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A Question of Intervention: American Policymaking in Sierra Leone and the Power of Institutional Agenda Setting

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Abstract: This article is an examination of American foreign policy towards Sierra Leone in 1999 and 2000. Hopefully it will contribute to the literature of Sierra Leone while shedding theoretical light on types of humanitarian intervention. It seeks to answer two questions about American policy: First, why did the Clinton White House become involved in this particular West African civil war? Secondly, what factors led the U.S. to give financial and logistical help but not military aid? These types of limited interventions have usually been ignored by American foreign policy scholars. To understand Sierra Leonean decision making, it examines four key policy decisions using primary interviews with Clinton officials and looking at internal documents from the White House, Defense and State Departments. I contend that a theory of international institutional agenda setting can best describe American policy. This argument explores how constructivist norms (i.e. human rights and sovereignty) are transmitted, magnified or mitigated by international institutions. By bringing neo-liberal institutional literature back into constructivism we can show how ‘institutional identity’ influences and shapes state policy preferences-- not only in decisions to intervene but in shaping the size and scope of UN peacekeeping mandates.

Introduction

The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) waged a decade long gruesome and terrifying campaign to unseat the Sierra Leonean government. Tens of thousands of people died, millions were displaced and the economy destroyed. Under international pressure the warring parties signed a peace agreement in Lome, Togo in July of 1999 which quickly collapsed. The RUF were finally defeated with a strengthened UN peacekeeping mission, West African military help, and key American and British aid. This article is an examination of the American decision-making in this conflict.

By using Sierra Leone as a case study we can hopefully expand two areas of the foreign policy literature concerning failed states and intervention: most treatments of Sierra Leone concentrate on the government in Freetown or the institution of the UN, not the decision making process in Washington. Secondly, and more substantively, I wish to examine the decision making process in what I define as limited interventions. To accomplish these goals we need to answer two questions about U.S. policy in Sierra Leone: first, why did the United States...
become involved in the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)? The Clinton Administration could have easily ignored the crisis. It was a low intensity civil war in a region with little strategic interest. Secondly, I try to answer why the U.S. chose to provide logistical and financial aid but not military help.

To answer these questions I will carefully look at American policy in Sierra Leone for 1999 and 2000 using internal memos from the National Security Council (NSC), Defense and State Departments, combined with elite interviews of key Clinton decision makers. This article will then break down Sierra Leone policymaking into four key decisions: first, the early 1999 decision to help end the conflict; second, the American dedication to the Lome Accords that culminated in July of 1999; third U.S. support for UNAMSIL; and finally the U.S. decision to save UNAMSIL as it seemed it was going to collapse in early 2000. We will then test these four observations against a structured focused comparison of two hypotheses of foreign policy making: neoclassical realism and what this article will develop as a hypothesis of institutional agenda setting based on constructivism and neo-liberal institutionalism. Since realism (in its many forms) is still considered the dominant paradigm of foreign policy scholarship it is essential we also discuss how it views intervention in Sierra Leone. These hypotheses will hopefully shed some theoretical light on how the Administration framed the questions of intervention and what guided their actions.

I contend that institutional commitments and UN legitimacy play a crucial role in American policy formulation for Sierra Leone. Nancy Soderberg, a member of President Clinton’s NSC staff summarizes the power of international commitments, “Sierra Leone does not become an issue on its own throughout all this. The UN cannot technically place items on the NSC agenda -- but the UN is part of the NSC agenda.”1 Institutional agenda setting provides a robust look at how the Sierra Leonean crisis was framed by these international commitments and how they shaped the policy path that was eventually chosen.

Sierra Leone and the Concept Of Limited Intervention

What makes Sierra Leone a compelling case is the nature of American involvement. UN missions in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and East Timor fall into a category of limited U.S. intervention. What is often missing in the literature of intervention and peacekeeping is a qualitative look at how decision makers understand peacekeeping as a question of degrees. There are levels of intervention. A limited intervention provides the financial and logistical support to other organizations and nations in humanitarian crises but does not reach the level of military intervention, or as policymakers say “boots on the ground.” In fact, a large component of U.S. participation in UN peacekeeping is not providing military but critical logistical aid.

Yet the literature has been silent on this subject. Interventions are often seen as a simple dichotomy: you either intervene or not. There are also plenty of large ‘n’ quantitative works on “third party” and UN interventions. However, these studies have the UN as the focus of analysis and not Washington. A good example of this can be found in Mark J. Mullenbach’s recent, “Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions.”2 There has been an explosion of qualitative research in...
places where the U.S. has actively intervened. For example, Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institute provide a descriptive policy analysis of the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts. In the same vein, Ken Menkhhaus and Louis Ortmayer provide an exhaustive account of Somalia. American failure to intervene has also been widely explored from a normative perspective; for example: Samantha Powers, A Problem from Hell, and Philip Gourevitch’s work on Rwanda.

Sierra Leone has not garnered the same kind of academic scrutiny as some of these other humanitarian tragedies in the post cold war world. But these kinds of missions deserve special attention because they are qualitatively different than what happened in Somalia and Rwanda. By providing a rich deep look at Sierra Leone I hope to shed light on the concept of limited intervention while adding to the historical record of American policymaking in West Africa.

Theoretical Discussion of Complex Human Emergencies

In order to better understand why the U.S. intervened in Sierra Leone and how it chose the type of intervention we need to ground our discussion in the larger theoretical debate of intervention, peacekeeping, and foreign policy. Can theory help us explain American behavior?

Neoclassical Realism

Realism is the baseline in which to judge American policy. In the eyes of Washington’s non-academic elites it is nothing more than creating policy that advances (or protects) American strategic interest. The real debate is how broadly we define interest. Peacekeeping sometimes advances these interests and sometimes not. However, one thing is certain for realists: the U.S. should only become involved in peacekeeping when American interests are threatened. The academic side of the realist debate is a bit more complicated but arrives at the same conclusion.

The power of realism is its parsimonious understanding of international relations. The world is understood as an anarchical system of nation states. The only difference between states is power. International relations occur in relation to the distribution of power. Realism has been silent about what to do in humanitarian crises and complex humanitarian emergencies for two reasons: first, because structural realism implicitly deals with a bigger picture and not specific cases. Secondly, that humanitarian tragedy is a priori outside of the national interest for most states. Kenneth Waltz for example seems to dismiss foreign policy outright in his work on structural neo-realism. Waltz cannot tell us how effectively (or even how) the units of a system (states) will respond to these pressures and possibilities of changes in the balance of power. Unless genocide or gross human rights abuses dramatically changes the balance of power then realism does not have much to say about peacekeeping. We find this same lack of understanding for the role of peacekeeping in the offensive and defensive variants of realism debated in the 1990s.

Though this paper focuses on understanding American foreign policy, it is important to note that realism has traditionally been silent about the politics of Africa and the third world in general. As John F. Clark states: “Neo-realism provided a form of analysis that seemed well suited to the Great Power relations of the Cold War era, but it reveals little about international
politics on the periphery in the post-Cold War era.” Clark goes on to state: “The concept of [western inspired] national interest fails patently in Africa.” Clark, along with other African scholars, Sakah Mahmud, and Assis Malaquias, point out that various African nations are often peripherally connected to global power politics. Overall, peacekeeping in the developing world has remained outside the scholarly gaze of structural realism.

A more fruitful alternative for understanding American foreign policy is the school of neoclassical realism. Neoclassical realists grapple with the foreign policy decisions that many structural realists ignore. The key to neoclassical realism is how policymakers perceive relative power. Gideon Rose explains: “Foreign policy choices are made by actual political leaders and elites, and so it is their perceptions of relative power that matter.” This emphasis on perception as an intervening variable opens up the black box of domestic politics and lets the state back into the analysis.

So how does a realist explain humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping? A neo-classical realist would contend that the core of every peacekeeping operation is a sober analysis of national interest. Policymakers must perceive that something will be gained from participating in these kinds of international ventures. A successful mission might maintain or change the distribution of power but always to the benefit of the intervening nation. What kind of hypothesis could we derive from neoclassical theory (hereinafter realism) when it comes to Sierra Leone?

Hypothesis 1, Realism: The U.S. will intervene in Sierra Leone if policymakers perceive American strategic and economic interests are at stake. These interests may include regional stability. Conversely, the U.S. will not intervene if these specific criteria are not met.

If this hypothesis is true we will find the Clinton Administration making choices to intervene or not based on explicit arguments of Sierra Leone’s importance to the stability to western Africa. These findings will be strengthened if we find evidence that top-decision makers made consistent and repeated references, in their comments to the media, minutes from official meetings, memoirs, government papers, reports, and personal interviews, to what were, if any, the geo-strategic and financial stakes Sierra Leone had to the United States.

Institutional Agenda Setting Hypothesis

The institutional agenda setting hypothesis explores how constructivist arguments of norms are transmitted, magnified or mitigated by international institutions. By bringing back institutions into the constructivist argument we can show how ‘institutional identity’ influences and shapes state preferences. States choose to cooperate in peacekeeping missions in areas of little strategic importance. However, there is a second part to the theory: since these institutions are meeting grounds they must mediate between international norms of human rights with member preferences of national interest. Organizations send mixed signals to policy-makers about its preferences. The end result is fluctuations over policies chosen – or limited interventions.

Constructivism provides an interesting avenue of research in the development of state norms and identity in complex human emergencies. Martha Finnemore’s The Purpose of Intervention best exemplifies this new research agenda. Finnemore sets out to explain why
states conduct military interventions; and how the rationalizations for such actions have changed over time. Intervention in the 19th century was strictly limited, and often tied to collecting international debts. By the 20th century, intervention to stop gross human rights abuses were not only discussed, but expected from the international community. In her earlier works, Finnemore (joined by Kathryn Sikkink) explore why states would accept these norms. They posit that states have a sense of appropriate behavior (and later Finnemore discusses the concept of felt obligations). In a process similar to peer pressure, policymakers accept these norms, “not out of conscious choice, but because they understand these behaviors to be appropriate.”

Finnemore ends The Purpose of Intervention with a jumping off point for future research: “We lack good understandings of how law and institutions at the international level create these senses of felt obligation [towards the norms of humanitarian intervention for example] in individuals, much less states, that induce compliance…” What we can tease out of Finnemore’s work is that membership and participation in these institutions are the transmission belt for felt obligations. Finnemore’s constructivism leads us to institutional liberalism.

International regimes are systems of norms and rules agreed upon by states to govern. The primary goal of institutionalism was to demonstrate that even in anarchy structured cooperation was still possible. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, two of the most prominent architects of institutionalism contend: “in the long run, one may even see changes in how governments define their own self-interest in directions that conform to the rules of the regime.” Keohane and Nye seem to suggest a constructivist argument. Over time institutions can change the behavior (and identity) of member states. The wall of fixed identity (so important to neo-liberalism) is now broken.

Jennifer Sterling-Folker concisely sums up the theoretical connections between liberal institutionalism and constructivism and how they are “birds of a feather,”

Actor expectations in a given issue-area [peacekeeping] converge around principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures which have relevance because they are the social practices in which elites are already engaged when the regime analysis begins. This neo-liberal institutionalism already recognizes what [Alexander] Wendt labels the fundamental principles of constructivist social theory… that people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them.

This connection between liberal institutionalism and constructivism is where I want to develop my hypothesis of institutional agenda setting in limited interventions.

Institutional Agenda Setting: Transmission

The UN plays an important role in transmitting ideas of peacekeeping to elite policymakers of member states. Ending gross human rights abuses is enshrined in the UN Charter (found in Chapters VI and VII). Over time, nations make UN peacekeeping part of their agendas even if it is not always consistent with a strict understanding of national interest. States learn to see multilateral action as the best way to end gross human rights abuses even in the face of institutional weakness in the UN Department of Peacekeeping. Keohane argues in After
Hegemony that states are loath to scrap these international regimes because they embody sunk costs. They “persist even when all members would prefer somewhat different mixtures of principals, rules, and institutions.” Institutions have staying power and once established become difficult to remove and hard to change.

Institutional Agenda Setting: The Importance of Feedback Loops

When it comes to complex human emergencies policymakers take their cues from international organizations. But agenda setting is a two way street. Institutions may be difficult to remove or change but they are open to influence from states. Stephen Krasner contends iterated cooperation within an institutional framework leads to a reinforcing feedback loop. The more states cooperate the more this reinforces the institutions of cooperation. However, that loop is more complex than just reaffirming legitimacy. If institutions push on states it is reasonable to assume that states push back. That is why constructivists are partially correct. UN identity is not fixed but a dynamic interaction with its members. States bring to the UN different interests, and capabilities. There are competing norms in the international sphere. Finnemore is correct to say that modern norms of intervention seem to trump sovereignty in military interventions. But it would be incorrect to assume that sovereignty, defined here as protecting national interest has no power in these organizations. The ideas of sovereignty and non-intervention are just as entrenched at the international level as stopping gross human rights abuses.

Nicholas Wheeler examines how the ideas of sovereignty cut both ways in the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978. The Vietnamese initially argued it was defending itself from an invasion by Kampuchea (a sovereignty argument). Many states, including China, saw it as aggression. What was initially left unsaid by the international society was the benefit of removing the Khmer Rouge. Wheeler challenges us to think of competing norms: “How should we morally judge a society of states that condemns the practice of humanitarian intervention on the twin grounds that such a right will be abused and set a dangerous precedent?” The norms of sovereignty are still strong. The U.S. chose to avoid the UN all together in Kosovo, opting for military action through NATO because of what preemptive war means to sovereignty and the expected Chinese and Russian opposition on the Security Council.

Institutions mediate the effects of the competing strategic and material interests of member nations with the norms of human rights. But states are active participants in the feedback process. In the example of peacekeeping: member state feedback to a proposed mission may be negative, thus tending to reduce the possibility of intervention; or positive, thus increasing the likelihood of multilateral engagement. But one thing is clear the size, scope and breadth of peacekeeping missions are partially reflection of the international consensus. This institutional agenda setting hypothesis not only allows us to understand why states choose to intervene but can try to predict the kind of intervention that will occur. Here is our hypothesis for Sierra Leone:

Hypothesis 2: Institutional Agenda Setting: The U.S. will intervene in Sierra Leone if key U.S. policymakers feel that Sierra Leone is important to the agenda of international institutions.
like the United Nations and other regional organizations. The institutional agenda (and its intensity) will dictate the size and scope of the American role.

If hypothesis 2 is correct we will find the Clinton White House acknowledging the importance, taking into account, and making choices of intervention based on their assessments and perceptions of ‘pressures’ from international organizations such as the United Nations. This hypothesis also postulates that the debate on intervention would be framed within the context of the UN. The findings will be strengthened if we see evidence that top decision-makers were explicitly concerned about international organizations from their comments to the media, minutes from official meetings, memoirs, government papers, reports, and personal interviews.

BACKGROUND TO THE SIERRA LEONE CRISIS

In 1991, President Joseph Momoh planned to hold free elections after many years of one party rule. However, the country broke out into civil war before that election could happen. A group calling themselves the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) crossed into Sierra Leone from Liberia that March with the goal of ending Momoh’s grip on power. Where did the RUF come from? During the 1980s, Libya had trained individual revolutionaries. This group of men included Charles Taylor of Liberia and Foday Sankoh, a former Sierra Leonean Army officer. The roots of the RUF may have started in Libya but they grew into maturity during the Liberian civil war. In 1989, Charles Taylor, helped by Sankoh, launched a rebel insurgency against Samuel Doe’s Liberian government. Taylor returned the favor by helping bring war to Sierra Leone.

It is hard to describe what the RUF really stood for. They played themselves off as a political movement for a better Sierra Leone, but in reality the RUF were no more than common thugs who killed, raped, looted and wanted the precious diamond mines. They conducted military operations like: “Operation Pay Yourself” or “Operation No Living Thing.” According to Ibrahim Abdullah and Patrick Muana:

The RUF has defied all available typologies on guerilla movements. It neither a separatist uprising rooted in a specific demand, as in the case of Eritrea, or a reformist movement with a radical agenda superior to the regime it sought to overthrow. Nor does it possess the kind of leadership that would be necessary to designate it as warlord insurgency. The RUF has made history; it is a peculiar guerilla movement without any significant national following or ethnic support.

Ryan Lizza of New Republic reported: “Typically RUF troops would enter a village and round up the children: Girls as young as ten would be raped. Boys would be forced to execute village elders and sometimes even their own parents. Once the past was cut off from the children they are hooked on speed.” Sankoh often tried to target certain ethnic groups to rip apart the fabric of the nation and cause mayhem. By 1992, the RUF had captured most of the eastern part of the country and created a refugee crisis. People fled into the capital of Freetown and into other neighboring countries.

President Momoh quickly doubled the size of the army with whoever wanted to sign up. But the Sierra Leonean government did not have the money or resources to conduct a long term civil war. The army was underpaid, overworked and ultimately demoralized. They eventually
overthrew Momoh under Captain Valentine Strasser, chair of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). But the Strasser regime now faced international pressure, as well as the civil war. The UN, the Organization of African Unity and The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) worked to negotiate a political settlement to return the country to civilian rule. In January of 1996, the settlement came when Strasser was himself deposed in a coup. The new government promised and delivered free elections within two months.

Ahmad Kabbah was elected President. But he soon realized his government was too weak to avoid further bloodshed so he entered into negotiations with the RUF that culminated in the Abidjan Accords in November, 1996. The Accords called for a cease-fire, disarmament, demobilization, and a National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace to be established. The cease fire did not last and fighting broke out by the end of the year leading to a coup of Kabbah by pro-RUF elements in the military in 1997. Coup leader Johnny Paul Koroma invited the RUF to join the government.

International pressure and sanctions worked effectively to force the coup leaders to the negotiating table but ultimately the situation was solved militarily when ECOMOG forces (the monitoring group of ECOWAS) combined with local anti-junta Sierra Leonean militias launched an offensive in February of 1998. The following month Kabbah was reinstated. Over the next several months ECOMOG forces were able to establish control over roughly two-thirds of the country. Alongside ECOMOG, the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was established in July 1998 to monitor the military and security situation. However, these organizations were not able to maintain the momentum. Another brutal RUF offensive toppled Kabbah in early 1999 and seized Freetown.

Key Decision One: Getting Involved in Sierra Leone

The first decision I want to examine is Clinton’s policy during the early chaotic months of 1999. Our hypotheses need to answer the fundamental question: Why get involved in Sierra Leone? It is important to note that the U.S. at this juncture could have chosen to ignore the conflict. Our realist hypothesis (hypothesis one) would suggest that if the U.S. had strategic interests in the region it would intervene to protect them. Conversely, the lack of interest would signal American non-involvement. Institutional agenda setting (hypothesis two) presents a different scenario: American policymakers understood that the UN is the dominant institution in setting the American agenda for gross human rights abuses absent broader national interests. While realism does have something to say about American interests and West African regional stability, the institutional agenda setting hypothesis presents us with a more robust picture of the actual policy path chosen.

The Clinton Administration had been closely monitoring the Sierra Leonean civil war. They applauded the election of Ahmad Kabbah in 1996, and supported the Nigerians and the other West African states of ECOWAS in reinforcing the civilian government. However, it was during the 1998-99 RUF offensives that the NSC started to seriously consider policy options. A Presidential Decision Directive-25 analysis (PDD-25 is an internal review to vet peacekeeping missions) was prepared and shared with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Administration officials did not think that Sierra Leone met the criteria for American action. The question of military intervention was moot. 28

Throughout the winter and spring of 1999, the Clinton White House was swamped with other international and domestic problems: the Kosovo crisis, UN missions were being planned in the Congo and East Timor, and the White House was dealing with the impeachment trial. According to internal memos, the NSC and the State Department were content to create an expanded UNOMSIL and a strengthened Nigerian-led ECOMOG as the best way to deal with the situation.29 The White House was not blind to the challenges UNOMSIL would face— including the failure of the RUF to turn over the diamond mines, corruption, continued fighting, lack of revenues, and the weakness of ECOMOG capabilities when compared to the RUF.

The ideal solution for American policymakers was a UN Mission that would eventually work in conjunction with a comprehensive peace settlement and the Nigerian-led ECOMOG providing the military support.30 Such an agreement would not only end the fighting, but provide a vehicle for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the RUF back into Sierra Leonian society.31 According to Ryan Lizza, the diplomatic process started when the State Department and Howard Jeter got RUF Ambassador Omrie Golley to speak on the phone to President Kabbah, eventually leading to negotiations that led to Lome. After the breakthrough phone call, American officials were dispatched to follow up on the conversation and build the foundation for what would become the Lome Accords.32

Can a realist explain the policy decisions of the Clinton White House in the early months of 1999? Since the U.S. never contemplated sending troops, realism would seem a viable theory in lieu of national interests. However, realism needs to explain the kind of involvement the U.S. would take. Some of these answers lie within an understanding of regional stability in West Africa. American policy was no longer a question of Sierra Leone or the brutality of the RUF but of greater regional security. West African concerns included: containing Charles Taylor in Liberia, and strengthening regional governments especially the democratic regime in Nigeria. Today Nigeria is one the top oil exporters to the United States.

Throughout internal documents we find evidence of the importance of regional stability to planning a U.S. response in Sierra Leone. One of the key questions that guided Clinton policy after the Somalia debacle: “Does UN involvement advance U.S. interests?” Policymakers were confident that it did by helping “regional instability...”33 They repeatedly talked about stability and communicated that to Congress. Former Deputy to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and one-time Director of Global and Multilateral Affairs at the National Security Council Robert C. Orr states, “The U.S. does have real interest in West Africa, not just on the humanitarian side, but in terms of hard national interests: oil, and the stability of major key regional states. Sierra Leone provided a huge challenge to the struggling democratic leadership in Nigeria.”34

But even if we establish that Sierra Leone had importance to American interests can realism explain the degree of participation? The choice to work through the UN and the limited response could be a reflection of the value U.S. policymakers put on that stability. West Africa would be of secondary or tertiary importance to the White House. The strength of ECOWAS could guarantee the U.S. not having to put large amounts of boots on the ground to remedy...
various crises situations. But as we will explore later, if the continued conflict in Sierra Leone proved to be too much a strain on Nigeria and these other regional powers then what would the U.S. do? At this juncture realism has a limited explanatory power.

However, we can find a more robust explanation of American policy in the institutional agenda setting hypothesis. The documents and interviews also reveal a White House agenda based on human rights, and a need to stop the violence, but more importantly UN legitimacy. As Finnemore points out, institutions at the international level create a sense of felt obligation for intervention. In the early months of 1999 American and UN policymakers realized a more aggressive policy was needed in light of the revelations of gross atrocities the RUF were committing. The sacking of Freetown transformed the crisis from a localized West African conflict with little political value to a question of international norms and human rights that threatened the legitimacy of the United Nations. Nancy Soderberg, Clinton’s Alternate U.S. Representative for Special Political Affairs at the UN Mission and former Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on the NSC, contends that Sierra Leone entered the American agenda when “the RUF started to reach the capital, and horrific pictures emerged of chopping off of hands.”

Eric Schwartz, Special Assistant to President Clinton and Senior Director for Multinational and Humanitarian Affairs for the NSC, points out the importance of the UN to policy discussion at the NSC: “There was awareness at the senior level of government that the credibility of UN peacekeeping was at stake and the lives of thousands of people were at stake.” UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke viewed Sierra Leone, as well as the Congo, as a testing ground for UN peacekeeping, and suggested that if the UN failed in Africa, it failed in general.

Both Soderberg and Schwartz suggest that the RUF had crossed a line with its seizure of the capitol. The RUF behavior was no longer acceptable within the changing norms of war. But the line crossed was not one of American interest. Internal discussions show that stopping the RUF and the legitimacy of the UN occurred side by side. Our hypothesis can now extrapolate into possible policy options. First, that any kind of mission would be conducted by the UN. Second, stopping the RUF had institutional limitations (both logistical and financial) within the UN. These limitations stem from a general lack of enthusiasm from the rest of the world. At this stage, there was not going to be a muscular UN response beyond the ECOMOG forces already present.

Key Decision Two: The Lome Accords and UNAMSIL

In key decision two we will explore why the U.S. opted to pursue a comprehensive peace plan between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF to end the conflict. At this juncture a peace plan was not the only option. The accords culminated in the creation of UNAMSIL. Realists (hypothesis one) would predict that the Lome Accords would advance American interests and protect the stability of West Africa. Whereas, institutional agenda setting (hypothesis two) predicts that the Lome negotiations are guided by the need to stop the suffering but tempered with a realization of the limitations of ECOMOG and the UN to use force. We find that in decision two realism, struggles with predicting the outcome of the Lome Accords. Once again the agenda setting hypothesis provides a more compelling explanation.
Throughout the first half of 1999, special envoy Jesse Jackson, and other State Department officials worked with Charles Taylor in Liberia, the RUF, and President Kabbah to sit down and negotiate a comprehensive peace plan. In May, serious talks began in Lome, Togo. A cease fire was signed on May 18 and on July 7 the Sierra Leone government and the RUF officially signed the agreement. The White House hoped that a minimal UN investment was needed for its implementation. On May 7, the Administration informed Congress that if a peace agreement were negotiated the U.S. would support a stronger UN mission. A month later the White House notified Congress that the Lome Accords “represent Sierra Leone’s best chance to end a terrible war.”

The Administration was honest that Lome was far from perfect. Officials told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee they would not push for a war crimes tribunal. The White House also told the Senate there were doubts about ECOMOG’s ability to stay and possible RUF resistance. The U.S. did not have faith in the Kabbah regime. However, Administration officials felt that the people of Sierra Leone’s views on the peace agreement were more important than seeking justice.

Officially, the Lome peace agreement ended hostilities, formed a new government of national unity, and requested, as planned, an expanded role for ECOMOG and UNOMSIL. Under the agreement, the RUF would become a political party and some members of the RUF would be incorporated into the government until the next general elections in early 2001. All former combatants, including the RUF, members of the former military who led a 1997 coup against the government, and the pro-government civil defense forces were required to assemble for disarmament and demobilization. Eventually the World Bank, working with the Sierra Leone government would invest in long-term development projects to reintegrate ex-combatants into the civilian economy.

But the agreement was flawed. Leonard Hawley, the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs states: “Lome was a screwed up agreement largely because it was put together by diplomats who wanted to get a solution to the fighting because it was pretty bleak. They wanted to open the door so they could get something in there... not really appreciating the military and other aspects of it.” Hawley describes some of the problems the U.S. faced in implementing Lome:

When I finally got a shot at the draft of the Lome agreement I sent out some immediate [corrections to the settlement.] There was no way disarmament was going to happen within sixty days of the signing. There are no mechanisms within the agreement that stated the RUF had to come to a joint Lome commission, or that they have to abide by the decisions of something like a joint commission and several other implementation mechanisms that we had learned were tried and true to implement deals.

But why back a poor agreement? Hawley contends that Kabbah was interested in a deal, and as for the RUF: “…they would sign just about anything.” It was Kabbah that gave Sankoh amnesty, diamonds, and a government position which was essentially his primary goal. To not deal with the RUF was to ignore the reality on the ground. As one Defense Department official put it, “the inherent weakness of Kabbah government meant that it probably could not survive on its own and Kabbah did not have control of the diamonds.” If the Nigerians and ECOMOG withdrew, the RUF would have realistically defeated Kabbah.
With Lome signed the UN needed a new mandate to replace UNOMSIL to enforce the Accords. Officials were cognizant that proposals in the UN needed to be carefully vetted to match resources with mission objectives. As sporadic fighting continued in Sierra Leone, an internal memo on June 17 mapped out the outstanding questions about a possible mission: there was a fear of the RUF reneging on their Lome promises. Thus anyone sent to peace-keep in Sierra Leone must be able to defend themselves and a Chapter VII peace-enforcement mandate was considered crucial.

On July 16, the State Department prepared a new PDD-25 analysis for the expanded UN Sierra Leone mission for NSC consideration. The undersecretaries (the Deputies) wondered if the proposed operation had adequate means to carry out its mission in the face of potential rebel resistance. Would the RUF really disarm and give up the diamonds? Problems still remained concerning the international funding and the financing of ECOMOG. The analysis asked this crucial question, “Does UN involvement advance U.S. interests, and is there an international community of interest in dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis?” The first part of the question was yes: Lome would promote a peaceful settlement, reduce regional instability, and alleviate humanitarian crises. The second question on international support seems to have been a bit more qualified. Outside of West Africa and Great Britain there was not much interest in Sierra Leone. Because of the lack of international support Sierra Leone was going to have to be a Chapter VI (peace-keeping) mission that would make allowances for self defense. The mission had to avoid open ended commitments, clear exit strategies, setting down reasonable objectives for reconciliation and conducting elections, the professionalization of the Sierra Leone army and police, and building accountability and responsibility into the government. But even with these considerable shortfalls the NSC Deputies Committee decided to officially support the expanded mission on August 5.

The White House officially informed Congress of its intentions to vote for an expanded UN observer mission to Sierra Leone later that month. The letter states: “Because we believe that the prompt expansion of UNOMSIL is an important factor in maintaining the momentum of... [the] peace process which could be jeopardized by delay.” The letter made sure to note that the UN did not request U.S. military participation in UNOMSIL. American involvement would be limited to civilian specialists that would help build public support for the integration of ex-combatants, document human right abuses for a possible Truth and Reconciliation Committee, and help the Sierra Leone government devise a strategic framework to coordinate peacekeeping humanitarian relief and development activities alongside financial aid.

The culmination of this behind the scenes work produced UNSC Resolution 1260, an interim measure designed to be implemented in accordance with Lome. The Resolution called for the expansion of UNOMSIL. The U.S. voted in favor of it on August 20, 1999. With ECOMOG providing the security, the Resolution authorized the provisional expansion of the mission (political, civil affairs, information, human rights, and child protection elements) along with necessary equipment and administrative and medical support. The role of UNOMSIL was to strengthen and assist the Lome agreement. Military observers would have a mandate to conduct disarmament, with ECOMOG providing initial demobilization activities. UNOMSIL also pledged further bilateral financial and logistical support to ECOMOG. The mission would hopefully terminate with the constitutionally mandated elections tentatively set for early in
2001. Madeline Albright was dispatched to meet with Kabbah and show support for the peace process.

In October, administration officials told the Senate that the outlook for the peace process looked favorable. Responding to Senatorial questions, the White House expressed guarded optimism, the cease fire was still holding and there were significant improvement in the delivery of aid. In further Congressional meetings that year Senators were concerned about funding and whether the UN had issued an appropriate mandate. Money, however, not humanitarian concern remained a key issue with Congress. White House officials stressed that there was a broad interdepartmental understanding that this was the best mission possible at the time.

Resolution 1260 was meant to be a temporary bridge to move the peace process forward quickly while the UN made better plans. The Deputies Committee decided the U.S. would vote to authorize an even stronger permanent peacekeeping operation to replace it in October. A stronger mandate that required getting UN peacekeepers to replace the exhausted West African ECOMOG troops already there. The notification letter to Congress stated: “We are notifying you that the United States intends to support [a new] mission that would subsume the current United Nations observer mission now deployed to Sierra Leone.” It pledged that: “no U.S. military personnel will participate in this mission, nor do we anticipate the U.S. armed forces will provide support to the new mission called United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).”

In deciding for the diplomatic track at Lome, and laying the groundwork for the UNAMSIL mission, the White House reassured Congress that this was helping promote American interests. We find evidence for realism in the repeated references to reducing regional instability and indirectly helping Nigeria. But realism struggles in explaining decision two and the Lome Accords. If the stability of the region was within the realm of American security why was Lome flawed? The accord was written in such a way that many critics say it rewarded the RUF for violence. The risk of the RUF reneging on the deal was high. If the Nigerians withdrew, the RUF would have defeated Kabbah. Policymakers did not suffer from a lack of information or perception gap. Why would a realist choose a policy with a high rate of failure?

Herein is the problem with realism: If the stability of West Africa relied on Sierra Leone, one could reasonably assume the White House would have forced a tougher accord on the RUF. There are two other possible options for realism: First, that Sierra Leone was not of importance. But if we accept that answer then realism fails to explain any U.S. action at all. Secondly, we could claim that Lome was a failure of the liberal Clinton Administration. But inaction and regional instability are insufficient answers to describe the Lome negotiations.

Maybe the talk of national interest was more rhetoric than real. We find ample evidence that the U.S. did not have regional stability in mind during the negotiations of the accord. Nancy Soderberg states: “While [Lome] now looks like a bad agreement because the RUF reneged, at the time, the Sierra Leone people wanted peace so we backed it.” Wanting peace and ending conflict are different than just protecting interests. Leonard Hawley speaks for the entire Administration when he states, “I think the RUF are the most despicable people on the planet.” Hawley continues that Lome was built on a realistic appraisal of the capacities of Kabbah and the RUF: “[the U.S. recognized] that you needed to be very careful, that if you put
on rose colored glasses [about the peace process] you could say that things are going to be great but you always had to have plan B ready to go.” Administration officials were not confident in Kabbah’s regime. There is no mention of the RUF/Charles Taylor dominoes falling. No mention of Nigeria being drawn into a wider regional conflict.

The institutional agenda setting hypothesis does a better job of explaining U.S. policy. The Lome agreement fits in with the concept that institutions help transmit norms of intervention and values like ending gross humanity. As Soderberg contends the people wanted peace. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice contends: “The Lome agreement, like many others before it, was a calculated risk that did not play out as the people of Sierra Leone, the international community, or the U.S. would have hoped.” She noted, “Some may second guess the inclusion of the rebels in any kind of peace process, given their grisly record, but this would not be realistic given the circumstances.” According to Rice’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Lome accord:

was a peace agreement widely welcomed by the people of Sierra Leone. It was an agreement freely negotiated by the Sierra Leonean parties themselves... As many members of Sierra Leonean civil society stressed to Secretary Albright a year ago, the people of Sierra Leone were desperate for peace— even if it meant justice were to be deferred.59

Why were the Lome Accords lacking muscle? The key to our institutional agenda setting hypothesis is the lack of international interest outside of Great Britain and the other West African states. The UN did not request U.S. military participation in UNAMSIL. This lack of interest transforms a possible strong Chapter VII mandate into a poorly funded Chapter VI mission. The tragedy requires some sort of international action (felt obligations) but the lack of interest weakens the possible responses.

Key Decision Three: UNAMSIL and Implementing Lome

U.S. efforts to help Sierra Leone did not end with Lome. The Accords called for a beefed up United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone and the transferring of peacekeeping duties from the Nigerian led ECOMOG to UN authority. The U.S. played an integral role in planning, implementing and ultimately ensuring a smooth transition from ECOMOG to UNAMSIL. Here is the key question: Why did the U.S. put the effort into locating, and supplying other foreign troops for a mission with limited American security interests? Hypothesis one suggests that the stability of West Africa was a question of relative gains for the U.S. But if realism is correct then we must find evidence that UNAMSIL promotes or helps offset the costs of American security. Our second hypothesis (institutional agenda setting) predicts that U.S. participation in building UNAMSIL is due to its responsibilities in the UN. A successful mission would not only alleviate suffering but strengthen the institution as a whole. As a member nation the U.S. has an interest in seeing the UN succeed, even in places where it does not always explicitly advance American strategic goals.

Leonard Hawley contends that American policy assumed that ECOMOG and Nigeria would continue to be the key players in the mission through the summer and fall of 1999. “We thought that the Nigerians were going to stay and American policy was built on the premise the U.S. would be contributing something like 20-30 million a year to keep ECOMOG going. I did
not think a UN operation would have the power [outside of ECOMOG] to be able to do this.” While the U.S. understood the West African exhaustion, they overestimated its inability to indefinitely continue supplying troops. The ECOWAS countries had hoped Lome meant they could leave. Nigeria faced domestic pressure to bring the troops home. Non American troops had to come from somewhere.

On October 22, 1999, the U.S. voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 1270 that established The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The resolutions called for, “ensuring the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel; monitor adherence to the Lome cease fire agreements; encourage the parties to create and implement confidence building mechanisms; and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.” The United Nations vowed to periodically review the status of the peace process and security situations so that troop levels could be adjusted as appropriate. But where was the UN going to find the troops necessary for UNAMSIL?

American policy hinged on convincing ECOMOG to stay. A State Department memo to the NSC Deputies Committee stated, “US policy must keep ECOMOG and the Nigerians involved.” In March of 1999, Ambassador A. Peter Berly was quick to thank the ECOMOG troops and in particular, Nigeria which carried a disproportionate share of the burden. He added that, “Now, more than ever, ECOMOG needs our support.” Nancy Soderberg states, “If ECOMOG left there would be a problem because the UN lacked the resources and means to confront the RUF on its own.” UN forces in 1999 were not trained and equipped to fight.

However, the Administration also realized that ECOMOG forces had limited capacities. Without international aid they would be forced to remove their troops. The Nigerians were tiring of a war with no end in sight, spending at least a million dollars a day in Sierra Leone, while at the same time trying to democratize at home. The new civilian government in Nigeria was afraid that officers were enriching themselves and the soldiers were picking up bad habits in the lawless sections of the Sierra Leone. There was a fear that poor and disgruntled soldiers would wreak havoc and destabilize Nigeria when they returned.

With the signing of the Lome peace accord, Nigeria had quickly announced a phased withdrawal of its estimated 12,000 troops. On December 23, 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan informed the Security Council of the Nigerian need to repatriate its soldiers. Washington was still discussing how to send supplies and equipment to ECOMOG. The U.S. hoped to convince them to leave some troops behind. The NSC Deputies meetings were clear: “We need to support ECOMOG.” In the final UNAMSIL plan, the United States settled on having the UN pay for two Nigerian battalions to temporarily remain in Sierra Leone to bridge the troop gap until a full UNAMSIL deployment of international peacekeepers arrived. Nancy Soderberg put it: “the issue was more whether we could get the Nigerians in there quickly [and to stay]. The U.S. ended up training seven Nigerian Battalions.”

Policymakers were convinced that any viable Sierra Leone policy must have a strong ECOMOG presence at its core. The U.S. would concurrently work to increase UN force capabilities from other nations to deal with RUF resistance. The U.S. pledged nine million and asked all current prospective donors to consider making similar contributions to ECOMOG through the UN Trust Fund or bilaterally. When Susan Rice appeared before the House Committee on International Relations’ Subcommittee on Africa she put ECOMOG in the
The support for the Nigerians should have come as no surprise. Throughout the 1990s, American policy towards peacekeeping has drifted to support for a regional state approach. This approach was a global response to problems within the UN Department of Peacekeeping and a steep learning curve within the White House over the collapse and confusion of the Bosnian and Somalian UN missions. Those missions were marred by ineffective mandates and inadequate communication between New York and Washington. Clinton’s 1994 intervention in Haiti would become the blueprint for future American humanitarian missions: find a nation with the strongest stake in the crisis and allow them to form a fighting force with UN blessing (but not part of the UN) to do the heavy lifting. Regional states due to the proximity and interest can project their power faster, quicker, with more resolve and theoretically with better results than sending U.S. troops to non-vital areas. In 1999 we saw both the United States intervene in Kosovo, and an Australian force lead the mission in East Timor.

The use of the ECOWAS organization was an example of this regional approach. Sierra Leone directly affected the nations of West Africa. The ECOWAS mission was organized to help foster trade and better relations for the region. It should only be natural that they assembled a group willing to help President Kabbah maintain democracy and fight the RUF. As one State Department official stated: “Having a regional power willing to step up to the plate like Nigeria enabled the U.S. to provide trainers for Nigeria, Ghana, and Senegal and made the mission stronger.” ECOMOG troops, primarily from Nigeria, but also from Guinea, Mali and Ghana, made substantial contributions to restoring Sierra Leone’s democratic government and forcing the warring factions to the negotiating table. Without them the RUF would have been victorious. American policy revolved around how best to help ECOMOG accomplish their goals of stabilizing the crisis.

Replacing ECOMOG proved to be difficult. The UN was afraid of not meeting its manpower goals for UNAMSIL. The Resolution had anticipated many of the UNAMSIL troops would roll over from the ECOMOG mission. The UN mission would probably collapse without ECOMOG. Leonard Hawley states: “I do not know where they [the UN] got all the troops [UNAMSIL] from because I tried to get troops to go there to make an initial push [in 1999] and just got ‘slam dunked’ by the rest of the world.” Hawley contends that the international community was hesitant to go because European troops were deployed to other missions, like Eritrea and Ethiopia. The other concern was costs. Often U.S. policymakers heard that potential donor nations did not have the money to participate. No one was going to Sierra Leone. Hawley states, “It would take a tremendous effort to get India, Bangladesh and some others to go.” The U.S. ended up playing an aggressive role in helping the UN raise the necessary troops.

The UN decided to address troop concerns with expanding the UNAMSIL mandate. The White House notified Congress: “Now that ECOMOG has decided to repatriate its troops, an expansion of UNAMSIL is considered vital in order to keep the peace process in Sierra Leone on track.” Leonard Hawley contends “the warning flags went up all over the place” [when Nigeria decided to withdraw most of its troops] and American policymakers had to ask, ‘what
are we going to do?” The U.S. “vigorously worked to get the Jordanians and the Indians and a few other people who could carry a rifle.” Through American efforts UNAMSIL reached its greatest strength of 17,368 troops in March of 2002. The U.S. provided the logistical support and eventually helped deploy troops from Bangladesh, Bolivia, China, Croatia, Egypt, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Sweden, Tanzania, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay and Zambia. By 2000, it had become one of the largest UN peacekeeping missions in the world. India was chosen as the lead nation for UNAMSIL. One State Department official noted that India performed well during the mission. He added: “The troops were fantastic. When I visited [India] I made sure to tell the deputy foreign minister they were outstanding.”

In early December, the Clinton Administration told the Senate: “The peace process was at a crucial moment: We will work closely with the UN.” Washington was still afraid of a weak, disorganized UN force. One of the key failures of Somalia was the question of mission creep in a failing state. Mandates needed to have clear goals. Feeding the Somali people was one mandate, but ending the civil war (that caused the famine) was another. Disarming the RUF, for example, should not resemble disarming the warlords in Somalia. Now Sierra Leone is not Somalia, President Kabbah enjoyed far greater legitimacy than the warlords. But what should be pointed out is how quickly the 1993 UN disarmament mission evolved and outpaced the mandate that had been formulated. UNAMSIL faced the same troubling issues: if disarmament failed, mission creep would set in and the UN would be under fire.

US policymakers were not blind to this reality but felt they had an obligation to “ensure a smooth transition of peacekeeping responsibilities from ECOMOG to UNAMSIL.” There remained questions about whether the mission had adequate forces, funding, and an appropriate mandate as well as whether the proposed UN troops from donor nations were properly trained and equipped to adequately carry out the peacekeeping tasks at hand. But complete inaction was seen as unacceptable.

Why did the U.S. put the effort into locating, and supplying other foreign troops? This question becomes relevant in light of the fact that a RUF victory would not substantially change our interests in the region. The U.S. could have easily let the Lome Accords die a natural death and retrench its West African policies elsewhere. After all, President Clinton left strategically important Somalia. The dominoes theory of West African stability stumbles on the reality of ECOMOG’s situation in late 1999. The West African nations no longer thought of Sierra Leone as a strategic linchpin. They were more than happy to pass the baton of peacekeeping. In fact, some Nigerians felt that the ECOMOG mission was actually undermining Nigeria. U.S. policy was to “keep ECOMOG and the Nigerians involved.” However, from a realist viewpoint that is an ironic statement: to ostensibly protect Nigerian security by stopping the Nigerians from leaving. The empirical evidence also suggests that stability was no longer a policy motivator. We find less discussion of stability in the internal documents. When it comes to understanding policies actually chosen realism as an explanatory theory seems to fail.

Overall the institutional agenda setting model is a better fit for decision three. Policymakers felt that UNAMSIL was the only viable international solution considering the lack of domestic and international will. The Clinton White House felt an obligation, not a strategic imperative, to
ensure a smooth transition between ECOMOG and UNAMSIL. These obligations stem from the commitments of institutional membership. U.S. support for a limited mission could hopefully accomplish several goals: to end the suffering, and, just as importantly, to strengthen UN peacekeeping in Africa. Would the U.S. have been sucked into Sierra Leone if UNAMSIL failed? There was never a substantive internal dialogue about sending troops. The answer is no. The UN, not the U.S. had to do something. Policymakers understood Sierra Leone as a UN problem.

Key Decision Four: Saving UNAMSIL

In decision four, American policymakers had to decide whether to save the UNAMSIL mission in the spring of 2000 or possibly pull the plug in fear of mission failure. The Lome Accords looked like they were about to collapse. The RUF were on the verge of re-starting the civil war. There were serious questions whether the UNAMSIL mission could shift to a peace enforcement mandate. What do our hypotheses predict for American action? Realism (hypothesis one) must be able to explain how propping up the UNAMSIL mission in the wake of failure advances African goals. One of the key things to look for is whether UN and U.S. legitimacy become conflated. Does the U.S. look weak if the UN leaves? In institutional agenda setting (hypothesis two) one prediction is clear: U.S. policymakers are concerned with protecting UN legitimacy.

One of the driving questions in Washington about the future of peacekeeping concerned the “blue vs. green helmets.” It was only after ECOMOG exhaustion that the United States reluctantly committed itself to the blue helmets: men from Jordan, Kenya, Zambia and India to name a few of the donor nations. However, there was a real fear that these troops were not tough enough to handle the possibility of RUF intransigence. As UNAMSIL proceeded with the disarming of combatants under Lome, there were a series of challenges to its authority in the spring of 2000.

The RUF were probing and searching for international weakness. First, they stopped UN convoys, and seized weapons in areas they controlled. These actions led to a chain of events that put the UN mission in a disaster mode reminiscent of Somalia. Leonard Hawley elaborates that some of the problems stemmed from how the UN was deployed on the ground. To disarm you have to spread yourself out, “like a spider. You have to send people out and collect them and bring them into central areas for disarmament and demobilization.” The RUF took advantage of the UN posture on May 2 - 3 and attacked. Fighting resulted in the deaths of four Kenyan peacekeepers and in ensuing confrontations the RUF detained over 500 UN personnel. UNAMSIL was in disarray: Lome seemed dead, disarmament was only half complete, and the rebels were still firmly entrenched in the key diamond-mining areas. The White House placed “the highest priority on stabilizing a secure situation and gaining the release of the detainees.” The Security Council issued two statements in May condemning the seizure of peacekeepers, and calling for their release. In response, the UN wanted to expand the UNAMSIL mandate to handle the situation and the U.S. agreed.

RUF leader Foday Sankoh rejected the UN charges that his men were to blame for the clashes. In an interview with CNN, Sankoh stated that the UN made “a small mistake. They tried to disarm these [the RUF] men forcefully.” UN spokesman Philip Winslow however felt
differently: “Their [peacekeepers] detention is unlawful.” Winslow went on to note that the general amnesty included in the Lome peace accord would not extend to crimes committed after the deal was signed. Sankoh responded to growing world condemnation: “The people who have done this will be held accountable for their actions.” He demanded his rebels release any hostages, but added, “The situation… was not from our side.” And more cryptically: “The U.N. peacekeepers are not detained, but are missing because they don’t know the terrain.”

One State Department official understood (but did not condone) Sankoh’s actions, “The UN pushed the RUF, a little bit too hard, too fast if anybody can say that, at least from the RUF point of view.” UNAMSIL nations started to augment their troop contingents.

So how did the Clinton Administration respond to this crisis? One gets a sense of the problems the White House faced in a range of Defense Department memos to the Executive Branch from May 5 to May 11. The Administration supported putting more teeth into the UN mission. But they remained leery of mission failure. The Lome Accords were going to remain the only policy option. The Administration notified Congress: “[of a] resolution in the UN Security Council that will increase the authorized force level … for force protection purposes… We are going to make a substantial investment in efforts to return peace and stability to Sierra Leone and to the West African sub-region…” In their briefings before the Senate and House staff on May 16, Leonard Hawley and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Howard Jeter discussed: “this is a very difficult security challenge and the U.S. is considering a wide range of policy options for subsequent steps in Sierra Leone.”

One of the best options was the entry of a muscular United Kingdom commitment into the conflict. The U.K. had a natural interest in Sierra Leone, a Commonwealth Nation and former British colony. With American logistical help, the British put the men on the ground and trained a professional Sierra Leonean army. The NSC wanted to support the U.K. intervention “as much as they could.”

According to one participant to the Deputy NSC policy meetings:

On Sierra Leone there were plenty of internal discussions. I think there was broad acceptance that we wanted to support the British in their efforts. Where the difference started was on the question of how to support the British? Did that mean money, did that mean technical support, did that mean lift, and did that mean U.S. ships floating off the coast so the British could point at a U.S. ship and tell everyone on the ground, see that’s the U.S.? While British forces were small they played an instrumental role in a post- ECOMOG UNAMSIL. In May 2000, British paratroopers were sent to evacuate British citizens and secure the airport for the UN. In July, they participated alongside the Indians, Ghanaians and Nigerians in rescuing Indian peacekeepers that were under siege by the RUF. British forces mounted other military operations to rescue U.K. hostages. Leonard Hawley claims the British response should not be underestimated: “The RUF made the mistake of capturing some British troops. The British freed the hostages with minimal loss of life. The British also conducted other military operations against the RUF. The RUF started seeing the message that the UN operation was here to stay.”

The RUF military resolve collapsed further with the capture of Sankoh by Sierra Leonean government troops in May 2000. Sankoh was arrested and imprisoned after his bodyguards’ sprayed bullets at unarmed demonstrators. The arrest of the RUF founder Sankoh was a blow to the loosely knit rebel group. What little legitimacy the RUF enjoyed came through him.
According to official UNAMSIL documents the RUF resistance in the spring and summer 2000 evaporated: “the international community put pressure on the rebels to obey the ceasefire and slapped sanctions against RUF sponsors. Subsequently, UNAMSIL launched new mediation efforts and brought the two adversaries back to the negotiation table.”

So much of realism has depended on an understanding of West African regional stability. We still find reference to it in a May 2000 State Department letter to Congress: “[The mission was designed] to return peace and stability to Sierra Leone and to the West African sub-region…” But is this rhetoric for domestic consumption? Possibly, there is only a limited ECOMOG presence and one cannot realistically present a dominoes falling across Africa scenario. In its place stood India and other nations with limited or little stake in this particular African civil war. Can realism shed light on American actions at the UN?

Three possible realist explanations come to mind. First, realists are not opposed to multilateral institutions as long as they serve the interests of the state. Second, that Sierra Leonean policy was now about helping the United Kingdom. As one policymaker stated: policy became how best to help the British. The U.K. angle provides an interesting story to our understanding of limited interventions. In both of these scenarios West Africa represents a long term (or secondary) threat to American interests. The U.S. was more than happy to help others do the heavy lifting of peacekeeping to achieve its goals. If Nigeria was gone the U.S. could support another nation to take its place. We find limited evidence for this possibility, more so in interviews than in the primary documents. It can also explain why the U.S. kept up its commitments to saving Lome.

Another realist possibility is that letting the RUF win might do damage to American, British, or Nigerian reputations. The U.S., in this scenario had to prop up the UN mission because of the sunk costs of prestige. The U.S. worked hard to forge the Lome Accords and to keep the Nigerians. Letting the RUF win would send a message to other rebel group in Africa that the U.S. was not a serious negotiator. This concept of “reputation” remains a hard concept to empirically define, but neo-classical realists realize that it impacts perceptions of power. However, one must ask: whose reputation? Ultimately the U.S. did not commit its reputation on Lome or reigning in the RUF. Internal documents and interviews also do not bear this argument out. However, the reputation that was at stake was the UN and the challenge of peacekeeping in nations with little strategic importance.

Our institutional liberal hypothesis presents a stronger explanation to American actions in Sierra Leone than realism. First, U.S. actions were designed to protect the credibility of the UN. Second, the final major decision sheds some light on the feedback loop between global institutions and states.

What is clear is that American credibility was never at stake. There is plenty of evidence that UN credibility was on the minds of U.S. policymakers. We have previously noted Schwartz’s statement that credibility in UN peacekeeping was at stake. Richard Holbrooke speaking in front of the General Assembly declared: “The crisis in peacekeeping was most apparent last May [2000 when Sierra Leone served as an exclamation point for the overall crisis in peacekeeping.” The official UNAMSIL webpage discusses the impact of the kidnapped peacekeepers: “endangered the credibility of UN peacekeeping.” Kofi Annan admitted that RUF actions represented a challenge to UN credibility.
American policymakers saw support for UNAMSIL as support for international organizations. A sampling of the international press conducted by Global Security.org shows how the world understood Sierra Leone as a UN mission. The People’s Daily in China argued: “The tragedy is also tarnishing the image and affecting the credibility of the United Nations.” The London Financial Times, stated “…is likely to prove a seminal event for the UN.” The Toronto Star reported: “has become an urgent test of United Nations resolve…”

Secondly, Sierra Leone also hints at the feedback loop present in institutional agenda setting. The UN is not static and issues can move to the forefront of the international agenda or move down. In May 2000, Sierra Leone faced a crucial moment. The mission seemed to be on the verge of defeat. One could speculate that if there had been a lack of will in New York, the blue helmets would have left and it would have moved down the list of international priorities. However, this did not happen. British Ambassador to the UN, Jeremy Greenstock hints at the importance of international consensus: “I think it shows that when a UN peacekeeping operation has the right mandate, [and it] has to do something, and has the will to do something, it can do it.” As Leonard Hawley contends the UN operation was here to stay.

This new found strength in UNAMSIL can partly be credited to British resolve and continued American support. Both had an interest in protecting the UN and ending the suffering. This mutual understanding between allies smoothed the wheels of bureaucracy at UN headquarters. When the British became actively involved, it strengthened the “positive” feedback loop to the UN and UNAMSIL remained globally important. The U.S. and U.K. worked together to write mandates, and marshal financial and military resources for the mission. The UN provided the framework in which the U.S. and U.K. could communicate. It is doubtful that without the UN either one of these nations would have solved the collective action problem of ending the civil war.

THEORETICAL DISCUSSION FOR SIERRA LEONEAN DECISION MAKING

Neoclassical Realism

In each of these four major decisions, we presented evidence that policymakers considered power (defined by regional stability) in West Africa and especially in relation to Nigeria. Joseph Grieco points out that realists are not opposed to cooperation within international institutions as long as they protect national interests. Types of intervention are then chosen by levels of interest. The U.S. could engage multilateral organizations to achieve U.S. goals in secondary and tertiary interests. Policymakers use the UN to lower the costs of unilateral action. This realism argument fits into a broader understanding of American policy towards Africa in the post cold war. According to James Jude Hentz, Clinton’s African policy concentrated on identifying and supporting key pivotal states or “big emerging markets.” Nigeria is a pivotal state both militarily and economically. Sierra Leone and Liberia are not American security interests in there own right, but these conflicts could eventually undermine Nigeria.
How does realism explain the type of mission chosen? Neoclassical realism struggles with the question of limited intervention. Realists would argue that flawed policies stem from incomplete information that is distorted by domestic institutions and psychology. But it is hard to argue that decision makers had distorted information about RUF intentions. Realism struggles to explain why Lome and UNAMSIL were chosen as the vehicles to protect West African stability. If stability were truly riding on the success of the Lome Accords it should have been a stronger agreement.

Realism: Perception and Identity the Slippery Slope of Interest

Furthermore, the discussion of what is a strategic interest leads to methodological problems. The neo-classical research agenda ends up discussing policymaker’s perception of power and not power itself. This sleight of hand may open up analysis of foreign policy but removes the parsimony of realism and moves the discussion towards identity construction (and constructivism). Measuring power is different than measuring peoples perceptions of power. Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik critique realism: “if exogenous shifts in relative power, domestic preferences, and perceptions and information problems can all influence state behavior, what remains theoretically distinct about realism?” Realism has been eerily silent in predicting or explaining this phenomenon.

Ultimately, realism is an indeterminate theory to explain humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. There are global threats to national security which realism can illuminate, but complex human emergencies and peacekeeping pose a problem. Many cases revolve around the dominoes falling in the future. But every crisis can be painted as a long term threat to national security. Famines, droughts, and diseases can lead to long term state failure that could threaten American interests. For example, in 2001 it was revealed that the RUF were connected to both Al Qaeda and Hezbollah. But the further we project into the future, the further we leave realism and the harder it is to define a threat. So even though we can make an argument that the U.S. used the UN to achieve its strategic goals on the cheap in West Africa. It is just as easier to say that the UN had an influence on the shaping of these policies.

Another Realist Cut: Explaining Nigerian Policy

This article has highlighted the weakness of neoclassical realism in understanding Great Power peacekeeping on the periphery. However, as we noted earlier, realism struggles to understand Africa and the third world in general. John F. Clark states that while the end of the Cold War has brought peace to the northern hemisphere interstate war in Africa has been on the rise. Realism has been eerily silent in predicting or explaining this phenomenon. According to Hentz, American foreign policy makers privilege the Westphalian model of the
homogenous state. However, African states do not resemble the Westphalian ideal of homogeneity: they are heterogeneous with little traditional measures of economic and military power.

But African leaders understand the rules of Westphalian sovereignty and become willing patrons to superpower politics. This participation was not a desire to advance the larger ideological or material goals of the hegemonic powers but to generate the necessary revenue streams to pursue regime consolidation. The power imperative of an African leader is to seek security from both external and internal threats: military coups, insurgencies, ethnic unrest and foreign intervention. Clark states, “Such a conception of the behavior of African rulers applies to both their domestic and their external behavior, obviating the need for any artificial division of domestic and ‘international’ politics.” Was Nigerian policy in Sierra Leone realist? By removing the structural underpinnings of balance of power and national interest, African autonomy emerges from the shadows of Great Power politics. In Africa, all politics is local.

Thus Nigerian policies in Sierra Leone were being pursued for rational but albeit different reasons than the balance of power in West Africa. Nigerian involvement may have been tied to the survival of General Sani Abacha’s government. Sakah Mahmud points out that Nigeria was under international sanctions for canceling the results of the June 1993 elections. The sanctions were meant to compel a return to democracy by crippling the economic capacity of the military regime. However, Abacha was not only able to survive the sanctions but seemed to grow stronger in the face of them. Mahmud posits two ways Abacha was able to overcome being an international pariah and maintain his control. First, was the use of rhetoric to frame the sanctions regime as bad for Africans not just him. He centered the discussion around the complexity of imperialism, colonialism and the North-South struggle. Secondly, and more importantly, Mahmud suggests that Abacha went about becoming a West African leader. Nigeria aggressively pushed for ECOWAS involvement in regional conflicts (Abacha was organization’s the Chair).

By the late 1990s, the General was able to reinvent himself as a statesman. This move allowed him to shift the global discussion from thwarting democracy inside Nigeria to one of protecting democracy in West Africa. His actions in Sierra Leone to end the civil war seemed noble compared to western foot dragging. Mahmud claims that Abacha effectively accomplished a diplomatic coup that forced the U.S. and U.K. to back off the sanctions for a policy of accommodation with the military government: “Nigeria’s regional efforts and role [in Sierra Leone] accepted by other Africans enabled the country to avoid international isolation.”

Nigerian policy was quite possibly a ploy to maintain Abacha’s legitimacy within his own country and not rooted in power politics; or necessarily a humanitarian desire to end the suffering. By opening up the black box of structural realism, we have a better picture of Nigerian interests in ECOMOG.

Institutional Agenda Setting

A more fruitful look at Sierra Leonean policy was provided by the institutional agenda setting hypothesis. Both constructivists and liberal institutionalism contend that institutions can shape state preference. Keohane and Nye suggest that institutions can alter the way
policymakers can see cause and effect: “The principles and norms of regimes may be internalized by important groups and thus become part of the belief systems which filter information.” The UN as the proper vehicle for multilateral peacekeeping in areas of non-strategic importance has been ingrained in American policymakers for quite some time. The Presidential Decision Directive states: “Does UN involvement advance U.S. interests, and is there an international community of interest in dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis?” After the Cold War, these policymakers had the chance to implement these norms.

Nancy Soderberg stated: “Sierra Leone does not become an issue on [the American agenda]... the UN is part of the NSC agenda.” American policymakers wanted the mission to succeed for the Sierra Leonean people and to strengthen UN legitimacy. We have seen various policymakers (Holbrooke, and Schwartz) contend the UN could not sustain another failed mission in peacekeeping. UNAMSIL had to succeed. The norms of membership subtly pressure the U.S. to work within the UN for some kind of solution. But how did American policymakers arrive at the type of limited intervention for Sierra Leone? The shape, size and scope of the UNAMSIL reflect the lack of international support. Instead of a well-funded muscular Chapter VII mandate it was watered down to a fiscally strapped Chapter VI (peace-keeping) mission.

Alternative Liberal Hypotheses: Ideas not Institutions

Overall, this article presents institutional agenda setting as a more powerful explanation of American policy. But there is an alternative story for liberalism – ideals instead of institutions. The core tenets of Wilsonian idealism center on the promotion of democracy and human rights as an American interest. Wilsonian policymakers are committed to working with multilateral organizations to find peace. President Clinton intervened in Sierra Leone to promote these ideals because he was already predisposed to working with the UN. It is difficult to assess in what directions the causal arrows point. When it comes to the relationship between the U.S. and the UN who influences whom?

But Wilsonian liberalism also struggles with the concept of limited intervention and in the end it is indeterminate as well. If liberal values truly motivated the President then why did the U.S. do so little (Where realism might ask why they did so much)? Clinton was attacked for doing too much in foreign policy. The White House was criticized for setting up costly utopian policies that drained the American coffers while weakening our credibility abroad. Michael Mandelbaum chastised President Clinton for conducting foreign policy like misguided social work. Somalia became the case in point of promoting multilateral operations at the expense of hard American interests. But ironically Clinton was also attacked for doing too little: Senator Judd Gregg of New Hampshire was angered about how U.S. policy was favoring the RUF at the expense of innocent lives. Ryan Lizza of the New Republic wrote: “Sierra Leone: The Last Clinton Betrayal.” Belief in Wilsonian liberalism becomes hard to measure. Eric Schwartz addresses the general criticism of the Administration’s peacekeeping record: “For people on the outside to make these [critical] post-op judgments it is very easy, they don’t have the responsibility of power, they don’t have the responsibility of office and they write with limited appreciation of how those constraints work.”
However, the problem of causal arrows brings up a more substantive methodological flaw with institutional agenda setting and constructivism: where do norms originate? Hikaru Hayashi critiques constructivism on this very set of questions: “What is the exact mechanism of the norms to change? In addition, lack of testing on large samples and lack of rigorous formal modeling weaken the constructivists’ approach.” These are relevant questions to ponder and explore in the continuing dialogue of methodology. But when it comes to the question of explaining peacekeeping every approach has methodological problems. We have already discussed that even the definition of ‘interest’ is open to debate. Realism is no closer to understanding the phenomena of humanitarianism.

Conclusions

This article hopefully adds to the literature of the Sierra Leonean crisis. The record will show that the conflict came to a peaceful end. It took a strengthened UN peacekeeping mission, West African military help, and key American and British financial aid to end the conflict. UNAMSIL completed its mission: overall it cost 2.8 billion dollars and 192 UN personnel were killed in their peacekeeping duties. However, by early 2002, the UN could boast having disarmed and demobilized more than 75,000 ex-fighters. It also helped return hundreds of thousands of displaced refugees and set up a truth and reconciliation commission. ECOWAS and the African Union joined UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leonean government in holding its first free and peaceful elections in many years. The Revolutionary United Front Party struggled. In 2002, the party won 2.2% of popular votes and did not win any seats in the Sierra Leonean legislature. According to UNAMSIL, the May 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections and the subsequent local government elections in 2004 “marked important milestones... Since then, the UN peacekeeping mission has worked alongside the new government to establish its authority throughout the country.” Though UNAMSIL struggled at times, it successfully left Sierra Leone in December 31, 2005 with its mission accomplished.

So let us return to the original question: why did the U.S. become involved in Sierra Leone? Why did the U.S. choose to pursue a path of limited intervention? There were no real strategic interests that demanded immediate military action. Eric Schwartz provides his analysis of American policy:

I think the post-op analysis of Lome has to be looked at with a great deal of scrutiny because if you are the Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs and you are dealing with a conflict that is clearly of secondary importance to decision makers and in a world with competing resources, you are just not able to muster the interest and attention for this issue that addressing it would require and people are at risk of having their hands, legs and arms chopped off with the international community basically standing by and those are the cards that you are dealt. You are then offered the prospect of supporting an agreement between the protagonists and antagonists that offered some prospect of ending the conflict. What is the moral course to take? You could stand on your high horse and oppose it and then be unable to garner the resources that would be necessary to promote an alternative vision, where you try to work as best you can to get to a settlement and I think that was the choice that faced U.S. officials in many respects in the context of Lome. I’m saying is this was a far closer issue than
some of the post-op analysis seems to suggest. Did U.S. diplomats... desire to see the RUF take over Sierra Leone? No, they were motivated by a desire to bring peace.

However, a more theoretical understanding can be found by bringing institutions back into the constructivist argument. We can show how ‘institutional identity’ influences and shapes state preferences, not only in decisions to intervene but in shaping the size and scope of the UNAMSIL mission. As Schwartz points out, Sierra Leone is of secondary importance and a multilateral response was the best possible forum to stop the suffering. When there is a general lack of enthusiasm in the international community limited intervention is the policy outcome.

There are limitations to examining institutional agenda setting with one case during one presidential administration. But it is the hope that a deep and rich analysis of American policymaking in Sierra Leone can provide a jumping off point for future research in both limited interventions and the role of institutions in humanitarian crises. Would these findings hold true for President George W. Bush? Could institutional agenda setting explain global muddling in the Darfur crisis?

Notes:

1. Nancy Soderberg, Interview by email, e-mail correspondence, July 15, 2002
7. Both schools of thought hold true to the realist conception of anarchy and structure. However, they differ on what signals the system sends to states. For offensive realists security is scarce and states try to achieve it by maximizing their relative advantage. For defensive realists the system is not as hostile. States are defensive in nature, they seek to balance against potential threats and only respond to external threats. For more see Mearsheimer, John. "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," in Brown, Michael E. et al., ed. The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995.
8. Clark, John F. “Realism, Neo-Realism and Africa’s International relations in the Post Cold War Era.” In Africa’s Challenge to International Relations Theory, ed. Kevin C.

9. Clark, John F. “Realism, Neo-Realism and Africa’s International relations in the Post Cold War Era.” p. 91


30. The State Department also made it clear that the Nigerians must be kept involved as a bridge until a comprehensive peace settlement was worked out and a larger and more robust UN force could be installed.


32. Lizza, “Where Angels Fear To Tread.”


34. Robert C. Orr, Interview by Author, tape recording.

35. Ibid.


40. Accordingly, they decided to support an extension of the UNOMSIL mandate when it came up for a vote in the Security Council.


43. Also there were unsure of a general amnesty. U.S. Department of State, Round the World Briefing for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 16, 1999, in documents collected for the General Accounting Office, UN Peacekeeping- Executive Branch Consultation.


47. U.S. Department of State, Info Memo for NSC Peacekeeping Core Group, June 7, 1999, in documents collected for the General Accounting Office, UN Peacekeeping- Executive Branch Consultation.


49. U.S. Department of Defense, Decision memo to NSC Peacekeeping Core Group, October 1, 1999; and U.S. Department of Defense, Decision Memo to NSC Peacekeeping Core Group, October 18, 1999, in documents collected for the General Accounting Office, UN Peacekeeping- Executive Branch Consultation.


52. The letter went on to state that the US had a national interest in supporting the democratically-elected government of Sierra Leone, stabilizing the troubled West African sub-region and alleviating Sierra Leone’s immense suffering while encouraging ECOMOG’s continued efforts in regional peacekeeping and peace enforcement. See U.S. Department of Defense, Decision Memo for NSC Peacekeeping Core Group, October 13, 1999; and U.S. Department of State, Memo to NSC Peacekeeping Core Group, October 14, 1999 in documents collected for the General Accounting Office, UN Peacekeeping- Executive Branch Consultation.


55. The Deputies Committee of the National Security Council is comprised of the undersecretaries to the primaries and other ad hoc actors.

57. U.S. Department of State, Notification Letter for Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 8, 1999

58. See Lizza, “Where Angles Fear to Tread.”


60. United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1270, S/RES/1270. October 22, 1999. Key elements of the mandate: authorize up to 6,000 UN peacekeeping troops, 260 military observers and 6 civilian police. Establish a presence at key locations throughout Sierra Leone and cooperate with the government and the other parties in implementing the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plans.

61. On February 7, the United States voted in favor of UNSC Resolution 1289 which expanded UNAMSIL further. The expanded UNAMSIL’s mandate included providing security to key installations in Freetown, its environs, facilitating the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along specified roads, safeguarding and disposing of arms collected from ex-combatants, assisting Sierra Leone’s law enforcement authorities with the maintenance of law and order. UNAMSIL was not expected to conduct peace enforcement activities and it was hoped that it would provide the neutral peacekeeping force requested in the Lome Agreement. The UN wanted to be clear that the primary responsibility for the mission rested with the people of Sierra Leone. The mission would terminate with conclusion of the constitutionally mandated elections in early 2001.


64. U.S. Department of State, Decision Memo for NSC Deputies Committee, August 24, 1999, in documents collected for the General Accounting Office, UN Peacekeeping-Executive Branch Consultation.


67. The memo also reminded the NSC that the UN needed to be clear whether this mission was peacekeeping or peace enforcement. U.S. Department of Defense, Decision Memo to NSC Peacekeeping Core, January 14, 2000, in documents collected for the General Accounting Office, UN Peacekeeping-Executive Branch Consultation.


70. Confidential Interview.


73. By May 17, UNAMSIL’s troops stood at 9,251The UNAMSIL mission was due to reach its full troop strength of 11,100


79. Confidential Interview with State Department Official.

80. Defense wanted the USUN mission to ask the UNPKO tough questions: Was this the best way to support the West African states and the British? Was the force going to be the UN or a multinational force? Defense once again preferred the green helmet approach. Furthermore, who was going to pay for all this? There were also concerns over Congress, and whether they could support the mission. U.S. Department of Defense, Info Memo for NSC Deputies Committee, May 5, 2000; U.S. Department of Defense, Info Memo for NSC Deputies Committee May 7, 2000; U.S. Department of Defense, Decision Memo for Principals Committee, May 8, 2000. U.S. Department of


82. Ibid.


84. Robert C. Orr, Interview by Author, tape recording.


90. The United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping, UN Mission in Sierra Leone, Overview.


97. Clark, John F. “Realism, Neo-Realism and Africa’s International relations in the Post Cold War Era.”
99. Clark, p. 91.
100. Ibid. pp. 94-95.
102. Ibid. p. 141.
103. Keohane and Nye, p. 266.
107. The United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping, UN Mission in Sierra Leone, “Overview,”

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Comparative Perspectives on the Rehabilitation of Ex-Slaves and Former Child Soldiers with Special Reference to Sudan

RANDALL FEGLEY

Abstract: Despite the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, reconstruction of southern Sudan remains a daunting task, which limited resources and unlimited suspicions may derail or delay. Among myriad issues facing agencies and their client communities are the problems of assisting children traumatized by the brutal legacies of Sudan’s first half century of independence. Given the length of Sudan’s conflicts, few have experienced a “normal” childhood. Furthermore, the psychological and social aspects of rehabilitation have only been examined recently. This article tabulates the successes and failures of governmental and non-governmental programs rehabilitating former slaves, many of whom were or are children, and child soldiers, many of whom are now adults. It compares activities in Sudan to programs in other parts of Africa (Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Uganda) and beyond (Afghanistan, India, Sri Lanka and the United Arab Emirates). Applying these comparisons in the absence of long-term assessments, the author endeavors to determine pitfalls to be avoided and best practices to be followed.

Historical Context

Most ancient forms of forced servitude sought to absorb conquered peoples and avoid their reintegration into previous cultures. But the rise of profit-driven mass slavery in Imperial Rome, Ottoman Turkey, and later the Americas, raised new issues, as slaveholders had little desire to integrate chattels into their societies. The Trans-Atlantic slave trade created an easily distinguishable class to clarify socio-economic divisions. The removal of Africans from their homelands and the disruption of their cultural patterns without absorption into their masters’ societies generated complex problems reflected in contemporary forms of slavery elsewhere. As defined in international conventions, all forms of slavery entail loss of control over one’s labor and movement for non-criminal reasons to another without pay, usually involving ownership for permanent or unclear terms of service.¹

In the two centuries following the abolition of slavery in the British Empire, legal emancipation and economic assistance, particularly the provision of land, jobs and other resources to allow the development of new livelihoods, were assumed to be all that was necessary for ex-slaves to adjust to their new status. These assumptions guided the workings of America’s post-Civil War Freedmen’s Bureau and the establishment of freed slave communities

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in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Fernando Po. However, problems were immediately evident. The American formula of "forty acres and a mule" proved unrealistic. Such approaches are still evident in Mauritania’s El Hor movement which has campaigned for the enforcement of anti-slavery laws, land reform, and the formation of agricultural cooperatives since the 1970s. Over the past two hundred years, great attention has been placed on children’s issues. Exactly what the numbers and roles of children were in early slavery and slave trading are sketchy. As anti-slavery crusades and anti-child labor campaigns emerged in the early 19th century, western societies also began to make distinctions between childhood and adulthood to an extent unknown in any other time or place. Children came to be perceived as requiring protection from exploitative labor practices, far beyond slavery. However, by the 21st century various forms of profit-driven bondage enslaved an estimated 27 million people worldwide, ranging from West African chocolate slaves to Thai sex slaves to Central Asian carpet slaves. All of these practices involve the exploitation of children.

Following World War II, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration’s reintegration of Nazi Germany’s 7 million slave laborers exposed the limits of focusing only on the legal and economic status of former slaves. The American civil rights movement emphasized slavery’s profound long-term effects. British sociologist Kevin Bales would later argue the mental bonds of slavery are at least as strong as physical force. Hence in the last sixty years, a variety of initiatives developed to address the unanswered psychological, social and cultural needs and complex dilemmas facing ex-slaves. These solutions differ from culture to culture and vary according to the proportion of a slave’s life under servitude. Common to these programs is the emphasis on meeting ex-slaves’ immediate needs for medical care, improved nutrition, and time to rest and define what their changed status means. For those who have known only slavery, this can take a long time. Former slaves require education and reorientation of their skills. Their one advantage is that they know how to work and given opportunities to work for themselves, often rapidly achieve a measure of economic stability.

THE SUDANESE SITUATION

Sudan has one of the longest known histories of human bondage. Ancient Kush, medieval Nubia, and numerous periods of foreign rule bear witness to widespread slavery and slave trading. Unlike most forms of servitude outside of the Middle East, early Sudanese slaving included many destined for military service. The ages of such slaves are seldom known. Undoubtedly many were ancient equivalents of child soldiers. Mass profit-driven slavery dates from Sudan’s 1820 invasion by the Ottoman Turks who imposed heavy taxes, paid in slaves. Conquest by the British in 1898 ended this institutionalized slavery, but the replacement of forced labor with wage labor proved difficult. Slavery or equivalent variations of bonded labor continued in isolated areas. When independence came in 1956, the memory of slavery was still recent and loomed large in the consciousness of both those who had benefited and those who had been victimized. Increasingly polarized ethnic and religious differences between north and south resulted. Centered on Khartoum, northern political dominance of Sudan was characterized by oppression and neglect. Many northerners still refer to southerners as abeed (slaves).
Not surprisingly, a half-century of civil war promoted an upsurge in slavery as a tool of oppression. By the mid-1990s, more than two million people were displaced from the south and Nuba Mountains to the north. While most fled the conflict of their own accord, some were clearly abducted as slaves. Raids by government-backed muráheleen militias captured Nuba from South Kordofan and Dinka from the Bahr El Ghazal and Upper Nile. Held in bondage and often physically and sexually abused, abductees were forced to herd cattle, fetch water, work fields, dig wells or do housework. Some had their hamstring muscles cut to prevent their escape.

In the Sudanese context, distinctions between slaves, child soldiers and street children are fluid rather than mutually exclusive." The government, SPLA and SSIA forcibly or deceptively recruited underage boys into their ranks. Many street children and others who were displaced found themselves exploited. Some demobilized child soldiers became street children as a result of poverty. Many became adults by the time of their demobilization. All totaled, tens of thousands were coerced into servitude and denied basic rights. Even more found soldiering, begging, prostitution and menial labor the only means to survive the oppressive poverty characterizing most of Sudan.

While Sudanese culture may conceptualize childhood differently than Western societies, the legal obligations of governments in Khartoum are clear. Sudan acceded to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on 18 March 1986, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on 18 March 1986, and ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child on 3 August 1990. Though Sudan’s 1991 Criminal Code does not specifically prohibit trafficking in persons, its constitution prohibits slavery and forced labor. Sudan has ratified the Slavery Convention and other international instruments banning slavery. However, the Khartoum regime has not enforced its own laws against kidnapping, assault and forced labor. Dismissing criticism and claiming it has little control over hostage-taking by rival groups, Sudanese leaders have denied the findings of numerous reports documenting slavery, but acknowledged that abductions occurred.10

One important report was that of the International Eminent Persons Group, which emerged from the mediation efforts of former U.S. Senator and Special Envoy for Sudan John Danforth. Led by American Penn Kemble of Freedom House, this eight-person team included U.S. Ambassador George Moose and representatives from France, Italy, Norway and Britain, supported by Canadian, British and American technical experts. One of four confidence-building measures agreed by both sides was cooperation in studying the issues of “slavery, abductions and forced servitude.”11 The group interviewed scores of individuals in northern and southern Sudan and Kenya. Identifying slavery as “one of a series of continuing human rights abuses in Sudan,” its 55-page report concluded that an upsurge in abductions and related human rights abuses since 1983 met the international definition of slavery. The report argued that the situation was not a continuation of traditional practices beyond government control, as explained by Sudanese officials, but a direct consequence of militia activities encouraged by successive governments in Khartoum. Most of the report’s findings were aimed at Khartoum, but the group also expressed concern over abductions and other human rights abuses committed by SPLA forces, noting the absence of democratic institutions and practices in all parts of the country.
Another damning investigation was carried out by Jok Madut Jok and John Ryle of the Rift Valley Institute and resulted in the Sudan Abductee Database. Following an eighteen-month field investigation in seven SPLA-controlled counties of Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal and contiguous parts of Abyei district, their survey produced an impressive record with the full names and identifying details of 12,000 people violently abducted in over 2,000 raids on Dinka, Luo and Fertit communities by militias operating out of government-controlled areas between 1983 and 2002. More than 5,000 people were reportedly killed in these raids. Over half of the recorded abductees were under 18. Most were males. Over 11,000 remain unaccounted for. The worst case was found in Aweil West County where 101 adults and children were abducted from the village of Ajok in a single week in 1999. However, one weakness of both the Sudan Abductee Database and the report of the International Eminent Persons Group are their geographical limitations. The total number impacted by slavery is much higher than the figures found in these reports, which though well-researched, detailed and important, deal only with the northwestern quarter of SPLM-controlled areas.

In June 2003, the UN Human Rights Commission’s Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery issued a report, noting that “[s]lavery, otherwise referred to as abductions and forced labor, remains a reality in Sudan.” The UN Special Rapporteur on Sudan reported to the commission that “in spite of some new commitments, so far human rights abuses have not decreased neither in the north nor in southern Sudan and the overall human rights situation has not improved significantly.” He added that raids and abductions were continuing and that the government had not clearly condemned abductions and forced labor. To the surprise and disappointment of many, the commission voted not to extend his mandate in 2004.

Numerous organizations have been involved in slave redemption in Sudan, which received a surge of press coverage at the very beginning of the 21st century. Accounts of ex-slaves’ lives became best-selling books. However, not as much attention was given to healing the wounds of bondage. Several church groups and Canadian Aid for Southern Sudan offer educational and vocational training for former slaves. Ongoing instability, insufficient resources and the scale of Sudanese slavery have made the effects of many programs unclear.

Nowhere is the complexity of slave reintegration more evident than in the workings of the Sudanese government’s Commission for the Eradication of Abduction of Women and Children (CEAWC), which seeks to identify, retrieve and reintegrate abducted persons and train those involved in this process. CEAWC was founded by the Sudanese government in May 1999 following widespread international criticism. Its operations have been dogged by lack of agreed standardized procedures, coordination, planning and trained personnel. Its tracing, documentation and reunification activities have been insufficient due to limited access to affected areas and lack of resources, such as transport, food, water, medical care, tools for cultivation, shelter, and structures for exchanging information and messages. CEAWC’s policy has been to return everyone identified as abducted to their places of origin without assessing individual circumstances. This has led to serious problems.

Based on interviews and casework, UNICEF and other agencies believe that a significant number of returned abductees were not voluntary. Most slaves are of Dinka origin, abducted into the North’s Arabic-speaking, Muslim culture. Some required counseling as a result of brutal treatment, while others were reluctant to leave their present situations for uncertain
futures. The offspring of women subjected to forced marriages or concubinage generated disputes over parental rights. Difficulties resulted as a consequence of female genital mutilation, practiced in northern Sudan, but not among the Dinka. Some abductees were encouraged to return by misinformation about destinations and available services. Separated from their families and homes for years, many have little or no recollection of their relatives, culture, language or place of origin. Highly vulnerable, unaccompanied children, some of whom made attachments to northern families who provided for their needs, were moved great distances. The assumption that children whose families cannot be traced will be cared for by their "community" was not adequately researched. Not surprisingly, some returnees protested with hunger strikes or by running away.

The International Eminent Persons Group acknowledged CEAWC’s establishment, but raised questions about the government’s commitment, as measured by its administrative and financial support and cooperation with international agencies. It also criticized the Sudanese government for not pursuing offenders. CEAWC’s chairperson has the power to prosecute any person involved in the abduction of women and children, but had not. In fact, no prosecutions had been brought in the previous 16 years.18 The UN Special Rapporteur’s report also criticized CEAWC’s slow progress. Noting that some sources described CEAWC as “massively dysfunctional,” the rapporteur pointed out that “no public statements were made in support of CEAWC by the highest political levels” and that its claim that it could identify and reunite 11,500 cases in one year was “entirely unrealistic.”19

Since 2003, fighting in Darfur has been reportedly accompanied by raids by government-supported janjaweed militias similar to earlier muraheleen activities in the south. Despite the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, reconstruction of the south, including the return and rehabilitation of former slaves and child soldiers, is certain to be long, hard and under-funded. CEAWC and the Dinka Chiefs Committee estimate the number of abducted women and children to be 14,000, while UNICEF and Save the Children put the total number between 10,000 and 17,000. Other estimates claim as high as 100,000 individuals are enslaved.20 Given the issues facing Sudan, a comparative study of programs elsewhere and analysis of their successes and difficulties is necessary.

EX-SLAVE ISSUES

In 2005, the International Labour Organization reported that children represent a higher proportion of forced laborers in Africa than in other parts of the world.21 However, other parts of the world have seen an upsurge in slavery and some Asian programs offer models and practices worth mention.

One of the most experienced rehabilitation agencies is the South Asian Coalition on Child Servitude-Bachpan Bachao Andolan (SACCS-BBA).22 Founded in 1980 to oppose child labor, it pioneered slave rehabilitation in India. Its rescue operations freed over 55,000 children in a 25-year period. Its multi-faceted rehabilitation program includes social education to promote human rights, responsibility and accountability and to combat dowry abuse, child labor, child marriage and corruption; conventional education to provide reading, writing and mathematical skills, cultural pride and a sense of unity and to promote health, personal hygiene and etiquette;
and vocational training for those over age 14. Sensitizing parents, children, employers and educational, labor, political and religious groups about child labor issues, SACCS spearheaded campaigns to promote free, compulsory education and the child labor-free Rugmark carpet label.

In 2004, a unique rehabilitation center was established in Abu Dhabi as a result of laws eliminating the trafficking of underage boys as camel jockeys. Run by the United Arab Emirates’ Ministry of Interior and Pakistan’s Ansar Burney Welfare Trust International, the center can provide healthcare, counseling and education for up to 400 rescued children for four to eight weeks before repatriation to their home countries, mainly Pakistan and Bangladesh.23

Some African programs have also seen success. In isolated parts of western Ghana, trokosi, the illegal practice of giving virgin girls to traditional priests as slaves to atone for family sins, received international attention early in the 21st century.24 Once freed, few have skills necessary for life outside the shrines where they had been held. Imparting skills like batik dyeing, sewing and palm oil processing, the Ative Vocational Centre, a vocational center and training program sponsored by the Women’s Funding Network, has assisted thousands of liberated slaves, many now grown with children of their own.25 Funded by the Australian Government, International Needs (IN) established a residential center providing trauma counseling and vocational training.26

In Ghana’s Volta and Central regions, impoverished parents sold children to fishermen. The International Organization for Migration registered 1,002 cases trafficked in this manner. Boys aged 3 to 14 were forced to cast and draw fishing nets and dive to release tangled nets. Poorly fed and never paid, many drowned. Local leaders helped win the cooperation of fishermen, who abandoned slavery and received training and micro credits to improve fishing techniques or engage in other livelihoods, such as cattle rearing. A small grassroots NGO, the Association of People for Practical Life Education (APPLE) works with those freed.27 An IOM transit center in Yeji gave 298 freed child slaves medical examinations and counseling before they were reunited with their parents and sent to school or vocational training programs. Prior to their release, the IOM identified the needs of parents and provided training and micro-credits in market trading, charcoal production and restaurant ownership to help them raise their incomes.28

However, African programs are typically limited by funding and government commitment. Around the world every year, some 1.2 million women and girls enter the sex trade, often involuntarily, generating US$1.5 billion annually for their exploiters. Between 30 and 35% of the victims are girls under 18 years old.29 In Africa, efforts to rehabilitate sexually exploited juveniles have been paltry. In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the Addis Meraf Centre provides shelter, medical assistance, counseling, vocational training and family reunification support to women and children trafficked for sexual exploitation and forced domestic labor, mostly to the Arabian Peninsula. Initially, the centre accommodated only twelve clients at a time, though the estimated number of victims is 40,000.30

As with abolitionist movements, several Christian church organizations are in the forefront of slave rehabilitation efforts. Save the Children addresses the health and educational needs of impoverished and abused children worldwide, including former slaves. Others are more focused. World Vision has developed innovative programs for rehabilitating bonded child
laborers in India and supports thousands of ex-child soldiers at a rehabilitation center in Gulu, Uganda. A nonprofit Catholic human rights organization, People’s Recovery, Empowerment and Development Assistance focuses on Filipino women and children exploited by demeaning labor such as prostitution. In September 2005, the Ukrainian government requested church assistance in dealing with thousands of victims of human trafficking.

CHILD SOLDIER ISSUES

While anti-slavery activists campaigned to bring these issues to the attention of a world that often sees their cause as a thing of the past, a new set of humanitarian concerns emerged as conflicts brought younger and younger combatants onto the battlefield. Often accompanied by physical force or manipulation, child soldier use had mushroomed. Due to their emotional and physical immaturity, children are vulnerable. As many as 300,000 between ages 8 and 18 serve in armed forces, both government and rebel, in 33 current or recent conflicts on four continents. This represents three-quarters of the world’s armed conflicts. Another 500,000 children worldwide may be in paramilitary organizations. While the country with the most child soldiers is Burma (approx. 70,000), Africa’s share of child soldiers totals over 120,000. UNICEF defines a child soldier as a person under age 17 who has been, or still is, active in a military unit with a formal command structure.

Unlike the heavier, more complex weapons of the past, modern lightweight automatic rifles are useable by children. More than anything else, this technological development has contributed to the explosion of child soldier use in contemporary times. Inevitably from poor or displaced backgrounds, child soldiers serve numerous roles as porters, cooks, guards, messengers and spies. Lacking education, threatened and often drugged, they have been used in suicide missions and sent into mine fields ahead of older troops. Girls are often raped and substance abuse is encouraged.

A ground-breaking 2004 study surveying some 300 former Ugandan child soldiers found that over half of those abducted at an average age of twelve had been seriously beaten, 77 percent had witnessed someone being killed, 39 percent had killed another person, and 39 percent had abducted other children. Over one third of the girls had been raped, while 18 percent had given birth while in captivity. Of 71 children who completed a questionnaire to assess post-traumatic reactions, 69 showed clinically significant symptoms. Almost all had experienced a number of traumatic events. About 6 percent had seen their mother, father, brother or sister being killed and 2 percent had participated in killing their father, brother or another relative. Over a third of the children had no mother; two thirds had no father.

Child soldiers have brought new dilemmas to the conduct of war. The UNICEF standard, which defines childhood, is alien to many societies, particularly in poor countries. As with the issues of racism, female genital mutilation and terrorism, fundamental changes in attitudes are necessary to truly end the problem. Conversely, western views must also be revised. In August 2000, a patrol of the Royal Irish Regiment peacekeepers in Sierra Leone was taken prisoner when their squad commander refused to fire on child soldiers. Sixteen days later a special task force freed the prisoners in an operation that probably killed more child soldiers than if the unit had defended itself. More recently, a compound suspected of housing El Qaeda militants in
eastern Afghanistan was bombed, killing seven boys, who with others were suspected of being held against their will. The bombed site bore similarities to child soldier “recruitment” centers, both in Afghanistan’s past and in other conflicts. Had the presence of children been known the attack would not have been authorized, but no alternatives were suggested. Pointing out that children bear disproportionately high consequences in Africa’s armed conflicts where they are often deliberately targeted, Pearn argues for the inclusion of pediatricians in military medical units, particularly in peacekeeping operations.

The 1998 Machel Study contributed greatly to understanding the myriad issues facing children in war. However, while it deals extensively with issues facing children as combatants, orphans, and landmine victims, it does not adequately address the problems of child slavery and forced labor as instruments of war. Advocating national and international assistance to speed up the provision of health care and economic recovery, Albertyn identifies the severe negative affects of war on children, in terms of pediatric health, health care infrastructures and health education. Cunneen notes the need to recognize the complexities of contemporary forced labor and the current restricted focus on immigration in most situations. She advocates greater support for those leaving forced labor and more thorough study of causal factors to reduce future vulnerability. Examining the case of Sierra Leone, Faulkner criticizes the inadequacies of legal instruments to prevent military service by children and analyzes the conditions that create underage combatants and the difficulties of rehabilitating combat-traumatized children. Approaching broader legal issues, Pask questions many assumptions about returning victims, in particular theories of habitual residents, the definition of “unaccompanied” children and notions of what lies in their “best interests.” Recognizing the unique problems of refugees and displaced persons, she demonstrates the need to settle issues regarding jurisdiction, selection of decision makers, processes of decision making, and representation of children and their interests.

As humanitarian agencies campaigned to halt the recruitment of children and demobilize and rehabilitate those forced to serve, they succeeded in altering the climate regarding child recruitment. As in the case of Sudan’s slaves, testimony by victims proved to be powerful whether in writing or in appearances before world bodies. Exacting pledges from various governments and armed groups, activists succeeded in developing new international legal standards where none has existed. Between 1998 and 2000, three important treaties were adopted, including the 1998 Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, defining the military conscription, enlistment, or use of children under age of fifteen as a war crime; the 1999 Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention (Convention 182), which prohibits the forced recruitment of children; and the 2000 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which established eighteen as the minimum age for participation in armed conflict. On 22 April 2004, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1539, calling on members to “end the impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other egregious crimes penetrated against children.” It called on all to “prepare within three months concrete time-bound action plans to halt recruitment and use of children in violation of the international obligations applicable to them.” However, in practice child soldier use often fails to elicit action by the international community, beyond general statements of condemnation. Human Rights Watch found no evidence of sanctions imposed on any
government or armed group for using child soldiers. In most situations, recruiters are rarely, if ever, prosecuted by governments. Given this pattern of impunity, many will continue to seek out children, who are easily lured or intimidated.

DEMOBILIZATION, REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION

In the last two decades, the rehabilitation of child soldiers revealed dilemmas which are the subject of a growing body of scholarly and clinical literature. Child soldiers experience bizarre twists of slave-like powerlessness and armed empowerment. They have often been abducted and are subject to others but are armed, have committed violent acts, and usually form a high degree of camaraderie with others in their same predicament. Substance abuse and severe post-traumatic stress are more evident than in other types of exploited juveniles. Slaves, on the other hand, are subject to others and feel little empowerment of any sort. In returning to their communities of origin, unfamiliarity may result with either the victim (sometimes in the case of ex-slaves) or the community (often in the case of ex-child soldiers) rejecting the other.

Two approaches emerged to what agency jargon dubbed “DDR” (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration). Those advocating programs that separate child soldiers from other exploited juveniles (the “segregate” position) note the unique psychological and social needs of child soldiers and their often violent nature which may present danger to others. Preferring programs for war-affected children in general (the “integrate” position), the UN and much of the NGO community believe that separation decreases the potential for successful reintegration. This position was expressed in the UN’s 2001 Appeal. “Child welfare agencies agreed to adopt a holistic approach to meeting the needs of child fighters by stressing psycho-social, physical and economic reintegration.”

Having supervised demobilization programs in several countries, Jean-Claude Legrand, senior UNICEF adviser on the protection of children in armed conflict, advocates going beyond “traditional demobilization programs.” Legrand sees that creating a “rupture” with military life is essential. Hence churches, NGOs and local civil associations run centers, in which military staff is not present, such as the rehabilitation program run by the British Catholic aid agency CAFOD in Sierra Leone. Legrand notes that stronger efforts must be made to monitor and prevent recruitment. Alternatives to military service are essential. Without access to education or vocational training, children are much more likely to return to military service. Reunifying separated children with family members also reduces recruitment risks and facilitates reintegration. Effective programs also include sensitizing children, families and community leaders to international norms, the negative impacts of child soldiering and local risk factors encouraging recruitment. Birth registration, to ensure that children can produce proof of age, is vital. Increased security around schools is needed to ensure the safe pursuit of education.

By late 2003, UNICEF demobilization and rehabilitation programs for former child soldiers were operating in Colombia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and the Congo. In 2004, a total of 3,998 boys, mostly aged between 14 and 17 years old, were demobilized by UNICEF’s Child Soldiers Demobilization and Reintegration Program in Afghanistan, where as many as 30 percent of males had participated in military activities as children over more than two decades of war. Serving about half of Afghanistan’s estimated 8,000 child soldiers, this
effort provided each demobilized child with a package of support, starting with registration in a database, receipt of a photo identity card, medical and psychosocial assessments and briefing sessions on mine risk education and reintegration options, including return to education, enrolment in vocational training programs or participation in income generation schemes like sheep or poultry farming. Other programs were begun in Burundi, Liberia, and Sri Lanka.62

With few exceptions, these programs were available to only a small percentage of the children who needed them. To make matters worse, assistance has often been delayed. The UNICEF program in Afghanistan was established almost two years after the conflict had ended. Between July 2001 and November 2002, only 280 child soldiers were released from government forces in the Congo, where insufficient resources precluded implementation of a demobilization decree issued in June 2000.63 In Angola, a peace agreement was reached in April 2002, but 7,000 to 11,000 child soldiers were excluded from demobilization programs, perceived to be an adult concern, and no special rehabilitation services were set up. Programs were virtually nonexistent in some key countries, including Burma, Nepal and the Philippines.64

The best funded agencies are inevitably from the developed world. Much criticism has been leveled at their programs which involve foreign intervention in complex local conflicts.65 Concerned with appealing more to donors than clients, international agencies are often under-scrutinized. Lacking local knowledge and seldom speaking the language of those they are trying to help, expensive foreign experts often bypass local concerns and wisdom. The naiveté of expatriate personnel can lead to misuse of resources earmarked for rehabilitation by warring parties, local elites or young men, who were never child soldiers but enlist in programs to get material goods or training. In the eastern Congo, parents sent children to armed groups for a few months to receive program support including school enrollment, vocational training and starter kits for income generation activities.66 Hence assistance may actually encourage enlistment or corrupt use of programs. Problems like these could be reduced by closer ties between agencies and local communities. Where local conditions preclude community control, programs are best run by local NGOs with local expertise. However, they inevitably lack funding, organization, technology and recognition.

Rehabilitated child soldiers often face hostility from their communities of origin because of acts they have perpetrated. In its 20 year rebellion against the Ugandan government, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) abducted at least 30,000 children, some as young as eight years old, to work as soldiers and laborers.67 Constituting 90 percent of its force, children are severely brutalized. Many have been forced to commit atrocities in their own communities which lead to their being stigmatized and unable to return home. “Since these former child soldiers are often blamed and stigmatized for the countless atrocities they committed—mostly against their own people—their psychological recovery and reintegration can be seriously complicated.”68

Ruaudel and Timpson decry the insufficient attention given to the reconciliation of children abducted by LRA rebels. They claim that the process of integrating former fighters into their communities is proceeding poorly and that the willingness of communities to accept large numbers of fighters remains untested, especially for women returning with children born in captivity. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, half of 66 girls demobilized in 2001 had babies.69 Ruaudel and Timpson emphasize the need to not only involve communities but provide programs to develop communities and avoid engendering resentment of the returnees.70 In 2002, a British
charity, SOS Children established a children’s program in Gulu, Uganda. Former LRA child soldiers, abandoned children, and AIDS and war orphans are provided with basic necessities, food, and medical and psychological support. The program’s goal is the re-unification of the children with their families, with community awareness education, reunification rituals and ongoing clinical support. However, large numbers of traumatized children have no communities to return to. Hence nine caregivers live with 117 children in a temporary “village” that is likely to become permanent. SOS Children runs similar communities in Kakiri and Entebbe. Different circumstances led to similar situations in Liberia, where programs saw numerous drop-outs and difficulties determining the status of self-defining unaccompanied children, 40% of whom were not reunified with families and remained transit shelters for long periods.

Studies in Mozambique revealed problems with Western approaches to healing victims of psychological trauma. In many cases, those involved want to start fresh after ritual procedures, which do not emphasize recalling the traumas suffered, as western-style counseling would. Immediately after the end of hostilities, a group of Mozambican child soldiers was placed in a recuperation centre where child psychologists worked with them. This proved unsuccessful because the children were removed from their communities. An exclusive focus on individual “clients” ignored family and community roles in the healing process. The ex-soldiers were asked to talk about painful memories as a way of healing. But recalling traumatic experiences verbally was not as effective as more experiential traditions of coping and reconciliation. Local society emphasizes the importance of ancestral spirits and other supernatural forces in the causation and healing of mental health problems. Therefore, the reintegration of child soldiers must begin with community rituals.

There are different types of rituals. Some are addresses to those who have participated in the war but did not kill; others are particularly directed to those who killed other people. The latter are more complex and require the expertise of a traditional healer. It is believed that the spirits of the dead can make the killer become insane. In all these rituals is the idea of pollution that the children bring to their homes and villages. They have to be cleansed as soon as possible to be able to socialize freely with relatives and friends.

Another important issue that comes out of these cases is the idea of symbolically breaking with the past: the washing of the body in the river so that the dirt of the war would go away; the burning of the hut and the clothes brought from the war. It is interesting to see the use of a chicken in the rituals (the blood for cleansing, and the meat for the sacrificial meal shared with the ancestors), and of herbal remedies to cleanse the body internally (inhaling and drinking) and externally (bathing and rubbing).

In the case of Uganda, former LRA child soldiers have ritually broken with their violent pasts by stepping on eggs in public reintegration ceremonies. Acholi society has several older but similar mechanisms. Performed in public ceremonies after a mediated process has brought two parties together, mato oput is the consumption of a bitter drink by perpetrators and their victims or victims’ families. Offenders accept responsibility, ask for forgiveness and make reparation to their victims. Another Acholi custom, gomo tong (the bending of spears) ritualizes the ending of hostilities between groups. Both of these rituals are preceded by discussion and “truth-telling.” Similar ceremonies are found in Sierra Leone and elsewhere. Honwana notes,
In these cases, to separate body and mind does not work because individuals are seen as a whole body/mind composite and as part and parcel of a collective body (their wrongdoings can affect their families as well). This explains the direct involvement of the family (both the living and the dead, the ancestors) in the cleansing and healing process. The ancestors are believed to play a powerful role in protecting their relatives against evil and misfortune.

The performance of these rituals and the politics that precede them transcend the particular individual(s) concerned and involved the collective body. The family and friends are involved, and the ancestral spirits are also implicated in mediating for a good outcome. This shows how the living has to acknowledge the dead (the past), both the ancestors and the dead of the war, to carry on with their lives. The rituals were aimed at asking for forgiveness, appeasing the souls of the dead, and preventing any future afflictions (retaliations) from the spirits of the dead, in this way serving the links with that “bad” past.78

In all cases, those involved in reintegration ceremonies recognize that much needs to be done after the rituals. Some findings suggest that labor-intensive public works projects are extremely effective in reintegrating former combatants in general.79 By contributing to local communities, child soldiers could reduce the stigma attached to their pasts through such projects. Advancing a number of issues regarding appropriate therapies for war-traumatized children, Parson sees Western models of intervention as useful but localized, culturally-appropriate community techniques as better.80 Conducted by Columbia University and Save the Children, the Mozambique Child Soldier Life Outcome Study showed “that former child soldiers who are provided rehabilitative services and accepted back into their families and communities will become productive, responsible and caring adults.”81 This qualitative and quantitative study traced 39 captured or escaped child soldiers from their 1988 arrival at the Lhanguene Rehabilitation Center in Maputo, where they received six months of psychological and physical rehabilitation, through a two year period of additional assistance after they returned to their families/communities to a point when all were adults sixteen years after returning home. Again rehabilitation was linked to community acceptance.82

One weakness of most programs is the exclusion of girls from demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration processes. This is due to multiple factors. Girls who do not serve in combat roles are often overlooked. Some are reluctant to participate in demobilization programs because of the stigma of being associated with military forces, particularly when sexual abuse is common.83 Furthermore, much evidence suggests that many, in some cases most, female abductees are never registered and continue to be held in captivity.84

The disruptive financial patterns of agencies dependent on donations and “soft money” grants for their funding also influence rehabilitation programs. For example, in May 2003 U.S. Labor Secretary Elaine Chao announced a $13-million initiative to help educate, rehabilitate and reintegrate ex-child soldiers worldwide.85 Yet, despite the popularity of the cause and the fanfare accompanying it, the very next month, a UNICEF rehabilitation program in Sierra Leone was forced to suspend operations temporarily when it ran out of cash.86 Such situations are not unique and the financial constraints of many agencies limit the scale of their operations.

What is required in the course of rehabilitation varies according to the nature of a child’s experience. The needs of an Acholi child soldier brought to Kampala differ greatly from Ghana’s trokosi slave girls whose families of origin might be in the immediate neighborhood of...
the shrines where they are held. However, these cases still exhibit a clarity dividing child soldiers and slaves not found in Sudan, where discerning and treating the problems of different types of exploited children with different experiences is a prime concern.

Rehabilitation and Reintegration in Sudan

The current status of Sudanese child soldiers can best be described as dismal. According to a UN report, government armed forces, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, pro-government janjaweed militias and anti-government Darfuri rebels have all used child soldiers extensively. Recruitment into Sudan’s national army has taken forms indistinguishable from abduction. UNICEF has proved to be the only agency capable of dealing with mass demobilizations. With the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, it expanded its child soldier rehabilitation activities in the south. However, little has happened in Darfur.

Not surprisingly, the most significant reductions in child soldier use have accompanied the end of conflicts. From May 2001 through January 2002, the UN mission in Sierra Leone demobilized almost 48,000 combatants, including 6,845 child soldiers, from government and rebel forces. However, re-recruitment of former child soldiers occurs frequently wherever demobilization is attempted during a continuing armed conflict. In Sri Lanka, the rebel Tamil Tigers pledged to UNICEF to cease recruitment of child soldiers. However, evidence suggests that abduction has continued. Southern Sudan is another example. In 2000, the SPLA made a similar commitment to UNICEF. The following year, over 3,500 children were demobilized from SPLA forces and reunified with their families in high profile ceremonies. Some accused the SPLA of window-dressing to gain international support. Indeed, by 2003, the demobilization process stagnated and 7,000-8,000 children remained with SPLA forces. Some recruitment continued and cases of re-recruitment of children previously demobilized emerged. Similar situations were reported in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone and Uganda. Since fighting ceased, the SPLA has more effectively demobilized child soldiers, 242 in Tonj and over a thousand in Akobo in July 2006. According to UNICEF, between 2001 and 2006 more than 15,000 children have been disarmed, demobilized and returned to their communities from SPLA ranks. Meanwhile, no efforts have been made to stem the use of child soldiers in Sudan’s government forces.

One factor that makes the plight of exploited children in Sudan, Africa’s largest country in area, much worse than what has occurred in Uganda, Ghana and Mozambique, are the vast distances over which slaves and child soldiers have been transported and therefore the vast distances and expense which must be dealt with in the course of their rehabilitation. In 2006, UNICEF’s financial needs for reintegration operations in Sudan totaled US$22,000,000 of which $16,500,000 were designated for southern Sudan. Its 2006 operations were aimed at the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of some 4,500 children remaining in the SPLA; up to 12,500 associated with government and other armed forces in southern Sudan, south Kordofan, Abyei and southern Blue Nile; and at least 500 children from regular and militia forces in Darfur.

However, the Sudanese situation has some positive aspects when compared to others. In southern Sudan, returning child soldiers have seldom committed the atrocities associated with
conflicts in Uganda, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Indeed, many have returned as heroes. This places their situations closer to those of other exploited juveniles. On the other hand, child soldiers in the SPLA and other rebel groups often volunteered for service, either as the only option for survival or in response to propaganda, which permeates youth group songs, slogans and stick drills throughout the region.\textsuperscript{98} On the government side, recruits have been inspired by the official Islamist agenda. Hence in many cases, child soldiers are not merely victims of abduction or economic circumstances. The fact that many were not conscripted makes them appear not exploited, and therefore not in need of rehabilitation.

The civil war in southern Sudan ended at a time when preliminary studies of child soldier rehabilitation programs elsewhere were available. As a result, the most serious pitfalls could be known if not avoided. Interviews with local NGOs in Equatoria and in refugee communities in Uganda show that some agencies have already moved away from orphanages and other models of rehabilitation separate from local communities.\textsuperscript{99} Art and drama therapy, which have already been brought to southern Sudan, are perceived as beneficial to all categories of exploited children.\textsuperscript{100} Rituals have been a part of child soldier demobilization events since 2001.\textsuperscript{101} Unlike the Ugandan egg-breaking ceremony, demobilized children in these ceremonies simply lay down their arms and as a group move forward towards crowds of relatives and neighbors with their backs to the weapons. They are welcomed home, the weapons are often destroyed and rehabilitation begins.

Conclusions

The needs of 27 million slaves worldwide are much greater than those of 800,000 child soldiers. But ex-slave programs suffer from lack of recognition, while child soldier programs have had significant public exposure. One persistent problem is deep-seated attitudes in many donor countries that slavery is a historical issue only. Nowhere is this mindset more thoroughly debunked than in Sudan, which is currently experiencing both the freeing of slaves and demobilization of child soldiers, two processes which interlock, but have differing needs. Yet, while child soldier programs receive much attention, slave rehabilitation has languished.\textsuperscript{102} Given the profound, long-term impacts of slavery and war, reintegration remains problematic.

The effectiveness of virtually all rehabilitation programs remains unclear as their development is very recent, their techniques are varied and little study has been devoted to evaluating them. Training, alternative sources of income and other poverty reduction measures remain important, for victims, perpetrators and their communities, as Ghanaian and Ugandan examples show. However, such economic solutions, rooted in ex-slave rehabilitation efforts, are only beginnings.

Training and the development of training materials are also critical. Those working with those traumatized children require a diverse range of professional skills and expertise in research, documentation, communication, child care, health care and social work. Yet specific training for those rehabilitating slaves and child-soldiers is not available anywhere beyond a handful of international agencies. One admirable attempt to remedy this problem is the development of manuals by Save the Children Federation.\textsuperscript{103} However, local NGOs have few, if any, training resources. Drawing on psychological, psychiatric and social work with refugees
and torture and rape victims, even the most effective agencies, such as SACCS-BBA, admit that they are inventing and adapting techniques as they go.

Slave rehabilitation programs are older, but could borrow much from the more recent, but better funded and better documented child soldier programs. Given the severe psychological trauma which child soldiers, juvenile rape victims and other exploited children are known to have endured, programs seeking to rehabilitate them have tended to be therapeutic. Whereas, ex-slave rehabilitation, which predate these approaches, has emphasized the vocational. A broader view suggests that child soldier programs need to do more to address the vocational needs of their clients and ex-slave programs require greater therapeutic elements. Adult and child clients should not be mixed, even if victimization occurred when all were juveniles. Some techniques currently used to rehabilitate child soldiers and other exploited children could be applied to ex-slaves. Reintegrating rituals similar to those facilitating child soldier returns could be useful in reintegrating former slaves, as rites of recognition and welcome rather than as modes of dealing with wrongs to their communities, which ex-slaves did not commit.

Effective rehabilitation is an expensive, long-term undertaking and agencies’ current dependence on donations and soft money grants is problematic. Graça Machel has argued that programs to assist former child soldiers should last at least three years. Providing basic services to broader communities is often essential to avoid local resentment of the special support former child soldiers are given. Typically of shorter duration and cheaper to run, ex-slave programs are still very expensive for the societies where they are needed. Preparation of affected persons and their families, particularly to promote awareness of the problems of reintegration, is essential. Communities need to be committed to ending these problems and dealing with their many consequences. However, comprehensive counseling of families and communities involves high transport and personnel costs, which few programs can meet. Multi-faceted education is also essential, as shown in the experience of SACCS-BBA.

In the best of worlds, programs working with traumatized children would differentiate their services on the basis of their clients’ ages and the nature of their experiences. Compelling cultural and financial reasons have and will prevent this from being the reality in Sudan and much of the world. The “integrate” approach has become the norm by choice or by force of circumstances. Programs that deal with exploited children without distinguishing the type of victimization can be effective. However, they eventually need to deal with their ex-child soldier clients as perpetrators as well as victims.

Further research in many areas of this important field is sorely needed. We need to assess the long-term impact of programs and determine what measures “success”. We need to explore culturally appropriate ways to insure that groups in conflict refrain from exploiting the weak in their ranks. We need to explore developmental alternatives that would provide non-violent options for children and their communities. However, numerous programs have already revealed good practices and avoidable pitfalls. Among the shortcomings of some programs is failure to understand local recruitment and enslavement circumstances which perpetuate exploitation. Hence the importance of community involvement ranks above all other findings. In most cases, local concerns are not given enough attention. Yet study after study shows that local acceptance is vital to successful demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration.
Activism, reconciliation and therapy for exploited children and their now adult counterparts cannot be delayed until assessments show a clear way. Nor can efforts wait for changes in relationships between adults and children, and citizens and the state, in poor countries. Any attempt to build peace in Sudan must incorporate child soldier and slave rehabilitation and the cessation of their recruitment. Inevitably, changes in attitudes will follow, even if slowly by Western standards. Attention to the needs of the world’s children is already centuries late in coming. The problems are too great and the needs of millions in physical and emotional bondage are too compelling to wait.

Notes:


20. UN Commission on Human Rights, *Forced Labour and Slavery in Sudan*. Bales quotes 50,000 as a high estimate for Sudan on Free the Slaves (www.freetheslaves.net) and Anti-Slavery International’s high estimate is 100,000.


27. Free the Slaves (www.freetheslaves.net)
28. International Organization for Migration (www.iom.int)
32. PREDA (www.preda.org/home.htm).
34. UNICEF (www.unicef.org/emerg/index_childsoldiers.html).
35. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (www.child-soldiers.org).
38. Amoa, B. D., “The Role of Small Arms in African Civil Wars” message by the Chairman of the West Africa Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA) and President of the Africa Forum on Small Arms to www.pambazuka.org (21 September 2006).
41. Abrashi, F., “Coalition air strike kills 7 boys, ‘several’ militants in eastern Afghanistan” AP News Feed, June 18, 2007, (ca.news.yahoo.com/s/capress/070618/world/afghanistan_67)
51. Becker, J., Children as Weapons of War.
52. Ibid.
57. Becker, J., Children as Weapons of War.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
60. UNICEF (www.unicef.org)
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.


74. Ibid.


83. Becker, J., Children as Weapons of War, Barth, E. F., Peace as Disappointment: The Reintegration of Female Soldiers in Post-Conflict Societies: A Comparative Study from Africa. Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, August 2002; and Bouta, T., Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Building Blocks for Dutch Policy. The Hague: Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, March 2005;


90. Becker, J., Children as Weapons of War.

91. Human Rights Watch, Sri Lanka (www.hrw.org/reports/2004/childsoldiers0104/16.htm); “Tamil Tigers Will Stop Using Child Soldiers,” The Scotsman; and “Government and LTTE agree on action plan to address the needs of children affected by war in the Northeast.” UNICEF Press Centre.


93. Becker, J., Children as Weapons of War.

95. Ibid.
97. Ibid., p. 115
98. The author witnessed all of these activities in visits to Kajo Keji County in 2002, 2006 and 2007 and confirmed their existence in other parts of southern Sudan in discussions with numerous Sudanese exiles.
100. Discussions with Susan Tabia and Wani Jackson Wale. Also Tolfree, D., *Restoring Playfulness: Different Approaches to Assisting Children who are Psychologically Affected by War or Displacement*. Stockholm: Radda Barnen, 1996.
101. Discussions with Sudanese exiles, also UNICEF film (4236h_sudanchildsoldiers.ram).

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Also useful is Child Soldiers Newsletter, an electronic newsletter produced by the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (www.child-soldiers.org), supported by the Human Security Programme at Foreign Affairs Canada. Members of the coalition include Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, International Federation Terre des Hommes, International Save the Children Alliance, Jesuit Refugee Service, and Quaker UN Office. Particularly important issues are numbers 8/June 2003 and 14/ Winter 2005/06.


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Official Representations of the Nation: Comparing the Postage Stamps of Sudan and Burkina Faso

MICHAEL KEVANE

Abstract: An analysis of the imagery on postage stamps suggests that regimes in Sudan and Burkina Faso have pursued very different strategies in representing the nation. Sudan’s stamps focus on the political center and dominant elite (current regime, Khartoum politicians, and Arab and Islamic identity) while Burkina Faso’s stamps focus on society (artists, multiple ethnic groups, and development). Sudan’s stamps build an image of the nation as being about the northern-dominated regime in Khartoum (whether military or parliamentary); Burkina Faso’s stamps project an image of the nation as multi-ethnic and development-oriented.

Introduction

The sovereign state of Sudan, as a stamp-issuing entity, has chosen over the past fifty years to not honor on its postage stamps any person from the southern region of the country. This is a sharp fact that cuts through the rhetoric that the dominant northern elite deploys to ward off separatist sentiment in the south. This rhetoric is that the Sudan is a land of many peoples, but one country, with a shared hybrid Afro-Arab identity. If that were the case, then why have there been no southern, African heroes on the stamps of the country? Consideration of the images on the postage stamps of Sudan reveals another fact. In contrast with many other African states, Sudan issues shockingly few stamps that celebrate the multi-cultural make-up of the country. Many African states regularly issue postage stamp series that represent cultural icons and images from major ethnic and cultural groups; Sudan has done so only once (and ironically under the regime considered by most to be least tolerant of difference).

This paper compares the imagery on postage stamps of Sudan and Burkina Faso. Burkina Faso’s imagery offers a counterpoint to that of Sudan, a “what might have been.” Both countries straddle the Sahel zone and livelihoods through much of the colonial and post-colonial periods have been secured through rainfed small-scale agriculture and rearing of livestock. Both countries contain large numbers of ethnic groups and languages. In Burkina Faso, the Mossi ethnic group dominates the country in terms of population. In Sudan, ethnic groups thinking of themselves as Arab dominate the population. Both countries have sizable Muslim populations,
but well-educated Christian elites often have constituted a powerful minority (more regional in
Sudan, more national in Burkina Faso).

The categorization and coding suggest that the two countries, through successive regimes,
have sent very different messages on their stamps. Burkina Faso’s political regimes have
emphasized multicultural tolerance, while Sudan’s political regimes encode an Arab, Islamic,
and northern Sudanese identity for the country. Students of Sudan’s colonial and post-colonial
history will not be surprised by this observation.1 They may, however, find it useful and
stimulating. The content analysis of postage stamps offers striking and irrefutable
complementary evidence of the non-inclusive character of Sudanese regimes since
independence. There are other quasi-objective indicators of regime strategies that might also be
analyzed (street names, media content, public statuary, etc). There is a clear lacuna of
sociological analyses of the impact of state-produced imagery in Sudan and the civil society
response. Also lacking, in the corpus of Sudan studies, are analyses of the icons and songs of the
Southern People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), and the role of images of “Dr. John” (as many
southerners refer to the late John Garang, leader of the SPLA for two decades) as symbols of the
aspirations of people in the South, or at least those the SPLA wants to promote.

A number of researchers have analyzed postage stamps in their efforts to illustrate the
representational strategies of regimes. A recent issue of African Arts was devoted to the imagery
on African postage stamps.2 Igor Cusack, in his analysis of the stamps of Lusophone Africa,
argues that, “stamps are carriers of potent images of the dominant ideologies of the state…”3
Beth Baron, to take another example, sees in early images of peasant women on postage stamps
of Egypt confirmation of the ascendancy of a feminization of nationalism, of Egypt as a
woman.4 There are also analyses from other parts of the world. Robert Jones analyses the
imagery celebrating scientists on stamps to show that England, France and Germany have had
different representations, in ways that perhaps reflect distinct social valuation of science and
scientists.5 Stanley Brunn reviews the first stamps of newly independent nations of Central Asia
and Europe, finding that symbols of statehood (flags and coats of arms) trumped ideological
messages.6 Raento and Brunn, in an analysis very similar to that conducted here, trace the
imagery on Finnish postage stamps over the period 1917-2000.7 Other recent papers analyze the
images on stamps of France, Ireland, South Africa, Latin America, and Japan.8

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers historical background on each country,
illustrated by postage stamps. Sections 3 and 4 present the method and results of a
categorization and coding of stamps, enabling analysis of how the major themes on postage
stamps have evolved over time as regimes succeed each other. Section 5 offers some concluding
reflections.

BRIEF HISTORY OF SUDAN AND BURKINA FASO ILLUSTRATED BY POSTAGE STAMPS

For centuries, political entities centered on the Nile raided for slaves and extracted
resources from Sudan’s population. These polities ebbed and flowed, to eventually coalesce into
a kingdom located in Sennar on the Blue Nile. In 1821, an Egyptian expedition organized by
Mohammed Ali invaded the region. The Turkiyya, as the next six decades came to be known,
forged a bureaucratic state centered in Khartoum, capable of projecting power through much of
the territory of contemporary Sudan. That power continued to be used for raiding and resource extraction. A revolt led by Mohamed Ahmed, the Mahdi, crushed the Egyptian and British forces in 1885 (the battle was commemorated on a stamp in 1985, and Mohamed Ahmed himself in 2003).

![Image 1: The Battle of Shaykan, 1883, a decisive victory against the British-led forces (issued 1983)](image1)

![Image 2: Mohamed Ahmed al Mahdi (issued 2003)](image2)

The successor regime, known as the Mahdiyya, employed some of the clerks and literate functionaries of the earlier period, but attempted to create an Islamic caliphate to guide the community of Muslim believers, the *umma*. The spirit of the regime was not nationalist, in the European sense. British-led forces destroyed the Mahdiyya in 1898 (the resistance at Kerari was commemorated on a stamp in 1998) and established colonial rule, the Condominium. The British eventually settled on a Closed District policy for the south, indirect rule through Native Administration policy for rural areas in the north, and bureaucratic administration of towns, ineluctably cultivating an educated elite of northern Sudanese who inherited power at independence in 1956.

Burkina Faso likewise had centralized kingdoms that strategically used insecurity on the periphery as opportunity for predation. The Mossi Empire, as Dim Delobsom labeled the political and cultural alliance of four kingdoms, was probably founded in the 1300s and survived, as a political entity, conquest by the French in 1898. Originally administered as part of French West Africa (Soudan), the French created in 1919 the colony of Haute Volta, largely coterminous with the Mossi Empire and the northern reaches of the kingdom of Kong. The colony was suppressed in 1932 and chopped up among three other administrative regions, was reanimated in 1947 after intense lobbying by the Mossi nobility, became a republic in 1958, and then independent in 1960. It was renamed Burkina Faso in 1983.

Neither colonial power saw fit to create, through images on postage stamps, an iconography of nationalism. Colonial stamps of both countries consisted almost entirely of innocuous images of bucolic tribal life, with generic and non-identifiable scenes. The Sudan
Political Service stuck to its famous ‘camel postman’ design for much of the colonial period. There were only two exceptions. In 1935 a series honored Charles Gordon, the British officer defeated by the Mahdi in 1885, and in 1951 an inclusive series showed people and scenes from all corners of Sudan. Colonial Haute Volta did not issue its own stamps, instead using issues from the region of French West Africa. Only two of these stamps were specifically designated with imagery from Haute Volta. One celebrated the construction of the railroad reaching Ouagadougou in 1956. Another honored the Mossi emperor, the Mogho Naba, in 1958.

Fig. 3: The Moro Naba (issued 1958)

Apparently, the colonial authorities wanted to reward and flatter the Mogho Naba for opposition to the regional ambitions of Félix Houphouet-Boigny’s Rassemblement Démocratique Africain party in Cote d’Ivoire. The stamp shows the Mogho Naba’s face over a map of the colony: “This is your country” the stamp seems to say.

After independence, both parliamentary regimes quickly succumbed to military coups, Sudan in 1958 and Haute Volta in 1966, and neither country has had stable democratic governance since.

Early stamps of Haute Volta featured large portraits of the first two pre-independence heads of government, and then at full independence in 1960 a well-designed stamp with flag, village and peasant farmers was issued. In 1965 President Maurice Yaméogo, who had fashioned a single-party regime, featured a large portrait of himself on a stamp; he was ousted within a year.
General Sangoulé Lamizana, then ruled Haute Volta from 1966 to 1980, when he in turn was ejected in a bloodless coup. Ironically, Lamizana's only appearance on a stamp was to commemorate the visit of Pope John Paul II in 1980, just before he lost power. Junior officers took over, notably Thomas Sankara who ruled from 1983-87 and whose lasting innovation was to rename country Burkina Faso. The change itself reflected the multi-cultural inclusiveness typical of regimes in the country: Burkina means “integrity” in the Moré language of the Mossi, while Faso means “father’s house” in the Dioula language, and the citizen identifier Burkinabè uses the Peul language suffix “bè” to indicate a “person of.” Sankara also prominently featured himself on a stamp commemorating the first anniversary of his regime. The stamp featured a typical heroic-sized portrait of the president in front of “the people.”

In 1987, second-in-command Blaise Compaoré had Sankara and other members of the regime killed or ousted and he assumed sole control of the country. Compaoré has civilianized his rule, and after having the national constitution amended he was re-elected for a third term as president in 2005. Compaoré has not appeared on any stamps.
Sudan began independent stamp-issuance with an uninspired rendition of map and national emblem, followed by a stamp commemorating the Arab Postal Union. The military regime followed with a stamp showing a farmer shaking hands with an infantryman, followed by a stamp commemorating the opening of a new Arab League building in Cairo.

Fig. 6: First military coup d’état (issued 1959)

So the first four stamps were about the political regime and state (not the people), and the Arab identity of the country. Southern military officers, who rebelled in 1955 fearing the worst from the northern elite, would have had no reassurances in the stamps of the first decade. The Arab League was featured again in 1962, 1967 and 1972, and the Arab Postal Union again in 1964, and the PLO in 1967. Cultural icons from the northern pre-Islamic period appeared on six stamps, stemming from world-wide interest in salvaging archeological items from the Aswan High Dam’s lake. These were belated tips of the hat to the Nubian population of the northern region, whose homelands were destroyed by the dam. Africa-wide institutions first appeared with a stamp honoring the African Development Bank in 1969 and then the African Postal Union in 1972. One might say that the Arab to Africa ratio was 7:2 by 1972.

Fig. 7: Gamal Abdal Nasser (issued 1973)

The military regime of Ibrahim Abboud lasted until 1964, when popular urban protests led to a bloodless transition to civilian rule in the north. A few students were killed in a protest, one of whom, al-Gurashi, was honored in a 1965 stamp. The parliamentary regime survived only five years but during this time issued a striking set of stamps featuring portraits of prominent political leaders of the pre-independence period including two from the Mahdi family, whose scion, Sadiq al-Mahdi, was Prime Minister. Those honored were El Siddig al Mahdi, Mubarak Zarouq, Abdullahi el Fadil al Mahdi, Mohammed Nur al Din and Ahmed Yousif Hashim, and Mohamed Ahmed al Mardi.
Colonel Gaafar Nimeiri took power in a coup in 1969, and put himself on a stamp in heroic pose, in front of “the people” in 1970. (An interesting sidelight of philatelic history, to my knowledge not researched, is that the first issue of is set of stamps was withdrawn on the day of issuance, and then re-issued several months later. The only difference, apparently, other than a slight change in the placement of the denomination, is the skin-tone of Nimeiri and the background persons; in the original they are shaded, in the reissue they are white.)

Nimeiri presided over, but then shattered, a ten-year peace with the south. The civil war re-ignited in 1983, and continued through 2005. A bloodless civilian uprising ousted Nimeiri in 1985, but the parliamentary regime that followed lasted only four years and escalated the civil war.

A sign of the disorganization of the regime (close to what political scientists call “anocracy” or the absence of institutionalized competition within the context of a state structure), only six
stamps or series were issued over the period. One represented fishing for World Food Day. In 1989, military units working with the National Islamic Front seized power and have held power until the present. Colonel Omar al-Bashir and NIF ideologue Hasan al-Turabi jointly ruled until 1999, when al-Bashir bested al-Turabi in a struggle for power. Al-Bashir escalated the war in the south, pushing proxy militias to commit ethnic cleansing and developing an Islamist paramilitary force known as the Popular Defense Forces (PDF) to shadow the army, but then went on to sign a peace agreement with the southern rebels under John Garang in 2005. Al-Bashir was unable to control in 2003 a smaller rebel movement in Darfur in western Sudan, and unleashed proxy militias whose wanton destruction led to human catastrophe of hundreds of thousands dead and millions displaced.

The two countries have had very different paths, Sudan with a 50 year long civil war in the south and long-simmering and finally erupting war in western Sudan, while Burkina Faso has had no significant incidence of ethnically or regionally-based civil strife. It seems worth inquiring, then, whether the content of their postal stamps sheds light on the different strategies of national representation pursued by political elites.

CODING POSTAGE STAMPS

Quantitative measurement of the imagery on postage stamps has several virtues. Such quantification permits a subtle, complex and continuous measurement of regime strategy, since typically numerous stamps are issued in every year. Imagery on stamps varies quite a lot, since it is relatively inexpensive to design new images: the regime simply requests stamp designers to produce a new image that can be incorporated onto stamps and distributed throughout the country. Comprehensive catalogues of stamps issued by all countries of the world are widely available. The best known are Michel, Minkus, Scott and Stanley Gibbons stamp catalogues. Online catalogues, such as www.freestampcatalogue.com, are often provided as part of philatelist dealer lists of stamps for sale. The classification and counting presented here were based on the Scott catalogues for 2006.
Decisions have to be made when coding the imagery on stamps, even before arriving at a smallish number of categories to be used for grouping the wide variety of images and messages. These decisions arise from four sources of complexity in the kinds of stamps produced by countries: (1) some stamps are intended for the collectors market; (2) some stamps have different physical properties from the ordinary perforated, gummed stamps, properties that make them more or less suitable for use on letters; (3) the quantities produced and usage of stamps vary with the images on the stamps, in perhaps predictable ways; (4) and many stamps are issued in series rather than as stand-alone images. These four characteristics of stamps—collectability, properties, quantities, and series—have to be addressed in coding.

First, many countries issue stamps that are aimed at the philatelic market, and are not intended for domestic use. In 2004, about 70 countries of the world were clients of the Inter-Governmental Philatelic Corporation (IGPC), a private stamp designing and marketing firm. This firm works with client countries to produce stamps that are desired by collectors who collect by the images on stamps (known as ‘topical collectors’). These collectors, mostly based in the United States, seem to prefer certain kinds of images: celebrities (Lady Di, Mother Theresa, the Pope); domesticated animated (cats and dogs); wild flora and fauna; space exploration; Boy Scouts; etc. Fortunately, most collectibles or topicals are quite easy to spot: they have nothing to do with the country issuing the stamps.

Second, many countries issue a variety of kinds of stamps, including stamps with perforations, imperforated stamps, souvenir sheets with perforated stamps and souvenir sheets with imperforated stamps. As the categories suggest, some of these stamps are explicitly intended to be souvenirs. In the coding presented here, all stamps that are explicitly issued as souvenir sheets are excluded.

Third, quantities produced of stamps vary with the images on the stamps. Many countries limit printing runs of more fancy ‘commemorative’ stamps (which cost more to design and print), and encourage use of ‘regular’ issues for domestic postal service. Many countries also issue separate stamps for overseas airmail service. These stamps are less likely to be used on domestic mail. Unfortunately, there seems to be no easily accessible data on number of stamps sold (or even printed) for each amount. Many countries confronting inflation routinely surcharge old stamp issues, sometimes decades after their first issuance, suggesting that national postal administrations sometimes retain substantial stocks of stamps that, for one reason or another, did not get used when originally issued. Stamps also vary in denomination, with regular postage stamps used for ordinary letters presumably more common than other stamps (especially those of larger denomination), but again, in many African countries it is not uncommon to find regular mail using four or five smaller denomination stamps. For the analysis presented here, surcharged stamps are not counted, and no adjustments are made for differing denominations. Only regular issues, and not airmail or official stamps, are coded.

Fourth, countries usually issue stamps in series. There may be a set of five stamps issued to commemorate local buildings. Sometimes these sets consist of stamps with the same images, or images that are variations of a common image but with different colors and denominations. For the analysis presented here, stamps are only counted if they have a separate and novel image. Different denominations of the same stamp image are counted only once.
STAMP IMAGERY OF BURKINA FASO AND SUDAN

The goal in coding the imagery on stamps is to classify stamps into a discrete number of mutually exclusive categories. Three very broad umbrella categories have been used for this analysis: (1) stamps for the philatelic collectors market; (2) internationalist stamps; and (3) and national-oriented stamps. National-oriented stamps are further categorized according to their emphasis on twelve themes: Christianity, Colonial power, Commemoratives and political, Development, Single ethnic group, Icons of the nation, Multi-ethnic, National political person, National non-political person, Nature, panAfrican, panArab and panMuslim, Presidents, and Women. Stamps are coded using a first-level analysis: the image or statement on the stamp is taken at face value, and possibly hidden or subtle meanings are not coded. A picture of the President is taken to be a stamp about the President, and if the stamp designer has given the President a too-large ear to mock him, that is not coded. Some interesting studies use formal semiotic methods to code stamps for one country for a limited period of time, and to codes flags and national anthems according to formal criteria, but this is perhaps impossible with the large number of postage stamps that would need to be coded.11

![Fig. 15: Multiethnic stamp of Burkina Faso (issued 1987)](image1)

![Fig. 16: Multiethnic stamp of Burkina Faso (issued 1987)](image2)

![Fig. 17: Multiethnic stamp of Burkina Faso (issued 1985)](image3)

![Fig. 18: Development-oriented stamp of Burkina Faso (issued 1987)](image4)

The categories and national-oriented subcategories are explained more fully in the table (Fig. 19), which also presents the numbers and percentages for each category for Sudan and Burkina Faso, coded over the period 1960 through 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Burkina Faso</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>Definition (what is major)</th>
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</thead>
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http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v10/v10i1a3.pdf
### Table: Image, Raison d’Être, or Text on Stamp

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<tr>
<td>(a) Broad categories</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collector’s items for philatelic market</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>Intended for collector’s market (e.g. Lady Di) and stamps of local flora and fauna with no obvious nationalism message (e.g. butterflies, tropical fish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>International organizations or international coordination (e.g. Year of the Child, World Meteorological Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National-oriented</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>Promote imagery of national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td></td>
<td>235</td>
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<tr>
<td>(b) Breakdown for national-oriented stamps only</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
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<td>Overtly Christian icons or persons, except for Christmas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Colonial power</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Honor, in a sycophantic way, a colonial or other power (e.g., stamps honoring de Gaulle, or state visits by the British Queen)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commemoratives and political</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>Events important in national history (e.g. independence anniversaries, coups, regime transitions, regime anniversaries) or important political events (Party Congress, for example, in single-party states)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>Economic development (projects, modern agriculture,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Icons</td>
<td>Multi-ethnic</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>One particular ethnicity or group of ethnicities at the expense of other ethnicities (so typically a series of stamps showing local culture of one group, but not showing other cultures, and no series within two years shows those other cultures - e.g. multi-cultural not spread out)</td>
<td>Images of the nation (antiquities, monuments, natural wonders, flags, traditional life, prehistory, historical events, coats of arms, etc.)</td>
<td>Multiple ethnic or religious groups;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
usually a series of stamps showing local culture or traditional institutions where there is a clear attempt to represent a broad cross-section of ethnicities or religions; or stamps explicitly advocating tolerance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Country A</th>
<th>Country B</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political person</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Political personage from the country (most are deceased)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-political person</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>Sports figures, artists, writers, etc. from the country (often still living)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PanAfrican</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>PanAfrican institutions or ideals, or that honor African leaders from other countries (e.g., Organization of African Unity, Africa Cup)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PanArab/PanMuslim</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>PanArab or Muslim institutions or ideals, or that</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 20 shows how the number of stamps issued per year varied over the period. As can be seen, Sudan has produced almost no collector stamps, and in general has produced a small number of stamps—only 208 over 40 years, compared with 936 for Burkina Faso. Even in the non-collector categories, the imagery output from Burkina is double that of Sudan. Among national-oriented stamps, there are sharp distinctions, as noted in the introduction. Burkina Faso has produced large numbers of multi-ethnic series of stamps. Sudan has not. Burkina Faso has also produced a much higher share of development-oriented stamps. Sudan, by contrast, has produced a higher share of stamps depicting national icons, commemorating political events (especially regime anniversaries and historical events), celebrating the Arab League and Islamic icons, and honoring political figures (mostly during the second parliamentary period in the mid-1960s).
Figure 21 shows how the broadest categories have changed over time, for political regimes in each country. Remarkable is how for both countries the percent of national-oriented stamps has been declining. Collector stamps have been rising steadily for Burkina Faso, and only became significant for Sudan during the current military regime. The current Sudanese regime also sharply cut the number of stamps celebrating international organizations and activities. For the various national-oriented categories presented, it is striking how much more variable Sudan is across regimes, compared with Burkina, where percentages change slowly across regimes.
Fig. 21a: Percentages of stamps that are collector, national or international in orientation (with regimes indicated)

Burkina Faso

Sudan

Note: Lines are smoothed three-year moving average. Stamps issuance is subject to some stickiness as regimes change.
**Fig. 21b:** Percentages of national-oriented stamps that are multi-ethnic or development (with regimes indicated)

Note: Lines are smoothed three-year moving average. Stamps issuance is subject to some stickiness as regimes change.
Figure 22 presents the same numbers in a different way, aggregating some of the smaller categories into four larger categories: political (commemoratives, political persons, presidents); civil society (development, women, non-political persons); ideology (icons, panAfrica, panArab and panIslam); and multiethnic. The radar chart shows the percent of stamps in each category for each regime. So Sudan has six regimes, while Burkina has four regimes. At this broader level of aggregation, there is striking consistency across regimes: Sudan’s stamps are sharply skewed towards ideological and political stamps; Burkina’s stamps sharply skewed towards multiethnic and civil society.
Fig. 22: Percent of images in major categories of national-oriented stamps for different political regimes

At a broad level Sudan’s stamps focus on the political center (regimes, Khartoum politicians, and Arab and Islamic identity of the country) while Burkina’s stamps focus on society (artists, multiple ethnic groups, and development). Sudan’s stamps build an image of the nation as
being about the northern-dominated regime in Khartoum (whether military or parliamentary); Burkina’s stamps project an image of the nation as multi-cultural and development-oriented.

The consistency across regimes raises the interesting possibility that the pre-colonial and colonial experience may have shaped the iconography of post-independence African states. Did French colonies, more exposed to an ideology of inclusiveness (even if quite hypocritical) find themselves transmuting that discourse into an iconography of multi-ethnic inclusiveness? Did former British colonies take an opposite tack, and create images consistent with ideas of a superior or civilizing group standing above the rest and being responsible for the nation? These sorts of questions can only be answered by a broader statistical analysis of the imagery on all African stamps in the post-independence era.

IMPLICATIONS

Political regimes that represent states in sub-Saharan Africa, as elsewhere, use iconography to evince emotion and sentiment. Citizens and subjects respond, of course, with icons of their own making. But the images individuals create are not always made under conditions of their own choosing, and state icons may display a disproportionate power in their effects. This power enables states to disproportionately initiate and capture the space of thought, and counter private responses.

Part of the power of states comes from the massive resources, reach, and organization available in its image production. States can mandate an image of the president in every office, a national icon on every postage stamp, the national emblem on every piece of currency, national colors on the airline, statuary in the roundabouts, and music on the airwaves. Few other organizations can compete: ethnic groups may be able to produce music, masks, clothing, and dances; churches and mosques use their rituals, architecture, and vestments; opposition groups may carefully choose a color and symbol for public manifestations. But as these examples suggest, their resources, reach, and organization are limited compared with that of most states. Another part of the power of the state flows from an international order that naturalizes states as expressions of the will of the people. The international legitimation of states adheres even to illegitimate states, making their icons have unwarranted effects. Ubiquitous and ordinary, postage stamps include themselves in the repertoire of everyday construction of national identity. Appeal to authority is never sufficient to establish the reasonableness of a hypothesis, but in arguing the case that postage stamps reflect broader regime strategies of identity transformation it is useful to recall Albert Hourani’s analysis of the emergence of nationalism in the Arab world. The new spirit, according to Hourani, “was symbolized by the change in postage stamps, which no longer showed mosques or sphinxes or kings, but workers and peasants in heroic attitudes, shaking their fists at fate.”

Excessive power and routinization banalizes and tempers the power of state iconography. Licking a stamp and handling the face of the sovereign on currency may make too intimate the majesty of power. A repressed community of the arts encourages the least imaginative to rise to positions of authority in the image-making machinery of a state; the
results are often laughable. A lively opposition may cleverly make mockery of state images. Intelligent citizens encourage others to pierce the hubris of power.

Inquiring into the effects and meanings associated with state iconography thus suffers from fundamental epistemological questions about translating and measuring popular understanding. Does the image of the President in leopard skin fez instill fear and abjection, or a derisive and dismissive grunt in the ordinary citizen? When the Islamic regime of 1989 Sudan ordered the painting of all commercial doorways in the pale green of Islam, did this encourage piety and respect for the regime, or compliant insolence? When the revolutionary regime of Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso rebaptised a main street as Avenue Nkrumah, did the residents of Ouagadougou give a hooray for pan-Africanism or roll their eyes at the excesses of youth? More generally, have sentiments and actions inspired by national icons, whether of fear, derision, or compliance, engendered other common sentiments or inspired other common actions? Is the commonality extended to many through and reinforcing their identity as national citizens subject to or participating in a state? Or does the commonality disintegrate or exclude some from national identity?

A small, modest paper comparing the imagery on postage stamps of Sudan and Burkina Faso cannot answer these questions, but the questions that are addressed here are motivated by these larger questions. One thing is clear: the sovereign and internationally recognized state of Sudan has rationalized its long war against the SPLA and much of the population of southern Sudan by mocking rebels as malcontents overly distrusting of northern good intentions. The imagery on the stamps issued by Khartoum suggests the southerners are fully justified in their suspicions of a hegemonic project by the north. The stamps of Sudan are not at all like the multi-cultural expressions of tolerance and diversity seen in Burkina Faso.
Notes:

10. Adedze 2004a.

References:


Reference Style: The following is the suggested format for referencing this article: Michael Kevane, "Official representations of the nation: Comparing the postage stamps of Sudan and Burkina Faso," *African Studies Quarterly* 10, no.1: (2008) [online] URL: http://africa.ufl.edu/asq/v10/v10i1a3.htm
An Interest in Intervention: A Moral Argument for Darfur

CHRISTY MAWDSLEY

Introduction

The United States government has consistently failed to act when faced with governments committing mass atrocities against their own citizens. Yet U.S. leaders acknowledge that the United States is capable of and responsible for such action. We have thus seen one U.S. administration after another crying “never again” after a humanitarian crisis or genocide, while allowing the crises to go on unhindered when they recur.

In response to this gap between belief and action, this paper proposes that the U.S. Government (USG) develop a policy toward genocide and other mass atrocities that is consistent with U.S. values. To underscore the practical and real need for such a policy, this analysis will examine the crisis in Darfur, Sudan. The paper will address three central questions: what is occurring in Darfur? What is the theoretical case for U.S. action in Darfur or any other mass murder? And how can this be carried out practically? These questions are extremely pertinent to U.S. policymakers and citizens as they help clarify how our country views and deals with humanitarian crises, if it should at all. The fundamental argument of this paper is that the United States does have an obligation to act in the Darfur crisis and in similar situations in the future, based on both interest and value-grounded rationale.

I aim in this paper to 1) outline the crisis in Darfur from 2003 to the present; 2) describe the U.S. response to the situation in Darfur; 3) delineate what I believe the U.S. should do/be doing in response to the crisis and 4) provide rationale for why the U.S. should undertake these or similar actions in response to genocide in Darfur or other nations in the future.

The scope of this paper is limited in two central ways. First, in addressing human rights violations that necessitate U.S. attention and action, I am speaking to situations in which a government or group within a country is committing mass abuses to a degree that “shocks the human conscience.” This is with an understanding that very basic laws of morality are universally available to human reason. The “atrocities” discussed in this paper entail those along the lines of genocide, ethnic cleansing, gendercide, or mass extermination. The humanitarian crises referenced in this paper refer to objective crises in which mass atrocities are being committed by one group versus another, including but not limited to genocide. I am referencing here a (relatively) sudden act that could necessitate emergency status. Thus, excluded are “nation-building” operations, interventions in the case of a failing state, or interventions for purely economic or strategic purposes.

The second limitation of scope in this paper is the aspect of ethics that I am suggesting be
added to American foreign policy. Though a perfectly consistent, moral foreign policy may be the ultimate goal of several theoretical approaches referenced here, developing this idea is not the goal sought here. Rather, I am addressing the addition of ethics and consistency in responses to mass humanitarian crises and atrocities. This paper is not intended to cast other governments or delineation of economies or political systems in terms of “good” and “evil.” It is not intended to promote or devalue any alliance with any other government along these lines, nor do I advocate forcible “regime change” from authoritarian to democratic.

THE CRISIS IN DARFUR: 2003-PRESENT

The crisis in Darfur began to unfold as the Sudanese North-South Peace Agreement was coming to a close. The agreement was a momentous feat, bringing a 21-year long civil war to an end. Darfurians had appealed to the Sudanese government to include their concerns in the peace talks. These requests were ignored. Citizens in the Darfur region of Sudan were deliberately excluded from the talks and shortchanged by the negotiations and the power and wealth-sharing agreements that were arranged. This was compounded by the Sudanese government’s historic neglect of investment in Darfurian roads, schools, hospitals, communications facilities, and other hard and soft infrastructure in the region. Two rebel groups - the Justice and Equality Movement and the Sudan Liberation Movement - responded to the discrimination by calling for rebellion against the Government of Sudan (GoS).

The Sudanese government responded to the rebellion by cracking down with disproportionate force against rebels and civilians in Darfur. The GoS also recruited militia groups in the region to raid villages and conduct massive killing sprees in Darfur. These militia groups came to be known as the “Janjaweed,” which literally means “evil horsemen.” The results of this four year catastrophe are as follows: 2.5 million Darfurian refugees and internally displaced persons; over 300,000 Darfurians killed or dead from related causes, a majority of whom are Sudanese citizens; thousands of abductions and rapes; around 1,000 villages burned to the ground; millions of livestock stolen; and a virulent spread of disease and malnutrition throughout the region. Attacks include violent and brutal crimes against humanity, including rapes of pregnant women, murder of male and female civilians of all ages, gang-rapes of women, other forms of sexual violence against men and women, abduction of children, and killing of infants. Rebel troops and government protestors face even worse torture and violence.

A wide body of evidence has emerged - much of which has been compiled by the U.S. Department of State, USAID, and the United Nations - proving that the Janjaweed are indeed government backed and sponsored. Sudanese Army and Air Force units and equipment are frequently spotted during attacks and from satellite imagery. Predictably, the Sudanese government has denied the existence of genocide and has broken established cease-fires, all the while continuing its campaign against primarily civilians in Darfur.

The U.S. Record on Darfur

The Bush administration, in dealing with the Darfur crisis, has done something that few administrations have done when confronted with genocide, ethnic cleansing or similar
catastrophes: it has refused to claim ignorance. This action stands in contrast to U.S. government responses to the Armenian massacre in Turkey, the killing fields of Cambodia, Saddam Hussein’s cleansing of the Kurds in Iraq, the Rwanda genocide, and other mass atrocities.

In September of 2004, Colin Powell called the situation in Darfur “genocide” after reviewing a report from a U.S.-sponsored investigation. President Bush did the same in a speech to the United Nations soon thereafter. These were important first steps for taking positive action to deescalate the crisis in Sudan. By calling what is happening by its proper name – genocide – the administration and Congress have increased awareness of the issue throughout the U.S. and the world.

The U.S. also allowed 51 members of the Sudanese government and Janjaweed militias to be referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in April 2005. This was an historic precedent and weighty gesture given the U.S.’s typical stance of disregard toward the ICC – disregard based on a fear of U.S. sovereignty being encroached upon.

The U.S. catalyzed negotiations that produced the Darfur Peace Agreement in May of 2006. Though this was a positive step displaying U.S. concern and involvement, the peace agreement was deeply flawed. The agreement excluded one of the two main rebel groups and resulted in the rebel groups turning against each other, which the Sudanese government was only too glad to witness.

On April 18, 2007, after visiting a new photographic exhibit in at the Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C., President Bush remarked that he “saw an exhibit that puts faces on the millions of men, women, and children who have been killed or driven into the desert…No one who sees these pictures can doubt that genocide is the only word for what is happening in Darfur - and that we have a moral obligation to stop it.”

Despite these positive steps, the United States government response to the Darfur genocide is insufficient. Diplomatic efforts with and current sanctions placed on the GoS have proven ineffective. The genocide has lasted four years and I argue that, on the grounds of both moral and self-interested rationale, the U.S. has an obligation to make reasonable sacrifices to bring an end to the atrocities.

What the U.S. Should Do in Darfur

U.S. policymakers have several options for action in the Darfur crisis. These include diplomatic processes (including diplomatic pressure on China to divest from Sudan) economic sanctions, arms embargoes, support of a NATO, UN or African Union (AU) peacekeeping force, and sending in U.S. troops. I will explore here the options of a NATO force, an AU force, and diplomatic pressure of China.

One policy option the U.S. could choose to pursue is promoting NATO involvement in Darfur. This would decrease the chance that U.S. troops would be sent to Sudan and perhaps make the political will needed to support the mission more enduring. The counterargument to this policy proposal, as articulated by Christopher Preble of the Cato Institute, is that directing NATO troops toward a mission in Darfur will decrease the focus on NATO’s mission in Afghanistan. This could become a “distraction” that threatens the security of NATO member nations and the world at large, according to Preble.
Instead of NATO or U.S. troops, Preble asserts that a fortified African Union force is the only viable way that peace will be achieved and maintained in Sudan. Many share this perspective with him. There is no doubt that using regional organizations and forces to bring an end to regional conflicts or crises is the ideal. In this case, the solution would come from within, and references to a reinvigorated imperialism are avoided. The African Union’s “Constitutive Act” declares “the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the assembly [where all member states are represented] in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” The problem is that the African Union is severely under-funded, under-staffed and under-supported. The only way an African Union force can succeed is through monetary assistance and military and communications equipment from the developed world.

Most recently, multilateral international movement has become the most viable possibility for ending the genocide in Darfur. Global support exists for a mixed intervention force of African Union troops, UN peacekeepers, and regional police forces. The United States has the option to provide resources and support or to stall, hide behind empty rhetoric and ignore the situation in Darfur – much as it did during the 1994 Rwandan genocide that cost the lives of 800,000 people in a 100-day massacre.

The United States must also place diplomatic pressure on China to divest from Sudan. China has developed increasing economic ties with Sudan in the past several years, in part due to Sudan’s oil resources and China’s ability to provide weapons to the Sudanese government in exchange. This contributes to the continued strength of the regime and its ability to conduct a genocidal war against rebel troops and civilians in Darfur. Some pressure has been put on China to divest, but this has primarily come from the European Union. The U.S. of course fears putting a damper on its prosperous economic relationship with China, often precluding any U.S. critique of Chinese policies, but this is an extreme case and this should indeed be done.

After examination of what the U.S. should do to end the atrocities in Darfur, the question of peace maintenance arises. This is a complex question, with hints of imperialism to those already skeptical of American power and overreach in the world today. Nonetheless, author and philosopher Michael Walzer does suggest the possibility of trusteeships and protectorates after a genocidal government has been deposed or begun to decompose. A trusteeship takes place when the intervening country essentially sets up shop in the nation, ruling it directly. This option has much heavier overtures to colonization and risks lowered support from the citizens of the nation in crisis, particularly if the ruling nation is the United States or a former colonial power. A protectorate, on the other hand, involves bringing a local group or collection of groups to power to keep the atrocities from resuming. In the case of Darfur, this might be an option as the African Union (with the support of the U.S., UN and other relevant parties and nations) might be able to broker an arrangement in which power is distributed more equitably.

Why the U.S. Should Care about Darfur in the First Place: The Case for Intervention

There are several theoretical and practical reasons why the U.S. should intervene to stop the atrocities in Darfur or any other place they many occur. This section will address arguments against intervention and interest and value-based rationale in support of humanitarian
One common argument against intervention by one nation in another nation’s internal affairs is the principle of non-intervention, which has been a foundational aspect of international law since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. David Chandler, in *From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond*, makes the argument that if this principle of non-intervention is repeatedly broken, the order of the state system will erode as respect for sovereignty decreases.\(^{13}\)

However, a new consensus is emerging (albeit a limited consensus at this point) that “sovereignty is not absolute and that citizens as well as governments have rights” and that “the act of genocide is proof that the state has failed in its duty to its citizens…it should, as a result, forfeit some or all of its sovereignty.”\(^{14}\) That is, when state-sanctioned atrocities occur against a state’s own citizens, that state loses its claim to sovereignty, leaving the door open for humanitarian intervention, militarily or otherwise. This also encapsulates the growing notion that human security, not only state security, is an important consideration in foreign policymaking as well as domestic policymaking.

Furthermore, humanitarian interventions are not a free-for-all, they are not “justified for the sake of democracy or free enterprise or economic justice or voluntary association or any other of the social practices and arrangements that we might hope for or even call for in other people’s countries…their aim is…to put a stop to actions that… ‘shock the conscience’ of humankind.”\(^{15}\) Humanitarian interventions clearly should not be motivated by covert purposes or to achieve a strategic goal for the intervening nation, and interventionist policies must certainly be qualified.\(^{16}\) But this does not mean that they should not occur under certain circumstances. Walzer points out that “yes, the norm is not to intervene in other people’s countries; the norm is self-determination. But not for these people, the victims of tyranny, ideological zeal, ethnic hatred, who are not determining anything for themselves, who urgently need help from outside.”\(^{17}\) The principle of sovereignty and non-intervention loses its force and theoretical foundation in the face of genocide and similar atrocities.

The principle of sovereignty as limiting intervention can be countered by a final redefinition of sovereignty. Anne Marie-Slaughter calls this redefinition “sovereignty as responsibility,” in which an important aspect of sovereignty becomes a nation’s ability to uphold its duties to its citizens.\(^{18}\) This may include very basic human rights, such as the right to life, but the major tenet is simply a “responsibility to protect.” Even with this very basic definition, it is clear that the Sudanese government has shown remarkable inability to uphold its duty to a part of its citizenry. On these grounds, it has also sacrificed its sovereignty, at least in part.

Theorists focusing on great power politics tend to downplay the importance of Africa in the international system except when African countries enter into the interests of the great powers. The United States (and other developed countries) typically does not include African well-being as part of its “national interest.” This has contributed to a general neglect of humanitarian and health crises on the continent, and this neglect has fed the Sudanese government’s ability to continue its ethnic cleaning campaign without major opposition.

The Independent Task Force on U.S. Policy toward Africa, organized by the Council on Foreign Relations, appropriately underscores the nearsightedness of such a narrowly defined “national interest.” The task force points out that

By the end of the decade, sub-Saharan Africa is likely to become as important a source of
U.S. energy imports as the Middle East…Africa is also one of the battlegrounds in the fight against terrorism. Osama bin Laden based his operations in Sudan before setting up shop in Afghanistan…Mass killings in the Darfur region of Sudan and the persistence of conflict on the continent challenge the world’s will to spotlight, prevent, and stop atrocities. Africa is also the epicenter of the world’s most serious health pandemic, HIV/AIDS.19

Thus it is clear that a more broadly-defined national interest will necessitate attention toward Darfur and similar crises.

Furthermore, a focused and narrow national interest is in danger of missing an important point. The U.S. national interest is consistently shifting, and has necessarily shifted since the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War era, resources and policymakers focused on the potential for great power war.20 Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the major problems and foci have instead become ethnic, religious, and civil wars and conflicts. This shift from a bipolar to a unipolar world necessitates a new approach for creating a stable international system. Thus, U.S. resources should be allocated to deal with this new system in a new way.

Scholars and policymakers who propose that international stability is not relevant to U.S. national interests misunderstand the very nature of a globalized world. A globalized world, by definition, is one that entails aggregated systems of all types: economic, communications, transportation, ecological, and others. International stability levels have the potential to feed into each one of these systems, thereby affecting American quality of life either positively or negatively (albeit to varying degrees). Genocide and similar atrocities have historically shown to have destabilizing effects. Because of globalization, this may have an (indirect or direct) negative effect on the American national interest.

In the Darfur genocide, for instance, millions of refugees have fled over the Sudanese-Chadian border into Chad, contributing to higher monetary and resource costs for the already poor government of Chad. The humanitarian crisis that has ensued in both Chad and Sudan divert resources from important areas in need of funding such as education, the fight against the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and economic development. In a world of independent nations, U.S. policymakers could write this off as irrelevant to the national interest. But in a globalized world, airplanes cross borders thousands of times a day, and the U.S. imports goods and resources from hundreds of nations, and nuclear weapons can be launched from one continent and hit another. Though these impacts might be irrelevant in the Darfur genocide, they might become far more relevant in a future genocide in a more strategically-relevant location. Ideas and products flow freely in this age, and it is certainly in the U.S. national interest to prevent the spread of the instability caused by genocide in our globalized world.

What makes an activist approach when faced with genocide or similar events far more compelling is the argument that action is not only consistent with U.S. interests but also with U.S. values. Values are important because, in a multi-cultural, multi-lingual, multi-ethnic country such as the United States, they are precisely what bring American citizens together as a nation. The values upheld in the U.S. Declaration of Independence and Constitution are the glue that gives American people a shared identity. They are thus of immense weight in U.S. survival as a nation. Our values should be upheld consistently both in domestic and foreign policy. An inconsistent application of our values in the broadest sense will lead to an erosion of the strength of the United States as a common nation as values are indeed the foundation.
The Genocide Convention, which was drafted in 1948 and ratified by the U.S. by President Reagan in 1988 says that the U.S. (and all member states) commit to prevent and punish genocide. In the case of Sudan, President Bush, high-ranking cabinet officials and U.S. Senators have all explicitly referred to the crisis in Darfur as “genocide.” This therefore carries with it in an obligation to act.

The United States has been one of the most ardent promoters of global “human rights” since WWII, having led the passage of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. It has been the driving force behind the concept of fundamental and global human rights. U.S. leaders travel to other countries on a regular basis and invoke the importance of democracy and human rights in high-level diplomatic meetings. The U.S. Congress frequently forces countries to achieve “Human Rights Certification” before American funding or aid can flow to that country. Despite these actions, the U.S. consistently fails to ratify treaties that it gets passed, refusing to be subject to international law in any form. This gap between (professed) belief and action is one that undermines far more than the credibility of the U.S. in the world. It also decreases the ability of U.S. to promote security through other countries’ subscription to important treaties like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Other nations have far less of an impetus to participate in organizations and treaties or to subjugate their own power or sovereignty to an outside body when the global hegemon and alleged “leader” refuses to do so itself. This has far-reaching implications. As other countries observe the U.S. disregard for international norms and lack of consequences, they will have an incentive to flout those norms themselves, which could impact situations from nuclear weapons inspections in Iran to a potential UN-led peace process for Israel and Palestine.

One argument for a foreign policy that incorporates a set of ethical standards that are applied consistently is that they strengthen U.S. initiatives in all areas. The United States will generally be more successful in international initiatives to achieve whatever goals it lays out if countries are in support of, rather than opposed to, the U.S. This idea works in tandem with the idea that “perceived hypocrisy is particularly corrosive of power that is based on proclaimed values. Those who scorn or despise us for hypocrisy are less likely to want to help us achieve our policy objectives.” Supporting even this minimalist version of human rights consistently – the right to have life – is an action the U.S. can take to gain favor and support in the world, and be seen as a state that uses its force to protect the public good in dire circumstances.

When the United States refuses to act on its anti-genocide rhetoric, it betrays a crucial value and a crucial interest: it betrays our belief in human rights (including the foundational belief in a right to life) and it betrays our abidance by international norms, which has long-term implications for the security and power of the United States.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

U.S. leaders and policymakers have frequently decried genocides after they occur. After the massacre of one million Armenians in Turkey in the early 1900s, then-U.S. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, Sr. departed for the U.S., stating that “my failure to stop the destructions of the Armenians had made Turkey for me a place of horror – I had reached the end of my resources.” When the Genocide Convention was up for a vote in the U.S. Senate in 1986,
Senator Dole declared, “We have waited long enough...as a nation which enshrines human dignity and freedom...we must correct our anomalous position on this basic rights issue.”

President Clinton called his inaction in Rwanda the worst failure and biggest regret of his presidency. And current President Bush has repeatedly claimed that genocide will not be allowed to occur on his watch. U.S. leaders throughout the 20th and into the 21st century have called for an end to genocide and similar crimes, and found themselves ashamed when they ignored what was happening. Yet the rhetoric of these and other leaders consistently fails to provoke meaningful action to derail the crisis.

There are innumerable barriers to creating a consistent policy for dealing with genocide and similar crises, if only for the fact that each one is innately different. However, if national leaders are willing to match their rhetoric toward genocide with action and policy measures, it can be done. Any developed policy plan will be necessarily vague to account for differences in the situation at hand. The President should issue a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) making formal the idea that the United States will not allow another Rwanda or Darfur to unfold without attention and movement on its part. This should also include the idea that the term “genocide” does not have to be invoked before action is taken, as the word is not often used until thousands are already dead.

The State Department should also develop a plan for atrocity prevention and work with the UN Security Council to establish norms and rules for humanitarian intervention in the case of genocide.

The action proposed for the U.S. Government toward Darfur provides a normative framework that can be used when dealing with similar situations in the future. To summarize, this involves maintaining an acute awareness of genocides and similar atrocities around the world at all times (this is not difficult for the U.S. Government – this is already being done, albeit not publicly); using diplomatic measures, political pressure and economic sanctions and other economic tools to achieve the desired result (cessation of the atrocities); logistical, financial, and resource support for regional organizations and forces able to intervene militarily, and finally, U.S. military intervention. The United States should also support International Criminal Court procedures for the prosecution of Sudanese officials and Janjaweed leadership who have incited and perpetuated the genocide. This is a policy of gradual escalation toward the government or group committing the genocide, and each step should be used in succession. However, this should not understate the importance of preventive diplomacy and measures in every case.

I do believe it is possible, and important, for rhetoric to match action. The world is witnessing terrible atrocities in Darfur and leaders have named this genocide. The United States has an ethical obligation to act for the preservation of life in Sudan due to the values it holds domestically and the basic human rights it reinforces internationally. Key interests are also at stake. U.S. national leadership must recognize that adherence to international norms play an important role in power-maintenance in the long-run, and this is applicable with the Genocide Convention as much as anything.

Notes:

1. Thus, it should be clear that I am not referencing more low-intensity (albeit despicable) human rights abuses that arise from political oppression, gender discrimination,
authoritarian regime types, et al.


7. I purposely exclude a discussion of a U.S. peacekeeping force, given the current military overstretch in place due to campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. This subject warrants its own examination of misallocation of U.S. resources and the long-term consequences of this misallocation.


27. “Gradual escalation” is not used militarily in this context.

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BOOK REVIEWS


_Telling the Truths_ is a collection of essays developed out of a conference at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies of the University of Notre Dame. The book provides a novel and welcome comparative examination of truth-telling processes. The introduction by Tristan Anne Borer provides a careful and thorough overview of terms and concepts and is therefore a useful resource for students and neophytes. Borer also addresses some of the big questions such as the politics of historical memory; who defines truth and delineates who the victims are (and are not) and what are the ramifications as hegemonic narratives emerge, potentially marginalizing other discourses, views, and experiences?

The volume essentially examines the relationship between truth-telling and peacebuilding from a variety of perspectives. Most chapters are overviews without in-depth case studies, and the lack of these is surprising. Although she correctly points out that her case is somewhat unorthodox, Shari Eppel’s chapter on Zimbabwe is a welcome exception. The other chapters consist of thematic discussions such as Pable De Grieff’s “Truth-telling and the Rule of Law” and Debra DeLaet’s “Gender Justice.” While these two topics in particular are of great interest, this reader was disappointed by the general nature of the text; the chapters generally offer more of a philosophical reflection on the subject than a hard-nosed empirical review of past and current truth-telling efforts.

The TRC of South Africa has attracted the most attention, and it is also heavily referenced in this volume. As it is a relatively well-known case, more details of other truth-telling initiatives would be desirable (a TRC has even been established in Greensboro, North Carolina to deal with violence during the civil rights movement). Juan Mendez’s “The Human Right to Truth” chapter is helpful in this regard as he provides an overview of truth-telling initiatives in Latin America, bookended by a brief comparative discussion. (Readers may also wish to consult Rosalind Shaw’s work on Sierra Leone and other recent publications).

While arguably a necessary feature of the academic marketplace, most edited volumes are weakened by a lack of integration. Like the vast majority of others, this volume would have been greatly strengthened by a concluding chapter drawing out some lessons from the assembled chapters. The introduction somewhat addresses this task, but a more thorough discussion would have been an excellent addition.

In summation, truth-telling will likely remain an area of great interest to both Africanist and other scholars and practitioners for some time to come. As this review was being written, the media are reporting calls for a TRC in Kenya to address the post-election violence of 2008. _Telling the Truths_ is a worthy or even, given the embryonic state of this literature, necessary.
addition to the collections of scholars specializing in peacebuilding, truth-telling, and reconciliation. The introduction would be invaluable for advanced classes on the latter two subjects. As the introduction of *Telling the Truths* underlines, much work must still be done on these topics, and one hopes that further works will soon appear. In the meantime, this volume provides an important contribution, and it may have a significant impact on the evolution of this literature.

Mark Davidheiser
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Gérard Prunier is a research professor at the Centre National des Recherches Scientifiques at the University of Paris and Director of the Centre français des études éthiopienne in Addis Ababa. The first edition of his *Darfur, the ambiguous genocide* was published by Cornell University Press in 2005. Unfortunately, the Darfur deadlock remains. Two years after the initial publishing of the book, millions of Darfurians continue to live in a precarious situation, threat of famine still lurks behind each corner and the quasi genocidal violence continues, allowing Prunier to publish a revised and updated edition of his book. It is a valuable account of history that places the situation in Darfur in a broader economical and political, African context.

As written on its first page, this book aims at describing and understanding the massive political, security and humanitarian crisis which has enveloped Darfur since February 2003.

The introductory chapter does not intend to give a detailed description of the region’s geography, history or ethnography, but wants to provide us with a welcome overview to enable the non-specialist reader to grasp the context in which the crisis has developed. Only those elements necessary to announce and explain later developments, were singled out. Prunier succeeds in unravelling the complex mosaic of tribes and clears up the fog while correcting existing inaccuracies with regard to the fragile situation and complex economical and political influences are at the heart of the atrocities in Darfur. Therefore he provides a long-awaited, eye-opening work. The smart use of references to and comparisons with known European history, lighten the text. Nevertheless, this chapter requires the undivided attention and concentration from the reader, due to the complex terminology and the use of Arabic wording. Fear of oversimplification sometimes leads the author into a detailed narrative. It might make this book an unexpectedly difficult work, which possibly discourages the audience.

The introduction lays the vital foundations. In the build up to the start of the 2003 atrocities, attention is drawn to the socio-political climate at the time. The young democracy never was of the best health, stirring up feelings of deprivation, frustration caused by benign neglect externalised through for instance a lack of education and to little medical facilities. The socio-economic underdevelopment was and still is the seed for further conflict. The pressure of demographic growth due to the degrading ecological situation and the starting desertification worked as an extra fertiliser.
The following Libyan presence in the area, acted like acid on the open socio-economic wounds which started to be reinterpreted in increasingly ethnic and racial terms. It acted as the real trigger for the conflict and it did not take long before the situation reached the point of utter confusion. In the meantime, the international community stayed willfully blind. Even though Darfur was sinking to a point of no return, it never succeeded in grasping the international attention. The situation got unbearable for humanitarian aid organisations. “African solutions to African problems” is indeed a polite way to say that we aren’t interested.

In this revised and updated edition, the 2005-conclusion is replaced by a new chapter, entitled “Darfur agonists,” written during the summer of 2006, eighteen months after the research and writing for the first edition was completed. Starting with the United Nations Security Council resolutions as a turning point in the position of the international community, Prunier discusses their political implications, and the complex relationship between the referral to the ICC and the idea of setting up a Special Tribunal on Darfur. In the mean time, the African Union Mission in Sudan was faced with a harrowing situation on the ground, there being no “peace to keep,” on top of a lack of cash, men, equipment and a clear mandate. Different political ambitions, expanding political hurdles and conflicting geopolitical agendas combined with the worsening situation in Chad and the collapse of agricultural production in Sudan, made the road to peace even more bumpy than it already was. The bitter and cynical narrative makes no attempt in hiding Prunier’s anger and disappointment. At times he is a little too harsh and portrays the international community as naïve and incompetent even though there is a lot more to it. Statements are not always finely tuned.

It must be said that the book loses some of its power due to a number of flaws and inaccuracies. Even though most of the grammatical and spelling mistakes in the first edition have been corrected, some still remain. Additionally, the word divisions at the end of the line are often incorrect. Hyphenations are placed in the most bizarre places. Funny in the beginning, distracting after a while. Unfortunately the sentence that ‘Even the usually well-informed advocacy NGO Justice Africa not mention Darfur in its October 2003 Monthly brief” is still there, even though reviewers of the first edition already noticed its incorrectness. The indignation caused by that sentence makes interested readers turn to Google to double check. The brief does in fact – though very briefly and maybe a bit disrespectfully – state that “The Darfur conflict continues to cause ripples more widely.” The situation is dealt with in four rather short paragraphs. Whereas some sources are treated inaccurately, an impressively large number and wide variety of sources are brought together in this short book. Interviews and field information have a strong added value and give a crucial insight, complementing the literature overview.

Prunier provides us with a lot of food for reflection, certainly a contribution to the field and a practical source of reference for students interested in the historical, socio-economic and political roots of the ambiguous genocide in Darfur.

Wendy De Bondt
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_Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid_ depicts the Alexandra Rebellion of 1986 as analyzed through various themes from literature on collective action and social movements, as well as those on identity and space. With these, Bozzoli frames the rebellion and its aftermath as a drama played out in the township, and although she uses just one case study, it is general enough to represent what was occurring in many of the townships during that time. She draws upon thousands of archived interviews with the actors involved to create a rich and cohesive story that one cannot help but think sets the stage for the horrendously high rate of violence experienced in the country today.

It is the youth who are the crux of this story, as they fight against the complacency of previous generations to overthrow apartheid in any way possible, and in the case of Alex, it is often a violent one. Ironically, these youth were educated enough under apartheid to know just how bad it was, and decided to follow in the steps of such fighters as Mandela, Tambo, Slovo, Mbeki, to get out of it. Some of the more important tactics depicted here include the almost impenetrable male social networks of bonding on the streets, ‘comrade’ activities of boycotts and strikes to render the township ungovernable, and the sheer violence in acts such as torture, public brutality and necklacing against _impipis_ (informers). At one point the youth rival the police in dishing out punishments and organizing people’s courts, which draw on the historicity of _kgotlas_, albeit led not by elders but by increasingly hostile youth themselves.

For Bozzoli’s script, space is a key issue. The township represents the setting from which individuals need liberation, and how it is theirs to transform; they — the ‘conveyors of a just cause’—are to free the adults from their own oppression. Audiences and actors play out scripts of revolution, justice, and transformation that pit nationalistic comrades against the immoral evils of apartheid. For many perpetrators, it matters not that there are times when the innocent inadvertently become entangled in the violence, for the importance lies in the evolving identity of the township and its inhabitants as ‘free’ in what is to become the new and improved South Africa.

‘Nationalism’ overtakes violence as the master frame, as is evidenced in the post-rebellion years as memories are re-constructed. The recollections of the most heinous of actions evolve into those by some ‘other,’ thus romanticizing the nationalist movement by spotlighting the repression and casting the brutal acts to the wings. In the TRC stories to emerge, Alex plays the role of victim and the stories of individual struggles transform into meanings that go beyond the private sphere. Thus, a new public sphere has been constructed that allows township residents to share in each other’s stories and create a collective township mentality.

Bozzoli fully fleshes out the theatre theme in Chapter 9 (*Nationalism and Theatricality*), and she does a good job of portraying funerals as political street theatre, defining the framing as that of group suffering and persecution, and illustrating the rules of the game regarding discipline and interpretation of events. Yet the careful reader may find herself wishing these themes had emerged earlier in the book with as much depth as they do here.

Perhaps the greatest question the book raises, and leaves inadequately answered, is how these events have shaped the current extreme rates of violence in South Africa today.
author’s credit, she acknowledges that this is not the aim of the book, as it is historical rather than predictive, but with the brief references she makes at various points, she cannot help but leave the reader wanting more. The youth and their activities are discussed in the final chapter as a source of great pride as well as great shame for the township regarding “our heritage to our children: The knowledge of how to die, and how to kill” (p. 276). This statement is chillingly prescient given that it was made by an interviewee over twenty years ago. Disaffection and displacement continued past the rebellions and bubbled to the surface in violent acts by the late 1990s: “A culture of criminality, rooted in the very shattering of bonds that took place under high apartheid, emerged” and is currently sustained much of the time through peer pressure (p. 281).

Thus the book shows us in part how township rebellions have set the precedent for violence today, but we don’t fully understand why this has carried over and remained so strongly embedded. This is not the goal of the book, however, and thus it has no option but to leave this theme until the last chapter, even if it comes across as too little too late. *Theatres of Struggle and the End of Apartheid* does, however, successfully accomplish its goal of depicting the Alexandra Rebellion of 1986 as a type of political theatre in the streets, and it also accomplishes the task of raising questions quite relevant today to the region concerning relationships between nationalism and civic-ness, space and struggle, violence and crime, and elder and youth identities.

Kenly Greer Fenio

*University of Florida*

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In *Reconstructing the Nation in Africa*, author Michael Amoah examines the extent to which theories and debates on nationalism formed in eighteenth-century Europe and America are relevant to present day Africa. Amoah challenges the Eurocentric use of the late 18th century France as the threshold for the emergence of nationalism. He proposes that the term nation as defined by modernists could be applied to African entities which pre-date the French Revolution. The Ashante nation emerged in 1701 and the Fante nation even earlier.

Amoah argues that existing theoretical constructs are relatively successful in categorizing macro, but not micro expressions of nationalism as is generally the case in Africa’s multinational states. He is critical of ethno-nationalism being presented as irrational or counter to patriotism except in nation-states. The book’s brief introduction posits that a sense of nationhood can deteriorate or be lost over time and that in many African states nationhood was based on anti-colonialism and was strongest just after independence. Due to poor economic conditions, ethno-nationalism and “politics of the belly” have characterized much of post-independence Africa (p. 6). People quite rationally vote along ethnic lines (what Amoah terms rationalization of ethno-nationalism) or for ethnic groups viewed as good for the entire country (what Amoah terms figuration or civic nationalism). Whereas ethno-nationalism enhances
patriotism in nation-states, it undermines it in multi-ethnic states, if ethno-nationalism and civic nationalism are not aligned.

To learn whether civic nationalism or patriotism among urbanites is separate from ethno-nationalism Amoah carries his laptop to markets, factories, malls, schools, and restaurants to log survey responses and undertake unstructured interviews. He examines voting in Ghana’s 2000 presidential elections as a form of nationalism; one which is particularly complex in urban areas and uses Tema as his study site because it is the most ethnically diverse of Ghana’s larger cities.

Somewhat unconventionally, Amoah’s methodological approach and field research are described quite late in his book, much of which is devoted to a review of the literature on Ghana in support of the author’s theory that Ghana’s origin derives from a federation of native states rather than being rooted in modernity. Amoah uses place names in multiple languages as evidence of place of origin or ancestry and argues that in virtually all but portions of the Volta region, modern Ghanaians trace their origins to Guan people who migrated from the old Ghana Empire, which had its capital, Ghannah, near present-day Timbuktu in Mali. Amoah maintains that people of common ancestry, but with somewhat different ethnic identities (Ashanti, Bono, Gonja) would have emerged as a nation “had there not been colonial intervention” (p. 70).

Amoah also believes that the Ewe of the Volta region would have emerged as a nation had it not been for colonial intervention and the partition of Ewe lands between the British and French. The emergence of an Ewe nation pre-partition is not difficult to imagine. The Ewe retain relatively strong ties even across international boundaries as evinced by the rapid absorption of Ewe Togolese refugees into Ewe homes in Ghana in recent decades.

Amoah’s case for the emergence of a Ghanaian nation based on common heritage across Guan ancestry lines relies heavily on the work of Eva Meyerowitz. Meyerowitz’s work, as Amoah admits, has been criticized by leading Africanists, including Jan Vansina, who described Meyerowitz as displaying a “lack of critical judgment” in the ‘handling of her sources’” (p. 93). Amoah is so convinced by the accuracy of Meyerowitz’s work that he details potential inaccuracies in the works of her critics and positively presents authors who agree with her. Whereas Amoah’s research does unearth some intricacies related to Ghana’s electoral process, such as the role of ethnicity not only in who people vote for, but also who they would refuse to support, and that women are more likely to disclose political preferences to friends rather than spouses, he seems too willing to present only those facts which support his Guan ancestry hypothesis. Thus, his belief that his “book successfully traces the ethno-geographic origins of all nationalities in modern Ghana, fills the gaps, completes the jigsaw and explains the evolution of the phenomena” is a bit difficult to believe (p. 5). He dismisses Ashante-Ewe rivalries as post-colonial in origin and asserts that Ghana’s relative political and economic stability can be attributed to its Guan ancestry and emergence of an Akan identity for much of its population.

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http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v10/v10i1reviews.pdf

Amoah finds that urbanites in Ghana do not lose their ethno-nationalism and tend to vote along ethnic lines even though they simultaneously recognize that tribalism undermines the state. He suggests that urbanites are only “partially detribalized” and that groups which believe they have been discriminated against, such as the Ewe and the Asante, are most likely to vote along ethnic lines or refuse to vote for a candidate based on the candidate’s ethnicity (p. 132). The author notes Northerners have come to “see themselves as belonging to a common identity
or ‘brotherhood’” due to their common Islamic traditions and relative economic and educational depravity and that this regional identity further impacts voting patterns in Ghana (p. 70). Specifically, that the vice presidential position is typically slotted for Northern candidates in order to get ethno-nationalist based votes — which Amoah presents as another example of tribalism. He continues to argue that Northerners are well aware of this fact and “manipulate their ethnonational identity to their political advantage” in order to remain in the political sphere (p. 120). Amoah believes that Ghana will remain a democracy, but questions whether a revitalization of nationalism and patriotism is possible in modern African states and suggests that multinational states may not be viable in Africa.

Restructuring the Nation in Africa has several tables, but no maps, which could make it somewhat difficult to follow for general readers or even Africanists unfamiliar with Ghana. The two-page conclusion makes for a rather abrupt ending in which a more detailed recap of his philosophies could have helped the reader make sense of his arguments, and help transition more smoothly into his cursory introduction to global warming, Ghana’s diaspora, the African Union and other topics tangentially related to book’s main themes.

Amoah presents the politics behind the concept of nationalism akin to Dava Sobel’s Longitude which exposes the politics behind the placement of the Prime Meridian. Restructuring the Nation in Africa should make for interesting debates in upper-level undergraduate and graduate courses in International Studies, African history and politics.

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The Peace Corps, I was once told, has a matrimonial agency quality to it. It is about helping, and occasionally, espousing third-worlders. It is about roughing it up and sowing one’s wild oats. David Lyons, a rather self-absorbed, inconsequential type, does just that (besides dodging conscription to Vietnam, this being 1969): no marriage, however, comes from his encounters with Nigerien women, but a child, whose elusive quest makes up the main drive of an otherwise spectacularly bland story. Paul Stoller’s Gallery Bundu is a confessional novel that never lives up to the demanding criteria of that sub-genre, and, more sadly, fails to build on other possible strengths – like the exoticness of the setting (for Western readers) or the potentials for making a political point under the pretext of telling a story.

The novel takes place mostly in Niger, at various points in time between 1971 and today, following the comings and goings of Lyons between New York, Niamey (Niger’s capital) and Tillaberi (the small town north of Niamey where he serves as a Peace Corps volunteer). This has a slightly perverse tantalizing dimension: Lyons, himself as uninteresting as an un-carved piece of wood (the bundu in the title means, in Songhay, “wood”, as in carved wood art work), meets at several junctures fascinating characters, whom one would rather follow instead of sticking
with him, and he chances upon fascinating possibilities – for instance learning the art of seeing in the future, for which a Tillaberi elder told him he has a gift – which are not further pursued.

Nor does one feel that these threads could have been powered by Stoller’s writing style. Supposedly, this is Lyons telling his story over tea to West African business partners in the African art shop he runs with his wife in New York, and although the style is written, not oral, it certainly has the endearing but thoroughly bleached quality of a fireside chat conducted by a scrupulously liberal American academic. This, of course, reminds us that Stoller himself is an anthropologist who lived as a Peace Corps in Niger, in the same locales visited by Lyons (some of the people portrayed here are adapted from his real life account of his experience in Niger’s Songhay country, *In Sorcery’s Shadow*.) Although Stoller’s own story is very different from Lyons’, and distinctively more interesting, he certainly endows him with his anthropological concern for minutely describing objects, events and scenes, in extensive passages whose only discernible relevance is to showcase and display expertise and attitudes.

To my surprise, Stoller does not eschew the trap of making of Africa and Africans a backdrop to the lives of a circle of Western agents – mostly French and American – although this is not done in a demeaning way. In fact, it is precisely the sense of respect with which the Nigeriens – and a family of Senegalese traders – are depicted that greatly participates in a stylization which, ultimately, makes them lifeless. The backdrop is usually steeped in misery and hospitality, the two flashing points of decent Africa nowadays: dazed donkeys and maimed beggars abound, as well as folks who force on you endless meals and welcome you with ecstatic clamors. It is marred by a few inaccuracies and anachronisms that would strike the admittedly few potential readers of this novel with knowledge of this area of West Africa, as definite blots: I doubt that children in Abidjan would run up to White men, crying “Toubab! Toubab!” This is more likely to happen in Senegal (where “Toubab” means White person). Describing the past of Zainabou, the beautiful woman with whom Lyons will have a son, Stoller shows her, in the 1960s, dreaming of becoming a student at the University of Niamey which was not founded until 1971.

Descriptions of life in Niamey in general are impervious to the many political and economic changes that transformed the place and its inhabitants over thirty years: but there is in fact no real sense of what is happening in the country outside of Lyons’ small circle and his modest problems of growing up awkwardly and belatedly. Even this is not taken up as substantially as might lead us to think of Lyons’ story as a kind of Bildungsroman. He doesn’t have the internal meat and flesh that would make of his confrontations with the intense issues making up his story – his consortin as a White Westermer with a struggling Black African woman, his sexual escapades in Tillaberi, the racism of the French development workers or, for that matter, that of Nigerien society against half-breed children – life-shaping experience. Lyons, of course, meets his child at the end of the book – when, at least Nigerien readers, would read with a mix of embarrassment and incredulity the rage directed at him by the boy for having left him, a half-breed, in a society which allegedly hates half-breed. This part of the encounter has two conspicuous flaws: no Nigerien, or African-educated child would speak in such a direct, blaming manner to a parent; and inasmuch as it is true that Nigeriens would hate half-breed children (which I find by experience an extreme conception of the author), it is surprising that race-conscious France would fare better on this account: “You have no idea what
it’s like to grow up a bastard *baturé* in Niger. You never fit in. The kids call you a half-breed, and the adults keep you away from their children [that is simply not true: to wit, there is not even a word for “half-breed” in Niger, apart from the French “*métis*”, which is in fact indicative of an ambiguously superior social position inherited from colonial times]… In France I’m free.” Whatever his individual experience of such matters, Stoller cannot be actually thinking that.

What Stoller really likes is the Songhay country, and Tillaberi. The scenes set in that area are the most captivating. Even the unbearable heat is conveyed to the reader with a sense of utter discomfort that is not without poetic intensity. Stoller reaches a calm lyricism as he describes the mesas of the Songhay country, quiet contemplative hours at dusk, or meaningful relations with local folks. We acknowledge here that we are no longer with Lyons, we are with his carver. The *bundu* comes alive. Otherwise the novel is quite wooden. It is an effortless read, this said, and I’d recommend it for exposing readers to a world so generally absent from the English language.

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The text is “a logical, systematic, and normative interpretation or analysis of the idea of communalism in African cultures” (p. 2). This, according to the author, is necessitated by the dilettante attitude and misunderstanding of the communal spirit in Africa with the result that at a metaphilosophical level it is criticized as harboring pervasive religious supernaturalism, reckless anachronism, and irrational authoritarianism. The text is therefore an effort to offer a critique of such criticisms, especially the last one, though the three are closely interrelated.

According to the author, moral thought and epistemology in African cultures are, contrary to what some scholars have suggested, not innocent of the critical and analytical mode of inquiry. Though the notion of community and its relationship to individuals in African cultures differ from those in Western worldview, this does not warrant the conclusion that the community in African cultures hinders individuals from independent thinking. The author notes that in African cultures a community is not simply the aggregate sum of individuals (as is the case in the West), but where the aggregated sum is fused. However, for him, the critical point which others have failed to take cognizance of is that the African view of communalism is not one-way, but a two-way affair between community and the individual. It still gives room for individual rationality, creativity, imagination, and inventiveness to adapt various situations. “What the community does as a normative structure, epistemic context, and conceptual scheme is to circumscribe the context of relevant alternatives and counter-evidence, and to provide some basis for one’s rationality, imagination, and creativity” (p. 84).

In the Western world, because of its universalist metaphilosophical view of philosophy, ethics is basically conceptualized as systematic, rigorous, and critical theories of right and wrong. The author argues that this is not accurate. According to him, some of the ideas of the
past Western thinkers that have today been reconstituted do not in themselves display the so-called essential critical, systematic, and rigorous features of philosophy. On the contrary, it is the process of reconstitution that has infused rigor and systematization to such ideas. He argues that similar reconstitution and analysis of African traditional ideas such as communalism should pass as contemporary Analytic Philosophy. The author sees his text as a contribution in this regard.

In comparing and contrasting moral education in African (traditional) communities and Western (modern) world, the author argues that the informal (communal) methods and processes of moral education in the form of narratives, folklore, proverbs, and oral tradition in African communities are superior to the Western formal, individualistic, and cognitive view or model of moral education and development. “The relevant factors in African communal culture seem to have enhanced efficacy in moral education, while their absence seems to have hindered the efficacy of moral education in modern Western culture and in African cosmopolitan cities where people have adopted the Western ethos and individualistic attitudes” (p. 162).

On the controversial issue of whether the communal structures and informal processes in African traditions necessarily lead to authoritarianism, the author distinguishes between rational and irrational forms of authoritarianism and then argues in favor of a rational form of authoritarianism in African cultures. The error made by critics, in the author’s view, is that they fail to see the rational form. The basis of the rational form of authoritarianism is, according to the author, the principle of epistemic deference, and the social, contextual, and pragmatic nature of knowledge and justification. Hence epistemic or rational authoritarianism in African cultures is not something insidious or bad. In fact, “it is pertinent to note that an element of epistemic authoritarianism is accepted in science as a legitimate principle” (p. 210).

The author also challenges the view that epistemic authoritarianism in African cultures leads to indoctrination rather than education. He postulates that indoctrination is not necessarily bad unless the process is extreme enough to involve brainwashing. At the same time, he argues that epistemic authoritarianism in African cultures does not involve brainwashing hence there is nothing bad about it. The author also argues that indoctrination, contrary to popular belief, is a necessary part of or a precondition for any meaningful education and that it does not vitiate rational autonomy. Ironically, the author proceeds on to argue that in all honesty and fairness, it is the Western emphasis on “thinking for oneself” that would actually in some instances constitute extreme indoctrination (brainwashing).

On some libertarian criticisms on communalism in African cultures, the author believes that they are misguided. Such criticisms, he is convinced, emphasize too much on individual autonomy to the extent that they either ignore the limits or exaggerate the power of individual rationality, as well as the value of individual autonomy and freedom. And this is a weakness that communalism in traditional African cultures does not suffer from.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with some of the views expressed by the author, one aspect of the text stands tall: the author has ably and meticulously fulfilled his primary objective of giving a logical, systematic, and normative interpretation and analysis of communalism in African cultures. In this respect he has made reasonable reference to works of some notable West African philosophers namely Wiredu, Gbadegesin, Gyekye, Appiah, Menkiti, Bodunrin, and Nzegwu. However, for the sake of balance, it would have been better had the author
included references from works of some renowned scholars from Eastern and Southern Africa besides Nyerere. There are some glaring typographical errors in the text though bearing in mind its voluminous nature some may turn a blind eye. All said and done, given the conscientious and detailed manner in which the text treats the topic of communalism in African cultures, the text should be resourceful and of interest to scholars in African studies regardless of their areas of specialization.

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University of the West Indies


This work is an important contribution both to the recent historiography of South Africa and to analysis of the post-apartheid era. It also provides interesting discussions of such practical matters as teaching, designing curricula in a challenging policy environment, and applied history in efforts towards the rectification of social injustices. For these reasons, plus the fact that it is well-written and edited, the volume should appeal to a wide audience of teachers, historians, political scientists, sociologists, and anthropologists.

The book grew out of a 2002 conference sponsored by the Nordic Africa Institute and the Center for African Studies at the University of Copenhagen. This brought to Denmark more than fifty historians and historically oriented scholars, most of them from South Africa and northern Europe. Students of South African history over the past several decades will recognize many of the names of the scholars present.

The editor, Danish historian Hans Erik Stolten, has divided the volume into three sections. Part I consists of six essays that focus on the “role of history in the creation of a new South Africa.” These include an account of the history of South Africa as a concept (Saul DuBow); an analysis of the concepts used in the description of the democratic “transition” (Thiven Reddy); a discussion of how history is taught in the post-apartheid era (Colin Bundy); a critique of two prominent narratives of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Elaine Unterhalter); and descriptions of the role of the researcher in land restitution cases (Anna Bohlin, Martin Legassick). Part II consists of five papers on the theme of “heritage and the popularizing of memory.” Topics covered here include public history and “heritage” in the post-apartheid era (Gary Baines, Christopher Saunders); the centenary commemoration of the South African War (Albert Grundlingh); how apartheid is depicted in the museum at Gold Reef City (Georgi Verbeeck); and the restructuring of key South African spaces to conform to global consumerism (Martin J. Murray). Part III consists of six papers that deal with South African historiography. The first three (respectively by Bernhard Makhosezwe Magubane, Christopher Saunders, and Merle Lipton) pay special attention to the debate between “liberal” and “radical” South African historians and its legacy. The fourth paper by Wessel Visser and the fifth by Allison Drew both concern representations of communism. The former is about the production of anti-communist history in Afrikaans and the latter about the role of racism in the Communist Party in the 1920s.
The sixth paper by Catherine Burns is rather unique in offering a new vision of the relevance of history for the South Africa of today. The editor has also made available on his website unpublished conference papers.

Due to space limitations, I can mention only a few things about the papers and the issues they bring up for debate. First, Catherine Burns’ paper provides a fresh vision of history’s relevance. It describes how she and her colleagues at the University of Natal, Durban are bringing history to life for a new generation by focusing on health and legal issues. History has a “thirsty audience,” she suggests, but only when it is dressed up in such disguises. Martin Legassick’s essay is particularly interesting for its personal insights on the role of an academic historian working to identify and foster legitimate land restitution claims in the Northern and Western Cape. This description is nicely supplemented by Bohlin’s paper on land restitution and memory in the small Western Cape community of Kalk Bay. Murray’s paper will be of interest to those concerned with the post-modern simulacra of global capitalism. Here Murray discusses the pseudo-gold mine at Gold Reef City, the pseudo-maritime ambience of Cape Town’s Victoria and Alfred Waterfront, and the ostentatious fantasy of the entertainment facility known as “Lost City.”

As mentioned above, the split between so-called liberal and radical South African historians is explicitly addressed by three essays in part III, but it is also an issue that is implicit in a number of others. This debate has essentially been about the relationship between capitalism and apartheid. Debate continues over the causal roles of culture, race, and class. That there are still tender emotions here is revealed Merle Lipton’s paper as she describes the hostile reception her work has faced because it argues that segments of business were in fact instrumental in ending apartheid. From a quite different perspective, Magubane is scathing in his judgment that white South African historians, whether liberal or radical, “never confronted what it meant for black folks to be treated as non-persons in the country of their birth. Or indeed, what it meant to be white and be proclaimed a member of the superior race!” (p. 252).

Even if unduly harsh, Magubane’s critique leaves one wondering how white historians investigating black history under apartheid could overcome the institutional racism of their segregated and economically privileged upbringing. Psychologically, how did they deal with the fact that many could jet off to study in England or the U.S.A. while at the same time research grave issues of poverty and injustice at home? Did they have life changing experiences that led them to history or did history lead to those experiences?

At least in their contributions for this volume, white South African scholars do appear reticent to reflect on the role of race in their work lives. While Saunders provides a nice paper on his four decades of work, he does so in a purely intellectual fashion, not really addressing psychological or identity issues. Furthermore, neither he nor anyone else in the volume brings up such issues as translation complexities and the use of research assistants. Why has translation or the use of European languages with non-native speaking informants been such a non-issue for scholars in a country where there are so many languages and dialects? And, if white scholars used black research assistants as translators and collectors of oral history why do they now seem invisible? Unfortunately, there is nothing here to compare with the fascinating account published recently in ASQ by historian Robert Edgar about his research life, the long-
term impacts his work has had on the peoples he studied, and the way that he has become personally intertwined in locally produced religious worldviews (Edgar 2007).

Robert Shanafelt
Georgia Southern University

Reference:


Sylviane A. Diouf has assembled a collection of provocative essays by scholars of African history that challenges the idea of West Africans’ complicity with the transatlantic slave trade by examining various strategies of resistance. Through the use of oral histories, ship logs and records, as well as archaeological findings, these scholars unveil a resistance to slavery that occurred in West Africa primarily before slaves were boarded and transported to the New World. The collection is divided into three parts, examining of different strategies of resistance: defensive, protective, and offensive.

The scholars in this collection overwhelmingly argue that certain populations of West Africans were keenly aware of the devastating impact of the transatlantic slave trade on their societies, and these populations sought to mitigate the damages as best they could. One method used was to develop defensive strategies, such as the environment, for protection. Elisée Soumonni and Thierno Mouctar Bah in their essays “Lacustrine Villages in South Benin as Refuges from the Slave Trade” and “Slave-Raiding and Defensive Systems South of Lake Chad from the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century,” respectively, examine the relations between the movement of refugee populations to the lake area and the impact of the transatlantic slave trade on these populations. They contend that as the market for human cargo increased, some West African communities relocated to environments that less accessible to slave raiders.

In addition to the use of environmental features as a defensive strategy, architectural features were also used as a means to protect against slave raiders. Homes and villages were often designed with labyrinths, high walls, and various points of ingress and egress to impede easy access by slave raiders. While West Africa and the transatlantic slave trade are the primary foci of this book, Dennis D. Cordell’s essay “The Myth of Inevitability and Invincibility: Resistance to Slavers and the Slave Trade in Central Africa, 1850-1910” focuses on resistance to the Muslim slave raiding and slave trade in north-central Africa. This also involved peoples relocating, abandoning their villages and taking refuge in caves and tunnels, and banding together in large settlements to ward off slave raiders.
While defensive strategies were used, protective strategies also proved to be compelling response to the slave trade. Part two, “Protective Strategies” is highlighted by an essay by Diouf, “The Last Resort: Redeeming Family and Friends.” In this essay, Diouf explores the practice of captive redemption. One example Diouf vividly resurrects is the fascinating story of Ibrahima abd al-Rahman Barry who spent 40 years in bondage in Mississippi, and how he returns to Liberia in 1829 to gather money from his wealthy family to purchase his five children and eight grand children from slavery. Unfortunately, Ibrahima dies before the caravan arrives in Monrovia carrying $6,000 to $7,000 in gold (p. 81).

If captive redemption was a viable protective strategy against the slave trade, the rise in secret societies and alliances amongst various groups helped to protect some West Africans from enslavement. Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson’s essay “Anglo-Efik Relations and Protection against Illegal Enslavement at Old Calabar, 1740-1807” explores such arrangements, and specifically how the Arotaders were able to travel with security throughout Old Calabar, “which supplied over a quarter of a million persons for export to the Americas between 1740 and 1807”, with the use of oracles, chalk markings, and kinship ties (p. 102). A rise in secret societies amongst the Efik and in the Ekpe society also helped to protect African slave raiders and traders against enslavement.

The offensive strategies examined in part three range from training children to act as scouts for detecting the encroachment of slave raiders, to revealing a continuum of resistance that culminated in the Mandingo Rebellion, 1785-1796; the Hubbu Rebellion against the Futa Jallon state in the 1850s; and the Bilali Rebellion, 1838-1872. John N. Oriji in “Igboland, Slavery and the Drums of War and Heroism” also uses oral traditions and other sources to examine offensive strategies that involved such practices as communities forming alliances and pacts to protect themselves against Abam slave raiders; people dropping poisoned food, water, and wine along strategic slave raiding routes; and young men receiving military training to protect their communities. Ismail Rashid’s examines the importance of slave rebellions as an offensive strategy in “A Devotion to the Idea of Liberty.” Rashid refutes the pervasive belief that “antislavery […] emanated solely from religious, economic, and philosophical ideas of eighteenth-century European Enlightenment” (p. 132). He argues that “the Mandingo Rebellion in the eighteenth century and the Bilali Rebellion in the nineteenth century — attest to the tenacity of the enslaved in resisting slavery and asserting their freedom” (p. 133). But even asserting freedom came with a price, such as adapting practices that challenged tradition and created dubious roles for some West Africans, particularly those communities that were decentralized.

Walter Hawthorne challenges Joseph Miller’s notion that “those persons who were not sold or traded into the transatlantic slave trade or enslaved in Africa were ‘human flotsam’” (p. 153) in his essay, “Strategies of the Decentralized.” Hawthorne asserts that for decentralized communities often the best strategy to protect themselves against the slave trade was to become slavers (p. 154). In “The Struggle Against the Transatlantic Slave Trade: The Role of the State,” Joseph E. Inikori seeks to answer the question, “what factors explain state involvement in the export trade in captives?” (p. 171). In Inikori’s concise historical overview, he asserts “the slave trade was dependent on transportation and weak or non-existent centralized government” (p. 172), ultimately concluding that those West African communities that did not centralize their
governments fell prey to the transatlantic slave trade.

Although the implicit thesis of the collection is to examine strategies of resistance other than mutinies, David Richardson’s essay expands the research on shipboard revolts and their impact on slavery. Richardson uses European shipping records to identify no less than 483 cases of violent actions taken by Africans to resist being enslaved and transported across the Atlantic Ocean. Richardson concludes that such revolts had a far-reaching and negative impact on the slave trade, helping not only to decrease economic profits but also to foster an increasing anti-slavery sentiment.

The collection concludes with “Epilogue: Memory as Resistance” by Carolyn A. Brown. Brown reiterates the necessity for and importance of oral history as a research mechanism by describing a pilot oral history project aimed at documenting the experiences of those Africans who were enslaved but not transported outside of Africa, and the impact of these slaves on communities along the West coast of Africa. Like other scholars, Brown argues for the efficacy of oral history projects.

The use of oral tradition and history may have some inherent pitfalls, nonetheless, absent written historical records, oral traditions and histories coupled with archaeological excavations can yield useful and uncanny information that continues to balance the contemporary record on the transatlantic slave trade. This collection is particularly useful in teaching undergraduate and graduate students about the transatlantic slave trade to counter and balance the pervasive belief that Africans were either passive victims or active participants in slavery.

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In West African literatures, Stephanie Newell examines, in thirteen chapters, crucial questions and debates, which are central in the commentaries of Francophone and Anglophone West African letters. The book begins with a particularly relevant introduction, which provides a very good survey of the topics, concepts and terminologies that have animated and stimulated the studies of the African literary production, and that will inform her own intervention: language, orality, postcolonialism, Bhabha’s “hybridity,” Appiah’s “cosmopolitanism,” Appadurai’s concept of “-scapes,” Marxism, feminism, queer literature and negritude. By circumscribing her study to West Africa, Newell’s aim is to emphasize the diversity within the region, and its implications for the description and study of the literary production. By rethinking the “elastic categorizations” she aims to “highlight the enormous literary dynamism within West Africa” and to draw attention to a “seminal aspect of West Africa’s postcolonial identity, or its postcoloniality: the heterogeneity of cultures and literatures within each West African nation means that the term ‘postcolonial’ must account for the diversity of literary currents within each country, as well as the shared historical
experiences of slavery and colonial rule in the region” (p. 7). In doing so, she also insists on the implications of the authors’ predilection for “European and American publishing houses,” at the expense of “their own national publishers,” for the forms and aesthetics of the texts. Newell can then draw attention to the tensions between “local production” and “elite production.”

The chapters in *West African literatures* are of different lengths (ranging from a minimum of 6 to a maximum of 20 pages) and cover topics as varied as “Oral literatures” (chap. 4), “Negritude” (chap. 2), “Islam and identity in African literatures” (chap. 3), “Feminism and the complex space of Women’s Writing” (chap. 9), “Queering West African literatures” (chap. 13), “Experimental writing by the third generation” (chap. 12), “Marxism and West African literature” (chap. 10) and “The three ‘Posts’: Postmodernism, Poststructuralism and Poscolonialism” (chap. 11). The chapters are not all equal and some of them elliptic. For instance, the chapter on Islam is relatively short for what is an important and yet neglected aspect of West African literatures. Though Newell’s intention is not to be “encyclopedic” as stated in her introduction, the absence of figures such as Amadou Hampâté Bâ, whose work has been literally shaped by Islam, or Yambo Ouologuem, with his devastating response to Islamic values in *Le devoir de violence* is questionable. References at least cursory to such works would have certainly helped to strengthen the author’s demonstration of “the diversity of literary currents.” Also, Newell’s very appealing label of “Islamic fiction” deserved further developments: What does it take to identify a text as an Islamic fiction? Is the religious consciousness of the text a determining element?

This observation is rapidly compensated by what remains a very solid work. Its strength lies in its important insights into existing interpretations and readings of canonical texts, or debates, as well as in its innovative and persuasive arguments. Newell’s careful discussion of “Popular literatures” gives a much-needed illustration of how the literary dynamism is ensured by local productions that “generate new types of selfhood” and activate new modes of reception. In the same vein, her chapter on the new feminism, which focuses on Werewere Liking, Calixthe Beyala, and Véronique Tadjo, explores the rejection by the three writers of outdated linguistic and normative codes to open to new expressions of “the new subjectivities of African women.” Furthermore, Newell’s discussion includes neglected problematics in the commentary of African letters, such as translation (chap. 5). She also revisits and rejects old paradigms, such as the exclusionary relationship between “written and oral genres,” which has been contradicted, as Newell demonstrates, by the works of the vibrant Nigerian “AlterNative poets” (chap. 8). Her chapter on “Marxism and literature” opens a crucial domain in the study of the history of African literatures by focusing on the dynamic debates about the affinities and divergences that make the ideologies of African literatures (chap. 10).

In conclusion, the breadth and the diversity of the key issues and debates covered by Newell, and the simultaneous reference to canonical figures and emergent writers, make *West African Literatures* an invaluable tool for scholars and students of African literatures.

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