BOOK REVIEWS

Identifying the Limits to Humanitarian Intervention: Echoes from Rwanda — A Review Article


Humanitarianism is now a legitimate goal for nations to pursue. Indeed, it is widely agreed that the international community has a responsibility to intervene in the event of genocide, massive abuse of human rights, and refugee flight. But this is a new ideal which emerged only in the last thirty years following debates about whether sovereignty trumped the responsibility to intervene in places like Biafra, Bangladesh, and especially in Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge reign. This debate is now over: humanitarianism can trump sovereignty. Among other things, this means that genocide is a crime which must be responded to and refugees are entitled to assistance. But this leads to the next question: how in a world of sovereign states with their own laws, armies, courts, and police are such ideals achieved? In other words, in the real world, how can these newly sacred ideals be implemented? Given that there is no international police force or military, how will the international community respond when international humanitarian laws are violated?

A number of international humanitarian operations undertaken within this “responsibility to intervene doctrine” can now be used to evaluate how these ideals fare in the real world of international politics. Since 1980, these include the humanitarian airlift to Ethiopia in 1985, the
humanitarian and military intervention in Somalia in 1992-3, interventions in the Balkans in the early 1990s, the humanitarian relief operation following the 1994 Rwanda genocide and refugee crisis, the NATO-led military and humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 was partly justified on such “humanitarianism trumps sovereignty” grounds. In 2005-06, there are continuing calls for international intervention in the Darfur region of Sudan.

In the process of undertaking humanitarian interventions, the capacity of the international community to respond is revealed. Indeed, the strengths of the new international humanitarian relief regime are now even taken for granted, and include the responsibility of governments to protect human rights, a defined role for independent peace-keepers, and the responsibility of UN, governmental, and non-governmental agencies to safeguard the victims of war, famine, and other catastrophes. But many weaknesses of the international humanitarian system of are also now apparent.

The failure of the United Nations (and the United States) to respond militarily during the 1994 Rwanda genocide is typically cited as a paradigmatic example of what damage humanitarian inaction can cause. But this awareness is tempered by the observation that excessive involvement puts humanitarians themselves at unacceptable risk. Indeed, while the lack of political will is viewed as a problem, so are the dangers implied by “Crossing the Mogadishu Line,” a reference to the 1993 intervention by the US military which resulted in the deaths of 18 American soldiers. In short, there are risks and dangers associated with the new idealistic humanitarian doctrine for intervention. In the real world, policy makers evaluate when lack of action will result in genocide or famine, while at the same time being aware that interventions can also go badly awry. Literature emerging since 2000 wrestles with the difficulties that emerge as this new ethic is established.

The Urgent Responsibility to Respond

In a “Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of Genocide, Samantha Power examines American responses to genocides of the 20th century. As the title says, this influential book is about American responsibility to respond to genocide, not about the types of societies which commit genocide. Books like this are particularly important for defending the morality of humanitarian intervention. Though passionate in making this case, they are less precise in developing ideas about what practical steps are available in a world where trumping sovereign rights requires prescient analysis, diplomacy, political will, and logistical capabilities.

Power finds that the United States has long verbalized a commitment to control genocide yet beginning with the Armenian genocide in 1914, there is a bureaucratic incapacity to respond in a timely fashion. She observes a pattern wherein idealistic individuals within the American bureaucracy have raised the issue of intervention, mirrored by a reluctance of politicians to respond to incipient genocides which have little political payoff among domestic constituencies. In short, Power writes, politicians in the democratic United States personally lack the “will” to mobilize the resources of the United States government to stop genocide. Power goes on to compare the righteous bureaucrat who points out the abuse with reluctant bureaucracies more in tune with domestic political considerations than human rights.
outrages. Power identifies this pattern with respect not only to Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, but also the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust.

Power selectively chooses her examples by focusing on failures to intervene. This is an easy temptation in the field of disaster prevention where successes (i.e. catastrophe prevented and therefore nothing happens), is always less obvious than failures (i.e. no intervention occurs, and a catastrophe occurs). Power does point out that on occasions outside action seems to have stopped at least some atrocity. Her best examples both come from Kurdistan and include the threats of sanctions against Saddam Hussein who committed atrocities against Kurds in the 1980s as well as the establishment of a humanitarian safe-zone in Kurdistan following the 1991 Gulf War. One could add the case of South Africa which teetered on the brink of civil war in 1993-94, and much of Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War. Both were places where genocide did not occur despite rapid social dislocation, but as the example of Yugoslavia points out, easily could have.

There are also two other types of interventions missing in Power’s analysis. First, Power does not evaluate cases where the United States military did intervene, ostensibly for “humanitarian” reasons, but the intervention failed to meet the high goals set for it. The current war in Iraq which was partly justified on the grounds of Saddam Hussein’s terrible human rights record, comes immediately to mind. Other examples include twentieth century interventions in the Caribbean (e.g. Haiti and the Dominican Republic), and other areas. Second, while Power discusses at length the lack of intervention during the Rwandan genocide in 1994, she is inexplicably silent about outrages which did not attract the attention of western political interests. The forced march of several hundred thousand Hutu refugees across Congo/Zaire in 1996-98 comes most immediately to mind. This attack by the victorious Rwandan army helped precipitate the killing and wars leading to the deaths of some four million since 1996 a humanitarian catastrophe unmatched since World War II.

Also unexamined in Power’s book is the actual capability of the United States to respond to genocide. At its best, A Promise from Hell is a passionate description of the amoral political and legalistic knots that the United States policy making apparatus ties itself into as genocide emerges. But she avoids specifics about how many troops make a successful intervention force, how are these troops supplied, how nineteen year-old Marines communicate with genocide survivors, or how stable government emerges after intervention. But hers is not a nuts and bolts book. Rather it is a general description of the problem of American political will which she assumes has an almost utopian capacity to project force and command obedience anywhere in the world.

The Limits of Humanitarian Bureaucracies

Where Power is insistent on the appropriateness of US or UN power to solve humanitarian crises, William Easterly is more skeptical. This has more to do with his understanding of international bureaucracies, rather than the justness of a cause. A veteran economist from the World Bank, Easterly now questions the basic premises of large scale efforts by the West to assist the poor, including humanitarian relief operations. As an economist, he emphasizes that foreign aid programs for which beneficiaries cannot provide feedback through either market
mechanisms (i.e. purchasing relief somewhere else if the proffered source is inadequate) or the ballot box (voting out incompetents) are unlikely to efficiently benefit the poor. Humanitarian operations in which a bureaucracy based in New York or Geneva extends protection is likely to be of this nature. Such bureaucracies are primarily responsive to the domestic constituencies which support them through votes and taxes, rather than the foreign poor or potential victims of genocide. He writes that as a result, to fund foreign aid programs, planners often make utopian promises to domestic constituencies who often want “to do good.” As with the nature of all utopias, the actual program inevitably comes up short.

Nevertheless, in the case of Rwanda, Easterly supports the conventional wisdom that military intervention would have mitigated the genocide. Albeit, he does this grudgingly since his overall thesis is that external bureaucracies are unlikely to be effective in responding to a situation with which they are inherently unfamiliar. Preventing the Rwandan genocide may well have worked, but he also notes that the end result would have been an international protectorate which has worked poorly for dealing with issues of economic and political stability in both the colonial (Dutch Indonesia, British India, Belgian Congo, etc) and post-colonial (Haiti, Dominican Republic, Iraq, Serbia/Kosovo, Vietnam, etc) periods.

The Limits of Western Diplomatic and Military Response

Alan Kuperman answers the question of what might have happened in Rwanda had the United States intervened militarily in The Limits to Humanitarian Intervention. Kuperman claims that given the actual political, military, and diplomatic resources of the United States, it is unlikely that a large enough military force could have stopped the genocide. Kuperman’s estimate is made by evaluating both military logistics, and the actual course of the genocide. Under a best case scenario, 15,000 American soldiers could have secured Kigali and rural areas where the genocide occurred. Given the flow of information and logistical capabilities, Kuperman calculates that the operation could have been in place within 40 days, and that as many as 125,000 victims (i.e. 15-20% of an estimated 600,000-800,000) might have been saved.

Kuperman’s thesis has since been challenged by Samantha Power and others who question the dates he used for when President Clinton “could have known and acted” assuming timely and accurate evaluation of available information. The critics indeed may be right. It is clear that President Clinton and others avoided the issue of intervention by resorting to legalism, rather than confronting a criminal act. But this only moves up Kuperman’s “best case” estimate a few days at best, and his central point that the deaths of over 400,000 would have occurred, more than enough to qualify as a major genocide goes unchallenged. The unanswered question throughout is: was this a result of a character deficit specific to President Clinton, or is it embedded in the nature of foreign and defense policy bureaucracies? Critics like Power lean toward the character flaw argument, by explaining that failure to intervene in places like Rwanda is due to a weak-kneed leaders lacking political will. But Kuperman points squarely at the limitations of the bureaucracies themselves. Like Easterly, Kuperman is suspicious of the capabilities of bureaucracies to rapidly analyze complicated field data, assemble a diplomatic and military consensus, and then implement a complex logistical operation.
The Urgent Need to Response in a Difficult Situation

The Canadian general Romeo Dallaire who wrote *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, was the commander of the UN forces assigned to Rwanda beginning in August 1993. As such, he was well aware of logistic issues. Famously, he requested permission to seize weapons brought in by the Rwandan government in a January 1994 fax, but was refused permission by the then-Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Kofi Annan. In April 1994, days after the genocide began, he also requested 5,000 troops in order to quell the killing. This request was also denied by Annan at the behest of the Clinton administration.

Dallaire weaves his personal story with the recent history of Rwanda. He describes well the various personalities involved in the genocide and its aftermath. Revealing are his interactions both with the former government of Rwanda which committed the genocide, and the government established in July 1994 by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) of General Kagame. Dallaire’s affection for his multi-national force is obvious, and he relates the sad story of his post-Rwanda emotional breakdown in an engaging fashion which emphasizes how vulnerable we all are to horror.

As with Power, Dallaire is a proponent of aggressive military engagement in humanitarian catastrophes like Rwanda. And undoubtedly he is right that if his orders had been changed, and reinforcements arrived when he requested them, many lives, particularly in Kigali, could have been saved. Unlike Kuperman though, Dallaire does not dissect the logistics of stationing and supporting troops on short notice in rural Rwanda where so much of the killing took place. This leaves unanswered the more detailed questions about how much force is needed to curb a genocide? Likewise, how credible were threats from an invading army (in this case the RPF under General Kagame), that any intervention would be viewed as a hostile act?

Morality, Ambiguity, and More Utopias

Like Power and Dallaire (and unlike Kuperman), David Rieff’s essays in *At the Point of a Gun* have a strong focus on the morality of humanitarianism and human rights. Rieff describes in detail the emergence of the new humanitarianism, and gives credit to the non-governmental organizations which in the 1980s and 1990s developed the humanitarian imperative to provide aid and comfort to civilian populations. Rieff’s complaint is about the success of this idea. As he points out, humanitarianism has been so successful that western governments, particularly the United States, have co-opted humanitarian advocacy groups (e.g., the Red Cross, IRC, CARE, and UN agencies) which developed the concept in the first place, with lucrative contracts to provide humanitarian aid. The U.S. government now even seeks to provide relief services through private contractors they can control, as in the case of the Iraq and Afghanistan.

Indeed, Rieff repeatedly quotes from U. S. Secretary of State’s Colin Powell’s speech in which he thanked humanitarian NGOs such as CARE for joining the US “combat team” in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. Rieff is particularly skeptical about the role of militaries in stopping human rights violations. He views the use of military force as an inherent affront to humanitarian ideals and is critical of NGOs who assume that they can use militaries to protect
relief operations. In fact, he claims that using the terms “military” and “humanitarian” in the same breath is always a contradiction. Whenever soldiers and humanitarians come into contact, it is military logic emphasizing skills at war, security, and violence which dominate. He cites numerous cases from places like the former Yugoslavia, Kurdistan, Somalia and Afghanistan where such cooperation did not work in the manner planned by humanitarians.

Despite acknowledging that military intervention typically makes a situation worse before it gets better, Rieff is not a pacifist. He supported the use of military in places like Kosovo and Afghanistan where long-term humanitarian good is served by deposing odious governments. Nevertheless, he notes that even in these cases, the use of military power always results in the death of innocents. This results in the ironic assertion that it is sometimes necessary to destroy a place in order to save it.

So Rieff’s contention is not so much with military intervention per se, rather it is with the co-optation of humanitarianism by militaries. Because so much funding and policy making originates from the U.S. State Department, no longer do humanitarian agencies critique policy, or more importantly, independently implement programs reflecting abstract humanitarian principles, as opposed to U.S. foreign policy. After all, if relief is about simply delivering services, why not let a food catering services or building contractor do it? Rieff’s fear is that as cooption occurs, refugees will come to see such agencies not as their protectors, but as representative of foreign policies and even militaries. While undoubtedly refugees would rather be at the mercy of the US foreign policy rather than the Somali, Sudanese, or Rwandan governments, Rieff points out that humanitarian pioneers are nevertheless losing their independence.

A Ground Level View of the Humanitarian Relief Regime

Rare feedback from the beneficiaries of humanitarian aid is provided by Marie Beatrice Umutesi, a Rwandan NGO organizer. In 1996-7 she walked 2000 km. across Zaire with hundreds of thousands of Rwandan Hutu refugees fleeing the new RPF-dominated government. Umutesi provides a moving account of what it meant to be a Hutu refugee in 1994-97 in a variety of refugee camps, and later on the fly as she and her adopted family of women and children fled. Her story is an account of fear, flight and hope — something of a cross between The Diary of Anne Frank, and The Great Escape. But the focus of this review is on her view of international refugee agencies’ policies towards, her and fellow Rwandan refugees.

Umutesi’s view is important because the Hutu refugee population was stigmatized by the UNHCR, U.S. government, and many NGOS, as being less worthy of assistance because Hutu genocidaires genocide lived amongst them. In describing their experience, Umutesi illuminates both the strengths and weaknesses of the humanitarian assistance regime. The refugee relief agencies, convinced that all Hutu refugees were guilty if not of genocide then at least abetting it, extended aid only begrudgingly. Assistance, Umutesi writes, was too little, too late, and distributed with a poor understanding of political conditions. She is also critical of agencies which when faced with security concerns, abandoned refugees during military offensives by Kagame’s Rwandan Army and Congolese rebels. Instead of offering succor, western agencies encouraged forcible repatriation of refugees to Rwanda on flights chartered by the UNHCR. As
reported by Umutesi, encouragement even included offering $10 bounties to Congolese betraying fleeing refugees.

Umutesi’s view of the international humanitarian relief regime is both a hopeful and harsh one. As a refugee, she actively seeks, and sometimes receives assistance from the UN and other agencies. It is clear from her account that she does believe that the assistance provided by CARE, MSF, UNHCR, WFP, and the other agencies are humanitarian entitlements, not charity. Time after time Umutesi’s survival depends not on the international refugee relief regime, but on the generosity of local Congolese and other refugees. In the meantime, the children and women with whom she flees die and disappear in the context of violence, hunger, disease, and exhaustion.

But most of Umutesi’s book is not about the short-comings of the international humanitarian community. Rather it is about the people who helped her. Many of these people are refugees themselves, and Congolese. There are also Europeans. Her heroes are those who fed them and provided a safe place to sleep despite risks to themselves. Her book is a reminder that no matter how fantastic and far-reaching the reach of the international community may be, it is on the ground when people flee that humanitarian assistance is proffered.

An Uneasy Way Forward?

The debate in the humanitarian world today — between the ideals and the real world applications — is an old one. Indeed, classical sociologist Emile Durkheim described it in his essay about the “dual nature of society” as being about the sacred world of shared ideals, and the everyday profane world where people fail to meet their own high standards. Much good advocacy work was done by people like Samantha Power to establish humanitarian ideals, and hold governments accountable at least in the court of public opinion. The success of advocates for human rights like Power and Dallaire is reflected in the range of new agencies and institutions addressing problems previously considered to be internal sovereign matters. Among these are refugee rights, genocide, and mass murder. These ideals are now sacred, and in the very real world of international politics can even sometimes even trump state sovereignty.

Ideals, sacred or not, are always idealistic and utopian. But they are important for orienting bureaucratic action, even if perfection is not always achieved. The problem is that single-minded crusaders pursuing sacred ideals have a natural tendency towards hubris and in the process sometimes even miss humanitarian outrages such as the Congo catastrophe. They are above all moral entrepreneurs specializing in establishing new principles, and not focused on the unintended complications of the policies they advocate. The righteousness of the humanitarian cause is now self-evident, yet they still need people like Alan Kuperman, David Rieff, and William Easterly to remind them that organizations are not only made of ideals, but also of policies, programs and constituencies. These are imperfect institutions which, left to their own devices and without checks, tend to become focused on internal bureaucratic and ideological dynamics, rather than the problem they were designed to address.

The most compelling critique of both the successes and weaknesses of the international refugee relief regime is found in Beatrice Umutesi’s story. Her goal was to seek the assistance...
from the international aid regime to which she was entitled as a refugee. As a refugee, she is aware of the new international norms about her rights against forcible repatriation, and the UNHCR’s responsibility to her. This awareness is a success. The victims of Biafra, Bangladesh, and Cambodia did not share her expectation. Instead it was simply assumed that sovereign governments could treat their citizens without any accountability to the outside world. Beatrice Umutesi and the illiterate Rwandan peasants she fled with in 1996-97 were aware that there was a new ethic in the world to which the humanitarian agencies are accountable. Umutesi is of course repeatedly disappointed and the deaths of her family and friends are the result. This happened because she is both an idealist and acutely aware that humanitarian institutions are unable to achieve high ideals in a profane and imperfect world. The appalling costs of such limitations are very apparent in what she writes. But the hope that this new humanitarian consciousness, which extends even into the remote Congolese forests, should also not be forgotten. This is a victory of the world’s humanitarian activists like Samantha Power, and they should receive credit for it.

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This book is one of many books that have been directed at the American foreign policy in Third World Countries. It attempts to give its readers clear accounts of the U.S. foreign policy in Africa since the end of colonialization. The central objective of the United States foreign policy is to protect the United States’ national interest. Ohaegbulam demonstrates that although the U.S. had no interest in the continent prior to the 1940’s, the threat of the Soviet Union, and the influence that the Soviet Union could wield in the decolonizing African states, was pivotal in how the United States advanced its foreign policy on the continent. Therefore, the U.S. involvement is seen as a response to the Soviet Union’s actions in the African continent.

Ohaegbulam maintains that although the U.S is not the primary sponsor of conflicts in Africa; some of its policies have helped to permeate these conflicts. The exigencies of the United States and former Soviet Union’s contention during the Cold War, and the inefficiency of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now African Union (AU), in conflict resolution, according to the author, exacerbated most of the African conflicts. The book contains ten chapters. The first, which introduces the U.S. role in global politics, provides a conceptual definition of U.S. national security, which is tied to U.S. national interest. Chapter two is an overview of African conflicts since the demise of colonial rule. Ohaegbulam laments the various internal crises that have left Africa in a state of dilapidation.

Chapters three and four address U.S policy in Africa by proxy, as evident in logistical support of America to its European allies who were the colonial powers in Africa. According to Ohaegbulam, the aim of this support through the colonial powers was to suppress “the struggle
for national liberation” (51). However, the events of the Second World War had greatly weakened the economic powers of these colonial countries, such that they could not maintain their grips on their colonies. The Soviet Union and the U.S emerged as the two superpowers produced by the Second World War. The fear of the Soviet Union spreading its communist ideology to Africa, and the fear that Africa might become the Soviet Union’s area of influence; made Africa one of the central focuses of U.S. foreign policy. This was the beginning of the colossal rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in Africa. The U.S. strategy shifted from logistically supporting its Western allies to becoming physically involved in Africa. For instance, one of the first U.S. involvements in Africa was in Ethiopia, in the Horn of Africa. The U.S. marveled at the “Ethiopians’ valor in the Korean War and decided to provide the Ethiopians military assistance. Moreover, the U.S. saw the proximity of Ethiopia to the Middle East as strategic to its interest in the region (55).

In chapters five through eight, which provide the main substance of the book, Ohaegbulam uses four case studies to illustrate the U.S. policy in Africa, with a chapter dedicated to each case study. The case studies are: “U.S. Role in Conflicts in the Horn of Africa” ; “U.S. Role in the Western Sahara Conflict, 1975-2003”; “U.S. Role in the Angolan Conflict, 1975-2002”; and “The United States and the Genocide in Rwanda, 1994.” The succinct presentation of each case by exploring their historical and political themes is the strength of this book. Each of the cases presents a different cultural and political aspect into the evolution of their problems. Ohaegbulam demonstrates that in all these conflicts, the U.S. was a major supplier of weaponry. Most exceptional is the Genocide in Rwanda. As the most powerful nation on earth, the U.S failed to stop the act of genocide from happening partly because of its bureaucratic policy decision- making structure, and largely because of the traumatic experience of the Somalian saga where eighteen U.S. marines were killed in the early 1990s. The picture of the marines that were killed in Somalia haunted the Clinton administration and prevented action in the case of Rwanda (213). In the remaining case studies, the author gives insight into how the U.S. supplied the weapons that were used in these conflicts.

Together, these case studies demonstrate the negative impact of the U.S. involvement in these conflicts on the socioeconomic status of African countries more than a decade past the end of the Cold War. The countries profiled in these case studies are some of the problematic situations that still threaten security in Africa. Chapters nine and ten deal with the formation of an African security force, (African Crisis Response Initiate) inspired by the Clinton administration after the Rwandan failure, to perform peacekeeping mission in the region because it is believed that Africa’s problem would be best solved by Africans.

For political science graduate students, the first chapter of this book can be skimmed over because the message it conveys has been brilliantly done elsewhere (See Wittkopf, Kegley, Jr., & Scott, 2003). This book provides its readers with intrinsic compilation of issues that surround both the internal and external influence on the conflicts in Africa. For its positive contribution to the study of American policy in Africa, Ohaegbulam’s book is somewhat limited by its focus on only the security aspect of the U.S. policy in Africa, thereby ignoring other aspects such as diplomacy and economics.

Another weakness of this book is the occasional repetition of certain ideas. To be fair, in many instances, this weakness is the consequence of the similarities of the U.S. policy in each

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If one wants to understand the Southern African region, one needs to look at the interaction between ‘global entanglements’ and ‘local aspirations’. This is the subtitle and the central message of Janice Love’s book ‘Southern Africa in World Politics’. For the military, political and economic fields she convincingly shows how global involvements influence what happens in the region and that these can have both positive and negative effects. In chapter four on ‘political globalization’ she illustrates the positive effects by pointing at the enormous contributions of the international anti-apartheid lobby to end the white minority regimes in the region. In chapter three and five on military and economic globalization respectively, she shows the negative effects by pointing at the protracted wars in Angola and Mozambique due to cold war world-power meddling and the influence of global neoliberal policies that have as of yet done little to decrease the enormous economic disparities in the region.

These and many other examples of where the global meets the local in Southern Africa are carefully traced through history, whereby Love distinguishes between various phases of globalization, but lays most emphasis on ‘contemporary’ globalization from 1945 to the present. The main questions in the book are whether there is anything distinctive about the contemporary phase versus past phases of globalization and whether the heart of globalization is formed by its economic dimension (pp.14-15). Love believes that the former is clearly proven in the Southern African region because of the intensity and speed with which global-local linkages change and influence one another. Regarding the latter she argues that although “in summary, if judged by the plight of the majority of people, economic interactions across local, regional, and global arena’s on the whole have not served Southern Africa very well” the analysis in her book “shows that globalization is both multidimensional and complex” and one dimension of the phenomenon does not clearly outweigh the others (pp.210-211). And this is probably the strongest point of the book. Although people familiar with the region will find little new information in Love’s book, she does put forth a very balanced picture of events in the
region, showing both the complexity and multidimensionality of globalization in Southern Africa.

The downside of the book is the rather simplistic way in which the theoretical framework is set up and applied, leading almost expectedly to few fresh or new insights in the rest of the book. Love, after Giddens and Held, defines globalization as the way in which “culture, politics, economics, and other social activities are stretched out across boundaries such that ‘events and decisions taking place on one side of the world have a significant impact on the other’” (pp.2-3). As a corollary, globalization is also characterized by localization but this is basically where the framework stops. In a liberal behavioralist tradition, she then analyses and frames all important military, political and economic events in this simplistic format. Love uncomfortably equates localization with ‘African ethnic rivalries’ (p.49), military globalization with a global ‘expanding of organized violence’ in the region (p.64) and argues that post cold war ‘new developments in military globalization’ revolve around disputes within nations (p.66). Moreover, the amount of times whereby inherently political issues are brought back to the mere ‘links between the global, regional and local’ leave the reader wondering whether these links are in the end unavoidable and more or less neutral interactions that have little to do with political ideology or historical inequalities. Admittedly, Love does on several occasions critique ‘neoliberal’ political and economic global entanglements in Southern Africa or the devastating disregard for local lives due to cold war rivalries, but somehow these do not sound convincing as they seem to disappear into the inevitabilities of the links between the global, regional and local. Possibly these points of critique stem from the fact that the book does not draw on a very wide range of literature available on the region. In fact, the book draws heavily on several ‘hot’ authors in the general global governance and globalization debates, such as Rosenau, Held and Sachs and therefore looses out on the more critical and nuanced literature available, especially that from the region itself.

These critiques do not make the book a less worthwhile read, but do impact on the potential audience for the book. As stated before, neither the issues covered in the book nor the viewpoints with which they are approached are new to those familiar with the region. For those unfamiliar with Southern Africa, this book provides a clear introduction to the political and military economy of the region and is therefore ideal for teaching (under-) graduate classes. This is even more so because Love explains all the main concepts encountered in the text and because of the fluidity of her writing. This is an achievement in itself and although it should be taught together with some more critical insights, the book is therefore a welcome contribution to the literature on Southern Africa.

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Getting In is a well-written piece that delivers on its promise of a systematic study of the entry stage of mediation in macro-level African conflicts or wars. A comparative approach is used to make universal claims supported by interpretations of case studies from Rwanda, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, Liberia, Sudan, and the Eritrea-Ethiopia war. The authors use the scholarly literature and media accounts of the events in the targeted areas to describe the background of the conflicts and the attempts to mediate. They also draw on insider information from their contacts and Zartman’s participation in the Congo-Brazzaville mediation effort of the Carter Center.

The book reads like a skillfully done write-up of a positivist research proposal, and it apparently emerged from the doctoral dissertation of Maundi, which was supervised by Zartman. The approach is grounded in concepts associated with Zartman such as the realist paradigm and the hurting stalemate, and Getting In is essentially an extension of his well-known work. A processional framework is used to situate the primary object of study, pre-mediation or initiation of mediation entry, as the first of three stages of international mediation. The second and third phases are issue negotiation and implementation of the agreement.

The authors employ a pragmatic, conflict management perspective. One of their conclusions is that international mediators do not need to change the parties’ zero-sum (win/lose) orientation. The focus is on getting agreements that will reduce, contain, or end ongoing armed conflict. They do not substantively discuss reconciliation or the recent work on conflict transformation and peacebuilding. The core concept is summed up on page 175: “Prospective mediators are motivated by their own self-interests in either initiating entry or accepting an invitation to mediate and parties to a conflict are equally motivated by self-interests in accepting mediation and entry of a particular mediator.” The volume masterfully presents the mainstream, rational choice theory type view prevalent in political science and international relations. The text is effective in illustrating the considerable explanatory power of the utilitarian, interest-based analytical framework for inter- and intra-state conflict.

The narrow focus is beneficial insofar as it makes for a tight, concise discussion. However, a dialogue with relevant Africanist scholarship would have made the work more interesting and broadened the potential readership. The citations are primarily drawn from media reports or policy-oriented scholarship from the northeastern United States. Many other connections could have been made. The Congo-Brazzaville discussion, for instance, could have been linked to the literature on the sociohistorical construction of pathologies of power and Bayart and Chabal’s discussions of (neo)patrimonialism. Africanists might also find some surprises such as the use of the term “tribes” (p. 86) in the context of a discussion that makes much of ethnicity, although it seems to indicate that a fundamentally regionalist and not tribalist cleavage may be a more appropriate characterization of the divisions in Congo-Brazzaville.

Getting In is appropriate for policy-oriented readers interested in political science and the international relations approach to conflict resolution. It should be considered more as a product of those fields than as an example of specialized African Studies as it originated out of...
what Avruch (1998) has called “the generic approach” to conflict resolution. As the authors aver, the conclusions of their comparative study are potentially applicable beyond the African continent. In this regards, several intriguing points mentioned in the case studies could have been given further consideration. It would have been interesting to see greater development of the more innovative aspects of the text such as the discussion of layered mediation (p. 90).

Getting In is not a provocative work likely to make waves or create debates but a very competent and well-organized examination of core concepts in the realist school of international conflict management. The first and final chapters would make good primers for students interested in that subject, and they also offer a nice illustration of the end product of a positivist research project. In fact, these chapters exemplify the scientific approach to research and could be assigned reading for some doctoral students preparing for their dissertations; they present a clear research problem and propose a number of hypotheses which are then addressed in the text.

The authors deserve praise for writing a clear and succinct book geared toward highlighting straightforward, practical lessons of interest to policymakers. As they point out, this is a relatively unexplored topical area; perhaps the next step could be a more creative extension of this substantial work. There are many theoretical issues that could be explored without losing sight of the laudable goal of producing practical insights of potential value to peacemakers. Getting In offers a good foundation and it will be a key reference for subsequent research and literature on the initiation of conflict mediation.

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The subject of the complicity of everyday citizens in the tragedy of the genocide in Rwanda has been thoroughly explored in both scholarly and popular literature. However, the issue of the complicity of churches of all faiths has a particular fascination. In fact, the title of perhaps the most widely read popular account of the genocide, We Wish to Inform you That Tomorrow we Will be Killed with Our Families by Philip Gourevitch comes directly from a letter written from Tutsi victims to the leader of the Adventist church in Mugonero. McCullum’s book deals explicitly with only the religious relationship, including historical context, in Rwanda and is admittedly a journalistic account of such events.

The introduction to the book examines some of the historical myths and details surrounding the Tutsi-Hutu divide in Rwanda and although the information presented in the opening chapters is basic and lacks detail, it is factually sound and makes no attempt to
promulgate the “ancient tribal hatreds” myth often found in journalistic works on the subject. A chapter briefly glosses over the international dimension of the genocide, including arms transfers, training, etc., although once again, it’s short on detail, but long on well-known criticisms of Mitterand’s France and Mobutu’s Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo). The chapter detailing the gruesome anatomy of the genocide criticizes the international community, especially the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), but McCullum avoids the derisive condemnation found in other eyewitness accounts and these have largely been addressed in other, more complex works.

The best elements of this work are the descriptions of the various churches and their behaviors during and immediately following the genocide, as McCullum was a journalist-observer during the actual conflict, and thus provides detailed eyewitness accounts. An interesting note is McCullum’s brief detail of the church’s response to the largely Hutu refugees in Eastern Zaire immediately following the genocide. The meat of McCullum’s work is essentially concerning the Catholic and Protestant (Adventist and Anglican) churches in the country, placing blame on the churches for their inability or unwillingness to help during the genocide especially given the power of the Catholic Church as an institution in the country. The close relationship between Habyarimana’s regime and the Catholic Church is touched on, but not given much explanation. Especially crucial to understanding the church’s behavior is McCullum’s portrayal of the post-genocide meetings of the Presbyterian Church and others examining the church after the events occur. The author attempts to reach an understanding of why the churches failed to respond and his discussion of leadership, problems and solutions is clear, concise and well-meaning. A larger part of the book is actually devoted to the churches’ role in Rwanda post-genocide as opposed to complicity during the event itself. This is somewhat frustrating, as a clearer answer on exactly how entangled the churches, especially the Protestant denominations, were involved in the genocide is missing from the current literature on the subject. A deeper discussion on the relationship between the new Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)-led government and the churches would have added to the quality of the material. McCullum essentially introduces the question of how much the various religions and African governments should collude, but never entirely answers it.

I find a number of things lacking in this account. For one, the sources of actual information are scant and are mostly reports either put out by churches or other non-governmental organizations. While sometimes effective sources, these reports often suffer the burden of bias and subjectivity. The book certainly opens the subject of religious bodies and political conflict up to those casual observers of the genocide, but more seasoned scholars will almost certainly find nothing new in the narrative. While many significant inquiries are raised, both as a matter of general interest and as one worthy of scholarship, their treatment remains unsatisfying. The author poses some interesting questions and seems to suggest answers, but never completes the thought process and investigation behind them. The book’s brief length (121 pages) is indicative of the quality of data given by the book- it provides only minimal coverage. Thus, the book is really meant for the introductory reader into the study of the Rwandan genocide.

However, even given the lack of fine detail and the glossing of historical record, the book challenges us both as scholars and world citizens to probe the way in which we act during tragedy, and ask ourselves to grapple with the notion of religious responsibilities during acts of
violence. This is certainly a thought provoking dilemma, whether one is a scholar investigating religion and politics, a development worker trying to find post-conflict solutions, or simply an interested spectator. McCullum succeeds in presenting an easily digestible, accurate, and accessible account of the events that took place April-July 1994 and the immediate efforts of post-conflict reconciliation involving the various religious entities and the sheer difficulty all parties involved face in doing so. While not necessarily adding to the body of work available on the subject, McCullum certainly helps to survey another component of the genocide in the hopes that through historical dissection and review prevention is possible.

Cara Hauck  
University of Florida


International development agencies suffer no shortage of critics. Fifty plus years removed from the international community’s first efforts to reduce global poverty and lessen the inequality gap between the world’s rich and poor, the agencies involved in this effort have variously been criticized for doing too much, too little, or nothing at all. The large multilateral agencies (i.e. IMF, UN, World Bank), given their central roles in development, have been placed under the greatest amount of scrutiny, most of which has originated outside these institutions.

Craig N. Murphy delivers an illuminating ‘insider’ exposition of one of the most ubiquitous international development agencies, The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which plays a strategic role in the coordination of UN activities in more than 150 countries. While the book was requisitioned by UNDP, Murphy — an academic historian — claims he was given total access to the organization and complete creative independence. Murphy deftly manages to synthesize twenty-two months of extensive research, including hundreds of interviews carried out in more than two dozen countries, into an impressively detailed yet accessible narrative. Although the book’s focus is UNDP, its insights should be generalized to the development industry and internalized by all individuals or organizations interested in development.

Historically, international development agencies favored allocating resources to highly visible projects and the production of glossy reports for public consumption. According to the book, UNDP has taken a different approach to development. Murphy portrays an organization that prefers to operate ‘behind the scenes’, effecting change for which it neither receives, nor seeks, recognition. UNDP’s willingness to work on development issues regardless of geopolitical or ideological considerations and to work closely with aid recipients to custom-design development plans has earned it the title of “the development programme of the developing countries.” The trust and respect developing nations grant UNDP make possible the close working partnerships with governments and organizations so vital to the organization’s success in fostering sustainable development.
Despite good intentions and its position within the UN, however, UNDP, like other development organizations, cannot completely ignore donor demands. Murphy’s analysis reveals the tensions international development organizations face in attempting to appease donors while concomitantly designing sustainable poverty solutions that reflect the input of aid recipients. The two activities are not always compatible, and the traditional power structure of the international system and the interests of nation-states frequently impede UNDP’s development efforts. One of the real strengths of this book is that it provides a rare inside glimpse into the complex problems international development agencies must overcome in order to survive and succeed. Though these organizations often are the objects of (deserved) criticism, Murphy’s candid examination of UNDP reveals that, at times, circumstances force development organizations into compromises that sabotage their efforts.

In the face of the constraints that may act on UNDP within the international system, the structure of the international organization itself is actually much more freeing. In contrast to other more rigidly hierarchical multilateral development institutions, UNDP comprises a loose network of relatively autonomous people and agencies, which allows the organization the flexibility and self-reflectivity necessary to continually innovate and refine its approach to development. The organization’s ability to learn and adapt is evident in its gradual shift from a “development as efficiency” to a “development as freedom” vision of development, in which UNDP’s approach evolved from focusing on technical knowledge transfers to promoting human and political development to alleviate poverty. The organization’s flexibility allowed advocacy issues — such as education, health, the empowerment of women, and democracy promotion — to become the core of its reconstituted agenda. The recognized complexity of development led UNDP in 1990 to create the Human Development Report, which charts global and national progress for a set of indicators related to people’s capacities to direct their own lives. These annual reports have broadened the definition and focus of development and transformed the funding allocations of nearly all development agencies away from economic growth and efficiency toward poverty reduction and social welfare.

While UNDP has been criticized for working too closely with authoritarian governments or for supporting the austere measures of the World Bank and IMF, Murphy portrays the UNDP as an organization that recognizes the efficacy of a pragmatic and incremental approach to development. UNDP operates as a ‘venture socialist’ that opens political space, empowering local advocacy groups while simultaneously weakening the intolerance and resistance of repressive regimes. UNDP seeks to strengthen marginalized groups and individuals so that they develop the capacity to challenge the Bretton Woods institutions. In short, UNDP recognizes that it can effect greater change by operating within the status quo than it could if it disengaged completely.

Despite Murphy’s praises of institutional innovation, critics of international development agencies will undoubtedly find evidence here to support their claims as well. For his part, Murphy identifies UNDP’s shortcomings along with its strengths. He notes that at various times throughout its history UNDP has suffered from bureaucratic incompetence, inefficiency, and shortsightedness. It has initiated ill-advised projects that failed. Even though its structure as a ‘loose’ network has allowed it to learn and adapt, UNDP has on occasion suffered from
organizational insularity and the desire to control information, often at the expense of organizational learning.

Yet while Murphy dutifully records both the good and bad associated with UNDP’s efforts, glaringly underrepresented in this otherwise impressive historical narrative is the story of UNDP told from the perspective of its supposed beneficiaries. Murphy relies on the archival record, secondary literature, and interviews with individuals associated with UNDP, and largely neglects the voices of aid recipients. What Murphy sterilely recounts as mistakes contributing to UNDP’s learning process have had very real consequences for those the organization intended, but failed, to assist. Failure to account for these human costs lends the book an overall feel of championing UNDP. Throughout the book it is obvious — Murphy even acknowledges this explicitly — that he is a believer in the organization’s vision of development. The book’s contribution would have been greater had Murphy included the viewpoints of aid recipients and let readers arrive at their own conclusions concerning the effectiveness and appropriateness of the organization’s vision of development.

This shortcoming notwithstanding, Murphy delivers an impressively well written account of the challenges and opportunities faced by one of the world’s leading development agencies. At its core, this book is a story about human agency operating within the context of the constraints and opportunities created by the structures of a bureaucratic organization and the international system. It is the story of the trials and tribulations of well-intentioned individuals hoping to make the world a more equitable place. Like all humans, and like all organizations, they have made mistakes. “These compassionate and hopeful men and women did things over sixty years that were sometimes triumphantly brilliant and, at other times, horribly foolish, even if motivated by impeccable intentions.” The real gauge of organizations like UNDP may be not whether they can foster democracy or eradicate inequality, but rather, whether they can improve “a situation that otherwise would have been worse.”

Joseph Kraus
University of Florida


Everything about the Sudan seems anomalous: A peculiar name (country of the Blacks), an exceptionally vast and oddly located country with little human and natural resources and a complex identity torn between black Africa and the Moslem Arab world. Stereotypes about the Sudan, its language, its people, its African backwardness and Arab culture of racism and violence, which still endure, add to the bleak picture of the Sudan. What is happening in Darfur today unfortunately reinforces these not new and negative perceptions of the Sudan.

This scholarly work, which deals with the socio-political history of the Sudan during the Anglo-Egyptian rule, a period also labelled the Condominium period, is a major contribution to
the imperial history of the region. This book, however, is much more about the British experience in the Sudan than the life of the Sudanese.

This pictorial history of the period offers us live images of the empire thanks to an impressive collection of photographic sources on the British Sudan from 1896 to 1956. The Durham Collection of photographs (together with the Sudan Archives Photographic Collection) is unique since it was never intended for publication. Yet, the authors’ adequate choice of the photos and the way they illustrate the themes under cover, cast no doubt about their value as reliable historical sources of the period. Hogan and Daly’s photographs tell us a great deal of the history of the British Empire in the Sudan, but in a different way. Very much like written sources, photographic sources settle controversies; illustrate key events; depict people and places; describe the famous and the powerful. Two significant criteria seem to have dictated the choice of the 303 photos of the book: their recording something of interest and their sense of time and place and what would represent it; including the interplay of change and continuity.

This copious photographic record is all the more important since it raises questions about the intellectual curiosity not only of the photographer but also of those who were photographed. Very few among these seem to have bothered writing about the country they ruled, the society around them, and the local culture and daily life of the Sudanese. Not one single photograph tells something about the Sudanese culture and society: a local wedding, a funeral, a meal, a mosque or a local tribe. These imperial images which clearly support racial and cultural biases towards the Sudan and Africa by extension, nevertheless, should not be seen in isolation and can in fact be instrumental in analysing and criticizing these imperial stereotypes.

Eleven short but highly documented and thoroughly discussed chapters (with the exception of the lengthy and historically loaded introduction) followed by an appropriate selection of photographs to illustrate the chapter’s theme structure the book. The themes include the British departure to the Sudan and its mixed emotions, the North-South wide divide and their radically different fortunes, the development of the railways, the colonial architectural heritage left to the Sudanese, British leisure pursuits in the Sudan, and British women and their roles. All revolves around British rule, its grandeur; its ceremonial aspect and its achievements as well as around what the British used to do even when those activities were idle. The Egyptians, who co-ruled the Sudan with the British during the Condominium and who financed most of the infrastructures in the Sudan are belittled and almost excluded from this illustrated history.

This book is, of course, about a colonial encounter, which, in reality, did not take place and when it did, it was then largely fraught with dangers of misunderstanding, misinterpretations and misimpressions. The photographic sources tell us in fact more about the coloniser than about the colonised, partly because it is the coloniser who took the photos. It is also because the colonised was absent, irrelevant, subsidiary, passive and subordinate. He was almost everything the coloniser was not or did not embody. The backward local values could not match the enlightened and civilized colonial ones. In the encounter, the colonised is nothing but an alien.

The nature of relationships between the British and the Sudanese was crystal clear, one of superiors and subordinates. The British command, control, act, teach and guide, while the
Sudanese learn, imitate and obey. This is reflected not only in the public photography of the Condominium era, the official source, but even in the more personal photos taken by British officials, the administrative staff, missionaries, engineers, teachers and other British residents. Both kinds of photos emphasize those values which seemed most useful in justifying the British presence in the Sudan and maintaining British control such as military strength, order, ritual, the love of adventure and danger, the sense of sacrifice and achievement. The photos include the identity of the British but not the Sudanese. Many of these photos need no comment indeed. They relate all the story of the civilizing mission undertaken by the British in what was regarded as an out-of-the-norm continent.

This collection of imperial images of the Sudan has shown that the strong barrier of colonial mentality prevented positive interactions across races and cultures. Even in the Northern Sudan, where most of the British and Sudanese reside, work and therefore interact, opportunities for friendship even among the elites after more than half a century of colonial encounter were superficial and easier in theory than in reality.

This is an extra good reference for the historian and student of Africa and African colonialism. It highlights the richness of photographic sources for the understanding and analysis of British colonial rule in the Sudan. The photographic record can also be of great interest to those with a fancy for historical photos.

Adel Manai  
*Université Tunis El Manar*


*Displacement Risks in Africa: Refugees, Resettlers and Their Host Population* is a compilation of studies that were initially presented at the conference, “Multidimensionality of Displacement Risks in Africa,” held in Kyoto, Japan, in 2002. Itaru Ohta and Yntiso D. Gebre have brought together articles from the conference in this volume with the aim of analyzing the major causes of displacement, the groups at risk of displacement and strategies for countering these risks in Africa. Ranging from literature reviews to specific case studies, this book attempts analysis of an extremely broad and complex issue. Yet, it lacks an adequate framework of analysis or structure that would assist the reader in connecting the common threads of analysis.

The result is a book that contains a collection of articles that are at times fascinating for their research methodology, thematic focus or unique policy-relevant findings. However, as an overall volume, the book fall short of the aims outlined in the introduction, while the shortcomings are made all the more glaring by the strong statement in the introduction that the book “conceptually qualifies” as one of only three studies that “promote comparative analysis of displacement experiences” (9). Despite including the impacts of displacement on groups who have been “largely underestimated or neglected by donors, mainstream development
researchers, and policy makers” (9), the volume fails to capitalize on this focus and draw firmer theoretical analysis from some of the threads of commonality that emerge through the articles.

In the introduction of the volume, Ohta and Gebre advocate for a shift from a focus on ‘forced migration,’ or indeed, specialized sub-fields of study including refugee studies, disaster studies or resettlement research, claiming that such “compartmentalization of sub-fields [has] prevented cross-boundary communication and knowledge sharing” (8). As such, they suggest a focus on displacement as a concept, rather than migration, arguing that the concept of displacement is “more holistic and integrative than most other terms” (1). Having provided this interesting and important conceptualization however, very few of the articles make any reference to this shift, making it seem as though it is simply a change in nomenclature mentioned in the introduction, rather than a substantive shift in understanding that could actually shed light on the impacts of various forms of displacement on diverse risk groups.

Moreover, the actual structure of the volume – divided into three sections, each addressing issues separately that the editors claim have strong commonalities – undermines the claims that displacement can be understood more holistically. Overall, it is the truncated structure of the book which lessens the potential for the reader to believe that the individual contributions of the articles can together be understood to answer some of the questions posed in the introduction. This is not as much a failing of the articles themselves, but is due to a lack of a cohesive feel to the volume, which does not have concluding comments for each separate section or an overall concluding chapter.

One particular strength of the book is the policy focus that the researchers provide. Beginning with Crisp’s analysis of the challenges of protracted refugee situations in Africa, many of the authors provide throughout their chapters recommendations and reflections for policy action. These proposals range from Schmidt-Soltau’s argument for a shift in the current paradigm of conservation that often leads to displacement, to analysis of post-repatriation land problems in Rwanda, to Willems’ suggestions for an urban refugee policy in Tanzania that could facilitate greater protection and enable refugees to access livelihood strategies. As such, this policy focus is where the breadth of the volume becomes a strength rather than a liability. It provides insight into a range of seemingly intractable issues, and encourages thinking that connects the policy challenges across a range of these issues.

The title of the book also implies a strong focus on risk, which actually only becomes a substantive focus in the sixth article by Michael M. Cernea entitled “Concept and Method: Applying the IRR Model in Africa to Resettlement and Poverty.” The IRR model outlines the eight major risks associated with displacement. Cernea’s article provides a detailed literature review of examples where the IRR model has been used to analyze issues relating to displacement, and the model is then drawn on in a number of the following articles. However, given the article only comes halfway through the volume, it does not adequately frame the previous articles.

Moreover, one question that surfaces in reading Cernea’s reserved optimism about the power of the IRR model in providing a framework for mitigation of resettlement risks is the dissonance with the findings in the later articles. For example, de Wet’s analysis of dam-induced resettlement in Africa finds that regardless of a necessary legal framework, resettlement policy and financing, these safeguards cannot “be seen as sufficient conditions for
successful resettlement” (277). However, Cernea’s argument – despite his admission that reconstruction has rarely happened in the majority of cases of development-induced displacement – is that risk analysis can be a tool “to make development sounder, more beneficial, by anticipating and preventing risks” (214). In fact, for Cernea, the IRR model can be used to make resettlement a cause of poverty reduction, and has the potential to become “itself one of the roads upon those affected could step towards poverty reduction is writ large” (241). The tension between Cernea’s position and the empirical findings in other chapters is not adequately explored, and would make an interesting point of departure for debate and analysis.

This volume addresses an important development challenge, which relates to a broad range of contemporary processes and dynamics in Africa, including increasing investment in infrastructure and industrialization, conflict and conservation. As such, the policy analysis that can be drawn from the chapters individually will be useful and interesting for scholars, policymakers and students alike. The volume could have been vastly improved by a stronger emphasis on the theoretical shift advocated in the introduction and a structure that lends itself to understanding the linkages proposed by the editors. If Cernea’s IRR model is the proposed framework of analysis, it should not have only been examined halfway through the book, and some critical analysis of the framework would have been useful.

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**Fipa Families: Reproduction and Catholic Evangelization in Nkansi, Ufipa, 1880-1960.**

This eloquent and succinct study skillfully explores intimate relationships between Catholic White Father missionaries and Fipa people living on the coast of Lake Tanganyika in Tanzania. Rather than try to discuss the wide range of interactions between Fipa and missionaries, the author concentrates on the themes of family life, generational and age expectations, and tensions between African and European priests, lay people, and nuns within the mission. Many of the typical concerns of scholars examining missionaries in colonial Africa receive little coverage here, especially spiritual beliefs. However, Smythe wisely warns her readers that her topic is family history rather than religious change writ large (p. xiv). And, if one looks at this study for what it intends to do rather than what it leaves out, it succeeds admirably.

After sketching out the influential position of White Father missionaries after their arrival in Ufipa in the late nineteenth century and their close links to German and British colonial authorities, the author examines the mission as an alternative site of socialization for young people. Other scholars have discussed the role of missions in operating settlements for former slaves, maintaining health care, and serving as a potential place of refuge for women. Creatively, Smythe discusses Fipa understandings of childhood and the process by which children slowly learn gendered tasks and behaviors en route towards adulthood. These
developments do not stay trapped in the prison of the ahistorical ethnographic present; the study follows individuals born in different generations over the course of the colonial period. The hopes of Fipa individuals and their extended families became tightly linked to the White Fathers by the 1920s, as the missionaries were the only providers of European-style education in the region.

Missionaries sought to persuade Fipa people that many Fipa social practices actually could be remade in a Catholic context, even though they urged Africans to abandon some of their older ways of socialization, such as communal sleeping arrangements for older children. Many Fipa accepted these terms, although members of the first generations that encountered Catholic clergy in Ufipa preferred to allow their own children to be educated and baptized rather than doing so themselves. However, tensions within families and between Fipa and missionaries emerged over who would be educated and how long children were to be allowed to stay in school. Many families wished to only allow some boys to stay in school for long periods to keep other young people close to home to support their families. At boarding school, children developed new academic knowledge and cultural capital that could later use to develop a career as well as entering an alternate form of socialization with different gendered expectations. The mission became understood as an alternate family, instead of a family always opposed to local kin obligations.

The last two chapters consider the intimate relationships of African clergy with their Fipa families and their European colleagues. This discussion is by far the best discussion of the challenges of African Catholic priests, nuns, and catechists in a colonial context that this reviewer has ever had the pleasure of reading. Fipa clans and European missionaries both sought to produce successful adults through education. However, missionaries wanted to create celibate priests and nuns while Fipa families wished for young people to marry and have children. Through archival research and life histories of two Fipa nuns, Smythe reviews the tensions caused by racial discrimination, family obligations, and troubles within the church hierarchy in the lives of both Fipa clergy and those who decided to not enter or remain in clerical life.

This book would make for an excellent addition to undergraduate courses on African Christianity and Catholicism in a global context. Its brevity and skillful prose will be a good fit for the classroom. It also is a good model for potential authors to follow in its unwillingness to stray from its central theme, to the point it even eschews such fashionable topics as sorcery and witchcraft. Unlike some other recent work on Tanzanian Catholicism that is more slanted against missionaries, especially the work of Maia Green, Smythe never dismisses the goals and views of her European subjects.

However, there are some issues that could have been clarified a bit. This study does not seem to distinguish between Africans living close to the mission with those Africans in outlying areas who only engaged with missionaries during rare visits or when they traveled to the mission. There are no direct references to archival sources in German that might have provided information on the pre-1914 period. Labor migration and the attractions of the coast do not get much attention here, despite the key role they had on other inland communities in Tanzania. Finally, the spiritual lives and concerns of Fipa laypeople and clergy never come into view: an
odd absence to find in a work that spends so much time on African clergy. Despite these minor issues, this book deserves a wide reading.

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