) indicating their interest in foreign child performers. The writers choice of words are apt in relation to the film industry such as “the level of spectatorial agency” (p. 91), “realism” (p. 127), “thematic relevance” (p. 190), “antiessentialist approach to screen acting” (p. 10) and “transnationalism” (p. 6), to name a few.

The stars of Nollywood can be called ambassadors of “bricolage” (p. 9) wherever they go—adaptable, fluid yet dynamic. The writer was able to outline the merits and demerits of Nollywood’s cinema stardom and redress the theoretical perspective, but in his conclusion he alluded to the issue of sexism (gay and lesbianism), leaving the reader hanging as to whether this is not an un-discussed subtheme in his discourse. Yet in light of the above, I recommend the book for reading and inclusion in cinematic discourse.

Comforth S. Bulus, University of Jos


Walker writes with fluidity, which makes reading enjoyable. He demonstrates understanding of the complex nature of the Nigerian socio-political and religious space. Eat the Heart of the Infidel is divided into three parts with a preface. The preface begins with a compelling narrative of a freed slave-boy who travelled through Africa and Europe before later settling down in Northern Nigeria as a colonial teacher. John Henry Dorogu was his name, born a Muslim and died a Christian among the predominantly Islamic community leaving behind a devout Muslim wife (pp. ix-xvi). Walker’s rendition gives the impression that the average Nigerian is religiously confused and oscillating between Christianity, Islam and a times secularism. This therefore raises the question/conflict on the religious identity of the Nigerian state. However, Dorogu’s narratives should be considered as tokens required to connecting with his white host, and his alien acquisition of foreign goods could also be understood as symbolic representation and evidence of his adventures than succumbing “to the sin of avarice,” cultural and religious confusion.

Part one begins with “If you Can’t Beat Them, Shun Them,” which centers on how Othman dan Fodiyo, a Muslim purist used force to convert Hausa states from religious superstition and fear to the worship of only Allah-the true God. Othman’s effort resulted in the establishment of the Sokoto caliphate (pp. 3-25). Next, “Disputed Territory” talks about the high level of political, economic, moral and religious corruption that befell the caliphate after the death of Dan Fodiyo (pp. 27-44). “Modes of Dealings” discusses the overthrow of Dan Fodiyo’s caliphate by British colonial interest in the 20th century and the establishment of western style government and education, which created tension in the North. Western culture was therefore considered as haram (forbidden). In order to reduce the tension, the colonial authorities established Arabic teaching colleges along side western education (pp. 45-64). That British action sowed the seed of a dual religious and academic identity among the people. It is this mixed identity that attracted
the initial support the Boko Haram group enjoyed among Muslim adherents, which was premised on the pretense of returning the region back to its pre-colonial Islamic status. Since force was used to convert the people, it could easily be reasoned that force is also necessary to sustain the intent of the Othman’s jihad, thus justifying the presence of a violent Boko Haram.

The second part starts with “Heart Rot.” It represents Walker’s suggestion that the root cause of Boko Haram in Nigeria is the dysfunctional educational system which has resulted to encouraging ignorance (pp. 67-74). Walker’s thesis is faulty because the word Boko Haram did not initially connote violence as it was a language of disagreement with alien educational curriculum from that of Islamic teaching. The sinister meaning Boko Haram has assumed since 1999 is in indeed the manipulation for political gains by Nigerian politicians. Next comes “Big Potato on Top,” which talks about the high level of corruption among the Nigerian ruling elite, which has compromised the institutions of governance for a cabal of self-serving and unpatriotic individuals’ thereby promoting insecurity (pp. 75-90). “Stomach Infrastructure” shows how politics work in Nigeria (pp. 91-107). From the voter to the politician, everyone is interested in personal benefits at the expense of the state. “Eating the Cord of the Society” narrates how religion has become a major determinant in Nigerian politics to the detriment of issues and rationality. This hypocritical mentality is actually eating the cord of the society (p9. 109-131). Walker is on point on this issue.

Part three’s first section, “The Rest of Us are Just Hawking Peanuts,” explains that motives for any action must first be understood as a way of resolving the impacts of the action. The support the Boko Haram sect has enjoyed in its followership is encouraged by the fanatical (mis)interpretation that death as a result of carrying out Allah’s injunction is divinely rewarding (p. 135-168). Those outside the fold of Islam are therefore divinely condemned to death. “Kill Zone” has become the code name not only for Bornu State but the whole of the northeast Nigeria (pp. 167-196). “Strange Cartography” shows the inability of the Nigerian state to curtail Boko Haram due to difficulty in properly identifying the nature of the sect. From the political, military, academic, and literate to the illiterate freelance commentators, Boko Haram represents different confusing and illogical interests. As long as this strange cartography remains, a coordinated response to the sect activities may remain a mirage (p. 197-216). And, finally, “Off With the Rat’s Head” reminds readers that despite the efforts of the Nigerian government, the Boko Haram menace is far from ending (pp. 217-19).

Simon Odion Ehiabhi, Adekunle Ajasin University, Nigeria


Africa is considered as the continent of the future. Young demographics, rising economies, rich minerals and resources base, and relatively stable polities have generated ever greater interest in the African affairs. In the last two decades, efforts have been made by great powers like the United States and Russia and emerging powers like China and India to engage with Africa in a more purposeful and practical manner. In addition to the interest of major powers, multinational firms, non-government organizations, and inter governmental entities have had a
sizeable presence on the continent. Engagement of such a diverse set of actors, increased international interest, and an emerging African scenario in response require a more nuanced appreciation of the international relations of Africa. The book reviewed below provides an entry point for fostering such an understanding.

Readings in the International Relations of Africa introduces readers to the complexity of the politics of the continent. The book is a collection of previously published writings spanning over a period of the last four decades. The oldest piece in the book was published in 1974 (about the genocide in Burundi), and the latest piece was published in 2014 (about the terror attacks in Algeria). Overall the book contains twenty-seven scholarly articles organized in eight sections. The book opens up with a discussion on “sovereignty and statehood” (in Africa) followed by the sections on the international order, great powers, conflict, war and interventions. There is a separate section dealing with key development issues surrounding the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and also a section on the geopolitical engagement with Africa in the post Cold War era.

Even though colonial domination cast a long shadow over the African engagement with the post colonial world, the writings in the volume do not dwell too much on the colonial period of late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is more contemporary in nature. Africa experienced the Cold War competition between the superpowers. Major focal points of the cold war years like the Congo crisis of the 1960s, civil war in Angola in the mid 1970s, communist revolution in Ethiopia and the overall politics in the horn of Africa in the 1980s, apartheid regime (since 1948) in South Africa, and international response to the policies of the regime, and interventions in Chad and regional politics surrounding the civil war (in the early 1980s) are covered in the volume. In terms of the post cold war crises, Somalia and Congo find sufficient space in the book but Rwanda and Darfur do not.

Developmental issues of the continent have always been severe and have needed concerted efforts by international agencies. Questions regarding Africa’s development provide an opening to the various issues of the political economy of the continent and the world. Issues like the nature and extent of international aid, policies of African regimes to utilize available aid, the relationship between donor and recipient states, the role of international agencies like the World Bank in facilitating developmental efforts, the nature of the African state, and conditions imposed by donors for democratization and governance spring up in the debate about Africa’s development. They find adequate representation in the volume.

Problems of Africa’s development are not limited to the aid efforts of international agencies. It rather offers us a window to look upon the international relations of Africa using aid as a tool of engagement. The involvement of former colonial powers like Britain and France, emerging powers like India and China, and the role of regional powers like Nigeria and South Africa assume importance in this context. The volume covers in detail British aid policies, overall French policies towards the continent and also the emerging Chinese approach towards engaging with Africa. Chinese engagement with Africa opens up space for the discussion on the validity and utility of existing theoretical approaches of International Relations (IR) to explain the relationship.

The volume includes writings that discuss the emergence of the African Union and how foreign policies of regional actors like Nigeria and South Africa played a part in it. It touches
upon the evolution of NEPAD as a development strategy in the new millennium and debates about the development problems of Africa in the new millennium. In terms of shortfalls of the volume, the omission of any discussion on the processes of regionalization and the role of regional organizations like ECOWAS and EAC in the emerging African political milieu could be noted. To sum up, even taking limitations into account, the book provides an excellent introduction to understand the international relations of Africa.

Sankalp Gurjar, South Asian University, New Delhi